

# **OLD WAYS, NEW SITES: POWER & PRIVILEGE AT A NEPALESE WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT PROJECT**

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## **I. Introduction**

In a recent paper on Women in Development, Pradhan and Shrestha (1983) point to the way Nepalese women have been by-passed by many development projects. Since project organizers, in their view, have operated on western assumptions about the dichotomy of domestic and outside production, presuming that women are merely involved in the household, the projects have therefore concentrated on men, and foreground the point that there are few projects specifically geared to fulfil objectives for women. Such projects when they are devised then become significant.

Our focus is on one of these projects. We have several major objectives. First of all we want to detail the specific features involved in the organization, that is, attempt to indicate how the scheme works on the ground, and provide an outline of certain features of the personnel, that is give a profile of the overall composition in terms of age, sex, caste and education. But in addition to this we are concerned to draw out the sociological implications of the arrangements identifying how the patterning relates to the outside social relations, whether disjoined or repeating these; as well as indicating how this particular kind of organization has certain repercussions for the people concerned.

Though many of the people we spoke with assumed that we would be involved in formulating future policy, to our mind this would be presumptuous. Our major concern is to identify certain discontinuities and continuities in this new form at the local level of relations.

The focus of the study, a Nepalese development scheme expressly devoted to women has been in existence for a comparatively long time - over twelve years. In a sense it wouldn't be inaccurate to say that the current project is running on the momentum established by the nine years of effort of a past director and her team since they steered the project through the difficulties of trial-and-error that come at the initial stages of any inventory venture. Of course this is not to imply that the new team hasn't made its own input. Nor is it to say that matters are static and that no changes have occurred since that time. But it is to point to the fact that certain general objectives of policy and the procedural measures geared to effect these were determined in the earlier phase of operation and to a large extent continue. Both the official documentation and the promotional information explicitly state that providing women on low income with skills for income generation is one of the main purposes of the project. The measures adopted to effect this have been through the utilization of Nepalese traditional crafts making goods with appeal to foreigners and locals. The principal products of the project are:

A handwoven cloth on which traditional designs are printed using a traditional wood printing technique; the resulting cloth is fashioned into tablecloths, cushions, bags, and bedcovers, garments and the like and; costumed dolls modelled on the wide range of ethnic groups in Nepal and number of other similar handcrafted novelties.

In this regard what has been particularly significant is the revitalization of certain crafts (like block printing and weaving) that were on the verge of becoming defunct or were being threatened by the quality finished products made by industrial machines. Through aiming to produce marketable items, the administrators hope to make the project self-sufficient in the long-run though recognizing that government support and especially funding from foreign aid are necessary to keep the project viable at present. This important area of funding and the involvement of outside agencies (whether Nepalese or foreign) will not be considered here. Our main concern as we said before is with the institution's operation and the implications flowing from this.

### Main Features of the Organisation's Structure

The Women's Development Project (W.D.P.) consists of a total of 47 persons, four of whom are located at Pulchok several kilometres away from the centre of production and administration, located at Lazimpat. Pulchok functions only as a sales outlet and as a centre for training women in machine sewing some of whom may subsequently be employed in productions at Lazimpat. Apart from being the site for production and the administrative centre of the W.D.P., Lazimpat also acts as a sales outlet of the various goods it produces. For details concerning each of the members of the organisation and profile of the organisation as a whole (to be discussed in section III) see the chart attached to the end of this paper. In the present section we want to draw attention to the way the organisation of the project is structured in terms of the sociological dimensions of power and privilege. This may be diagrammatically depicted as follows:-

<b>1. Top Management:</b>	- Director (1)	
	- Deputy Director - (1)	= 4 persons
	- Secretary/Accountant - (1)	
	- V.S.O. officer - (1)	
<b>2. Middle Management</b>	- Trainer - (1)	
	- Supervisor - (3)	= 6 persons
	- Salesperson - (2)	
<b>3. Producers:</b>	- Skilled workers involved in the actual production of goods (e.g., machinists, cut block printers)	= 34 persons
<b>4. ancillary Staff:</b>	- Unskilled workers involved in servicing only (e.g. peon)	= 3 persons
	<b>Total</b>	<b>= 47<sup>1</sup></b>

It is evident from our schematic representation that like most organisations in the field of commodity production, the structure is hierarchical. The line of command, however, is in some aspects, not typical of such organisations because unlike many other organisations in this field, the W.D.P. straddles both the public and private sectors of commodity production. This is most clearly manifested at the top management level.

First of all, it is important to note that the W.D.P. does not operate in isolation but rather it is anchored to certain bodies of the Nepalese government structures. Since the project comes under the rubric of the Nepal Women's Organisation (N.W.O.) and since it was the President of that wider organisation who appointed the current director of the W.D.P. then the project as a whole stands as an integral part of the larger government organisation. Moreover, since it is imperative that the project's director be recruited from the ranks of the Nepalese Civil Service, the project in turn, is also articulated with that component of the Nepalese government structures. In addition, insofar as the project depends largely on foreign aid, this places it even more decisively into the orbit of the Nepalese government's control. Yet, the project is expected to function like any other commodity production enterprise and compete in a market situation against independent competitors located in the private sector of production.

What is of relevance for our purposes here is that this interdigitation of the project and the governmental agency of the N.W.O. has implications that lead to a consideration of the question of authority. Since the director is accountable to the president of the N.W.O, it is clear that the director's position is not totally autonomous. At least in theory, this kind of arrangement allows for the possibility of constant intervention from the top, so to speak, though admittedly a lot would depend on the particular orientation of the persons concerned. Even so the authority structure allows for this interference.

It goes without saying that this bureaucratic feature is also present in the organization of the project's personnel. It appears even more blatantly with the workers at the level of production. Their autonomy is pretty minimal, limited to the way they execute their particular tasks yet in other matters, they are beholden to follow the orders from the top. While the expectation of obedience to authority is typical of usual organizational structure and might be seen as hardly warranting comment, nonetheless it is important since it becomes highly problematic in the context of disputes.

What we think significant here is that the structure privileges those with authority. In the case of the director, final say lies with the president of the N.W.O. whereas in the case of the workers, it lies with the director. With such structuring of authority the junior member in either relationship is provided with no outside place of appeal and arbitration when controversy arises. To take hypothetical case: on the one hand should the president of the N.W.O. instruct the director say to deploy a batch of goods: so that she, the

president can make an impressive gift to some important dignitary but on the other hand the director finds the instruction unacceptable since this would delay an export order by several months, there isn't much that the director can do except adhere to the instructions, albeit reluctantly. It is likely that in the latter's estimation the former's demands constitute a misuse of authority. Yet the president could stand by her decision, justifying the prestation in terms of publicity and goodwill. Then again a similar controversial situation could arise but in this context in a dispute between the directors and the workers where the latter find the director's rulings undesirable. This could happen say with the director's imperative that the producers start work on time and if not they should be penalized by the docking of their pay according to the time lost, or even being sent home and so having to forfeit the day's earnings. For that part the workers might find the director's insistence on promptness inflexible and lacking any understanding of the kind of transport difficulties which apply in the city. Rather than be polarized through loss of monies they may prefer to make up their time. On the other hand, the director could think that her ceding flexibility here might lead to a cavalier disregard for promptness and that the only way to ensure this is by resorting to such stern measures. As with the other hypothetical case it is of course the superior's decision which will prevail here in this or any other controversial issue.

