

Revue d'Etudes Tibétaines

**Sprouts of Early Twentieth Century Tibetan
National Consciousness**

Edited by
Fabienne Jagou, Bianca Horlemann,
and Scott Relyea



numéro soixante-dix-huit — Juin 2025

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ISSN 1768-2959

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La périodicité de la *Revue d'Etudes Tibétaines* est généralement bi-annuelle, les mois de parution étant, sauf indication contraire, Octobre et Avril. Les contributions doivent parvenir au moins six (6) mois à l'avance. Les dates de proposition d'articles au comité de lecture sont Novembre pour une parution en Avril, et Mai pour une parution en Octobre.

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Langues

Les langues acceptées dans la revue sont le français, l'anglais, l'allemand, l'italien, l'espagnol, le tibétain et le chinois.

La *Revue d'Etudes Tibétaines* est publiée par l'UMR 8155 du CNRS (CRCAO), Paris, dirigée par Matthias Hayek.

Hébergement: <http://www.digitalhimalaya.com/collections/journals/ret/>





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Notes on Transcription and Transliteration of Asian Languages

Tibetan terms are provided in both simplified phonetic transcription and in transliteration adapted from the Wylie system in order to render the readings more accessible while providing precise references for the spelling. The phonetic transcription is from the THL Simplified Phonetic Transcription of Standard Tibetan but in line with the approach followed by *The Treasury of Lives*. Already established convention has been taken into account. In the first occurrence, Tibetan names or terms are transliterated in parentheses according to the Wylie system: for example, Tubten Gyatso (Thub bstan rgya mtsho). For the Tibetan names for which we want to specify the Chinese form, we use pinyin, but hyphenating between words, for example 扎巴吉村 would be written Zhaba-Jicun.

Chinese terms are romanized according to the pinyin system. In the first occurrence, Chinese names or terms are first written in pinyin and followed by the traditional Chinese characters, for example, Zeng Jize 曾紀澤.

For Manchu names included within this volume that have not been identified through the Ming-Qing Name Authority File database maintained by the Academia Sinica¹ and for which we don't know or cannot easily guess what the original Manchu name would have been, we followed the convention to write out the Manchu name using pinyin, but hyphenating between characters, for instance, 聯豫 would be written Lian-yu.

For Russian terms, we use the Library of Congress Transliteration Style for Russian followed by the Cyrillic form, for example "historical moment" (Rus. *istoricheskii moment* исторический момент).

Japanese terms follow Hepburn.


For Thai names, we use the Royal Thai General System of Transcription (RTGS) published by the Royal Academy.²



¹ <https://newarchive.ihp.sinica.edu.tw/sncacgi/sncacFtp?@@1299190056>

² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Royal_Thai_General_System_of_Transcription

Acknowledgments

his special issue of the journal is the first outcome of a research project entitled “Building Nationalism in Inner Asia: The Empowerment of the Tibetan Revolution at the beginning of the twentieth century,” funded by the French Agency for Research (Grant ANR-21-CE27-0025; March 2022-February 2026). The geographical setting of the project encompasses the three regions of Greater Tibet—Central Tibet (U-Tsang), Amdo in the north-east and Kham in the east—and the Inner Asian countries, mainly Mongolia and Buryatia. The project aims to analyze the context of the 1911 Chinese Revolution in Tibet and Inner Asia from multi-faceted perspectives. This period of Sino-Tibetan relations is particularly important because it determines the end of the privileged relationship that linked the Tibetan hierarchs to the emperors of China, generally described as “spiritual master to lay protector” (Tib. *mchod yon*; whereby, in exchange for Buddhist teachings, religious hierarchs benefitted from the emperors’ protection). The project covers roughly two decades from 1901, marked by a Russo-Tibetan rapprochement, through 1918, when the last Manchu and Chinese officials and soldiers left Tibet. The research is based not only on archival documents, but also on published and unpublished accounts, reports, and diaries left by participants, observers, and protagonists, including Tibetan and foreign clerics, diplomats, military officers, government officials, and travelers. The project’s goal is to understand these critical years from the perspectives found in their writings in Tibetan, Mongolian, Russian, and Chinese, all adding context to official narratives.

