

Articles

PADMA DKAR-PO ON INTEGRATION AS GROUND, PATH AND GOAL

Michael M. Broido

II.I: Yuganaddha (*integration) in general

That *yuganaddha* (Tibetan *zung-'jug*) is one of the most important technical terms of the vajrayāna is a platitude which needs no comment from me; one need only look at the writings of Prof. H. V. Guenther or of Prof. Alex Wayman. At the same time it is hardly possible to think that this word has been adequately explained by either of these distinguished authors or by anyone else. It is clear that the use of this word by different¹ Tibetan writers varies; as in Part I, the treatment here will be restricted to Padma Dkar-po. However, Padma Dkar-po himself has criticized various earlier Tibetan authors in this area,² and we will be able to bring some of the differences which he discusses into sharp focus.

Both Guenther and Wayman have used a great variety of English renderings for *yuganaddha*. In Guenther we find e.g. "unity",³ "unity of opposites",⁴ "union of opposites",⁵ "unitive Being",⁶ "togetherness",⁷ "coupled together",⁸ "harmoniously blended",⁹ "harmonious juxtaposition",¹⁰ "coincide",¹¹ and "coincidence".¹² Given the overriding importance of this term for Guenther, he is careless about his use of these words to represent the views of different authors; for instance it is *Padma Dkar-po*¹³ (and not the *Bka'-brgyud-pas* in general¹⁴) who *in criticizing* Tsong-kha-pa, *attributes* to him, as I will show below, a view of *yuganaddha* which might be interpreted as "harmonious juxtaposition", a phrase, however, which does not fit the attributed passage very well. Most of Guenther's other renderings of *yuganaddha* represent either Padma Dkar-po's view (as he understands it) or Indian authors, such as Nāropa, whose views Padma Dkar-po accepted.

In Wayman's writings we find e.g. "pair united",¹⁵ "pair combined",¹⁶ "pair-wise united",¹⁷ "combined together",¹⁸ and "coupling".¹⁹ On the whole these renderings represent (confusedly, as we

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will see) a “lexical” approach to the notion of translation, but insofar as they represent the view of a specific author, it is Tsong-kha-pa (and, in LW, his pupil Mkhas-grub-rje).

In the introduction to his translation of the hagiography of Bu-ston,²⁰ Prof. D. Seyfort Ruegg has several times translated *zung-'jug* by “integration”, representing the views of various Sa-skya and Dge-lugs authors whom he quotes at some length. For reasons given below I feel that this word is a happy compromise between various Tibetan views of *zung-'jug*, and so I will sometimes use “*integration” as a cipher for *yuganaddha* or *zung-'jug*.

Methodologically, Seyfort Ruegg (and perhaps Wayman) is committed to a “lexical” notion of translation, in which one English word is used uniformly to translate one foreign word. Guenther seems to dislike this approach, though it is not clear to me what he wants to put in its place. In any case the lexical approach hardly constitutes a *method* of translation, since it tells us nothing about which word to use uniformly for each foreign word. When interpreting, I shall concentrate, on the whole, on sentences, without worrying overmuch about uniformity;²¹ but when focussing attention on single words such as *yuganaddha* I shall follow Gilbert Ryle’s recommendation to consider carefully their logical grammar: features such as the syntactic type (whether noun, verb, predicate with 1,2,3 . . . places, &c.). Ryle also emphasized the semantic categories of words with which a word may be combined, and though his notion of category is perhaps not clear enough to provide a basis for solving philosophical problems²² it is still of heuristic value in demarcating specific philological ones. As Ryle showed in English, these modest considerations may not tell us the meaning of a word, whatever that is, but at least they may prevent us from making mistakes.

Padma Dkar-po’s own “etymology” of *yuganaddha*²³ may be rendered thus: “*yuga* means ‘joined’ and *naddha* means ‘non-dual’, and so *yuganaddha* is said to be *integration”.²⁴ The phrase “and so” (*de'i phyir*) is tongue-in-cheek. The syllable-by-syllable analysis is not meant to be literal, but merely to give the right result.²⁵

The full form of the Tibetan *zung-'jug* is found quite frequently, and is *zung-du 'jug-pa*. The syntax of this full phrase gives us an important part of its meaning. *'Jug-pa* is in general a verb or a verbal noun (Skt. *vṛt-*, *vṛtti*) and here is a verbal adjective (modifying a noun to yield another noun). *Zung-du* just modifies this verbal adjective (yielding another). (Of course the semantics do not follow this simple course; it is partly for this reason that Padma Dkar-po’s *nirukta* must be so non-literal — see note 25 — and also that lexical translation into English runs into problems.) Also *yuga* or *zung* acts syntactically as a two place predicate (*two things* are joined). The logical grammar described so far may

be summed up in the schema:

$$(X,Y) \text{ zung-du 'jug-pa'i } Z \quad (1)$$

where of course the semantics will impose restrictions on what can fill the three places here labeled with variables X, Y, Z. In Tibetan the two-variable slot (X,Y) is usually filled by some phrase denoting two things, either in the explicit form X dang Y (X and Y e.g., *thabs dang shes-rab*), yielding from (1) the schema

$$X \text{ dang } Y \text{ zung-du 'jug-pa'i } Z \quad (2)$$

or by contraction of such a phrase (e.g. *thabs-shes*, corresponding more closely to the Sanskrit *prajñopāya*); or by a phrase of some other form but similar function (e.g. *bden-gnyis*, Skt. *satyadvaya*). Most of these features are found in the phrase²⁶

$$\textit{bden-pa gnyis-ga gnyis-su mi-phyed-pa zung-'jug-gi ting-nge-'dzin} \quad (3)$$

which may perhaps be translated “the *samādhi* which *integrates the two *satyas* inseparably”. This concludes the summary of the syntax of *zung-'jug*.²⁷

On its semantics according to the schemata (1) and (2), the first thing is to say something about the semantic character of what may replace X, Y and Z. Now Z is normally omitted, but when it appears, the word substituted is almost always, as in (3), *ting-nge-'dzin* (Skt. *samādhi*). I believe that any appearance whatever of *zung-'jug* or *zung-du 'jug-pa* (at least in the kind of context considered in this paper) is to be taken as an ellipsis of *zung-du jug-pa'i ting-nge-'dzin* (Skt. *yuganaddhasamādhi*). In particular we see quite often the phrase

$$\textit{zung-jug-gi rim-pa (yuganaddhakrama)} \quad (4)$$

which according to Padma Dkar-po²⁸ is short for

$$\textit{zung-'jug-gi ting-nge-dzin-gyi rim-pa (yuganaddhasamādhikrama).} \quad (5)$$

The expansion of (4) into (5) is not special to the *yuganaddhakrama*; he describes all six (sic) stages of the *Pañcakrama* as *ting-nge-'dzin*.²⁹ Similarly, Padma Dkar-po's most detailed discussion of *yuganaddha*, that in the *gzhung-'grel*,³⁰ opens with the following verse from the *Vajramālā*:

$$\begin{aligned} &/\textit{phyag-rgya chen-po'i dngos-grub che/} \textit{/zung-du 'jug-pa'i ting-'dzin-gyis/} \\ &/\textit{rnam-rtog med-par zhugs-nas ni/} \textit{/thob-pa 'di-la the-tshom-med/} \end{aligned}$$

which means roughly: “If one enters into non-discursiveness by means of *yuganaddha-samādhi*, without a doubt one will obtain the great siddhi of *mahāmudra*.” Another standard phrase is *zung-du 'jug-pa'i sku* where again the standard contexts³¹ make it clear that a *samādhi* is intended.³²

The claim, then, is that *yuganaddha* (*zung-'jug*) is a technical term used in Buddhist (and especially vajrayāna³³) soteriology; a *samādhi*, a state of mind. As far as I know there is no colloquial use competing with this technical use. From this point of view the problem of finding a suitable translation is quite different from that of translating terms like *rlung* (*vāyu*).³⁴

Now we turn to the main remaining feature of the schemata (1), (2), namely the two variables X and Y, that is, the two items joined or *integrated in *yuganaddha*. Padma Dkar-po has pointed out several terms that in this respect the terms *zung-'jug* and *lhan-skyes* (*sahaja*) are very similar.³⁵ In both cases the fundamental feature is the *inseparability* of the two items so related; this feature is already present in the example (3). A further point upon which Padma Dkar-po not only insisted but contrasted his view with that of others is that this inseparability is non-contingent (*ma-bcos-pa*³⁶). However, it seems that this non-contingency applies only to certain *zung-'jug* pairs, viz. those which are also *lhan-skyes*, i.e. "born together", roughly the "positive" type discussed below; these are the most interesting and controversial cases. *Sahaja* (*lhan-skyes*) is a two-place relational attribute, saying of the two terms that they are born together or arise or emerge together, rather than separately.³⁸ There is no one term with which it stands in a privileged relationship (as does *zung-'jug* with *ting-nge-'dzin*), and this difference emphasizes the extent to which *lhan-skyes* is a purely relational attribute, in contrast to the way *zung-'jug* stands for a kind of individual in the broadest sense (viz. a kind of state of mind).

Next we can ask: is there just one *yuganaddha-samādhi*, of which the different types listed in the standard sources (see below) are merely different aspects? Or are there several different such *samādhi*? The texts give no clear answer to this question. A possible line of attack is this: we may look at the possible ways of individuating a thing such as a *samādhi*. These will provide us with possible criteria on the basis of which individual *yuganaddha-samādhis* might potentially be individuated. Then we can look at the actual ways in which *yuganaddha* is described in the texts, and see whether the differences in these modes of description can be related in any way to those possible criteria. Two kinds of criteria suggest themselves. First, there are purely physical criteria, such as are used to distinguish between more familiar states of mind, such as sleep-states (frequency of the dominant electromagnetic mode active in the brain, movements of the eyeballs, &c.). It seems perfectly plausible to suppose that some of the different types of *dhyāna* and *samādhi* distinguished in Abhidharma texts and elsewhere might be individuated in this way. But when we review the different descriptive phrases used of *yuganaddha*, as I will do later, it begins to seem very implausible that they could be correlated with such physical criteria. (Still, I have no reason to dismiss it as impossible.) Second, one

might try to use dispositional criteria. Such-and-such a kind of *samādhi* will dispose the subject to behave in such-and-such ways . . . The only criteria of this kind, relevant to *yuganaddha*, which I can think of are those related to the powers and activities of the buddha and perhaps of bodhisattvas on the highest levels. It is not clear to me that there are any genuinely empirical distinctions in this area, but suppose there are. It seems most unlikely (say from Padma Dkar-po's own descriptions) that these will be clearly related to the different pairs of *yuganaddha* items listed in the *Yuganaddhakrama*, or to Birupa's *snang-stong/gsal-stong/bde-stong/rig-stong*. It might seem somewhat more plausible that such criteria might be related to the *śaikṣa/aśaikṣa* (*slob-pa'i/mi-slob-pa'i*) distinction in *yuganaddha*. But, as we see in the next paragraph, there is independent textual evidence that these two form a continuum of similar states. Accordingly, from now on I shall tentatively assume that we are dealing with one basic *yuganaddha*, perhaps in slightly varying forms or aspects, and not with a family³⁹ of different ones, related by some family resemblance. Should this tentative assumption prove mistaken, it will not be difficult to reformulate most of the remaining arguments.

According to Padma-Dkar-po, *śaikṣayuganaddha*⁴⁰ is the period from the understanding of the radiant light until ultimacy, and corresponds to the distinction of the *bhāvanāmārga* (*sgom-lam*), during which one cultivates *satya* (already) freshly seen.⁴¹ Its counterpart *aśaikṣayuganaddha* is just the buddha-level or ultimacy⁴² about which nothing more need or perhaps can be said.⁴³ But these are not two different *yuganaddha*; rather the *śaikṣa* stage is already the real thing, as far as it goes, and he criticizes the views of those who construct an artificial *śaikṣayuganaddha* (see below).

The term *yuganaddha* has a long history in India in connection with non-tantric Buddhist meditation, both in the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna. We find *dhyāna* and *samādhi* used almost interchangeably, Tibetan often using *ting-nge-'dzin* for both. *Śamatha* (*zhi-gnas*, mental quiescence) and *vipaśyanā* (*lhag-mthong*, insight) are first practiced separately and later joined together: *yuganaddha*, Tib. *zung-'brel* or *zung-đu 'brel-ba*, and not *zung-'jug*. They are associated with one-pointedness (*ekāgratā*, *rtse-gcig*) of mind. In Tibet all these terms are prominent in non-tantric mahāmudra meditation (see note 45) and as such are frequently discussed by Padma Dkar-po, who was famous for his expert descriptions in this area. Some details:

(a) Poussin (ADK vol. V, p. 131, n.2) gives references to the Pali literature with the spelling *yuganandha*, about which he is unhappy, e.g. *samatha-vipassanaṃ yuganandhaṃ bhāveti*, &c. He translates with "attelé". He also gives refs. to BCA, Sikṣ., MSL &c.

(b) Vaibhāṣika texts such as Saṅghabhadra's *Abhidharmakośa-kārikā-śāstra-bhāṣya* (Sde-dge Bstan-'gyur, Mngon-pa, vol. *khu* 95b1), and the

Abhidharmadīpa (author unknown, ed. Jaini) do mention one-pointedness (*ekāgratā*) where one would expect it, viz. at the beginning of chapter VIII (resp. 265a5 and p. 404) but without reference to *yuganaddha*.

(c) *Abhidharmakośa* VIII.1c runs: *samāpattiḥ śubhaikāgryam* (/snyoms-'jug dge-ba rtse-gcig-pa/). Vasubandhu comments: . . . / *sa hi śamatha-vipaśyanābhyām yuganaddha-vāhitvād dṛṣṭadharmasukhavihāra uktaḥ* (*de ni zhi-gnas dang lhag-mthong zung-du 'brel-bar ngang-gis 'byung-ba'i phyir mthong-ba'i chos-la bde-bar gnas-pa dang/ lam sla-ba zhes gsungs-pas*: Sde-dge *khu* 66b4, quoted by Padma-dkar-po, *Mngon-mdzod* 152b4). According to the *Vyākhyā*, this is a sūtra passage. The normal sense of *vāhin* is "conveying along" &c., and Poussin has accordingly rendered *yuganaddhavāhin* (in a longer phrase taken from the *Vyākhyā*, Shastri ed. vol. 4 p. 1128) by "attelés au joug". However, the Tibetan in the ADK passage is *ngang-gis 'byung-ba* (spontaneously generated, cf Jäschke s.v. *ngang*), and this is in broad conformity with the sense "causing, producing, effecting" for *vāhin* (Monier-Williams, s.v.). So it is clear that Poussin's colloquial translation receives little support from the Tibetan. But every other occurrence of *yuganaddha* mentioned in *paras*. (a)-(g) is technical, relating to the *śamatha-vipaśyanā* combination.