But what needs to be foregrounded is that the bureaucratic necessity for authority to prevail can sometimes be counter-productive. The authority structure (which privileges the superior's authority in issues which are not exactly clear cut) can obviously have repercussions for the smooth operation of the enterprise. Obviously so because it opens up the possibility by prompting resentment, discouraging co-operation and inciting an orientation of intractability.

Yet the complications are not inevitable. It isn't simply the case that in controversial matters the senior person must stand as final authority since there are alternatives for settling disputes. One is arbitration from some separate, independent agency. Another is use of some kind of collaborative decision-making procedure. While to be sure litigation of any sort, the holding of discussions geared to obtain some kind of consensus, can assuredly be time consuming, they can also encourage factionalism and so provoke other problems. Yet it is also important to hear in mind that this need not necessarily be the case and a lot would depend on how the dispute selling activity was arrange. The disadvantage in allowing matters to stand as they are, is that the junior in any dispute could feel that there is no possibility for obtaining "justice". Where as there could be great benefits

accruing from procedures where all members, even those low in the hierarchy were involved in the decision-making processes. We'll turn to this issue again.

Another observation can be made about the organizational features. It would seem that hierarchical structuring of the personnel is directly related to the nature of their job functions. As elsewhere and obviously it is the administrators (those who make the decisions, carry responsibility for others and to whom the producers are accountable both for their behaviour while working and for their products) who stand high in the rank order of personnel; and it is those who are making something and who only have responsibility for themselves who stand as juniors. Put crudely those who produce stand at the lower levels, those who make decisions for other, stand at the top.

As for the supervisory positions. Those who are neither administrators nor producers are allocated to a level intermediary between those. At this level, the personnel fulfil two functions. The supervisors and teachers (at Pulchok) import their knowledge of sewing and check that the trainees have learnt these skills. The assistant supervisors of the store (Lazimpat) by keeping checks on the stock to be used which is finally transformed into finished goods, fulfils a surveillance function. While the assistant supervisor of production (Sewing Section) by allocating the specific items to be manufactured by the producers regulates the amount of materials to be used and in this sense is also involved in surveillance. Therefore it might be said that here too standing in the personnel hierarchy is linked to the nature of the job function: middle level management appears to rest on the surveillance function of the job.

The general patterning then tends to conform to that usually found in any bureaucratic organisation whether in government or commercial fields. Therefore though a NWO project there is not much that distinguishes this particular organization from these others.

However it is worth mentioning that this is not the only possibility. After all projects of this nature could be organized on a co-operative basis however this is not to deny the point that a co-operative concern might not be feasible under Nepalese conditions. It might not be possible because of customary practices. It is well established in the anthropological literature that rank ordering characterizes several basic indigenous structures (like those of kinship, age and gender) where obedience and deference to the particular senior person is the expected mode of orientation to be accorded by the

junior. Nevertheless an enterprise utilizing a co-operative means in decision-making processes might work. If it did it could also have advantageous repercussions, especially by encouraging each person's commitment to the project's success and their personal identification with it. The significant point here is that one will not know whether a co-operative project in the Nepalese context is viable or not unless the method is tried. These observations would apply not only to the producers, assistant supervisors and the top echelons in administration but also to other workers involved in the assortment of services. Be that as it may.

Of concern here is the nature of the patterning. What is significant about the standing of sales person is that they appear to be located higher in the hierarchical structure than the craft workers. The fact that the saleswoman at Pulchok was previously a teacher and continues to draw the same salary (see chart) testifies to this possibility. Perhaps the relevant criterion here is the required qualification in literacy and numeracy. The salesman at Lazimpat is especially highly qualified, being a graduate. If that is so it is the educational achievements which cede such people their particular status and emolument.

Of course not all servicing personnel obtain such advantageous conditions. It is the people undertaking the straightforward manual tasks, like ironing and washing, who are located somewhat low in the hierarchical structure.

Then there are the other ancillary members of the personnel who stand somewhat outside the formal structuring (watchman).

As for the other positions and despite a number of complications, we think that the overall status patterning falls into three distinct overall categories. On the one hand there are the senior administrators along with those juniors to them like the teachers and the salespersons. Next there are those who make things, the producers. At the bottom are those manual workers who are not making objects but merely treating them by washing and ironing. It seems to be an invariable feature that such personnel get a lowly rank, even though their services are just as essential to the productions as the others. Though invariable it is, needless to add, not inevitable.

Before winding off this section, we want to turn to a policy of the NWO regarding the mode of appointment and consider how this has bearings on the director's management and exercise of power. Not only is the Director

appointed by the president of the NWO but so is her second-in-charge the Deputy Director, as mentioned before. This patterning of appointments apparently is a characteristic feature of the Nepalese/(civil) Service.

While it might appear a simple matter it is perhaps not the case since this mode of appointing senior people carries possibilities that many negatively affect the director's control, the person responsible for the project's operation. What this outside mode of appointment means in effect is that the second-in-charge, like the director, also has a direct connection with the ultimate authority-source, in this case the president of the NWO. Therefore the authority of the officer-in-charge, the director of the project is mitigated by this extra tie of her assistant since hers is not the sole connexion with the authority-source. This arrangement has repercussions that we'll come back to shortly. Of relevance here is the fact that had it been the director who had appointed here second-in-charge then some kind obligation on the latter's part would have eventuated as is customary according to the Nepalese cultural mores. However with the appointment coming from the outside, as it did in this circumstance, there is no necessity for the deputy to feel loyal and obligated to the director on this particular score. In short, the director's ability to evoke a sense of obligation from her assistant is accordingly mitigated. That possible foreclosure of obligation is one possibility affecting the director's control over her staff.

There is also another way of viewing the effects of this mode of appointment. While the director's command is mitigated, by this kind of bureaucratic procedure, the president's position can be advantaged. Specifically speaking this mode of appointing the two senior positions is of a kind which can operate towards the central agency's (president of the NWO) retention of some kind of control even though authority has been delegated. Not only does the president gain an ally at the site and one who belongs to the senior administration ranks but this in turn also opens up the possibility of the assistant undertaking surveillance, should the president find it necessary and desirable. In other words the machinery for checking on the enterprise's no. 1 (the director) can also be established by the dual appointment mode and accordingly countervail the president's loss of immediate control that comes with delegation.