In addition to publications disseminating the project’s scientific research and outcomes, documents and information collected are indexed in databases specific to the project and developed on several platforms—Zotero, Heurist, and OpenTheso. When available these searchable databases will make accessible the personal names, toponyms, and political concepts encountered in the vast array of multi-lingual sources dating from the late 19th and early 20th centuries and utilized by project members during their research. Each cross-referenced entry includes variants in multiple languages and scripts, as well as contextual details. This includes a comprehensive bibliography collected in the process of researching and writing conducted under the auspices of the project, available at (<https://natinasia.hypotheses.org/>). The development of these databases gave rise to numerous discussions among project members

with the participation of Béatrice Jaluzot, Rémi Chaix, Vincent Paillusson, and Bruno Morandière. The project benefited greatly from the expertise of Rémi Chaix, who set up the architecture of the databases. Xénia de Heering incremented them and catalogued and standardized the data. Her scrupulous analysis of lexicology greatly facilitated the production of this special issue, for which I am extremely grateful. I would like to thank them all.


The articles in this special issue were presented and discussed at a workshop organized in December 2022, at the Maison de l'Asie, Paris. The guest editors and contributors would like to express their sincere thanks to the peer reviewers who play a fundamental role in the collective life of research, anonymously sharing their skills and knowledge.

Fabienne Jagou, Bianca Horlemann, and Scott Relyea



Introduction: Sprouts of Early Twentieth Century Tibetan National Consciousness

Scott Relyea, Bianca Horlemann, and Fabienne Jagou

he articles in this special issue engage with different aspects of a Tibetan national consciousness emerging in the first decade of the 20th century and the formative influence the Thirteenth Dalai Lama's diverse experiences and encounters had on it during his first period of exile in Inner Asia (1904–1909). His exposure to evolving geopolitical norms during his five-year sojourn outside Lhasa, converged with his witnessing burgeoning opposition to Manchu rule among prominent lay and ecclesiastical figures in Urga (today's Ulan Bator), planted the initial seeds for the Dalai Lama's evolving conception of the Tibetan people as a nation and Tibet as a state. The authors investigate these influences on the Thirteenth Dalai Lama and coordinate events across Greater Tibet—in Amdo, Kham, and Lhasa—impacting his evolving understanding of Tibet's place in early 20th century Inner Asia. These influences also shifted parameters in the relationship between Tibet and China marked by the transformative role of the Qing government's implementation of New Policy reforms in Tibet.

Following his coming of age in the late nineteenth century, the Dalai Lama sought to reassert temporal rule over the peoples of Tibet in addition to his acknowledged ecclesiastical rule. While his assertion highlighted the weakened authority over Tibetan affairs of the Qing Imperial Resident (Amban) posted to Lhasa, the Dalai Lama did not yet seek to transform the centuries-old priest-patron (*mnchod yon*) relationship which defined the relationship between the Qing Court and the Tibetan government and Tibet's position within the Empire. However, neither the Qing Court nor the governments of Britain, Russia, or British India, among others, recognized this assertion of political authority, acknowledging the Dalai Lama as only a religious leader. Consequently, foreign governments accepted British characterization of Qing China's relationship with Tibet as 'suzerainty,' translating the role of 'patron' into the parlance of international law prevailing at the turn of the nineteenth century. Reflecting the confrontation of geopolitical norms and international legal structures within the relationship between Tibet and China evolving in the early 20th century, the Qing and later Republic of China (ROC) governments instead characterized

their administration of Tibet as 'sovereignty,' whereas the Dalai Lama following his second period of exile in British India (1910–1912) rejected any form of China's oversight, proclaiming that sovereignty resided with him and the Tibetan government. The seeds of these concepts of governance and international law were planted during the Dalai Lama's first period of exile, when his understanding of the geopolitics surrounding and influencing the Sino-Tibetan relationship began to widen, and the roots of an emerging Tibetan national consciousness began to form.

When the Dalai Lama fled Lhasa before the arrival of British Indian soldiers in the Younghusband Expedition (1903–1904), his original objective in Mongolia was an appeal to Russia to assume the role of 'patron' by then unfulfilled by a weakened Qing China, to find a new military protector to defend his people from the encroaching British Empire. Despite discovering a deep interest in Buddhism among such Russian elites as Prince Ukhtomskii and the Sanskritist Shcherbatskoi during his exile, the Dalai Lama came to realize that the Russian Empire could offer no more than warm words, focused primarily on his religious role. Thus in Mongolia and later in Amdo, he began to seek new allies—and began to accept the advice and guidance of a wide array of global figures. The Dalai Lama's encounters and lengthy conversations with government officials, explorers, and religious leaders from Mongolia, Buryatia, Russia, Japan, England, Germany, France, the United States, and beyond all opened his eyes not only to the volatile alliances and powerful rivalries of regional and global relations, but also to new political concepts that underlay the structure and interaction of states. Introduced to a Russian world atlas and to the coalescing concept of the nation-state, the Dalai Lama encountered the importance of mutually recognized, fixed borders in international law. Through his close relationship with the Mongol Prince Khanddorj, a future leader of the movement for Mongolian independence, the Dalai Lama observed deepening anti-Qing sentiment and an emerging Mongol national consciousness.