(d) *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* XIV.9ab runs:

yuganaddhaśca vijñeyo mārgastatpiṇḍitaṃ punaḥ /:
/zung-du 'brel-ba'i lam ni de/ /bsdoms-pa yin-par shes-par-bya/,

and Vasubandhu's comment on this group of verses includes: *śamatha manaskāraḥ* / *vipaśyanā manaskāraḥ* / *yuganaddha manaskāraḥ* / (confirming the feeling associated with the word *ekāgratā* that we are not yet near the goal). Sthiramati in his *Sūtrālaṅkāra-vṛtti-bhāṣya* (Sde-dge Bstan-'gyur, Sems-tsam, vols. mi-tsi) comments on this verse (mi, 266a6):

"At the time when *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* have not yet been joined together (*zung-du ma-'brel-ba'i dus-na*) they are *based (*dmigs-pa*; *ālambana* in verse 10b) separately. *Śamatha* is *based on words and letters, while *vipaśyanā* is *based on (their) *artha*. But when they are joined together (*zung-du 'brel-ba*) there is no separate *basis of words and *artha*, the two are merged (*bsdus-nas*) and *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* are unified (*mgo mnyam-du 'brel-te*), and the path based on this is called the path of *śamatha-vipaśyanā-yuganaddha*. By this means, *yuganaddha-manaskāra* is taught."

(Here, *dmigs-pa* = *ālambana* is not adequately represented by *based, *basis, but this complex problem cannot be dealt with here. *Yuganaddha* = *zung-du 'brel-ba* throughout.)

(e) *Bodhicāryāvatāra* VIII.4a runs: *śamathena vipaśyanā suyuktaḥ*, and the *Pañjika* comments: *śamathaḥ cittaikāgratā-lakṣaṇaḥ samādhiḥ* . . . *vipaśyanā yathābhūta-tattva-parijñāna-svabhāvā prajñā* / *tayā suyuktaḥ* / *yuganaddha-vāhi-mārga-yogena kurute kleśānām vināśam* . . . in full conformity with (c), (d).

(f) A single example from Padma Dkar-po must suffice. At *Rnal-'byor bzhi'i mdzub-tshugs* 6a3 (i.e. in the *rtse-gcig, ekāgratā* section) he contrasts *zhi-lhag zung-'brel* with *zhi-lhag zung-'jug*. Thus: *zhi-lhag zung-'brel-du bshad-pa'i lhag-mthong ni lhag-mthong gi don-spyi yin-la/ zhi-lhag zung-'jug-gi zhi-gnas kyang/ 'di'i skabs-kyi zhi-gnas ma-yin-no/*. The contrast is just what is suggested in the rest of paras (a)-(g) in relation to this article as a whole.

(g) Summary: in translating *yuganaddha* (especially in a non-tantric context) the Tibetans distinguished between *zung-'jug* (the goal, and with little or no *manaskāra*) and *zung-'brel* (joining or combination, not the goal, connected with *ekāgratā* and *manaskāra* and virtually always used of the *samatha/vipaśyanā* combination). Both words are used almost exclusively of meditational states, of *samādhi* or its close relative *dhyāna*.

Though *zung-'jug* is mainly a term of the vajrayāna, it also has a use in non-tantric mahāyāna⁴⁴ rather as does *mahāmudra*.⁴⁵ With regard to early Tibetan madhyamaka, in the oral tradition I have heard it said that Pa-tshab Lotsawa, Rngog Blo-ldan Shes-rab, Phyā-pa Chos-kyi Sengge and others spoke a good deal of *bden-gnyis zung-'jug* and that it was as a reaction against the over-emphasis on this connection between the two *satya* in his own time that Tsong-kha-pa was moved to write the very detailed *separate* treatment found in his *Rigs-pa'i rgya-mtsho* and *Dgongs-pa rab-gsal*, against which Mi-bskyod Rdo-rje and other Bka'-brgyud-pas and others later protested. Although Mi-bskyod Rdo-rje does not seem to use the phrase *bden-gnyis zung-'jug* in the *Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rta* his account of the history of Tibetan madhyamaka is broadly comparable with this one, which however I am not in a position to verify. Padma Dkar-po's summary of the tradition runs thus⁴⁶

Concerning the difference between *sūtra* and *mantra*, Rgyal-dbang-rje has said that the former is concerned largely with analysis and the method of negation, while the latter is concerned with establishing something positive. Accordingly the old translators of the *lakṣaṇa (yāna)* said that *zung-'jug* is simply non-duality, as though (its substrate) did not exist; while when translating the mantras they generally indicated two existing things as (connected in) *yuganaddha* or *sahaja-jñāna*.

Padma Dkar-po himself, while broadly following Rgyal-dbang-rje's remarks, diverges somewhat from the view attributed to the earlier translators. In his vajrayāna works he uses *yuganaddha* pairs found both in the Pañcakrama (see below) and in the tradition of Birupa (*snang-stong* &c., see above). The Pañcakrama pairs are of both positive and negative type. Now in his *sūtra* (i.e. not vajrayāna) works, Padma Dkar-po typically considers *zung-'jug* pairs of the types which appear

as positive in the Pañcakrama; these even play the main role.⁴⁸ (Later when we consider the ground/path/goal division in *yuganaddha* this positive/negative distinction will come to seem less fundamental than it does in these remarks. This is consistent with Padma Dkar-po's unwillingness to make a general distinction of *lta-ba* (viewpoint) between sūtras and mantras.)

II.2: Yuganaddha as ground, path and goal

II.2.1: Preliminary survey

In Part I we sketched and quoted Padma Dkar-po's own summary of the *cig-car-ba*'s ground, path and goal in general, as he gives it in the *Gzhung-'grel*. In the previous section, II.1, we gave his view of *yuganaddha* in general, using a variety of sources and arguments. Now we bring the two together. As a preliminary we may note that in addition to *yuganaddha*, Padma Dkar-po has divided various other non-dual conceptual categories⁴⁹ by using the ground/path/goal scheme: *mahāmudra* (*phyag-rgya chen-po*),⁵⁰ the radiant light (*prabhāsvara, od-gsal*),⁵¹ and the middle (way, i.e. *madhyamaka, dbu-ma*).⁵² While a full treatment of the ground/path/goal scheme would therefore include accounts of all these matters,⁵³ *yuganaddha* is perhaps the most fundamental, and we confine attention to the others to the notes.

Table 1 contains a list of all the pairs of items which appear in the verses of the '*bras-bu skye-ba'i rim-pa* (goal) section of the *Gzhung*, *integrated in *yuganaddha*. Without exception, all these verses are taken from the *Yuganaddhakrama* (col. 2); and of course all receive commentary in the *Gzhung-'grel* (col. 3). With the letters N and P in column 4 I have attempted to distinguish whether the verse asserts the absence of some pair of things discursively discriminated (negative type) or the presence of some kind of unity of two things (positive type). This classification is based entirely on the words (e.g. *ekatvaṃ*, one-ness) found in the verses themselves and describing the relational aspect of each separate case of *yuganaddha*; the Sanskrit words (as printed by Poussin) are given in column 5. The classification seems at first glance to correspond to that sketched by Padma Dkar-po in the remarks quoted at the end of the previous section. Unfortunately it seems impossible to introduce a single clear and uniform distinction on the basis of these analyses. Basically this is because two things differ (or are the same) *only under a description*. For instance, one is tempted to take the first pair, *saṃsāra/nirvāṇa*, as negative because the idea is to give up this dualistic conception (*kalpana-dvaya-varjana, rtog-pa gnyis-po spangs-pa*). But when we have done this, we are of course not left with just *nothing*; we are left with the world as it always was before the *saṃsāra/nirvāṇa* descrip-

TABLE 1: CLASSIFICATION OF THE YUGANADDHA VERSES IN THE GZHUNG

PAIR	YK	<i>gzhung-'grel</i>	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
<u>ground section</u>				
<i>saṃsāra/nirvāṇa</i>	YK 2	370b4	N	<i>kalpana-dvaya-varjana</i>
<i>kleśa/bodhi</i>	YK 3	371a5	P	<i>ekibhāvaṃ</i>
<i>sākāra/nirākāra</i>	YK 4	371b4	N?	
<i>grāhya/grāhaka</i>	YK 5	ibid.	P?	<i>abhinnatā</i>
<u>path section</u>				
<i>utpattikrama/utpannakrama</i>	YK 20	372a3	P	<i>ekatvaṃ</i>
<i>piṇḍagrāha/anubheda</i>	YK 12	372b1	P	<i>samantād</i>
<i>svādhiṣṭhāna/prabhāsvara</i>	YK 11	372b4	P	<i>samājam</i>
<i>rāga/arāga</i>	YK 18	373a1	N	<i>virnimuktaḥ</i>
<i>prajñopāya</i>	YK 8	373a4	P	<i>samāpattiyā, samāsataḥ</i>
<i>śūnyatā/karuṇa</i>	YK 7	373b2	P	<i>aikyam</i>
<u>goal section</u>				
<i>upādhi/anupādhi-śeṣaṃ</i>	YK 9	374a3	N	<i>kalpanā nāsti</i>
<i>pudgalanairātmya/ dharmanairātmya</i>	YK 10	374b1	N	<i>kalpanāyā viviktatvaṃ</i>
<i>śāśvata/uccheda</i>	YK 6	374b5	N	<i>prahāya</i>
<i>saṃvṛti/paramārtha</i>	YK 13	375a5	P	<i>sammīlanam</i>
<i>smṛti/asmṛti</i>	YK 17	375b6	N	<i>nirmuktaḥ</i>
<i>suptaḥ/prabuddha</i>	YK 15	376b4	N	<i>dvaya varjitam</i>
<i>kārya/kāraṇa</i>	YK 19	377a2	?	<i>abhinnam svabhāvataḥ</i>
<i>samādhāna/asamādhāna</i>	YK 16	377a5	N	<i>nāsti</i>

tion was imposed upon it, and it seems difficult to see how this can be generally and clearly distinguished from what happens in the “positive” cases. Similarly I have marked the fourth pair (*grāhya/grāhaka*, object/subject) as positive because the verse describes them as non-different (*abhinna, mi-phyed*); but actually what is claimed to be non-different is not these *things* but the particular state of mind (*buddhi, blo*) relating (to) them in *yuganaddha*. In fact virtually any one of the pairs can be seen (sometimes with a little effort) as positive if one concentrates on the things referred to or mentioned or described, and negative if one concentrates on the descriptions. This shift of perspective can easily be experienced with the two examples just discussed. A case which one might think difficult to see as either positive or negative in this sense is that of the two *satya*; but there is no doubt that Padma Dkar-po thought it could be seen either way, as I have shown at some length elsewhere.⁵⁴ A case which commonsense takes as ‘obviously’ negative is

rāga/arāga: how can opposites refer to the same thing? *But this is precisely the mistake* (leading to the nonsense of “unity of opposites,” &c.). *Of course* desire and its opposite are not the same. But the *paramānanda* in which (according to the verse) both are absent (“negative version”) is simply a state without either (“positive version”). There is nothing to distinguish the two versions other than what part of the description you concentrate on. (A lot of mysticism boils down to confusions of this kind.⁵⁵) A case which commonsense takes as “obviously” positive is *prajñā/upāya*. Is it not obvious that in the buddha-mind (or whatever) *prajñā* and *upāya* are both present, in some sense? Of course; but (as in the *rāga/arāga* case), in order to see this case negatively one need only note that in general *prajñā* and *upāya* are not the same at all and that by insisting “*prajñā, prajñā*” one only drives out *upāya*, &c., so that the right kind of *prajñā* can arise only when we withhold the description, as the *Prajñāpāramitā* sūtras never weary of insisting; this is the negative version.⁵⁶ The conclusion is clear: if the positive/negative distinction between the different pairs of things *integrated in *yuganaddha* has any significance at all, each case must be seen as regarded from some quite narrowly restricted point of view. If anything general can be said about these points of view, now is the time; unfortunately I have very little.⁵⁷

It was suggested earlier that there seems to be little hope of distinguishing different kinds of *yuganaddha* on the basis of the different pairs (say, as characterized in the different verses). We can now see more easily why this is, at least in individual cases. Consider again the first verse (Table 1) on *saṃsāra/nirvāṇa*. First take it negatively: we are required to distinguish some kind of *samādhi* solely on the basis of the absence of the notions of *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa* (say as against another kind individuated on the basis of the absence of the notions of *rāga* and *arāga*). It seems difficult to see how to do this; one is almost tempted to say: it is easy to see that it is impossible. Similarly on the positive interpretation of the *saṃsāra/nirvāṇa* verse: it is understood that “*saṃsāra*” and “*nirvāṇa*” describe the same world (as it were) and *on this basis alone* we are to distinguish some *samādhi*. It seems clearly impossible. It is not only that the characterization is much too slender; it seems to be of the wrong sort altogether. Similar remarks apply to taking the positive and negative interpretations together. Of course it is possible that a distinction may be set up when one or both of these interpretations is supplemented by some other information; but to claim this is to give up any claim to characterize anything on the basis of the verses. In any case, it seems pointless to pursue this possibility in relation to Padma Dkar-po, since nothing in his comments on these verses suggests anything remotely resembling a verse-by-verse distinction of this kind.

It seems that the usefulness of the positive/negative distinction among the pairs of *integrated items is likely to be fairly restricted. So we can perhaps sympathize with Padma Dkar-po’s evident lack of in-

terest in pursuing systematically this distinction which he inherited from Rgyal-dbang-rje and from the earlier translators. If nevertheless we accept the limitation, we may record, as in Table 1, what seems, from the relevant point of view, to be the positive/negative character of each pair. When we do this, we notice something fairly striking. The ground section consists of pairs which seem easy to interpret either way, and the given interpretations are mixed up. The pairs of the path section are all positive except for *rāgalarāga* (I will try to explain the anomaly later). The goal section is virtually all negative apart from the important case of the two *satya*; but this is not surprising when we reflect that they generalize many of the items found in the path section.

Do the materials recorded in Table 1 suggest any other distinction between the ground, path and goal divisions? Two further points seem worth recording. First, the path verses do concern various parts of the path₂ which are to be *integrated; this is especially clear with the first four. Second, there seems to be no such ground of distinction between the verses of the ground and goal divisions; this is strikingly illustrated by Padma Dkar-po's use of the *yuganaddha* of the two *satya* both as the goal (in the *Gzhung-'grel*) and as the ground (in the *Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta*).

So far in this subsection we have been considering the possible divisions of the *yuganaddha* section into ground, path and goal, or rather the possible sense behind the division given in the *Gzhung-'grel*. During this procedure we have taken for granted the position given to this section in the *Gzhung-'grel* as a whole, viz. that of the goal (strictly: graded emergence of the goal) of the path₁ of the *cig-car-ba*, taken as a whole. Now we may recall what was hinted at in the introduction to Part I, viz. that the distinction or contrast suggested by these two remarks is not as clear as one might suppose. That is: the *cig-car-ba* has his ground, path₂ and goal (viz. *dnagos-po'i gnas-lugs, lam₂* and '*bras-bu skye-ba'i rim-pa*), and this goal section is further divided into ground, path and goal; and it is not at all clear that this second ground, path and goal are different from the first set, even though on a crude set-theoretic or bibliographical basis it would seem that they must be. I now want to set aside these set-theoretical and bibliographic considerations and review briefly how the subject matter of the goal₁ ('*bras-bu skye-ba'i rim-pa*) in fact fits in with that of some of the earlier sections of the *Gzhung-'grel*.