Let us try and bring these points together. We have noticed that this mode of appointing senior staff can effect favouring the president's authority to the director's cost: if both women in the project are beholden to the president for their appointments, that person gains two loyalties and not just



the one as with the case of a single appointment; but at the same time the director's internal power over her staff is concomitantly curtailed when the appointment of her deputy is not made by her. The arrangements than are of a kind which allow for the possibility of preventing the director's total and easy consolidation of power while the outside authority (the president) can maintain its presence within in the form of the ally, (the second-in-charge, the assistant). Such significant consequences and their possibilities however depend on the establishment of a simple structuring of alignments. Instead of establishing a straightforward hierarchical chain of command and loyalty (going from the president to the director and then from the director to the next level) such arrangements merely articulate two sets of dyadic links to pinnacle (director to president, deputy-director to president also). Perhaps that is why this mode has been a characteristic practice of traditional Nepalese bureaucracy in the past where the state sent its official to take charge of areas outside the centre.<sup>2</sup> The practice of having a second man on the spot with a direct connexion to the centre and obliged to it (the centre) could serve the centre's favour if that person acted accordingly. Of course there is no guarantee that the deputy will actually act accordingly but the presence of such a mechanism does open up the space for this to happen.

There were probably sound reasons why this standard mode of appointing both of the senior personnel was practised in the past. Considerations of the problems of central surveillance and control prompted by inadequate and slow communications across vast distances probably played a role in the Nepalese state's implementation of this practice. Putting the matter crudely this bureaucratic procedure could have been a necessary part of a mechanism of surveillance facilitating the implementation of surveillance by the junior person on the senior. The former would not have been constrained by niceties of loyalty to the person immediately in charge. However irrespective of the mode's origin and its bureaucratic effectiveness in the past, it seems to us that in current circumstances it demands close scrutiny. In fact in our consideration the method can undercut the director's ability to administer effectively and render her authority somewhat delicate.

Let's take a hypothetical example, a situation where there is disagreement between these two senior women personnel. It entails a situation where the deputy wants to do "X" but the director disapproves yet the deputy goes her own way. The channel that is usually available via the bureaucratic procedure is that where the Director of the enterprise takes the matter to the ultimate authority, in this case the President of the N.W.O.

What makes it difficult for the director to act decisively is uncertainty of the outcome of this procedure. It is hardly a straightforward matter since there are two possible negative repercussions that could arise if the woman-in-charge did take action. Even raising the problem with the President is somewhat hazardous for the director since the president might take the complaint as a criticism of her judgment - after all it was she who selected the second-in-charge. Or then again, the fact of the director's having to bring there internal dispute to the outside authority could be taken as an indication of her own incompetence in controlling her staff - in fact negatively reflecting back on herself.

Therefore as far as the director is concerned not taking any action at all might be assessed as preferable. At least it has the advantage of keeping the problem contained within the project site and avoiding exposures to the uncertainties that action of this kind might propel.

But in turn this however can have repercussions for the smooth running of the enterprise. Of course what this means is that the conflict between the director and her deputy remains unresolved, allowing the junior member to go her own way with impunity.

This eventuality, should it arise, of course has wider implications. It propels a situation where the director cannot readily act in a manner that she thinks desirable in getting maximum efficiency from the women for whom she the director, is responsible in her position as director.

To our way of thinking it is the particular mode of appointment in the context of the matter of responsibility that especially needs to be closely examined. If the director does not have total authority over all the personnel (including her second-in-charge) yet at the same time is held totally responsible for the management and success of the project, then the viability of her position is seriously undermined. And accordingly so is the operation of the project itself.

While we have just examined one particular relationship and difficulties that may arise when the maneuverabilities of the person in charge of the running of the enterprise is constrained by certain arrangements: and earlier also considered the complications that also accrue by virtue of ultimate control residing outside, it is now necessary to return to a theme that relates to the producers and one partly touched on before.

One of the most important general observations that can be made by scrutinizing the listing of job functions is the high degree of separate specialization. On the whole the worker operates piece-meal, each doing her/his own particular task. To our way of thinking this has important repercussions. To be sure working at the project does undoubtedly provide the women concerned with particular skills and skills that enable them to earn monies. However, given the stress on job specialization the worker can only but remain a specialist in that arena. Therefore it is of limited benefit since a woman's maneuverability on the job market is facilitated by being trained in a number of skills and not just one.

Such a set up therefore militates against the possibility that those women with only specialized craft skills to improve on their position. Without a scheme of extensive in-service training at the site there is no opportunity to extend expertise and accordingly the producers and workers have little opportunity for lateral job mobility (Mazumdar, 1982). Let alone more ambitious possibility of establishing and running their own enterprise, should any of them want to and should they be able to gain a access to funds to do so. Given these features it means that most producers are likely to remain producers, dependent on the project (or like agencies) rather than move out and create spaces for other woman and rather than open their own business in comparable enterprises and there by create jobs for other woman. In short such arrangements do not have a momentum for expansion. While this is important especially from the perspective of "development", there is another implication following from the project's operation which is significant from the perspective of women's issues.

Not only are the jobs highly particularized but they are also hierarchies effecting discrete job functions. This means, as we mentioned earlier, that the craft producers and manual workers are separated from administration and the concomitant planning and decision-making processes. Though the project does provide opportunity for these women to learn skills for income-generation a point that we cannot emphasize too often, the project's organizational arrangements nonetheless keep such women in the subservient position. In other words the arrangements maintain inequalities of these women vis-a-vis the more advantaged women, as well as the project's senior men. Leaving aside the issue of men's presence for the moment, let's concentrate on the nature of the relations between the women in the project. We observe then that the arrangements are of a kind which to a large extent maintain the traditional patterning where those advantaged by higher education stay at the senior positions where as those without such

advantages remain subservient to them (even though they are given the opportunity to learn the skills of income generation). And from that angle we might say that class inequalities are articulated here even though the context itself diverges from what is usually understood as entailing class relations. But in whatever way the nature of the relations is described, there is little doubt that superordination/subordination obtains between the women concerned. So while one cannot deny that the operation of the project may serve the interests of development by producing goods for the tourist and export markets as well as the pockets of the producers in the creation of jobs, one ignore the presence of this superordinate/subordinate positioning of some women vis-a-vis other women. This raises two further points.

From the nature of the alignment we can't emphatically say that it is the senior women who gain most for after all a lot depends on the relative initial situations of each particular woman, but we can say that the women at the top do undoubtedly benefit handsomely and also reap the rewards of privilege and rank. This is manifested not only in the general acknowledgement of their superior job roles but also in the sites where they work and the conveniences immediately at their disposal. One need hardly describe the offices and its equipment, contrasting these with the workshop accommodation. Nor need one refer to the deference the senior people are accorded, irrespective of the worker's private considerations. Most of these details are not only well-known but are also taken for granted both by the people themselves and often also by researchers. Nor should one ignore the prerequisites that befall the privileged. If it is the senior women who are exposed to foreign officials it is they who first of all learn what outside scholarships for women are available. And it is generally those senior women who obtain such grants via the personnel contact. The fact that it is usually the senior women involved in the array of organizations dealing with women's issues who may reap the benefits (scholarships and are accorded privilege, a voice in wider arenas both inside and outside the particular country concerned) this fact has prompted the coinage of the term "femmocrat" to characterize the advantaged position of such women in Australia. Since the features pertaining have applicability elsewhere, as in Nepal, usage here is perhaps not unwarranted, either.

So what about those loss privileged? With this we turn to the second point. Though the structuring of status privileging and authority demarcates the women into two major categories (the superordinate and subordinate) it is not inevitable that this should invariably be the case. A hierarchical organization is not the only type. There is also the possibility of co-operatives where all members are involved in planning and decision making,

as mentioned previously. Such an egalitarian arrangement to a project's operation might however not be feasible. Nor may the women concerned find it desirable. Nonetheless that is a possibility that ought to be noted. Of course it's not the only alternative to what is currently practised. As a kind of intermediate possibility, one could have a situation which allowed the producers and workers to participate in certain decision-making processes, especially in matters that directly affected them. Unless some concessions of this nature are made, femmocratic control is as likely to become a characteristic of Nepalese Women's enterprises as they have become elsewhere. Even so one must recognise that there are certain complications which indicate that the matter is hardly clear-cut. We refer to a basic dilemma which characterizes projects of this kind.

The basic dilemma is the difficulty of deciding whether to privatize the goal of the self-sufficiency or the goal of women's welfare. The dilemma is encapsulated in the project's label which includes the relevance of development and the objective of reaching self-sufficiency and not being dependent on aid; as against the relevance of women and the objective of pursuing women's welfare which can be costly. Given the current state of affairs at the project this would entail continuing reliance on aid. Since many of the arrangements that would enhance the junior women's positions (involvement in decision making; or the more time-consuming possibility of co-operative enterprise) are either time-consuming or costly, if effected they would curtail the objective of self-sufficiency. The difficulties are compounded by the other possible procedures (the teaching of multiple skills, and the establishment of mechanism for handling disputes either through discussions with all members or through the use of a separate and independent arbitration agency) for coping with the disadvantage of the junior women.

And the dilemma become more complex if one also recognises the possibility that some women may not desire to embark on a work-life of constant discussion. They may think that those delegated to do the job ought to cope with its headaches.

### **PROFILE OF THE PROJECT'S MEMBERS & CONDITIONS OF WORK<sup>3</sup>**

#### **(1) Modes of Remuneration & categories of personnel**

The profile of the personnel deals with a number of important features and implications arising from these. Perhaps the best way to deal with these is to take them point by point.

As far as remuneration is concerned there is not only a range of amounts paid but also an assortment of modes, from piece-rates to daily wages (with or without public holidays) to monthly salaries. While a quick glance might give the impression that it is duration of service which constitutes the criterion for applicability to receive a salary, this doesn't appear to hold because the newly appointed salesman/messenger obtains a salary even though he has just been appointed. Nor is it a difference based on personnel status according to the three general categories discussed previously (administrative staff, producers and workers) since both the peon at Pulchok and the fashion dressmaker at Lazimpat are paid by salary. However, if we focus on the producers only, it seems that duration of employment does constitute a criterion for payment as a daily wage since this is the mode of remuneration in all those instances where a worker has been at the project for less than a year and a half. In the cases of these women the reward is pretty basic, fifteen rupees per day, which makes if Rs. 90 per week and Rs. 360 per month as long as they don't get sick and no public holiday falls during the time. This of course reminds us that we are not just examining the modes of remuneration but amounts also. And in terms of these two features the women paid by daily wage are the worst off - a low amount, and an amount which is variable because in time of sickness or public holidays the payments can get even smaller. In contrast, salaries obviously give a person the security that comes with fixed income. So initially, one might notice the discrepancies in terms of modes of remuneration, discrepancies to greater and lesser amounts; and discrepancies as to fixity as against variability.

So at this stage we think it useful to consider the pay arrangements in terms of the three major categories that we are utilizing to break down the personal organization.

**(a) Administrative staff (senior and junior or top level and middle level management)**

All senior members (director, deputy and accountant/secretary) are paid by monthly salary in amounts over the thousand mark. Compared to the others the director is well imbursed not only getting Rs. 2,000 per month from the project but this is supplemented by her civil service salary. Therefore she would obtain a larger pay packet than the Deputy who receives Rs. 2,500 per month. Yet given that the Deputy works on a part time basis the discrepancy here is not significant. What is significant is the discrepancy between the administrators' rewards and the other women involved in the life-line of the Project. If we just take the first producer on the list, the young woman who receives Rs. 480 per month for making fashion garments and

compare her income with the Deputy's, we see that the Deputy gets more than five times the producer's although the Deputy works on a part-time basis.

The discrepancy between the junior administrators, i.e. the supervisors and assistant supervisors is not as great. They obtain less than a thousand rupees a month.

Nor is there much discrepancy between the producers and the most junior level in the administrative staff to which we have allocated the sales persons<sup>4</sup>, since these people obtain salaries ranging from Rs. 600 to Rs. 850 which are not vastly higher than the producers but they do have the advantage of receiving salaries. This means that they, unlike the women on daily wages and piece rates, have security in obtaining a constant amount. Moreover it appears that duration of employment is not a condition that is relevant to their mode of remuneration whereas it does seem to be relevant to what happens with producers.

**(b) The producers (specialists)**

It is in this category that we find that all four possible modes of payment are applicable. To repeat, these comprise:

- (1) Daily wage but no payment for Saturdays & public holidays.
- (2) Remuneration based on output piece rate only.
- (3) Remuneration based on output plus concessions for Saturdays and public holidays.
- (4) Salary.

The criterion for obtaining a daily wage of Rs. 15 (with no payment for Saturdays and public holidays) seems to depend on duration since all these producers have only been at the project for a few months except one of those who have been at the project for longer than two years are advantaged by being paid salaries. It is with the craftswomen, the printers, weavers and the sewing specialists of household goods that remuneration based on output applies. Here there are two possibilities - piece-rate only otherwise piece-rate plus the concessions regarding Saturdays and public holidays. In their cases length of time at the project seems to determine which mode of piece-rate is to apply since those who've been employed for several years obtain the better conditions.

It is interesting that it is in tasks which are solitary, repetitive but also demanding concentration (as with printing, weaving and sewing

household goods) that are paid according to output. Doll-making in contrast brings all doll-makers together where each attends to a different part of the operation and is that kind of work which requires less concentration. It's hard to make errors in stuffing something or in hand-sewing the dolls' clothes. If errors occur they are readily fixed. Whereas if a print, for example, has been inaccurately placed on a bedspread the item can be ruined. Similarly for the demands that go with the sewing of the household goods as well as weaving. Given the requirements of skill and especially attentiveness, paying these workers (the sewers, the weavers and the printers) according to output then makes good business sense, and management is surely aware since the policy is a result of its decision.

We think it significant that it is with the bulk of the producers that their remuneration is made contingent on their actual production. None of the other categories whether at the higher structural levels or even the manual workers (like those whose work is ironing) are placed in a situation where actual performance determines what amount of payment they will actually get. This is not to say that some of the piece-rate workers (with or without the special extras) don't find the method acceptable, as some in fact approve of this mode of reward. But it is to say that other types of workers don't have to perform under the same kind of constraints. Obviously what it means in effect is that if these producers don't perform well they end up penalizing themselves. So while the incentive based on output can and in many instances does propel productivity, and can generate desirable performances from these producers nevertheless when performance is not up to scratch, it has its cost for the worker concerned.