When one examines the subject-matter at all carefully, it becomes clear that the topic of *zung-'jug* can easily be fitted into several places in the *Gzhung-'grel* besides the one it actually occupies. (The following observations can be clarified by using Appendix B.) In the ground section, *zung-'jug* could come under *lus dnagos-po'i gnas-lugs* (especially in the section called *mngon-par byang-chub-par gyur-pa'i rim-pa*, 30b1); or it could come under *sems dnagos-po'i gnas-lugs*, either in parallel with the

whole of the existing section, or as part of the subsection *'bras-bu phyag-rgya chen-po mngon-du 'gyur-ba*, 128b3 ff. In the path section, it could come under virtually any of the eight main sections of the *rdzogs-rim* (completion stage), viz. *gtum-mo*, *las-kyi phyag-rgya* &c. Guenther has rightly observed that the radiant light is the climax of the path. That doctrine, as we saw earlier,⁵⁸ is itself divided into ground, path and goal; and the goal section, as set out in the *Gzhung-'grel*,⁵⁹ is particularly closely related to the topic of *zung-'jug*. Now it is quite clear why Padma Dkar-po, in spite of all these considerations, put the goal section of the *Gzhung-'grel* where he did (viz. as the goal of the entire *cig-car-ba* section) and gave it the title which he did give it (*'bras-bu skye-ba'i rim-pa*). In both cases, the matter is decided already in the text upon which he is commenting, viz. the *bka yang-dag-pa'i tshad-ma*.⁶⁰ The point of my observations is not that he ought to have put it somewhere else. It is rather that the structure of his materials and argumentation would have allowed him to have it in several different places; and this fact is consistent with the view that the different *gzhi* are all aspects of the same ground, the different *'bras-bu* of the same goal, &c. It is much more difficult to reconcile the fact in question with the view that the different *'bras-bu* sections are about different goals. And to this extent, that fact supports the first of these views against the second.⁶¹ Some further detail on this point will be presented below.

Since the *'bras-bu skye-ba'i rim-pa* section of the *Gzhung-'grel* is quite complex, it would be tedious to pursue explicitly the parallels between it and the goal division of the radiant light section. But it may be worth setting out the parallel between the latter and what may be regarded as a summary of the former, viz. the *zung-'jug* section of the *Rim-Ingar 'khrid-pa*⁶² After different introductory remarks, both passages give a short account⁶³ of the mode of rising out of the radiant light⁶⁴ including identical summaries of the "reversed"⁶⁵ passage through the four lights, supported by identical quotations from the *Caryāmelāpaka-pradīpa*.⁶⁶ The *Rim-Ingar 'khrid-pa* account then concludes with a summary of how this process differs for the *cig-car-ba*, *thod-rgal-ba* and *rim-gyis-pa*.⁶⁷ The account under the radiant light concludes⁶⁸ with a more detailed version of how this happens for the *cig-car-ba*, most of which occurs again in different bits of the *'bras-bu skye-ba'i rim-pa* section, though not in detail; the reader can work this out for himself.⁶⁹

Other than what has been said, I know of no general principles which clearly or explicitly underlie the division of the goal section of the *Gzhung-'grel* into its own ground, path and goal. It remains therefore to set down what is found in these three divisions. To do so will be, in a sense, to confront what was done in Part I with its proposed application to *yuganaddha*. The general discussion of the present subsection suggests that this application will take two different forms. In the first form, *yuganaddha* either is, or is closely related to, the goal as

set out in general terms in Part I. That there is such an application seems too obvious to need detailed argument, and I shall take what follows as an illustration of this application, regarded as already known to exist. But this is of course not the application for which most of the general discussion of this subsection has been the preparation. Rather, it has been preparation for the application, to the separate ground, path and goal divisions of the *yuganaddha* section, of the ground, path and goal notions in general; and here it is far from obvious or explicit that such an application is intended, apart from the rather indirect evidence already presented. It therefore seems best not to assume or to take for granted that there is such an application, but simply to present a selection of materials, in the hope that the suggestion may be found illuminating by the reader (as I personally feel it is illuminating). Thus Part I provides a set of notions which may well underlie the threefold division of the *yuganaddha* section, and Parts I and II may seem mutually illumined by the idea of this application. Like so many other proposals made by scholars working in this and related fields, the value of the suggestion is perhaps best assessed in terms of its capacity to bring order to the complex materials under discussion.

II.2.2: SOME MATERIALS ON YUGANADDHA AS GROUND, PATH AND GOAL

The reader may find Table 1 a helpful summary of the main verses in the goal section of the *Gzhung*, and the following subsections will contain brief accounts of Padma Dkar-po's comments on a selection of these verses. Textual extracts in Tibetan, corresponding roughly to these accounts, are given in Appendix C.

II.2.2.1: GROUND-YUGANADDHA

Saṃsāra/nirvāṇa ('*khor-ba, myang-'das*)

After defining these terms, Padma Dkar-po says that when the discursiveness (*spros-pa*) which holds *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa* to be different has been abandoned, then no matter how one properly (*yang-dag-par*) analyses the *samādhi* of him who does this properly, since the artificial imposition of duality is broken up these things become one, and so one speaks of *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa* as *integrated.

The talk of two things becoming one is found already in the verse (see Appendix C: *angos-po gcig gyur-pa, ekībhāvah*) and derives from a confusion between two things and two descriptions of a thing. In other

contexts Padma Dkar-po advises abandoning the conflation of these subsumed in the notion of a *don spyi*.

Kleśa/bodhi (*nyon-mongs, byang-chub*)

When the essence of *kleśa* is cognised, by that very fact it becomes thoroughly illuminated and this is bodhi. When they are inseparable, like water and ice, *kleśa* is made the path and this is called *srid-zhi zung-'jug*.

Of course Padma Dkar-po's remark applies only to the *cig-car-ba*.⁷⁰

Grāhya/grāhaka (*gzung-ba, 'dzin-pa*)⁷¹

To claim that there is a substance (*dnegos-po*) involves the judgement (*rtog-pa*) that it has qualities (*rnam-pa-dang-bcas-pa*); to claim that there is no substance (*dnegos-med*) is to base it on emptiness. These errors occur through taking what is to be seen (*blta-bya*) as an object (*gzung-ba*) and what sees it (*lta-byed*) as a subject (*'dzin-pa*). When one rises beyond these errors into the sphere of *pratyātmādhigamajñāna* (*so-so rang-rig-pa'i ye-shes*), the object (*yul*) which is appearance rises as *gdangs* from the sphere of the void, and the owner of the object (*yul-can*) understands *rnam-shes* (*viññana*) as *rang-rig-pa'i ye-shes*, and one speaks of *snang-stong zung-'jug* and *rnam-shes dang ye-shes zung-'jug*.⁷²

II.2.2.2: PATH-YUGANADDHA

Utpattikrama/utpannakrama (*bskyed-rim, rdzogs-rim*)

When non-dual awareness occurs at the time of the *utpattikrama*,⁷³ it has the same pure taste as the awareness of the diety in its own unborn incensancy (*gdangs*), and this making the two stages non-dual is called their *integration.

Pinḍagraha/anubheda (*ril-por 'dzin-pa, rjes-su gzhig-pa*)

To destroy⁷⁴ the illusory body⁷⁵ all at once is *pinḍagraha*; to destroy vessel and contents⁷⁶ separately is *anubheda*. To enter the void, to stay in the radiant light, and to rise from it as the pure and illusory (body) in this way is all done to bring about the rising of the radiant light, and since when this is done there is no movement away from the *gshis*,⁷⁷ the sphere of the radiant light, there is *snang-stong zung-'jug*.

Svādhiṣṭhāna/prabhāsvara (*bdag byin-brlabs, 'od-gsal*)

When the depth of mind as a feature⁷⁸ is not made manifest by anything (else)⁷⁹ it is *abhisambodhi*. What is fit to be the example for all clarity is the *svādhiṣṭhāna*-diety. When that clarity generates it-

self unhindered from that depth, and that depth enlightens that clarity, there is *gsal-stong zung-'jug*.⁸⁰

Prajñopāya (*thabs dang shes-rab*)

Here *upāya* is the white dharma of charity &c. while *prajñā* stands for *prajñāpāramitā*. To abide in any great realization which acts by grasping all the other *pāramitās* with an essenceless *prajñā* is *prajñopāyayuganaddha*.⁸¹

Śūnyatā/karuṇā (*stong-nyid, snying-rje*)

The object or the basis is the sixteen voidnesses, and the subject or what is based on the former is the sixteen compassions. When one knows the path on which subject and object or basis and what is based on it are indivisible, one enters upon action out of desire &c., and this is called *śūnyatakaruṇayuganaddha*. By this desire one cultivates the opposite of the path of action out of great desire, and so it is called a *buddhagocara*.

II.2.2.3: GOAL-YUGANADDHA

Sāśvatoccheda (*rtaḡ-pa dang chad-pa*)

To view (things as) existent is eternalism; to view things as non-existent is nihilism. By whatever word(s) one gets rid of all attachment to the extremes (*mtha*) of existence, non-existence, and lack of either of these, one consecrates the madhyamaka path in which one does not fall into any extremes, and the wise know this as the *yuganaddhakrama* itself. Any other explanation of "lack of extremes" which really contains attachment to some extreme represents a failure to understand the character of *yuganaddha*.

Samvṛti/paramārtha (*kun-rdzob, don-dam*)

This case is discussed at great length in my paper (1983a).

Supta/prabuddha (*gnyid, gnyid sad-pa*)

Here "sleep" (*gnyid*) means the stage of un-knowing, while to wake up (*gnyid sad-pa*) means a one-sided knowing. The state of neither sleep nor waking is that where one has unequivocally and permanently risen up (*sangs-pa*) from this sleep of un-knowing. It is like a lotus flower upon which a bird sits (?) as if upon a broad (*ryas-pa*) field, and so an awareness which cognises everything cognisable is called broad. When these two are *integrated (*zung-du 'jug-pa*) there is buddhahood (*sangs-rygas*).

Kārya/kāraṇa (*bya-ba, byed-pa*)

Since this *yuganaddha*⁸² is the essence (*bdag-nyid*) of all the good of others, action and agent are inseparable.

II.3 Yuganaddha revisited

One may well feel that the account of *yuganaddha* given so far is lacking in something. Part I dealt with ground, path and goal in general, illustrating the great importance, for Padma-Dkar-po, of the notion of *dn̄gos-po'i gn̄as-lugs*.⁸³ So far, Part II has presented a variety of facts about *yuganaddha* and some of Padma Dkar-po's explanations of the *Gzhung* verses on it, without, one might feel, really saying what it is; and in another sense, the notions of ground, path and goal have perhaps been plausibly applied to *something*, but one is not quite sure what. (This is at any rate my personal reaction to the account in the *Gzhung-'grel*.)

Really, we still need a *general* account of *yuganaddha*. Now, in addition to three accounts divided into ground, path and goal in the way we have seen,⁸⁴ Padma Dkar-po has given several general accounts,⁸⁵ but they are too brief and cryptic for a reader who does not already have some partial grasp of his idea of *yuganaddha*, such as is provided by the materials already surveyed; these illustrate the general accounts, which in their turn enable us to see what lies behind the more specific ones. In this section I will extract from the general accounts, especially the one in the *Phyag-chen gan-mdzod*, a synthetic general account which I hope will fill the gap.⁸⁶ Padma Dkar-po is a quite ahistoricist writer, in that he hardly ever defines his position on anything by refuting the views of earlier writers (as, say, Tsong-kha-pa so often does); but on difficult matters like this one he has sometimes clarified his views by *contrasting* them with those of others. Later I will show him doing this; to start off with, it seems a good idea to mimic the procedure by saying a few things about what his notion of *yuganaddha* is not, especially in relation to some of the proposed translations mentioned in section II.1.

There seems to be nothing mystical⁸⁷ about *yuganaddha*, and the materials surveyed give no reason to translate it by "the union of opposites" (Guenther⁸⁸). For instance, *rāgārāgayuganaddha*, far from being the union of *rāga* and its opposite *arāga*, is something lacking in both. Nor is *yuganaddha* a logical relationship such as "coincidence" (Guenther⁸⁹). (It is almost too obvious to be worth saying that it is not a matter of logic that action and agent are *integrated in *yuganaddha*. And even if "coincidence" is not taken as a logical term, it is really obvious that it cannot apply, other than metaphorically,⁹⁰ to cases such as *rāga/arāga* and *puḍgalanairātmyā/dharmanairātmyā*. Similarly for "identity".) Again, *yuganaddha* is supposed to transcend various specific dualities, and perhaps all dualities whatever, but that does not mean that it is something transcendental in the sense of being beyond experience.⁹¹ In particular, it does not seem at all like Kant's "intelligible intuition".⁹²

It may be worth examining a little more closely the claim that *yuganaddha* is part of experience. First, it is not claimed that it is a part of ordinary everyday experience (for no *samādhi* is). Second, the claim is not that it constitutes some kind of (necessary? Kantian?) *ground* of experience.⁹³ Thirdly, the claim is not that it is some fundamental kind of experience from which all others are *derivative* in some sense.⁹⁴ The status of *yuganaddha* as experience begins with the observation, much too neglected by everybody writing on the subject, that it is a *samādhi* (II.1). No claim is made that this *samādhi* is totally without concepts; but what is important to see now is that even a *samādhi* which was totally lacking in concepts would not thereby be removed from experience, any more than a similar dream would be. Such a dream might perhaps be seen by us as an *uninteresting* part of experience, because not connected with the rest in the right ways. But Buddhists do not see this lack of connection as making such experiences uninteresting, indeed the very opposite (hence the interest in dream as one of the six topics of Nāropa and in other ways). The claim, then, is that Padma Dkar-po's notion of *yuganaddha* is consistent with our interpreting it as a kind of experience, a *samādhi* experienced perhaps under unusual conditions of meditation, *abhiṣeka* &c. or by unusually gifted people, but in no way *radically* different from other experiences enjoyed by perfectly ordinary people.⁹⁵

Guenther has frequently used the word "unity" for *yuganaddha* (see note 3); the points made in the last few paragraphs are sufficient reason for rejecting it as a quasi-literal translation, but I find it not without appeal as a metaphor (cf. note 90). What is this appeal based on? Attempts to expand it into such phrases as "unity of experience" and "experience of unity" seem to lead to nothing.⁹⁶ I think some kind of case might be made out for it *if it were made clear that it is a metaphor*; Guenther never does this. But even then, its appeal seems to be mainly a matter of its vague suggestion of a combination of mysticism and logic; and since we now have good reasons for rejecting each of these as irrelevant, we may feel able to reject the combination.

Earlier we noted that Wayman's translations of *yuganaddha*⁹⁷ are all based on the idea of combining two things together. Though to some degree this is intended to reflect the view of Tsong-kha-pa,⁹⁸ it does not reflect any difference in the Tibetan phrases *zung-du 'jug-pa* and *zung-du 'brel-ba* used to translate *yuganaddha*. Phrases like "pair combined" and "pair united" might qualify as literal translations of *zung-du 'brel-ba* but hardly of *zung-du 'jug-pa*. Neither the Sanskrit *yuganaddha* nor the Tibetan *zung-du 'jug-pa* is a colloquial expression with an obvious natural sense, and the analysis into *yuga* + *naddha* and into *zung-du* + *'jug-pa* yields nothing literal because in both cases the second component has no "natural" sense related to these translations (viz. "pair combined," &c.). (Just this fact is reflected in Padma Dkar-po's own ac-

count of the analysis, given in II.1 above.) So really the suggestion that Wayman's translations are literal will not stand up to serious analysis and can itself be no more than metaphorical. Let us ignore for the moment the possibility that these translations are themselves metaphorical. If we do so, their value must be seen as resting not on any *analysis* of the words *yuganaddha* and *zung-'jug*, but rather on the degree to which these words as wholes are as a matter of fact *used* in the sense of "pair combined", &c. Now on the negative interpretation of the verses, such a claim would be simply ridiculous; it can rest only on the positive interpretation; and this involves us with all the difficulties that arise from the easy shift between the two styles of interpretation, to which attention was drawn in section II.2.1. But with this (serious) reservation, the claim is not without merit; it works moderately well (as far as the verses are concerned) for most of the path section (see Table 1) and also for the important case of the two *satya*.⁹⁹ To say this is not to say that it gives the complete sense of the word *yuganaddha* as used here (for instance it omits the *samādhi* element) but it does at least give a central element. It turns out, however, that this element is more central for Tsong-kha-pa than it is for Padma Dkar-po.

So far we have not exploited the striking fact (see Table 1) that most of the important *Gzhung* verses on *yuganaddha* come from the *Pañcakrama*. Now in the *Gzhung-'grel* and his other works on *bsre-'pho*, Padma Dkar-po makes much use of notions from the *Guhyasmāja* cycle, especially in relation to the structuring of the various practices. He also makes much of the idea that the five *krama*, the four *mudra*, and the *ṣaḍāṅgayoga* give rise to alternative structures for what are essentially the same repertoires of *sampannakrama* practices in the *Guhyasamāja*, *Hevajra*, *Cakrasaṃvara*, *Kālacakra* and other tantras. So it is perhaps surprising that he interprets the *yuganaddha* verses not in the style of the father class of tantras (of which the *Guhyasamāja* is the chief) but in the style of the mother class. Before going on to the details of this, it is important to be clear that the difference has nothing to do with *yuganaddha* being *samādhi* or not; for instance the description of it as *samādhi* which opens the '*bras-bu skye-ba'i rim-pa* section of the *Gzhung-'grel* is in a verse from the *Vajramālā*, a father-tantra (indeed, an *ākhyāntantra* of *Guhyasamāja*). Even so, says Padma Dkar-po, the full sense of *yuganaddha* is not revealed in the father-tantras. More generally, the *Gzhung* receives the name *Ḍākinī-upadeśa* (*Mkha-'gro-ma'i man-ngag*) because it is the *Ḍākinīs* who, in the mother-tantra, establish fully yet briefly what is hidden in the father-tantras.¹⁰⁰ This remark is supported by a verse from the *Ḍākārṇavatāntra* (belonging to the mother class) running, "Confidence in the father-tantras comes from understanding the mother-tantras." Accordingly Padma Dkar-po treats the *yuganaddha* verses as mother-tantra, whereas Tsong-kha-pa, taking them from the *Pañcakrama*, of course treats them as father-tantra.

Thus we may expect a difference between the two authors in their styles of interpretation. In order to understand what to expect, we need to know that the differences do not stem merely from *general* disagreement about the distinction between the father and mother tantras; this point needs careful consideration because *prima facie* their views do seem to be rather different and because Tsong-kha-pa's views have not been well-handled in the literature.

Bu-ston and Padma Dkar-po concentrate mainly on listing the various distinctions that are found in the tantras themselves. Bu-ston thought that there are three kinds of Anuttarayogatantras (father, mother, and non-dual), a view he inherited from the Sa-skya school. Padma Dkar-po follows Tsong-kha-pa in holding that there are only two (father and mother). Tsong-kha-pa's attack on the earlier authors is directed mainly at this view of three classes, but at the same time he sought to replace the rather unclear collection of distinctions given by Bu-ston with a single general rule which would apply even to the doubtful cases¹⁰¹ and would provide a *criterion* for the clearer ones. Tsong-kha-pa sought this rule at the point of greatest interest, which also happens to be the point which concerns us, viz. the structure of the *sampannakrama*. (He is amusingly sarcastic on the uselessness of a rule based, say, on differences in the number of heads and arms of the dieties.) He states the rule and summarizes the argument behind it as follows:¹⁰²

"The explanation of the well-established opinion on the distinction of the anuttarayogatantras as prajñā and upāya, as given in the Vajrapañjaratantra &c.

"How indeed should one distinguish them as father and mother tantras? Though it is generally held that they are to be distinguished through their utpattikrama cycle, really the difference is mainly one of the sampannakrama. If we take bliss and emptiness (bde-stong) as means and insight (thabs-shes, upāya and prajñā) respectively, individual tantras cannot be distinguished; all must be called non-dual as above.

In the present context this distinction cannot be maintained, either generally or in detail. For in what are accepted by everybody as mother-tantras, such as Hevajra, mainly bliss is taught, but not in the Guhyasamāja &c., so there would be the absurdity that the Hevajra would be a father- and the Guhyasamāja a mother-tantra.

"Thus as far as the distinction of upāya-tantra and prajñā-tantra by means of the sampannakrama goes, prajñā must mean paramārthamahāsukha-jñāna, while upāya must mean samvṛti-māyādeha. Of these points, the first is about the mother-tantras and is found in the 13th. chapter of the Vajrapañjara:

*'Prajñāpāramitā as means is called yoginī;
Entry into tattva by union (with) mahāmudra
Is called yoginītantra.'*

Tsong-kha-pa then explains in more detail how this verse is to be understood in terms of the descent and ascent of bodhicitta, &c. This brilliant and thoroughly convincing piece of analysis is ruined by Mkhas-grub-rje¹⁰³ by the omission of most of the important points and the general vagueness and equivocation in what remains. (Given this unpromising material, it is not surprising that Lessing and Wayman's translation is incomprehensible; but they make matters worse by their indifference to the meanings of the technical terms.) Now Tsong-kha-pa's analysis is brilliant; but it leads straight to the conclusion desired by Padma Dkar-po, namely that the rule is intelligible only if the terms *prajñā* and *upāya* are taken in the mother-tantra sense, standing respectively for bliss and emptiness. For Padma Dkar-po this last point is very natural, since he regards the basic emptiness not as *svabhāva-śūnyatā* but as *sarvākāravāropetaśūnyatā* which is *saṃvṛti-satya* (not *paramārtha* as with the Jo-nang-pas) and is means (*upāya*) and which describes the diety, just as in the first line of the verse. *Paramārtha* here is great bliss. Padma Dkar-po follows Bu-ston in his statement of the *sampānnakrama* distinction:¹⁰⁴

"The mother-tantras show entry into *tattva* by the union (*sbyor-bas*) of *prajñāpāramitā-upāya* in *mahāmudrā*. The father-tantras mainly show the *svādhiṣṭhānakrama* and *abhisambodhikrama*."

The first of these remarks reflects the language of the *Vajrapañjara* verse (which they and everybody else quote) while the second comes from a verse from the *Ḍākāṛṇavatantra* which is also quoted by everybody. Of course Bu-ston and Padma Dkar-po list many other modes of distinction which are not accepted by Tsong-kha-pa, but these are irrelevant here; it is obvious from Padma Dkar-po's discussion in the *Phyag-chen gan-mdzod* that it was this particular point about the *sampānnakrama* that he had in mind when describing Tsong-kha-pa's treatment as *pha'i lugs*, and not the others. Padma Dkar-po also appears to follow Bu-ston in describing the distinctions between father- and mother-tantras as provisional (*drang-don*, *neyārtha*) whereas ultimately or really (*nges-don-du*) all the anuttarayogatantras are non-dual as between *prajñā* and *upāya*.¹⁰⁵ Tsong-kha-pa does not make this point. But this appearance of difference is an illusion, since Padma Dkar-po's use of these terms differs from that of Bu-ston and Tsong-kha-pa somewhat.¹⁰⁶ All Padma Dkar-po means is that the more advanced person will understand the ultimate purpose (*mthar-thug-gi don*) without all this explanation, while the somewhat less advanced person needs to supplement the father-tantra with the mother-tantra, as explained above. (The least advanced person cannot go further than what the father-tantras strictly and literally say, and part of Padma Dkar-po's complaint is that Tsong-kha-pa does not appear to offer more than this.)¹⁰⁷

Roughly speaking, then, the two authors agreed that the father-tantras concentrate more on the separate stages of the *sampannakrama* practices, while the mother-tantras tend to prefer a more unified or holistic approach. Hence the phrase “fully yet briefly” (*tshig nyung-ngus zhib-mor*) mentioned a few paragraphs ago in connection with the phrase *Dākini-upadeśa*. And now, taking the last few paragraphs together, we can see part of what, in Padma Dkar-po’s view, lies behind his differences with Tsong-kha-pa over *yuganaddha*. For Padma Dkar-po, the notion of *yuganaddha* is to be understood in a unified or holistic way, the analysis into pairs and their modes of combination being secondary and relatively unimportant. For Tsong-kha-pa the notion is one of combination, the constituents being as it were primary and their combination, as a *product* of those constituents, secondary. More generally, for Padma Dkar-po what is primary is the buddha-knowledge (*sangs-rgyas-kyi ye-shes*) or *sahajajñāna* (*lhan-cig skyes-pa’i ye-shes*). This corresponds roughly to the *anuloma* (*lugs ’byung-ba*) approach. For Tsong-kha-pa (as Padma Dkar-po sees him) what is primary are the components, say the two *satya* or the two *krama*,¹⁰⁸ and it is only when these are known separately (cf. YK13) that they can then be combined in *yuganaddha*. This corresponds roughly to the *pratiloma* (*lugs ldog-pa*) approach.

Now we can see why the translations of *yuganaddha* proposed by Wayman are so much less unsatisfactory for Tsong-kha-pa than for Padma Dkar-po. They reflect precisely the emphasis on analysis as against a holistic view, on the *pratiloma* as against the *anuloma*, on the father against the mother tantra, of which it might be excessive to say that they run right through Tsong-kha-pa’s way of thinking, but which certainly seem to inform his style of exposition.¹⁰⁹

Two aspects of Padma Dkar-po’s view of *yuganaddha* should be seen in relation to his discussion of Tsong-kha-pa. First, there is the primacy of the combination over its terms (or rather the claim that *yuganaddha* is *not* just a combination of terms). Second, there are proper and improper ways of combining the terms. Really these two cannot be cleanly separated. When one still thinks mainly in terms of combining two things, there is *śaikṣayuganaddha*. When the question of combining two terms no longer arises because they are seen and known as aspects of a single situation, there is *aśaikṣayuganaddha*. But these two also cannot be cleanly separated, for two reasons. First, as already mentioned, *śaikṣayuganaddha* already is the real thing, as far as it goes; and second, if the mode of combination is wrong we do not even have *śaikṣayuganaddha*, we just have a mistake. To put it another way, *śaikṣa* is *aśaikṣa*, only seen in the father-tantra way, while *aśaikṣa* is *śaikṣa*, seen in the mother-tantra way. As so often, the mistake is to treat a relational difference or a difference in points of view as a difference of two distinct items. When one reads Padma Dkar-po’s discus-

sion of Tsong-kha-pa, one tends to be more impressed by his points about the modes of combination because there are more of them and they are more detailed and seem easier to grasp; but the point about the father-tantra is there explicitly¹¹⁰ and indeed without it the details do not make sense.

Let us consider some of these details for the case of *svādhiṣṭhāna/ prabhāsvara*. Padma Dkar-po's own view, given in the *Gzhung-'grel*, is found above, under *path-yuganaddha*. He uses the description in terms of depth and clarity in a similar way in at least five other places¹¹¹ (twice quoting Nāropa, in fact from the *Sekoddeśaṭīkā*, and once in the *Vimalaprabhā*; apparently this line of thought comes from the *Kālacakra-tantra*). In all these materials Padma Dkar-po is unrelenting in his insistence that the two elements cannot be separated.¹¹² But he says that Tsong-kha-pa, after quoting the verse, says that the illusory body which is *saṃvṛti* and *svādhiṣṭhāna*, and the radiant light which is *paramārtha* are two halves, and when these are inseparably merged (*'dus-pa*), that level is called *zung-'jug*.¹¹³ Padma Dkar-po's own phrase for what happens is "not two in (its) nature" (*gnyis-su med-pa'i rang-bzhin*¹¹⁴). These examples illustrate what I called the difference in point of view, the difference between the father- and mother-tantra styles of explanation.

Now for some of the specific differences on the mode of combination. Tsong-kha-pa continues by saying that since *zung-'jug* cannot be understood unless the two halves have been understood, he will go on to explain them (I omit this). Now in the *abhisambodhikrama* there is no illusory body, while in the *svādhiṣṭhānakrama* there is no radiant light.¹¹⁵ It is because these appear alternately that there is no *yuganaddha*¹¹⁶ (and because of this it would be irrelevant to take the previous remark as being about the practices rather than what appears in them). But when the forward (*anuloma*) and backward (*pratiloma*) processes of going in and out of the radiant light go on at the same time,¹¹⁷ so that the essence (*ngo-bo; rūpa?*) of the two is (are?) inseparable¹¹⁸ there is *yuganaddha*.