There's another kind of adverse effect that can arise from this piece-rate mode of remuneration. Though the mode does allow the worker to increase her income by improving her work productivity, it also entails the possibility of self-penalization and therefore demands a constant self-monitoring. This can have an emotional cost. Perhaps it is not fortuitous that the section where accord and laughter spilled over was that where the women collectively worked at making dolls and where payment was not based on output. And in spite of the fact that these women were located in the most cramped conditions, all huddled together on the floor. As for the producers who are paid according to output management policy imposes a further condition which puts them under greater strain, the policy of docking wages where the worker has spoiled the material. So although these women can earn up to Rs. 25 per day (Rs. 600 per month) an appealing amount by Nepalese standards, this depends on becoming proficient in their work and



being over-attentive.

Similar demands however are not made on those who obtain salaries, an obvious but important point.

**(c) The Producers (manual workers)**

Although there are few manual workers (the man who does the washing and the peon and the women who do the ironing) we do find variability in the mode of payment of these few. What at first sight appears as significant is that it is the men who are salaried while the women are not. But whether or not a criterion of gender enters here is hard to say. Perhaps the difference is a function of the varying period of employment since it is the women ironers who are comparative newcomers who are paid by daily wage while it is the older workers who are on a salary and happen to be men in this particular category.

**(2) Some implications**

What we need consider now are the general patterning. Taking the entire personnel involved in the project with the exception of the canteen businessman, no man is paid on a daily wage or by piece-rated (either with or without the extras). All the men get salaries even if they are involved in basic manual tasks (washing or serving as a peon) or if they have only been recently appointed (as with the Lazimpat salesman). What was said earlier about the differential repercussions of producers versus others will also have bearings in this context of differential conditions applying to the sexes. By this we are not suggesting that the senior staff set out to favour the men but that this one outcome, if fixity of salary is perceived as a privilege. In a sense these men are privileged if they are not exposed to contingencies which penalize their income as happens with a daily wage. Nor are they exposed to the strains of being paid according to output as happens with those on piece-rates. Nor do any of the men on the project obtain incomes as low as those women on a daily wage of Rs. 15 (without any of the extras). While inexperience might be a consideration in the case of the particular women whose income is low (where at best they may get Rs. 360 in a month) nonetheless no comparable constraint was applied to the newcomer salesman/messenger who is also a comparatively recent arrival.

Another interesting feature to be discerned from the details in the profile is the absence of reward for long duration of service. One woman who is currently a supervisor and has been with the project for eleven years, a considerably long time, only receives a salary of Rs. 825 per month almost

the same as two recent arrivals, the salesman/stock recorder (Phulchok) and the assistant supervisor both of whom get Rs. 25 per month less than this woman. Given that the assistant supervisor is a graduate it appears that the payments are geared to privilege those with higher education. Long service doesn't seem to be of relevance to remuneration in the case of the doll-makers either though one has been with the project for five years, and another for three years, both get an identical salary (Rs. 480).

It would seem that the state's ruling as to yearly increments specified by the Labour Laws is not being recognized and enforced. In this context the body responsible would be the N.W.O., the ultimate source of authority. A directive from them would have to be followed by the person in charge of the project. Perhaps it is shortage of funds which prevents the N.W.O. initiating the implementation of this government ruling yearly increments.

Similar argument could perhaps be made vis-a-vis a point not raised in our chart that is, the spasmodic manner by which the senior staff are paid—often months later.<sup>5</sup>

However like most difficulties the matter comes back to priorities. If the N.W.O., the agency ultimately responsible for the project, is a government agency which articulates with other bodies controlling the allocating of funds, then it seems fair to say that the project's economic difficulties appear to come low on the government's list of priorities. In fact there is a fairly common assumption that the Women's Development Skill Project should be funded primarily from outside agencies. It makes one wonder whether the state is acting on this opinion by being tardy in paying the senior people and so is prompting them to seek monies with the foreign aid programmes. We are not saying that this is definitely the case, but if it is, then the government's strategy is one which falls back into third world dependency on foreign aid. And is engineering a situation where the women concerned are impelled to suffer (with salaries in arrears) or to take action with foreign funding agencies to change matters.

Coming back to the immediacy of the project site. A perusal of the educational qualifications, or perhaps more precisely the comparative paucity of qualifications, indicates that to a certain extent the project is fulfilling one of its major goals, providing opportunities to women who would otherwise not have such opportunities to gain skills in income generation. None of the female producers and manual workers (according to our categorization) are graduates. In fact many have had no formal education. Even so what also has

to be remembered is that those with higher education coming into the project are allocated the more senior positions and the favourable mode of remuneration as well as the higher amounts. While those with less formal education get the jobs with less status and lower reward. So the two categories start with a difference and to a large extent this difference is maintained. The exceptions apply to the few cases where the women (all young) with some higher education are able to and are continuing their studies. The bulk however are not. And should they stay with the project and the project continues its present policy, most of those women are likely to remain producers. Therefore in the new context of the development project the differential statuses are retained between those with differential educational standards. From that angle inequalities between women persist.

And the disparities can continue. Speaking generally it has to be acknowledged that it is the senior administrative staff who through their involvement in a project of this nature, are linked into what might be called an international community: the global circuit which incorporates the so called experts in foreign aid, development, academic research and feminine movements. By being inserted into this prestigious arena, they are exposed to possibilities where personal benefits can accrue (the Nepalese candidate for the expenses-paid international conference; the personal scholarship; incorporation into foreign agencies as the indigenous employee by virtue of experience at a development project; the establishment of one's own local consultancy by having the right credentials, obtained by having worked at the project and so forth). While we would not ignore the fact that some of these perquisites can be obtained by membership in the civil service, nonetheless involvement in a women's development project gives greater visibility and opens up additional avenues like the assortment of feminist networks, availability for scholarships. As one cynic working for the Poverty Commission in Australia commented with regard to the experts' rewards; "There's money in poverty", so we might also observe "there's kudos in women's subordination". It goes without saying that this is not to deny the tremendous efforts a lot of women have put into such projects, being subjected to demoralization through constant frustrations, nor to denigrate their impressive achievements, but it is to notice that there are also substantial rewards to be personally gained through involvement in these kinds of schemes. Schemes characterized as morally propel.

The point we want to make is not then to undercut the efforts and successes, the work energy and imagination of the senior administrators of such projects but simply foreground what can tend to get overlooked; the

major objective is to provide opportunity for the ordinary women personnel; and if that is so, the existence and operation of the project itself depends on the presence and work of the other women (the producers and manual workers). Without them, there is no project, Without their stamping and restaging the block on the fabric from ten to four every day for six days in a row, for example, there would be no justification for the senior personnel of N.W.O. members to participate in conferences held more often than not at international centres like Washington, Moscow or Delhi discussing the effectiveness of such schemes. This means that such privileges depend on the daily presence of those women who at the project's site spend their time printing fabrics, making dolls, sewing up cushions, fabricating smart gear, or ironing the finished products. If that is the case, then we might say that one category of women constitutes the "infrastructure" for the kudos of the others.