We know by now that Padma Dkar-po will see this whole approach as misconceived: far from *zung-'jug* not being understood until the two halves are understood, they cannot be understood except in relation to it. But now I want to concentrate on what he has to say about the mode of combination. *Zung-'jug*, Padma Dkar-po says,¹¹⁹ is not simply the merging, according to the method of the father-tantra, of two different items like the two horns of an ox. In any case, these two items are too dissimilar to merge in the way suggested by the analogy. They are even mutually repugnant; for since *samāhita* (*mnyam-bzhag*) is, on this view, without appearances, there can be no *saṃvṛti* in it,¹²⁰ and vice-versa. Similarly, if *asaikṣayuganaddha* arose through complete purification by entering the radiant light by means of *piṇḍagraha* and *anubheda*,

then *saṃvṛti-satya*, being impure, could not belong to it (and there is a contradiction).¹²¹ So for Padma Dkar-po, the mode of combination (in this class of cases) is not the merging of two quite different (even repugnant) items; the two items have to suit one another, as it were. In this case he ensures this by demanding that *saṃvṛti-satya* (of which the *svādhiṣṭhānakrama* is a particular case) contains *purified* appearances,¹²² rather than impure ones, as with Tsong-kha-pa. (In the language of Part I, *saṃvṛti-satya* is part of *dngos-po'i gnas-lugs*). Again, for Padma Dkar-po, *paramārtha-satya* contains *purified appearances*¹²³ rather than being merely empty of content. We see here Padma Dkar-po combining something like the three levels of *satya* used by Bhāvaviveka¹²⁴ (i.e. *saṃvṛti* and *pariyāya-* and *niṣpariyāya-paramārtha*) with the three levels used by Candrakīrti (*saṃvṛti-mātra*, and *saṃvṛti-* and *paramārtha-satya*).¹²⁵

The point that the *integrated items have to suit one another in the first place illustrates again the overriding importance for Padma Dkar-po of the combination over its constituents. Also the notion of *yuganaddha* does not seem to contain within itself any single or unified notion of a mode of combination; the different pairs are combined together in different ways (to give the right kind of result, as it were). (This point tends to be masked by the concentration of attention on the two *satya* and their instances.) Each of these points shows separately that for Padma Dkar-po there is no such thing as *yuganaddha* considered mainly as a relational concept (in abstraction from its other elements). The various pairs, considered merely as related, do not *in their being related* have anything more in common than their merely being *related*; and of course this is not enough to form even the basis of the notion of *yuganaddha* as the goal of Vajrayāna. This point is apt to be obscured by the importance of the constituents, in the cases usually discussed (*saṃsāra/nirvāṇa*, the two *satya*, the illusory body and the radiant light). One goes along with the vague idea, encouraged by the current translations and perhaps by Tsong-kha-pa's treatment, that these things only have to be seen as *related* in the right way, and the task is completed. But a glance at some of the other cases (*rāga/arāga*, *piṇḍagraha/anubheda* &c.) is enough to see that this is an illusion, that the different "relationships" have nothing in common and that the nub of the idea must be somewhere quite different. I suggested that Tsong-kha-pa's treatment encourages the illusion, but I am far from certain that he himself succumbed to it; the encouragement comes from his reliance on the father-tantras. This is of course Padma Dkar-po's very first point (cf. note 119); it should not be allowed to detract from the sharpness of his criticisms about the mode of combination.

* * * * *

Perhaps the time has come to say briefly why I prefer Seyfort Ruegg's choice of "integration" over all the other suggested translations of *yuganaddha*, *zung-'jug*. "Integration" seems to cover well the "merging" (*'dus-pa*) attributed to Tsong-kha-pa; and for Padma Dkar-po, "Integration-*samādhi*" seems to be the right kind of metaphor to convey the idea behind *zung-'jug-gi ting-nge-'dzin*, as he used this phrase. Integration is a kind of action (in the broadest possible sense); "integration-*samādhi*" suggests a *samādhi* in which various different kinds of viewpoint are, well, integrated; and I think this metaphor is about the best we can expect. (Because it is a metaphor, and not one naturally suggested by our own cultural context, I like to keep the asterisk: *integration.) This paper has not dealt with the Sa-skya view of *zung-'jug*; but I suspect it will be covered by the proposal, as being somewhere in between the two views just mentioned.¹²⁶

Earlier I mentioned that "pair-combined" &c. might perhaps also be intended to be read as metaphors. Well, perhaps they might. But I think it is clear by now that the *suggestive* power of this and similar phrases will not accomplish anything presently relevant which is not accomplished by their literal meaning.¹²⁷

* * * * *

At the end of section II.2.1, I suggested that the application to the notion of *yuganaddha* of the ideas of Part I might be expected to take two forms. First, *yuganaddha* is itself the goal; and second, being divided into ground, path and goal, it might be expected to illustrate this division as discussed in general in Part I.

There are plenty of illustrations of the first form of application. One example: the radiant light is the climax of the path, and its path-*section* describes the meditation techniques of *pinḍagraha* and *anubheda* (*ril-'dzin* and *rjes-gzhig*). In the path-division of *yuganaddha* we again find these two techniques, about which the verse says that when they, together with the three phases of entering, staying in and rising from the radiant light, become identical, there is *yuganaddha*; and we saw Padma Dkar-po explain this by saying that they become identical inasmuch as there is no movement away from the radiant light. Thus the *specific* techniques described as part of the radiant light doctrine have as their *specific* goal or culmination what is described under the same heading in *yuganaddha*. Similar remarks can be made about other aspects of *yuganaddha*, as correlated with the culmination or the goal of other parts of the path.

The example mentioned also illustrates the second form of application. For *pinḍagraha/anubheda* is (part of) *yuganaddha as the path*, and this is the culmination of what is described under the radiant light *as*

the path (in both senses of this phrase). Similarly, when all the other things which fall under the two *satya* have been *integrated, nothing more remains to be done and the goal has been attained, and so the *yuganaddha* of the two *satya* as the goal *in general* coincides with the goal of the various path-parts of *yuganaddha* (falling themselves, of course, under the *satya*). It is easy to give more illustrations of this theme.

These two different ways of looking at *piṇḍagraha/anubheda* can be summarized in a rather slogan-like way thus: The culmination of the path is the path-aspect of the culmination. And along these lines we can see the two applications to *yuganaddha* of the ground/path/goal distinction as reflecting a single vision in two different ways.

* * * * *

When stripped of the accretions imposed upon them by Western authors, the doctrines discussed in this paper emerge as rational (though not rationalistic) and sensible (though not commonsensical). I think this becomes clearer when we look at the sources of the remaining obscurities. One very fundamental thing not explained here is the notion of a non-discursive cognition or knowledge (*nirvikalpajñāna*, *rnam-par mi-rtog-pa'i ye-shes*), upon which depend Padma Dkar-po's conception of *paramārtha-satya* and of *dnagos-po'i gnas-lugs* and also that part of the radiant light doctrine needed for our present purposes.¹²⁸ Another thing which remains obscure is how it comes about that a person who has attained *yuganaddha* then goes on to all the *siddhi* of *mahāmudra*, including all the buddha's powers and qualities, especially the ethically important power of effortless (*lhun-grub*) action &c. However only the connection of *yuganaddha* with buddhahood depends on these *siddhi*, not the notion of *yuganaddha* itself. In my view the complete notion of buddhahood does have something transcendental about it (cf. *tathāgata*) but whatever it is, it is to be explained in terms of *yuganaddha* and not vice-versa, at least as far as Padma Dkar-po is concerned. More important, both *nirvikalpajñāna* and the buddha's powers and qualities form an integral part of the Mahāyāna as a whole; neither they nor any obscurity or mysteriousness in them have anything specific to do with Tibetan thought or with the tantras. Apart from whatever support he draws from these two general features of the Mahāyāna, then, Padma Dkar-po's accounts of tantra as continuity, of the three tantras of ground, path and goal, and of *yuganaddha*, seem rational enough. And their difficulties, such as they are, can be considered independently of the obscurities, much greater in my view, of the six topics of Nāropa, the cosmological aspects of the doctrine,¹²⁹ the (perhaps psychological) doctrine of *manomāyākāya*, and many other matters.

Because of these further obscurities, it may be too early to suggest that Tibetan thought *in general* and Vajrayāna thought *in general* may not have quite that special degree of obscurity and mysteriousness which they often seem to have in Western accounts. Be that as it may, here I have shown how to understand some of the leading conceptions of one of Tibet's most important Vajrayāna writers as little *more* obscure or mysterious than certain well-known features of the whole Mahāyāna.

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[For Appendix A, see Part I]

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APPENDIX B

PADMA DKAR-PO'S BSRE-'PHO WORKS:
OUTLINE OF THE SA-BCAD

- gang 'jug-pa rten-gyi gang-zag, 8a4::5a5
 gang-du 'jug-pa'i lam-la gnyis
 cig-car-du 'jug-pa'i lam-la gnyis
 bsdu-pa'i don, 10b5::6a2 (given in Appendix A)
 mngon-par rtogs-pa gtan-la dbab-pa-la gsum
 dngos-po'i gnas-lugs-la gnyis
 lus dngos-po'i gnas-lugs-la gnyis
 rags-rim-nas ngos-bzung*, 14b1::7b5
 phra-rim gtan-la dbab-pa-la bzhi
 lus ji-ltar grub-pa'i tshul, 24b1::c.8a3
 rtsa dngos-po'i gnas-lugs, 45a6::10b1
 rlung dngos-po'i gnas-lugs, 74a3::11b5
 byang-sems dngos-po'i gnas-lugs, 97b4::13a4
 sems dngos-po'i gnas-lugs-la gsum
 gzhi phyag-rgya chen-po gtan-la dbab, 115a2::14b1
 lam phyag-rgya chen-po nyams-su blang, 120a4::15a3
 'bras-bu phyag-rgya chen-po mngon-du 'gyur-ba, 128b3::15b3
 lam-la gnyis
 smin-byed-kyi dbang, 129b6::16a6
 grol-bar byed-pa'i lam-la gnyis
 rim gnyis bsgom-tshul spyir-bshad*, 142a6::17a6
 mngon-par rtogs-pa so-sor gtan-la dbab-pa-la gnyis
 bskyed-rim, 147b4:18a4
 rdzogs-rim-la-gnyis
 mdor-bstan*, 164a2::19a3
 rgyas-bshad-la brgyad
 gtum-mo lam-gyi gzhi-ma, 179b6::20a6
 las-rgya lam-gyi 'bogs-don, 278b2::x
 sgyu-lus lam-gyi srog-zhing, 310a6::77a5
 rmi-lam lam-gyi drod-tshad, 324b1::87b4
 'od-gsal lam-gyi snying-po, 331a1::94b6
 bar-do lam-gyi blo-chod, 345b6::108a4
 'pho-ba lam-gyi bsun-ma, 360b6::119b3
 grong-'jug lam-gyi 'thud-ma, 368a4::133b3
 'bras-bu skye-ba'i rim-pa-la gsum
 lta-ba rnam-dag zung-'jug-gi ting-nge-'dzin bslab-tshul-la gsum
 gzhi zung-'jug rtogs-tshul, 370a5::136a4
 lam zung-'jug bsgom-tshul, 372a3::136b3
 'bras-bu zung-'jug 'char-tshul, 374a3::137a1
 sgom-pa rnam-dag zung-'jug-gi ting-nge-'dzin bslab-tshul, x::137b4
 spyod-pa rnam-dag zung-'jug-gi ting-nge-'dzin bslab-tshul-la gnyis
 chags-can-gyi spyod-pa, x::138b1
 chags-bral-gyi spyod-pa, x::139b5
 rim-gyis 'jug-pa'i lam, 378b3::x

References: 8a4::5a5 means *gzhung-'grel* 8a4, *khrid-yig* 5a5; x = absent

(The sections marked * contain especially useful summaries of the reasons why the sections following them are organized as shown here.)

APPENDIX C

SOME VERSES ON YUGANADDHA, WITH EXTRACTS FROM PADMA DKAR-PO'S COMMENTS ON THEM.

The verses are headed by the Sanskrit words used in Table 1 and in sec. II.2.2. Each heading is followed by the verse itself (as Padma Dkar-po quotes it from the *Gzhung*), and then, following the ligature །, an extract from Padma Dkar-po's commentary (cf. II.2.2).

Bibliographic information may be found in Table 1.

Samsāra/nirvāṇa

འཁོར་བ་དང་ནི་སྤྲུང་ན་འདས། །རྟོག་པ་གཉིས་པོ་སྤངས་
 ནས་ནི། །གང་དུ་དངོས་པོ་གཅིག་གུར་པ། །རྩང་དུ་འཇུག་
 ཅེས་དེ་ལ་བཤད། ། །འཁོར་བ་དང་སྤྲུང་འདས་གཉིས་
 སྤྱུ་འཛིན་པའི་སྤྲོས་པ་རྣམ་པར་སྤངས་ནས་ཡང་དག་པའི་
 ཚུལ་གྱི་བདག་ཉིད་ཅན་གྱི་ཉིང་ངེ་འཛིན་གང་དུ་ཡང་དག་
 པར་འཇོག་པར་མཛད་པ། །གཉིས་སྤྱུ་བཅོས་མའི་རྩོལ་.....
 རིག་པའི་ཕྱིར་དངོས་པོ་གཅིག་ཏུ་གྱུར་པས་འདི་ལ་འཁོར་
 འདས་རྩང་འཇུག་ཅེས་བུའོ། །

Kleśa/bodhi

ཀུན་ནས་ཉོན་མོངས་དང་རྣམ་པར་གྲུབ་པ། །དོན་དམ་ཉིད་དུ་.....
 ཞེས་ནས་སྟུ། །གང་གི་གཅིག་ཏུ་སྦྱོད་གྱུར་པ། །དེ་ཡིས་.....
 ཟུང་འཇུག་ཞེས་པའོ། ། །ཉོན་མོངས་པ་དང་ཉེ་བའི་.....
 ཉོན་མོངས་པ་གམས་ཅད་རྣམ་པར་གྲུབ་ཞིང་བསལ་བས་
 བ་རྣམ་པར་གྲུབ་སྟེ། ... ཉོན་མོངས་པ་དེ་དག་གི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་.....
 ཞེས་པས་དེ་དག་ཉིད་དེའི་རྣམ་པར་གྲུབ་བར་སྐྱང་བའི་.....
 ཡིས། །ལྷག་པ་དང་ཚུ་བཞིན་དུ་དབྱེར་མི་ཡིད་པས་ཉོན་
 མོངས་པ་ལམ་དུ་བྱེད་པ་ནི། །སྲིད་ཞི་ཟུང་འཇུག་ཅེས་
 བུའོ། །

Grāhya/grāhaka [and sākāra/nirākāra]

དངོས་པོ་རྣམ་བཅས་ཀུན་རྟོག་དང་། །དངོས་པོ་མེད་པར་
 རྟོག་པ་དག །གཟུང་བ་དང་ནི་འཇིན་པ་ཞེས། །རྣམ་
 གཉིས་སྟོན་ཡོད་མེད་གྱི། །གང་དུ་མི་ཡིད་སྟོ་ཡོད་པ། །དེ་



མི་རྒྱུ་འཕུག་ཅེས་བྱས་བཤད། ། །དངོས་པོ་སྟེ་མམ་པ་.....
 དང་བཅས་པར་རྟོག་པ་དང་། དངོས་པོ་མེད་པ་ཞེས་སྟོང་..
 རྒྱུ་དུ། [༧]སྟོན་པ་བཟུ་བྱ་གརྒྱུ་བ་དང་། ལྟ་བུའི་འཛིན་..
 པའི་དབང་གི་ཚོར་བར་ཤེས་པ་སྟེ། སོ་སོ་རང་རིག་པའི་ཡེ་
 ཤེས་ཀྱི་ངང་དུ་བཟུ་བར་བྱ་བ་དང་ལྟ་བར་བྱེད་པའི་འཁྲུལ་
 བ་སངས་པས་ ... ཡོད་མེད་ཀྱི་སྟོང་བཏགས་ཞིག་ནས། ཡུལ་
 རྣམ་བཅུའི་སྟོང་པའི་ངང་གདངས་སུ་ཤར། ཡུལ་ཅན་.....
 མམ་ཤེས་ཉིད་རང་རིག་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེས་སུ་རྟོགས་པས་རྣམ་
 རྟོང་རྒྱུ་འཕུག་དང་། མམ་ཤེས་དང་ཡེ་ཤེས་རྒྱུ་དུ་
 འཕུག་པ་ཞེས་བྱའོ། །