Another way of approaching the problem is to pose the question: why don't some of the craftswomen get into this international circuit. Immediately a number of reasons come to mind: their inexperience, limited all-round knowledge and lack of education, especially lack of fluency in foreign languages like English. However in response one might also say that though these are good reasons for the current ineligibility of such women from access to the perquisites, yet couldn't there be some attempt to rectify the deficiencies. Of course in turn a counter-argument would ask how and at what immediatecast; and even if it were possible it would take years. It would be inordinately difficult. Despite such arguments to view the task as insurmountable seems to us somewhat defeatist and an approach geared to retain the discrepancies between these two categories of women. So as things stand it is the women workers who are excluded and this is taken for granted, at least to a large extent. And to a large extent it is taken for granted that the educated "leaders" be given the privileged opportunities.

Our concern in making these statements is to counterbalance what is usually expressed about these projects – that they provide opportunities for women to gain skills in income generation. We want to counterbalance the voiced declarations by stating what is often unstated in the policy speeches and hand-outs-that such projects also provide opportunities for those already privileged. Nor can this kind of opportunity site be dismissed as inconsequential and hardly worth a mention if it entail high international stakes for the players. Needless to add this brings us to issue of wide theoretical interest which we will turn to later.

### (3) **Distribution Of Personnel Within the Occupational Hierarchy**

Though the point was mentioned before one significant feature about the ethnic and caste patterning of positions is that the administrative posts are filled by high caste women. At least at this level one might simplify and say "caste equals class".

A second feature is the predominance of Newar woman at the project. Most of these derive from the general caste of Jyappu (the Maharjan and Ranjit) located in the middle range of the Newar Caste.<sup>6</sup> It is those Newar women who constituted the bulk of specialist producers.

Though traditionally their caste is renowned for craft skills, the woman didn't necessarily come to the project as experts but rather learned the required technique at the site. The reasons they gave for joining the project were economic. One of the Newar men in discussing their present at the project, remarked that "They would prefer to be autonomous, even as to running a small shop, rather than be subjected to dictates of others". Whether his assessment applies to the higher Newar castes only and not to other Newars (or the Parbatya for that matter) is hard to tell. But his point about the Newar inclination to participation commerce finds testimony in the many shops (from bigger enterprises in the main shopping streets to small fruit and vegetable stalls) run by Newar women. And one also has to acknowledge that there might be a stronger disinclination on the part of these higher caste Newar women since their presence at the project appears to rest on peculiar personal circumstances. Information gained but not systematically itemized on the chart reveals that one high caste Newar woman is physically handicapped, another is a widow, another separated from her husband, another is a young motherless girl. another young high caste Newar woman for her part simply regards the project as a stepping stone and hopes to eventually leave and establish her own fashion business.

When it comes to a consideration of the reasons for the presence of high caste Parbatya as producers or manual workers it seems that these relate to personal difficulties. Most have had problems of various kinds<sup>7</sup> while three others have certain physical disabilities. One Chhetri woman made no bones about the hostility she feeling having to work at the project, the only one to voice such strong antipathy. Given that they are comparatively few Brahmins and Chhetris belonging to these categories (craft specialists producers and manual workers) and that personal rather than economic circumstances appear to have prompted their participation in the project. This is significant.

At this juncture let us draw together some of the threads that have emerged up to this point. The discussion suggests that most of the high caste women (both parbatya and Newar) are present at the project because of particular personal misfortune that have impelled them to earn monies or acquire certain skills. On the other hand those women from the lower caste ranks (the Maharjans, and Ranjits) are present because of explicit economic reasons. This indicates that where the project's expressed goal is to provide opportunities for the personally disadvantaged and the chance for women to learn income-generating skills, then the two respective general goals take on a caste patterning: the higher caste women work (in the producer specialist section or manual worker section) because of personal misfortune while the other women in the lower caste ranks are present because of the economic opportunity offered by the scheme.

What must also be noticed are the absences. Of significance is the fact that within the categories that we've labelled "craft producers" and "manual workers there is a paucity of members from the tribal groupings, so few that a general discussion of patterning could proceed without mentioning them. What is just as striking is the absence of women from the once labelled "pani nachalne Jat" and known as the Untouchables in the Anglophone literature.

The absence of women from this category does not exactly reflect well on those responsible for its operation, whether at the N.W.O. level or at the site of the project itself.<sup>8</sup> One would have expected their commitment to a policy of Untouchable recruitment but presumably this has not been the case. Of course we should also recognise that there could be reasons for their absence. The omission might be due to the senior people's awareness of difficulties posed by the Untouchables reluctance to work there, should this be in fact the case, where these women prefer to follow occupations open to them because they are more familiar. and nowadays perhaps even more lucrative with the changing circumstances of tourism. Perhaps the inaction from the top derives from its assessment of the difficulties that might ensure, suspecting that the Untouchables presence at the project might provoke unease amongst the other women and that it would be politic to side the issue entirely. If this is indeed the case it appears somewhat defeatist even though it could be justified by reference to lack of guidelines from the government whose approach is somewhat equivocal.<sup>9</sup> But whatever the considerations take, if there were any, the fact remains that, at least to our knowledge, the project has no explicit policy for attracting women from this low caste to participate in the venture. And it's a sad omission in a scheme directed at providing opportunities for women in onerous predicaments. Since

it is undeniable that these people are disadvantaged by the construction of their untouchability one would have expected some kind of statement, albeit delicately phrased, as to the project's policy towards such women, given that the project is geared to improving the lot of Nepalese women. The most serious finding of all appears to be that their absence hasn't even arisen as a problematic because their usual exclusion is so taken for granted.

To turn to the tribal category (which incorporates an assortment of people) and its position within the work structure. Even though within the overall demographic compass, tribal numbers are not overly large, their representation at the project nonetheless is very small, only three. And when it is recalled that one of these is the wife of the nightwatchman/caretaker and joined the project via this connection, the point becomes even more vivid. The other is a widow but is also continuing her education and intends to take the SLC. The third tribal woman at the projects isn't a producer but is located within the top category at the managerial level as an assistant supervisor and as a graduated. As to the possible reasons for the comparatively low tribal representation at the project especially given their strong handicraft tradition we hazard the view that it is due to a verity of reasons. It is possible a number of tribal women are already tied up in handicrafts produced for private industry (e.g. carpet weaving), some businesses are themselves run by tribal women. It is also likely that some tribal women constitute some of the invisible producers working at home, providing goods for the project, for as was mentioned earlier the project also farms out work. But without the specific breakdown of which caste categories were involved in working at home we cannot advance this particular point further. What however can be considered is the possibility that some tribal women may be ignorant of the project's existence. Knowledge of the project's existence is relevant to recruitment for as we saw earlier eventual incorporation within the enterprise in many cases depended on that information (and the subsequent tapping of personal contacts).

It remains to consider the top levels (that is, the administrators, managers, salespersons, recorders, located in the categories administrators and producers) and examine their caste composition. Leaving aside distinctions of sex for the moment, we notice that there are more Parbatya Brahmin/Chhetris than any other caste in these top levels of the organizational structure. As for the tribals it is significant that one is represented here, given that so few tribals work at the project. Yet the same cannot be said for the Newars. Although they constitute the bulk of the biggest category the producers, they are poorly represented in the top levels for there are fewer Newars than

Brahmins and Chhetris. In other words, authority lies with the Parbatya Chhetris even though most producers are Newars.