Utpattikrama/utpannakrama

བསྐྱེད་པའི་རིམ་པ་འདི་གཅིག་ཡིན། །གཞན་ཡང་རྫོགས་.....
 པའི་རིམ་པ་དག །གཉིས་པོ་གང་དུ་གཅིག་གྱུར་པ། །དེ་ནི་
 རྒྱུ་དུ་འཕུག་པར་བཤད། ། །བསྐྱེད་རིམ་གྱི་དུས་དེ་ཉིད་..
 དུ། རྒྱུ་བཅེད་པའི་རང་གདངས་ལྟར་ཤེས་པའི་རོ་མཉམ་



གྱི་དག་པས་བསྐྱེད་ཚོགས་གཉིས་སུ་མེད་པར་བྱས་པ་ནི་.....
བསྐྱེད་རིམ་ཚོགས་རིམ་དང་རྩུང་འཇུག་ཅེས་སོ། །

Pinḍagraha/anubheda

རིལ་པོར་འཇིན་དང་ཇིས་གཞིག་དང་། །འཇུག་དང་དེ་.....
བཞིན་གནས་པ་དང་། །དེ་ནས་གང་དུ་ཕྱང་གྱུར་པ། །
མཉམ་གྱུར་རྩུང་དུ་འཇུག་པའོ། །། །སྐྱུ་ལུས་དུས་གཅིག་.....
ལ་གཞིག་པ་རིལ་འཇིན། །སྣོད་བཅུད་གཉིས་རིམ་པས་.....
གཞིག་པ་ཇིས་གཞིག །ཚུལ་དེས་སྣོད་པར་འཇུག་པ་དང་།
འོད་གསལ་ལ་ལ་གནས་པ་དང་། །དེ་ནས་ཚུལ་སྟ་ལྟར་.....
དག་པའི་སྐྱུ་མར་ཕྱང་བ་ཐམས་ཅད་འོད་གསལ་གྱི་འཆར་.....
སྣོ་ལས་བྱེད་ལ། །བྱེད་དུས་དེར་ཡང་གཞིས་འོད་གསལ་.....
གྱི་ངང་ལས་མ་གཡོས་པའི་ཕྱིར་སྣང་སྣོད་རྩུང་འཇུག །

Svādhiṣṭhāna/prabhāsvara

དེ་ཉིད་ཤེས་པའི་རིམ་ཤེས་ནས། །བདག་བྱིན་བརྒྱབ་དང་..



འོད་གསལ་གཤམ། །དེ་ཉིད་ལ་ནི་འདུས་པ་གང་། །རྩུང་དུ་
 འཕྲུག་པའི་རིམ་པའོ། །། །སེམས་ཀྱི་གནས་ལུགས་ཟབ་
 པ་གང་གིས་ཀྱང་མི་མཚོན་པས་མངོན་བྱུང་། གསལ་བ་
 བྲམས་ཅད་ཀྱི་དཔེར་རུང་བ་བདག་གིས་སྒྲུབས་ཀྱི་ལྷ། ཟབ་
 པ་དེ་ལས་གསལ་བ་འགོག་པ་མེད་པར་རང་བྱུང་ཞིང་།
 གསལ་བ་དེ་ཡང་ཟབ་པའི་ངོ་བོར་བྱུང་ཆུབ་པས་གསལ་
 ལྷོང་རྩུང་འཕྲུག་གོ། །

Prajñopāya

ཐབས་དང་ཤེས་རབ་སྙོམ་འཕྲུག་པས། །ཐམས་ཅད་
 བསྐྱུས་ནས་ཤེས་གྱུར་པ། །ནལ་འབྱོར་ཚེན་པོ་གང་དུ་
 གནས། །དེ་ནི་རྩུང་དུ་འཕྲུག་པར་འགྱུར། །། །ཐབས་ནི་
 སྦྱིན་སོགས་དཀར་པོའི་ཚོས། །ཤེས་རབ་ནི་ཤེས་ཕྱིན་ཏེ།
 པ་རོལ་དུ་ཕྱིན་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པའི་ཤེས་
 རབ་གྱིས་ཟེན་པར་སྦྱོང་པའི་ནལ་འབྱོར་ཚེན་པོ་གང་ལ་
 གནས་པ་ནི་ཐབས་ཤེས་རྩུང་འཕྲུག་གོ། །



Sūnyatā/karuṇā

ལྷོང་ཉིད་སྟོང་ཇི་གཅིག་པ་ནི། །ཤེས་ནས་གང་དུ་འཇུག་.....
 གུར་པ། །རྩང་འཇུག་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་ཤད་པ་སྟེ། །རིམ་འདི་...
 སངས་རྒྱུས་སྟོང་ཡུལ་ལོ། ། །ཡུལ་ལའམ་རྟེན་གྱི་ཆ་.....
 བས་སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་བཅུ་དུག་དང་། །ཡུལ་ཅན་ནའམ་བརྟེན་...
 པའི་ཆ་ནས་སྟོང་ཇི་བཅུ་དུག་སྟེ། །ཡུལ་ཡུལ་ཅན་ནའམ་...
 རྟེན་བརྟེན་པ་མི་ཕྱིད་པའི་ལམ་ཤེས་ནས་འདོད་ཆགས་ལ་
 སོགས་པའི་སྟོང་པ་ལ་འཇུག་པ་ནི་སྟོང་ཉིད་སྟོང་ཇི་རྩང་.....
 འཇུག་གོ། །འདི་ནི་འདོད་ཆགས་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་འདོད་ཆགས་...
 ཆེན་པོར་སྟོང་པའི་ལམ་བརྟོག་པའི་སྒོམ་པ་ཡིན་པས་.....
 སངས་རྒྱུས་ཀྱི་སྟོང་ཡུལ་ཁེས་སྟོས་སོ། །

Sāsvatoccheda

རྟག་དང་ཆད་པའི་སྟོང་དང་ནི། །གང་ཞིག་སྤངས་ནས་རབ་...
 གནས་པའི། །རྩང་དུ་འཇུག་པའི་རིམ་པ་ནི། །དེ་ཉིད་ཤེས་...
 བ་མཁས་པ་ཡིན། ། །ཡོད་པར་ལྟ་བུ་རྟག་ལྟ། མེད་པར་...



ལྟ་བུ་ཆད་ལྟ། གང་ཞིག་གི་སྒྲིམ་ཡོད་མེད་གཉིས་ཀ་དང་།
 གཉིས་ཀ་མ་ཡིན་པར་འཇིན་པའི་མཐའ་ཐམས་ཅད་དང་།
 བྲལ་ཞིང་མཐའ་བྲལ་དུ་ཡང་མ་ལྟོང་བའི་དབུ་མའི་ལམ་།
 ལ་རབ་དུ་གནས་པས་རྩང་འཇུག་གི་རིམ་པ་དེ་ཉིད་ཤེས་།
 ར་མཁས་པ་ཡིན་ལ། གཞན་དུ་མཐའ་བྲལ་བཤད་ཀྱང་།
 མཐར་འཇིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རྩང་འཇུག་མཚན་ཉིད་པ་མི་རྟོགས་
 སོ། །

Samvṛti/paramārtha

ཀྱན་ཚོལ་དང་ནི་དོན་དམ་དག །སོ་སོའི་ཆར་ནི་ཤེས་ནས་
 ལྟ། །གང་དུ་ཡང་དག་ཤེས་གྱུར་ཉི། །རྩང་དུ་འཇུག་ཅེས་།
 དེ་ལ་བཤད། །། །ཟག་པ་མེད་པའི་བདེ་བ་ཆེན་པོ་གཅིག་།
 ཉིད་ནམ་པའི་སྟེང་པའི་མཚོག་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱི་སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་
 དུ་འཆར་བས་བདེན་གཉིས་རྩང་འཇུག་སྟེ།

Supta/prabuddha

གཉིད་ལོག་པ་དང་སད་པ་སྟེ། །གནས་སྐབས་གཉིས་པོ་
 སྤངས་པ་ནི། །གཉིད་ལོག་པ་དང་རྣམ་བུལ་བ། །རྩང་
 འཇུག་ཡིན་པར་སྟོན་པས་གསུངས། ། །གཉིད་ནི་མ་རིག་
 པའི་གནས་སྐབས། གཉིད་སད་པ་ནི་ཡ་རིག་པ་དེ་དང་.....
 བུལ་བའི་སྐབས་ཞེས་རྣམ་པར་དབྱེར་བ་མེད་དེ་དུས་ཉུག་
 ཏུ་མ་རིག་པའི་གཉིད་ལས་སངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེ་ཉིད་
 པདྨ་ཁ་དབྱེ་ཞིང་རྒྱས་པ་དང་འདྲ་བར་ཤེས་བྱ་ཐམས་ཅད་
 མཐུན་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེས་ཡིན་པས་རྒྱས་པ་སྟེ། རྩང་དུ་འཇུག་པ།
 དེའི་ཕྱིར་སངས་རྒྱས་སོ། །

Kārya/kāraṇa

བྱ་བ་དང་ནི་བྱེད་པ་དག །མ་ཕྱིད་པ་ཡི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད། །
 གནས་ནས་རྣལ་འབྱོར་པས་ཤེས་པ། །རྩང་དུ་འཇུག་པར་
 དེ་བཤད་དོ། ། །རྩང་འཇུག་དེ་ཉིད་གཞན་གྱི་དོན་ཐམས་
 ཅད་པའི་བདག་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་བྱ་བ་དང་བྱེད་པ་པོ་.....
 ཞེས་རྣམ་པར་དབྱེ་བར་མེད་དེ།



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 HT: Hevajra-tantra, ed. and trans. Snellgrove
 MMV: Madhyamakāvatāra
 MSL: Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra
 PK: Pañcakrama, ed. Poussin
 PPD: Pradīpoddyotana, sde-dge
 Śikṣ.: Śikṣasamuccaya
 (For Tilopa's *Āha-pramāṇa samyag-nāma dākiṇī-upadeśa*, see Gzhung under Padma Dkar-po in the Tibetan section.)

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- Dol-po Shes-rab Rgyal-mtshan
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 Rgyud bla-ma'i grel-pa *Legs-bshad nyi-ma'i od-zer*
- Bu-ston
Gsang-'dus bshad-thabs: Gsang-ba 'dus-pa'i rgyud-'grel-gyi bshad-thabs-kyi yan-lag gsang-ba'i sgo-'byed, gsung-'bum vol. 8
Pradīpoddyotana-ṭikā, ibid.
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 Rgyud-sde spyi'i rnam-bzhag rgyud-sde *Gsang-ba gsal-byed, ibid.*
- Tsong-kha-pa (from the 18-vol. bka-'bum)
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-

Mi-bskyod Rdo-rje

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Sgam-po-pa Bkra-shis Rnam-rgyal

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NOTES

1. Though Guenther (Pers. 101) draws attention to the different views of Tsong-kha-pa and the Bka'-brgyud-pas, he mentions only Padma Dkar-po among the latter (and this only elsewhere).

2. On the particular issue of *bden-gnyis zung-'jug* (*yuganaddha* of the two *satya*) and its special cases *svādhiṣṭhāna/prabhāsvara* &c.. Padma Dkar-po has reviewed Tsong-kha-pa's views at some length at *Phyag-chen gan-mdzod* 155a6 ff. See below and Broido (1983a). This passage seems to form the basis for Guenther's remarks mentioned in note 1. See below also for Padma Dkar-po's view of the difference between *zung-'jug* in the sūtras and the tantras. (On Padma Dkar-po and other Bka'-brgyud-pas on the sūtra/tantra distinction in general, see again my paper (1983a)).

3. RS 29, Y 206-7 (many times), Pers. 55, 72, 73

4. Y 138

5. Y 161

6. TVL 109

7. TVL 17

8. Y 135

9. Y 206

10. Pers 101

11. Pers 75

12. Pers 72, 78, 98, 101, 109

13. *Phyag-chen gan-mdzod*, 155a6 ff. The passage is introduced by Padma Dkar-po with the words *Btsong-kha-pa chen-pos*, which may mean either a question from, or the attribution of an opinion to, Tsong-kha-pa. I have not been able to find this long passage in Tsong-kha-pa's works on the Guhyasamāja cycle, and on stylistic grounds too it seems likely to be Padma Dkar-po's own summary of what he saw as Tsong-kha-pa's view. I also think that Guenther is mistaken if he does indeed think that the view expressed in this passage can be adequately represented by "harmonious juxtaposition"; see below.

14. Pers 101 note 42

15. W 40, 129; YG 152, 153, 167, 228, 284, 312

16. LW 266-7

17. YG 172

18. LW 199

19. LW 320, 325; YG 179

20. BU 62-4

21. I try to observe the uniformity rule and to retain the structure of Tibetan sentences, but without regarding these as matters of principle.

22. See P. F. Strawson, "Categories", in *Freedom and Resentment and other essays*, (London: Methuen 1974)

23. *Gzhung-'grel* 370a5

24. Ibid.: *yuga zung/ naddha ni gnyis ma-yin-pa ste/ de'i phyir, zung-'jug zhes btags-sol*

25. This *nges-tshig* ("etymology", *nirukta*) is a good example of the kind of *sgra ji-bzhin ma-yin-pa* (non-literal, *na-yathāruta*) interpretation which Padma Dkar-po calls *yi-ge* and which is typically used for forming such "etymologies" for awkward Sanskrit words. For the *yi-ge* style of interpretation and its three modes, see Broido (1983b) and references given there.

26. *Lam-bsdu* 161a5

27. The phrase *zung-du 'jug-pa* and the schemata (1), (2) are syntactically ambiguous: is the phrase *zung-du 'jug-pa* to be taken as irreducible or as (nom. + postp.) + verbal adj.? I have resolved this question *ad hoc* by reducing the phrase, but only because this course leads to a clearer exposition. My general logico-grammatical intuitions are in favour of reduction, while my intuitions about *this particular phrase* are that it is irreducible; but these latter intuitions are surely semantic rather than syntactic. Its syntactic structure does *seem* to be the reduced one, but *argument* on this point would have to rest on syntactic analysis of its components in other contexts, such as is hardly possible here. "Use" arguments point towards irreducibility (partly because of the prevalence of the short form *zung-'jug* and the absence of significant variations of the long form *zung-du 'jug-pa*, suggesting that the syntactic details suppressed in the short form are not worked hard when the word is used). Unfortunately "use" is not very sensitive to the syntax/ semantics distinction.

28. *Lam-bsdu* 161a5, see (3), which is followed there by *zung-'jug rim-pa shes-par-'gyur zhes bstan-te/ bden-pa gnyis gnyis-su-med-pa shin-tu yang-dag-pa'i bdag-nyid-can-gyi ting-nge-'dzin yin-pas zung-'jug-go/*. The Skt. in (5) is mine. Three equally clear examples of the phrase *zung-'jug-gi ting-nge-'dzin* can be found in the headings of the *lta-ba/sgom-pa/spyod-pa* divisions of the '*bras-bu skye-ba'i rim-pa* in the *khrid-yig*, as given in Appendix B.

29. The six are the *utpattikrama* (*bskyed-rim*, *Lam-bsdu* 153b1) together with the usual five stages of the *sampannakrama* (*rdzogs-rim*), *Lam-bsdu* 155a6, 157a2, 158b6, 160a5, 161a5. For Padma Dkar-po's views on the names, number and numbering of the *krama*, see *Gsang-'dus-rgyan*, 16a3.

30. *Gzhung-'grel* 370a5

31. Skt. *yuganaddhakāya*, translated by Guenther as "unity of opposites" (sic), Y 134. The passage comes from Nārōpa's *Sekoddeśa-ṭikā*. Padma Dkar-po gives the Tibetan at *Gzhung-'grel* 345a1 and *Phyag-chen gan-mdzod* 38b6.

32. Especially the word *so-sor rang-gis rig-par-bya*, Skt. *pratyātmādhigamya* &c./ *bden-pa gnyis gnyis-su med-pa'i rang-bzhin 'di-nyid zung-du*

'jug-pa zhes brjod-del . . . so-sor rang-gis rig-par-bya'o/ (ibid., cf. also (3) in the text, and *Gzhung-'grel* 344b5).

33. On the *Mahāyāna/Vajrayāna* or *sūtra/tantra* distinction, cf. note 2.

34. See Part I, where the word *thig-le* (*bindu*) presents a similar problem.

35. See e.g. *Phyag-chen gan-mdzod* 49b4 ff., *Rnal-'byor bzhi'i mdzub-tshugs* 13b. These passages are translated and discussed at length, and the first quoted, in Broido (1983a), especially from the point of elucidating how the term *ghan-skyes* applies to the two *satya*.

36. Skt. *akṛtrima*, *akṛtaka*. In the case of the two *satya* Padma Dkar-po and Mi-bskyod Rdo-rje seem to have taken both *zung-'jug* and *ghan-skyes* to imply that it is nonsense to speak of either one appearing and functioning separately. They criticize Tsong-kha-pa, Bo-dong-pa and the Jo-nang-pas for establishing relationships which are merely contingent (all this is dealt with at length in Broido (1983a)). However there does seem to be one case where Padma Dkar-po does what he complains of in these other authors. *Gzhung-'grel* 375a3: "When the sight of things as they are is obscured because accompanied by *vikalpa*, one speaks of *saṃvṛti-satya* or of reality obscured; this is the time when purification by the radiant light has not occurred." The Tibetan runs:

rnam-par-rtog-pa-dang-bcas-pa dngos-po'i de-kho-na-nyid mthong-ba-la
sgrib-pas-na kun-rdzob-kyi bden-pa-am yang-dag sgrib zhes kyang bya-la/
'od-gsal-gyis sbyang-ba ma-byas-pa'i skabs-sol

Padma Dkar-po seems to have slipped here, since for him *saṃvṛti-satya* normally is purified. Perhaps the remark refers to the *cittaviśuddhikrama* (cf. point II in sec. I.3). An impure *saṃvṛti* cannot take part in *yuganaddha* (see note 121).

38. *Lhan-skyes* may also be applied to single nouns (e.g. *ye-shes*, *dga'-ba* &c., also names of deities) which describe the combinations of the things born together.

39. Rigs Skt. *kula*, *varṇa* &c. See Part I.

40. *Slob-pa'i zung-'jug*

41. *Slob-pa'i zung-'jug ni 'od-gsal rtogs-nas mthar phyin-gyi bar-gyi skad-del bden-pa gsar-du mthong-nas de-la goms-par-bya-ba sgom-lam phyeb-lta-bu* (*Gan-mdzod* 157b4)

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid. 31a2: see Part I, note 33

44. The uses of *zung-'brel* noted in (a)-(g) are of course non-tantric, but I can see no reason why this word might not find uses in the tantras also. The *zung-'brel/zung-'jug* difference appears on the face of it to cut across the *sūtra/mantra* difference.

45. On the basis on his Bka'-gdams experience, Sgam-po-pa introduced into the Bka'-brgyud tradition the view that *mahāmudra* can be attained in non-tantric *mahāyāna*. This view was criticized by Sa-skya Paṇḍita, but these criticisms have been rejected by 'Gos Gzhon-nu-

dpal. The controversy forms an important strand in the *Phyag-chen gan-mdzod*, see also Broido (1983a).

46. *Phyag-chen gan-mdzod* 32b3 (discussion of this point continues until 35b6).

47. *Rgyal-dbang-rje* is the name usually used by Padma Dkar-po for (Mi-pham) Kun-dga' Dpal-'byor (1423-78), the second of the line of 'Brug-pa incarnations of which Padma Dkar-po was the fourth. He collected together the doctrines of the 'Brug-pa tradition, which had become scattered among the lineages descending from the first 'Brug-pa, Gtsang-pa Rgya-ras Ye-shes Rdo-rje (1161-1211). The biographies of these personalities may be found in the *Blue Annals*. *Rgyal-dbang-rje* had a gift for aphorism, and Padma Dkar-po often quotes his pithy formulations of key points of 'Brug-pa doctrine.

48. For instance, the three main headings of the *sa-bcad* of the *Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta say* (see note 52) that in this method of setting up *madhyamaka*, the ground is the *yuganaddha* of the two *satya*, the path is the *yuganaddha* of *prajñā* and *upāya*, and the goal is the *yuganaddha* of the two *buddhakāyas* (*dharmā-* and *rūpa-*). For the first two of these see Table 1. Now it seems obvious enough that all three pairs are concerned with something which continues to exist as *integration, but the contrast with such negative-looking pairs such as *rāga/arāga* & *grāhya/grāhaka* which have merely to be given up (Table 1) is not as clear as it may seem. More analysis of the structure of the *Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta* is found in Broido (1983a, esp. Appendix C). The *bden-gnyis zung-'jug* section of this work uses the same Vajrayāna terms (*gshis*, *gdangs*, *gnas-lugs* &c.) and ideas (e.g. inseparability of ground, path and goal, 66b2) as other, clearer treatments discussed in this article. Its use of the *madhyamaka* notion of the equivalence of *sūnyatā* and *pratīyasamutpāda* is worth noting and is pursued further in the *thabs-shes zung-'jug* section, 68a3.

49. I mean a concept of something non-dual, not the incoherent "non-dual concept" of something. Concepts make distinctions, it is what they are for. Tsong-kha-pa has recognised this in relation to the similar non-dual category *tattva* (*de-kho-na-nyid*) in his *Rigs-pa'i rgya-mtsho*, 244a4, where he points out that one has to know what a word means before one can reflect on whether one understands that for which it stands. As Guenther has remarked, Padma Dkar-po too (*Phyag-chen gan-mdzod* 32a2, 33b4) stressed the importance of words and letters for conveying *tattva*: Pers. 38-9, note 4. At the end of this note, Guenther suggests that these Indian and Tibetan writers modelled knowing on seeing, holding that language "draws attention". (But I am unhappy about the comparison of Saraha with Wittgenstein.)

50. See Appendix B under *sems dngos-po'i gnas-lugs*

51. *Gzhung-'grel* 331a4, *Khrid-yig* 94b6. Padma Dkar-po's very pithy summary (*mdor-bstan*) of the stages (*skabs*) of ground, path and goal in

this case (*Gzhung-'grel* *ibid.*) has been translated by Guenther (N 90) and apart from some oddities with the technical terms he conveys well the gist of Padma Dkar-po's remarks. I hope soon to publish a detailed account of this (radiant light) section of the *Gzhung-'grel*.

52. See note 48. The headings from the *Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta* are:

gzhi dbu-ma bden-gnyis zung-'jug-tu thag-bcad
lam dbu-ma thabs-shes zung-'jug-tu nyams-su blang-ba
'bras-bu dbu-ma sku-gnyis zung-'jug-tu mngon-du bya-ba;

they are discussed briefly in Broido (1983a) (which is mainly about the *gzhi* section).

53. *Mahāmudrā* is probably the most comprehensive and historically resonant of these terms; *madhyamaka* is the one which has most roots in the kind of analysis with which our own culture makes us familiar, while the radiant light is perhaps the most culturally unfamiliar. At least for Padma Dkar-po, *yuganaddha* is the most fundamental of them, and this is my reason for treating it, and not the others, in detail here.

54. See the section of Broido (1983a) on the distinction between *gnas-lugs phyag-chen* and *'khrul-lugs phyag-chen*. The line of argument given here works most easily for the *samsāra/nirvāna* case.

55. For a somewhat more systematic reflection on tensions of this kind, see the concluding remarks of this article.

56. The Heart (*hrdaya*) sūtra and the *Prajñāpāramitā* sūtras in general are full of this kind of negation, of course.

57. A possible starting-point in this. Our verses appear in the *Gzhung* as well as in YK, and so they receive commentary in the *Gzhung-'grel*, the exact places being given in Table 1. In each case, Padma Dkar-po sketches the point of view from which (in his view) the verse, with the listed description, is to be taken. But even though this material is relatively short (c. 7 foll.), only very detailed study, such as cannot be recorded here, would enable us to draw conclusions of the required generality; a mere impression is of little interest.

58. Cf. note 51.

59. *Gzhung-'grel* 343a3 ff; see note 62.

60. Both these points are expressed in the famous verse from the *Gzhung*, quoted in the second paragraph of the section "Reconstruction of Padma Dkar-po's argument" in Part I. The goal section of the *Gzhung* also opens with the line *'bras-bu skye-ba'i rim-pa ni!* (*Gzhung* 8a1, *Gzhung-'grel* 370a5). Here the word *ni* ("as for . . .") does not distinguish between a title and some other kind of term referring to a section of subject-matter, but Padma Dkar-po uses the phrase *'bras-bu skye-ba'i rim-pa* explicitly as his heading several times, e.g. *Gzhung-'grel* 14b1, 370a4.

61. As noted earlier, other arguments of this kind are available based on the relations of the subject-matter of the *Gzhung-'grel* with other

writings of Padma Dkar-po on topics divided by the scheme ground/path/goal (*rgyud-gsum*). See notes 50-53.

62. Compare *Gzhung-'grel* 340a3 ff. with *Lam-bsdu* 161a5ff.; cf. similar parallels between the path division in the radiant light section of the *Gzhung-'grel* and the *mngon-byang* section of the *Rim-lngar 'khrid-pa* (*Lam-bsdu* 160a5).

63. *Gzhung-'grel* 340a6, *Lam-bsdu* 161b1

64. *l'Od-gsal-las ldang-ba'i tshul!*. *Gzhung-'grel* *ibid.* (The *Rim-lngar* contains fewer headings, sources of quotations &c.) In the *Gzhung* (6a4) we find *'phar-ba* for *ldang-ba* in the verse as quoted in the *Gzhung-'grel*; these words are no doubt alternatives for Skt. *utthāna*.

65. *Gzhung-'grel* 340b3, *Lam-bsdu* 161b3

66. *Ibid.* b4, b6

67. *Lam-bsdu* 162a4. These three points are dealt with also in the *Gzhung-'grel*, but this does not support the present argument.

68. *Gzhung-'grel* 341a3

69. Especially the very final part of the radiant light treatment (*mthar-thug-pa'i 'bras-bu*, 344b1) is similar to the very final part of the *'bras-bu skye-ba'i rim-pa* treatment (377b5) and also to the goal section of the *Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta* (cf. notes 50, 54).

70. *Gzhung-'grel* 9b1 ff. (comment on the verse quoted in Part I, note 23).

71. Some of the technical terms in this summary are explained in Broido (1983a)

72. These two *zung-'jug* are still to be distinguished in some way not clear to me. Padma Dkar-po does not seem to be identifying *blta-bya* with *lta-byed*, concentrating on the error of taking them as *gzung-ba* and *'dzin-pa*, i.e. (presumably) as ontologically separate.

73. *Bskyed-rim*, the stage of generating the deities and the rest of the visualization. Non-dual awareness is normally the province of the stage of completion (*utpannakrama* in the verse, but the form *sampanna-krama* is perhaps more common; Tib. always *rdzogs-rim*).

74. *Gzhig-pa*: the process by which the visualization is made smaller and smaller until it dissolves into the void or the radiant light.

75. *Sgyu-lus, māyādeha*; here the visualization of oneself as the deity and the world as a *maṇḍala*, regarded as a whole.

76. *Snod-bcud*; here *snod* (vessel) stands for the visualization of the world as a *maṇḍala*, and *bcud* (contents) for that of oneself as the deity.

77. For *gshis* see e.g. Pers 56-8; Broido (1983a). The notion of *gshis* contains several tensions; really it is the capacity for *paramārtha-satya* but Padma Dkar-po (and Guenther, following him) often identify the two. Further it is not clear whether *gshis* is subjective or inheres in objects. There is a similar difficulty over the word *ngo-bo* (*rūpa*) as used, e.g. of *paramārtha-satya*, in such important *madhyamaka loci* as MMV VI.23 and its *bhāṣya*. If as often seems the case *gshis* and *ngo-bo* inhere in

objects, we have the incoherent notion of an objective correlate for pure subjectivity. In any case Guenther is certainly right about the close parallel between *gshis* and *ngo-bo*.

78. *Sems-kyi gnas-lugs*, short for *sems dngos-po'i gnas-lugs*. For the contrast between this feature-universal and the sortal universal *yid* (*manas*), see Broido (1979). It is precisely this feature-aspect which is exploited whenever the depth-clarity metaphor is brought into play (cf. note 112 and Part I, note 51).

79. The radiant light is self-perceived (cf. Part I, note 53; also n. 77 above).

80. I have not been able to follow the pattern (if there is one) behind Padma Dkar-po's references to *snag-stong zung-'jug*, *gsal-stong zung-'jug* &c. in these passages of commentary to verses in which the terms do not occur. Padma Dkar-po differed from what he regarded as the orthodox Sa-skya and Bka-brgyud view of these four kinds of *yuganaddha* (*Phyag-chen gan-mdzod*, 52a2, 52b2, 54a5, 55a4 gives his view of the four).

81. *Prajñopāyayuganaddha* is the path of *madhyamaka*, according to the *Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta* (see notes 48 and 52). This very short treatment in the *Gzhung-'grel* is consistent with the use of the term *Prajñopāyayuganaddha* in either sūtra or mantra contexts. This consistency is a typical sign of the use (in the latter contexts) of a father-tantra terminology; cf. notes 101-107 below.

82. *Zung-'jug de-nyid*. It cannot mean this particular *yuganaddha* (as distinct from others explained in other verses) on pain of circularity. The remark is an inference from the general character of the good of others to a particular aspect of this good as connected with action and agent. Needless to say this inseparability of action and agent is one of the most common themes both of ethical discussion (e.g. in the sūtras) and of analysis (e.g. in *madhyamaka* works). Padma Dkar-po takes it for granted that his readers are familiar with all this material, supporting the quoted remark merely with a verse from BCA.

83. The central importance of the notion of *dngos-po'i gnas-lugs* for Padma Dkar-po's thought is argued on its own merits in Broido (1979).

84. *Gzhung-'grel* and *Khrid-yig*: see Appendix B; *Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta*; notes 48 and 52.