The location of Parbatya in top administrative positions is significant because it reflects the more widespread pattern of authority distribution found outside the project. As is well known the bulk of most senior personnel in governmental bodies is recruited from the ranks of high caste Parbatya. Which is not to say that there are no Newars in high office but that they do not predominate.

While of course one might hardly expect otherwise than to find a repetition of the cultural patterning in the caste composition of the personnel's job positions, where it is mainly the high caste who are in positions of authority and lower in positions of authority subordinate labour power. Yet it should be stressed that this isn't inevitable. After all it is not unreasonable to expect some attempt at innovation in a project of this kind. Furthermore the total absence of members of the Pani nachalne jat suggests a persistence of values discriminating against them though admittedly more precise information is necessary if one is to be more definitive here. Even so not only are these women absent but the others at the project are silent about this absence and it is this silence which to our minds is disturbing.

#### **(4) Ethnic & Educational Differences & Privileges**

The women who obtain high rewards from the project are those with higher educational qualifications. This is obvious in the case of those who hold the positions of director and deputy. Their salaries are considerably higher and underscore the point. But one should also notice that one woman with a degree began work as an assistant supervisor on a salary of Rs. 800 per month, an amount considerably higher than that of the craftswomen.

At a more general level one might say that knowledge qualifications constitutes one condition amongst others, for the effecting of privileges. However given that the two most senior women from the project belong to the Parbatya ethnic category it would seem that high educational qualification by itself might not be sufficient and that location in this ethnic category also appears to be relevant to obtaining high stakes. Yet one ought to be cautious here since ethnic/caste membership in itself might not be pertinent but rather a function of other social processes. The ability to tap a connexion who in turn has the pertinent influence to give priority to the seeker of support. That contact is said to have "source-force"<sup>10</sup>. From information that we have, it's interesting that the director appointed by the president is a relative of hers;



while the deputy, also appointed by the president, belongs to the same elite network and these women are known to each other. While one might also add in parenthesis that the salesman/messenger whose salary is hardly meagre is the director's nephew.<sup>11</sup>

How the system of privilege operates and reproduces itself elsewhere would also be relevant in the context of the project. In this process the gaining of the recognised educational qualifications, as well as the resources which make it possible, and an insertion into a network of contacts, all interrelate and play a circular role. It goes without saying that in Nepal the gaining of higher educational qualifications is to a large extent dependent on economic resources for the highly regarded primary schools are private and costly and senior educational institutions are fee-paying. This is not to imply that personal ability isn't relevant for it is. But without opportunity to learn the required educational skill (one of which is English), skills more easily obtained in the fee-paying schools one can't readily enter this arena of eligibility for more prestigious and lucrative occupations. So the picture is one where economic resources make for the possibility of gaining educational qualifications with potential. And becoming educated also exposes individuals to like members who so forming a network of contacts as well as constituting the educated pool of potential candidates for the privileged jobs. Education itself is only part of the route to high office. It is then necessary to have some connexion with those of influence. It could be an old college mate or a friend of the family (often of the same caste) or whatever but some connexion seems to be relevant for getting considered as a candidate and finally selected as the candidate. Once a person enters the arena of such privileges and contacts certain repercussions follow from this. And this brings us to the second feature. Not only do these people become exposed to the extra opportunities but they also have the variety of required assets to locate the next generation in the same circuit. And as a result privilege can remain with the same categories of people. The others outside cannot get in so readily - nor can their children. And so the differentials between the wealthy educated women and the others are retained and are perpetuated with the next generation.

What this also means is that at this comparatively new site the conditions for the operation and reproduction of privilege (economic assets, the expertise in what is the required knowledge, access to the contact with "source-force", *pahauch*), are not unusual. In fact, very familiar. But then so are the job values.

### **Concluding Remarks**

The significant sociological point in our consideration is that job values are being constructed according to some prior code. Either those based on that of western capitalism or those of traditional Nepali bureaucracy or both. There are no signs, at least in our view, that there has been any attempt to create a new vocabulary that would scramble the old vocabulary. To be sure the project could be lauded for providing a new kind of enterprise with new opportunities. But currently in Kathmandu there are many other new sites (there tourist facilities of varying kinds, as well as government employment) which offer jobs that weren't at hand thirty years ago. And it is the project which advocates that it is offering something different or special. Yet it's fair to ask, has it? Perhaps the workers' remuneration is considerably better than in private industry and the project does offer some initial training. But beyond that or after that the producers are expected to produce and the manual workers to work and not diverge from these expectations. The possibility of participating in the decision making process is not entertained as a possibility this being the arena of the administrators. Just the same requirements as there are in private industry or in government service. Furthermore to a large extent these women have no identity or identifiability other than as cogs in the wheels of production (capitalistic values). While the skills are publicized the presence and import of the skilled is less visible.

What we may also find is a kind of appropriation of the products by the senior personnel a practice lingering from bureaucratic mores. For example when there is some celebratory event and the items are exhibited for outsiders' inspection it is usually not the women who have been involved in the production or any one selected by them as their representative who is up front. Generally it is one or other of the senior persons depending on how important the outside observers are. If they are top-brass officials with potential funding powers, the project's spokes-person could very well come from the N.W.O; if of lesser significance then it's usually some member of the project's senior staff. But as far as the workers are concerned, they are rendered more or less "faceless" though all eyes are turned to look at what they have fashioned. What this means in effect is that there has been no revamping of old values but a remaining within the confines of the usual definitions that those in control are responsible and praiseworthy.

If there is not much of radical difference between what happens at the project's site and what happens elsewhere, the project's implementation contains no innovations which could characterize it as a women's project. It is a project where some women may work but that does not make it a project

of women. As to the possible innovations what these might be is not for us to say. Yet it is expected of us since the craft producers and workers presumed that our study provided them with an opportunity to voice some of their particular grievances.

On this score two issues were of paramount importance. And both entailed the producers and workers' exclusion from having some say in the decisions which directly affected them. One was the matter of the policy which meant non-participation in the Provident Fund; the other is the severe penalty for arriving late at work, grievances that the reader probably recalls were mentioned earlier. It goes without saying that there may be others, Nonetheless these were the two of utmost importance. Further, since the women chose to articulate their problems in this manner, this indicates the absence of a body where they could take matters of dispute. It also indicates the women's awareness of what is happening elsewhere on Kathmandu work front and their alacrity to have a say about their conditions when the opportunity occurs. And so it raises the possibility that it is in this area that policy might be able to introduce changes in accord with these women's perceptions and values.

### Notes

1. Where a person performed two or more functions and therefore appears in more than one of the four possible categories, then we chose to place that person in the category which best reflects the function that person performs most of the time. There were altogether eight (8) such cases.
2. For an account of this mode of appointment in the past and its implications, see Kondos (1984).
3. For details concerning each of the 47 members of the project, see Chart at end of this paper.
4. One at Lazimpat, two at Pulchok.
5. It has been reported that one past member of the project and no longer employed is still waiting for her salary that should have been paid a couple of years ago.
6. Itself in the middle "Matwali" category of the old Nepali scheme (see Sharma, 1977).
7. One was recently jilted. If she is to find a husband she will require a handsome dowry to compensate the stigma attached to having been jilted. Another woman is separated from her husband.