85. E.g. *Lam-bsdud* 161a5, reviewed above; *Phyag-chen gan-mdzod* 155a6 ff, for which see below and Broido (1983a).

86. It may be worth trying to deflect some impatient reactions to this proposal. Why do I not simply give Padma Dkar-po's own account? But what can this mean, other than printing the Tibetan texts? Any suggestion that one can translate these without extensive discussion of the technical terms can only rest on a confusion. Again, why do I not just say what Padma Dkar-po's conception of *yuganaddha* was? If read very informally, this is just what I will do. But if read more formally, as a de-

mand to isolate an identifiable "conception" attributable to Padma Dkar-po on the basis of some kind of evidence, then it suffers from the long-standing confusion which Quine has christened "the 'idea' idea".

87. The word "mystical" might itself be thought to be in need of explanation. I mean for instance the idea of an idea which contains logical contradictions, but is not thereby rendered empty; or of an experience of something to which can be strictly and literally ascribed contradictory attributes, &c.

88. Cf. notes 4,5

89. Cf. notes 11, 12. Similarly for his "identity" (e.g. N 116).

90. Since the question of metaphors in translation will come up again, it may be worthwhile trying to say something general about it. In word-by-word translation, the criterion of accuracy is the linguistic function of each word in its context (what Grice has called its utterer's meaning). Metaphors function by suggestion. If the foreign word is a metaphor, we may try to find an English one with the same suggestive power. But if there are great cultural differences, no such word may exist. In any case a literal translation may be irrelevant, as lacking the right suggestive power as regards the audience for whom the translation is intended. (Because of this argument I support Guenther's complaints about the literal translation of words like *vāyu* (*rlung*) and *bindu* (*thig-le*) by "wind" and "drop" in their technical uses, and his attempts to replace these English words by words which would literally (in English) convey something relevant (e.g. motility, creative potentiality).) If the foreign word is not a metaphor, we may still need one in English if there exists no literal equivalent. So it seems there can be no general argument against the use of metaphors in translation. But there may be particular arguments. A particular metaphor may simply have the wrong suggestive power. Or the cultural context in English may simply not make it clear to us that a metaphorical use is intended (or which metaphorical use). All my specific complaints about metaphors as translations in this paper are examples of one of these two sorts of objection.

91. This is my main objection to Guenther's translation of *yuganaddha* by such phrases as "unitive Being" (cf. note 6). It is the same as the objection to the translation of *dn̄gos-po'i gn̄as-lugs* by "the concrete fact of Being" which is discussed in Part I, note 50.

92. It is well-known that Kant's intelligible intuition is similar to *yogipratyakṣa* (*rnal-'byor mngon-sum*). Padma Dkar-po seems to have had little use for the latter. Of course he talks a great deal about yoga (*rnal-'byor*) (but cf. Part I note 76), about *pratyakṣa* and about what Guenther, rightly in my view, has called "intuitive understanding" (*mngon-sum-du rtogs-pa*). But I see no reason to think that this *mngon-sum* is what is discussed in *pramāṇa* texts (similar to Kant's "intuition"). We must remember that the normal meaning of the Sanskrit word *pratyakṣa* is

“perception”, and that Dignāga’s claim that this is without concepts (*kalpanāpodha*) was a great departure from this normal meaning. In his own *pramāṇa* works, Padma Dkar-po held that the formalized *pramāṇa* of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti is purely conventional (*kun-tu tha-snyad-pa’i tshad-ma*); this he contrasts with “real” or “proper” *pramāṇa* which is much more like what is discussed in this paper (*don-dam tshad-ma*; see his *tshad-ma ’jam-pa’i dgongs-rgyan*, 4b1 ff., and *tshad-ma rigs-pa’i snying-po*, 4b5 ff.).

93. In Part I we saw Padma Dkar-po saying that *dnegos-po’i gnas-lugs* is the ground of *samsāra* and *nirvāṇa* and the ground upon which the path rests. These claims are soteriological, and have nothing to do with Kantian *a priori* or metaphysical claims to ground experience.

94. Neither *yuganaddha* nor *dnegos-po’i gnas-lugs* have anything to do with sense-data or sense-datum theories. Confusions in this area may arise from the conflation of *mngon-sum* (as Padma Dkar-po uses the term) with the *pratyakṣa* of Indian *pramāṇa* works (see note 92).

95. An important technical term connected with this line of thought is *tha-mal-gyi shes-pa*, lit. “ordinary cognition”; as I show (1983a), Padma Dkar-po’s own view of this term comes to the similar “natural cognition”. Guenther’s “primordial knowledge” (Pers 77) perhaps reflects confusion of *tha-mal* (common) with *tha-ma* (poor, inferior; last), especially in the phrase *thog-ma dang tha-ma*.

96. As is well-known, confusion between unity of experience and experience of unity has a long and disastrous history in Western thought (e.g. P. F. Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense*, p. 162).

97. See notes 15-19.

98. Tsong-kha-pa’s view of *yuganaddha* will be considered below (mainly through Padma Dkar-po’s eyes).

99. Even in cases such as the two *satya* and *svādhiṣṭhāna/prabhāsvara*, the treatment in the *Pañcakrama* itself is not adequately conveyed by “pair combined” &c. for reasons argued in Broido (1983a); but for present purposes these points may be regarded as refinements.

100. *Gzhung-grel* 7b2.

101. Cf. *Rim-lnga rab-tu sgron-gsal*, 14a5; *Mtha-gcod*, 26b3: */khyad-par de gnyis ni pha-rgyud dang ma-rgyud-kyi gtso-bo re-la tshad-ldan-gyis bkral-ba’i tshul snang-na/ thabs-shes-kyi rgyud gzhan-rnams de’i sder gtogs-kyi yan-lag yin-pas/ tshul de dnegos-su mi-gsal-ba-rnams kyang phyogs gnyis-po der drangs-nas bshad dgos-pas ’jog-tshul des rgyud gnyis-po kun-la mi-khyab-pa yang min-no/*

102. Cf. *Rim-lnga rab-tu sgron-gsal* 12b3; *Mtha-gcod* 25a3: *thabs-shes so-so’i rgyud-kyi ’jog-tshul-la. . . . gnyis-pa Rdo-rje-gur-la-sogs-pa-las gsungs-pa-la. . . . legs-par gnas-pa’i phyogs bzhag-pa (ni): o-na pha-rgyud ma-rgyud gnyis-su ’jog-tshul ji-ltar byed snyam-na/ rgyud ’di gnyis-la bskyed-rim-gyi skor-nas kyang so-sor ’jog-pa’i phal-pa’i khyad-par yang ’dod mod kyang gtso-bor rdzogs-rim-gyi sgo-nas khyad-par gzhag-pa*

dgos-so/

*/de yang bde-stong-gi thabs-shes-la ltos-nas thabs-shes re-re-ba'i rgyud-du mi-
'jog-par gnyis-med-kyi rgyud-du 'jog-pa sngar bshad-pa ltar yin-la/ de-la
bltos-nas ni shas-che-chung-gi sgo-nas kyang gzhag-tu mi-rung-ste/ Kye-rdor-
sogs ma'i rgyud-las bde-ba shas-cher bstan-pa ltar 'Dus-pa-las ma-gsungs-pas/
Kye-rdor pha-rgyud dang 'Dus-pa ma-rgyud-du gzhag dgos-pa-i skyon-du
'gyur-ba'i phyr-ro/*

*/des-na rdzogs-rim-gyi sgo-nas thabs-shes so-so'i rgyud-du gsungs-pa'i thabs-
shes ni shes-rab don-dam bde-ba-chen-po'i ye-shes dang/ thabs kun rdzob sgyu-
ma'i sku'o/*

*/de la dang-po'i sgo-nas rnal-'byor-ma'i rgyud-du 'jog-pa ni Gur-gyi le'u bcu-
gsum-pa-las/ . . .*

/shes-rab pha-rol-phyin-pa'i thabs/ /'di ni rnal-'byor-mar brjod-do/

/phyag-rgya chen-po rab-sbyor-bas/ /gang-phyir de-nyid-la 'jug-pa/

/rnal-'byor ma-yi rgyud ces-bya/

103. LW 260-3 (nothing presently relevant is found in the *rdzogs-rim* section of Mkhas-grub-rje's discussion of earlier views, p. 254). The account of the *rang-lugs* is slightly better in Paṅ-chen Bsod-nams Grags-pa's *Rgyud sde spyi'i rnam-bzhag skal-bzang-gi yid-'phrog*, but much of the point still escapes the reader because the *gzhan-lugs* is almost omitted.

104. *Rdzogs-rim-gyi khyad-par ni/ shes-rab-kyi pha-rol-tu phyin-pa'i thabs
phyag-rgya chen-mo-la sbyor-bas de-kho-na-nyid-la 'jug-pa ston-pa ma-rgyud/
rang-byin-brlab dang mngon-par-byang-chub-pa'i rim-pa gtso-bor ston-pa pha-
rgyud-de/*

This entire remark occurs in Bu-ston at least twice (*Rin-po-che mdzes rgyan*, 281a2; *Gsang-ba gsal-byed*, 127b4), and also identically apart from the reversal of the two clauses in Bkra-shis Rnam-rgyal's *Nor-bu'i od-zer*, 14a5. However there is a variant which replaces *phyag-rgya chen-mo* with *rgya chen-po* (*sic*); this occurs in Bu-ston's *Gsang-'dus bshad-thabs*, 22a1, and is repeated exactly in Padma Dkar-po's *Rgyud-sde spyi'i rnam-bzhag*, 34b2. The variant does not seem to make sense; and since the *Vajrapañjara* verse (which is quoted in all texts, see note 102) contains the line */phyag-rgya chen-po rab sbyor-bas/* without variation, I have accepted the quoted version for Padma Dkar-po too.

105. Padma Dkar-po, *Rgyud-sde spyi'i rnam-bzhag* 32b5, 35a6; the latter (*nītārtha*) quotes the well-known GST verse on this topic which is also quoted for similar reasons by Mkhas-grub-rje and the others.

106. The use of the terms *drang-don* (*neyārtha*) and *nges-don* (*nītārtha*) in the tantras is quite different from its use in the sūtras. Their use by Bu-ston, Tsong-kha-pa and Padma Dkar-po is discussed, especially in relation to the tantras, in (1983b).

107. For reasons of this kind it would be desirable to give a detailed account of the dispute about the classification of the anuttarayoganatantras in which, among other things, the *bshad-thabs* terms were treated with the care their importance deserves (they do not receive this care in

Lessing and Wayman). I hope to present such an account soon elsewhere.

108. *utpattikrama/sampannakrama* or *svādhiṣṭhānakrama/abhisambodhikrama*, as the case may be.

109. Much criticism of Tsong-kha-pa by Bka-brgyud-pa authors such as Padma Dkar-po and Karma-pa Mi-bskyod Rdo-rje is related in some way to this set of issues, often expressed as the claim that various pairs of notions are (as Tsong-kha-pa explains them) not properly *lhan-cig skyes-pa* (*sahaja*, born together).

110. *Phyag-chen gan-mdzod* 156b2, 'di pa'i lugs-la' . . . (comment on the immediately preceding quotation or explanation attributed to Tsong-kha-pa (n. 13)).

111. *Gzhung-'grel* 115a4, 116a2, 332b1; *Yid-'phrog* 17b6.

112. On the inseparability of depth and clarity in this context, we have: *tha-dad-du 'byed mi-shes-pa* twice (*Gzhung-'grel* 116a4, 332b3); *tha-dad phyed yang ya-bral-du phyed-ba nam-nyang mi-srid-pas* (*Yid-'phrog* 18a2); *gnyis-pa med-pa* (from the *Vimalaprabhā*, see Part I note 51); *de gnyis mtshan-nyid tha-dad-du phyed yang ngo-bo-nyid ni gcig yin-no* (*Gzhung-'grel* 119a4). The last passage is especially interesting because of its analysis in terms of *sahaja*. The illusory body is present throughout the *abhisambodhikrama* (*Gan-mdzod* 157a5). Even in the *svādhiṣṭhānakrama*, the agent of purification is the radiant light (*Pañcakrama* II.5-6, V.26, V.30, quoted *Gan-mdzod* *ibid.*) Similarly, the illusory body is self-purified (criticism of the Bo-dong-pa position, *Gan-mdzod* 157b6), and similarly in terms of sealing (*ibid.* 39a4). In addition to all this, *svādhiṣṭhāna* and *prabhāsvara* are instances of the two *satya*, on whose inseparability Padma Dkar-po is just as insistent (see my (1983a)).

113. *De gang-la dbyer-med-par 'dus-pa'i go-'phang ni zung-'jug-go* (*Gan-mdzod* 115b2; an almost identical remark also at 156b1).

114. Used twice of the two *satya* in contexts related to the present, both times in the same remark taken from the *Sekoddeśatikā*: *bden-pa gnyis gnyis-su med-pa'i rang-bzhin 'di-nyid zung-'jug-pa zhes brjod-dol*: *Gan-mdzod* 36a2 and *Gzhung-'grel* 345a1.

115. *Phyag-chen gan-mdzod* 156a4 (cf. *Sngags-rim chen-mo* 406b, 410a, quoted LW 192).

116. *Gan-mdzod* *ibid*: *res 'jog-tu gyur-ba'i phyir zung-'jug med-do/*

117. *Ibid.* 156a5: *gnyis dus mnyam 'byung-zhing*

118. *Ibid.* 156b1; cf. also note 112.

119. *Ibid.* 156b2: 'di'i pa'i lugs-la/ glang-la rwa-co lta-bu gnyis zung-'jug-go/

120. *Ibid.* 156b4

121. *Ibid.* 156b5: *de yang ril-'dzin rjes-gzhig-gis 'od-gsal-bar yang bcug-pas mthar dag-pa-na mi-slob-pa'i zung-'jug 'byung-bar gsungs-pas/ kun-rdzob kyi bden-pa de ma-dag de-srid mi-slob-pa'i zung-'jug ma byung*; cf. *Mkhas-*

grub-rje (LW 326-7): *de-nas ma-dag-pa'i sgyu-lus de-nyid ril-'dzin dang rjes-gzhig-gi bsam-gtan gnyis-kyis*. . . .

122. This topic is dealt with in more detail in Broido (1983a).

123. *Phyag-chen gan-mdzod* 157a5: *mnyam-gzhag-tu snang-ba dag-pa*

124. Padma Dkar-po identifies *paryāya-paramārtha* (*rnam-grangs-pa'i don-dam*) with a purified *saṃvṛti* (see discussion in Broido, 1983a and 1983b), and says here that it is the mere tearing of the veil of ignorance and contains but a little *paramārtha* (*Gan-mdzod*, 157a2).

125. Candrakīrti's distinction between *saṃvṛti-satya* and *saṃvṛti-mātra* was developed, somewhat differently in each case, by Tsong-kha-pa (see Williams (1979)) and by Padma Dkar-po (*Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta* 36b6).

126. Cf. for instance the passages quoted by Seyfort Ruegg, BU 62-4 (but cf. also note 80).

127. This suggestive power is not needed for *zung-'brel* (see section II.1).

128. For present purposes all we need to know about the radiant light is that it is self-cognising and *paramārtha-satya*. Cf. notes 77, 79.

129. See Appendix B under *lus ji-ltar grub-pa'i tshul*.