8. There is some talk that in the past two women from this category joined the project but soon left. We have been unable to corroborate the story.
9. The state prevaricates on this score for on the one hand it bans discriminatory caste practices yet on the other hand perpetuates them in prohibiting the Untouchables' entry into the temples of the high gods like that of Pashupatinath.
10. There is a substantial literature on the topic approached from the angle of patronage. For a recent study of the issues see A. Kondos, 1987.
11. And caused a lot of discussion in the work rooms.
12. This is a kind of superannuation scheme.

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## PROFILE OF MEMBERS OF WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

Caste	Sex	Age	Marital Status	Education	Function	Period with project	Mode and amount of remuneration
<b>Producers</b>							
Newar	F	20s	Single	S.L.C. (& continuing)	Fashion dress maker	2 yrs	S. Rs. 480/month Bus Rs. 45.
Bramin	F	20s	Single	S.L.C.	Crochet & sewing	3 mths	D.W./Rs. 15
Chetri	F	20s	Single	S.L.C.	Crochet & sewing	3 mths	(No. Sat. & H) D.W. Rs. 15
Newar	F	40s	Single	No formal education	Asst. Supervisor	5 yrs	(No Sat. & H) S. Rs. 705
Rai	F	20s	Single	Graduate	Asst. Supervisor	3 mths	S. Rs. 800
Newar	F	late 40s	Married	Class 9	Sewing (Cushion & others)	4 yrs	P.R. Sat. & H.Rs. 16
Newar	F	late 40s	Married	No formal education	Sewing (Cushion & other)	5 yrs	P.R. Sat. & H. Rs. 16
Newar	F	late 20s	Single	No formal education	Sewing (Cushion & other)	3 yrs	P.R. Sat & H. Rs. 16
Chetri	F	early 20s	Single	S.L.C. (& continuing)	Sewing (Cushion & other)	1 yr (1 mth)	P.R. Sat & H. Rs. 16 P.R. only
Newar	F	early 30s	Married	Class 9	Sewing (Cushion & other)	1 yr	P.R. only
Newar	F	45	Separated	No formal	Sewing (Cushion & other)	1 yr	P.R. only
Newar	F	late teens	Single	Class 4	Sewing (Cushion & other)	1 yr	P.R. only
Brahmin	F	late teens	Single	Class 6	Sewing (Cushion & other)	1 yr	P.R. only
Newar	F	19	Single	Class 6	Sewing (Cushion & other)	1 yr	P.R. only
Brahmin	F	early 20	Single	Class 6	-	-	-
Newar	F	early 20	Single	No formal education	Sewing (Cushion & other)	4 yrs	P.R. + Sat. & H. Rs. 16
Newar	F	late 20s	Widow	Class 9	Sewing (Cushion & other)	1 yr	P.R. only
Rai	F	late 20s	Married	No formal education	Sewing (Cushion & other)	1 yr 6 mths	D.W. Rs. 15 (No. Sat. & H.)
Newar	F	Late 40s	Married	No formal education	Doll-making	3 yrs	S. Rs. 480
Newar	F	50s	Married	No formal education	Doll-making	5 yrs	S. Rs. 480
Tamang	F	20s	Widow	Class (10 & continuing)	Doll-making	2 mths	D.W. Rs. 15 (No. Sat. & H)
Newar	F	late teens	Single	No formal education	Doll-making	4 mths	D.W. Rs. 15 (No Sat. & H)
Newar	F	20s	Single	No formal education	Block printing	5 yrs	P.R. + Sat. & H. Rs. 16
Newar	F	20s	Married	No formal education	Block printing	4 yrs	P.R. + Sat & H. Rs. 16
Newar	F	20s	Married	No formal education	Block printing	5 yrs	P.R. + Sat & H. Rs. 16
Newar	F	20s	Single	No formal education	Block printing	1 yr	P.R. only

Caste	Sex	Age	Marital Status	Education	Function	Period with project	Mode and amount of remuneration
Newar	F	20s	Single	No formal education	Block printing	1 yr	P.R. only
Newar	F	20s	Single	No formal education	Block printing	1 yr	P.R. only
Newar	M	50s	Married	No formal education	Print master	6 yrs	S. Rs. 800
Chetri	F	30s	Married	No formal education	Iron section, Trainee in Printing	3 mths	D.W. (No Sat & H)
Newar	F	30s	Married	No formal education	Weaving rugs place mats	5 yrs	P.R. + Sat. & H. Rs. 16
Newar	F	40s	Married	No formal education	Weaving	5 yrs	P.R. + Sat. & H. Rs. 16
Brahmin	F	late 30s	Separated	No formal education	Ironing	6 mths	D.W. Rs. 15 (No Sat. & H)
Brahmin	F	40s	Married	No formal education	Ironing	2 mths	D.W. Rs. 15 (No Sat. & H)
Chetri	M	20s	Unmarried	Class 10 (& continuing)	Lab Boy	4 yrs	S. Rs. 550
Newar	M	30s	Married	Class 9	Washing	10 yrs	S. Rs. 467
Chetri	M	20s	Single	S.L.C. continuing studies)	Salesman & Messenger	1 mth	S. Rs. 600
<b>ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF</b>							
Chetri	F	40s	Married	MS Home Science	Director	1 yr	S. Rs. 2,000
Chetri (Rana)	F	late 30s	Married	BA. Textile design, Int. Dec.	Deputy Director /Designer	2 yrs 6 mths	S. Rs. 2,500
Newar	M	late 30s	Married	B. Com.	Account/ Secretary	7 yrs	S. Rs. 1,600
British	F	late 50s	Married	H.S.C Self taught in design	V.S.O.	1mth	Rs. 1,200
<b>EXTRAS</b>							
Rai	M	25	Married	No formal education	Caretaker morning & night	6-7 yrs	S. Rs. 400
Newar	M	19	Married	No formal education	Canteen business	2 weeks	gets equipment & free rent provides food & charges for lunch
<b>PULCHOK</b>							
Newar	F	late 50s	Widow	No formal education	Senior Supervisor	11 yrs	S. Rs. 825
Brahmin	M	25-30	Unmarried	S.L.C (& continuing)	Salesman & Recorder of stock	7-8 mths	S. Rs. 800
Chetri	M	19	Unmarried	Class 9	Peon	2 yrs	S. Rs. 450
Newar	F	late 30s	Married	S.L.C.	Trainer	5 yrs	S. Rs. 700-800
Brahmin	F	late 30s	Married	S.L.C.	Salesperson (ex-Trainer)	2 yrs	S. Rs. 850

Abbreviations:

F = Female

M = Male

S.L.C.= School Leaving Certificate

B.A= Bachelor of Arts

BSc = Bachelor in Home Science

B.Com = Bachelor of Commerce

H.S.C.= High School Certificate

MS = Master in Nutrition

DW = Daily Wage

PR = Piece rate

S = Salary

H = Public Holiday

Sat = Saturday

Int. Dec. = Interior Decorator