While these interactions may have planted the seeds of a transformed conception of the Tibetan people as a 'nation' and a Tibetan polity with the Dalai Lama as political leader in the evolving geopolitics of the early 20th century, his meetings with academic Tibetologists and Buddhist adherents—Mongols, Buryats, Russians, Japanese, Americans, and others—opened his eyes to another potential role. Both Japanese and Russian Buddhists, such as Teramoto Enga and Baradin, hinted that the Dalai Lama could in the future become the preeminent Buddhist leader across Asia and beyond, several Russians and Buryats even proposing to convene a World Buddhist Convention under his auspices. Thus, even as several local Tibetan Buddhist

leaders in Amdo and Mongolia may have questioned the Dalai Lama's assertion of temporal power during his first period of exile, even grown weary of his intrusive exercise of ecclesiastical authority while in their midst, his diverse conversations may also have initiated a vision of Tibetan Buddhism's role in a wider regional and global context. The evolution of such a vision during his first period of exile paralleled the sprouting of the Dalai Lama's new understanding of Tibet as a polity, of the importance of a 'national consciousness' for Tibetans in the geopolitics to which he was exposed.

Studies of the emergence of nations in the nineteenth and 20th centuries often focus on social constructs either derived or crafted from a people's shared cultural practices, shared vernacular language, and shared socio-cultural institutions. While these may have roots in earlier or even ancient societies which inhabited a similar geographic space as the coalescing nation, both Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson emphasize the impact of the social and economic transformation wrought by modernity in distinguishing a 'nation' from its potential ethnic origins.¹ Whereas Gellner places the elites of a society in the central role employing cultural and linguistic markers, among others, to define social boundaries encircling the coalescing nation, Anderson somewhat displaces their centrality, emphasizing the role of societal elites as both the architects and the shepherds of 'imagined communities,' also guiding a people to recognize their affinity. Anderson emphasizes the formation of institutions by elites that highlight and utilize socio-cultural aspects of that affinity which both demonstrate and establish the intrinsic existence of the nation. From the products of print capitalism, which could standardize both the language and subjects of interest in a coalescing nation, to the employment of history and geography through museums and national maps, elites could foster a natural—if not inevitable—emergence of the nation from its socio-cultural or ethnic predecessors.² It was these forces of nationalism transforming geopolitics, diplomatic interaction, and both state and global institutions at the turn of the nineteenth century with which the Dalai Lama came into contact in his diverse conversations and encounters with peoples from Asia, Europe, and America during his first period of exile.

Although the Thirteenth Dalai Lama's emphasis on asserting temporal authority over Tibetans alongside his ecclesiastical rule predated these consequential interactions with foreigners in Mongolia, Amdo, and Qing China, their introducing concepts of nation and state

¹ See Gellner 1983 and Anderson [1983] 2006.

² Winichakul (1994) explores the use of museums and the national map, which unique shape forms a geobody that becomes an essential visual representation of the nation and focus of national identity and pride.

provided him with the conceptual understanding eventually to articulate and realize this goal in the complex geopolitics of Inner Asia and the world. During the first decade of the 20th century, as the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan elites came to perceive the people of Tibet not as Qing imperial subjects, rather as a Tibetan “nation” and a “state” distinct from the Qing Empire, they began to implement policies and establish institutions to instill a ‘national consciousness’ internally—especially after the Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa from his second period of exile in British India. Similarly influenced by the transformation of diplomacy and geopolitics across Asia and the world, the Qing Court also sought to change the relationship with Tibet in this decade, first supporting Sichuan Province officials in their implementation of New Policy reforms in the eastern part of Kham under provincial administration, then directing their implementation by newly appointed Ambans in Lhasa.

While the initial purpose of implementing the New Policies in Kham was focused internally on strengthening Sichuan authority in the region, their introduction in Lhasa was focused externally on countering British characterization of Qing rule in Tibet as mere suzerainty by demonstrating conformance with globally recognized principles of sovereignty. In Kham, implementation began as early as 1903, ultimately engendering armed resistance that revealed sprouts of a Khampa consciousness linked with a deeper Tibetan identity, that then prompted a sometimes violent expansion and intensification of the policies by Sichuan soldiers and officials until the collapse of Qing rule at the end of 1911. In Lhasa, where implementation began in 1906 during the Dalai Lama’s first period of exile, there was little local reaction since existing Tibetan institutions remained largely untouched, which was not the case in Kham. Through these actions, the Qing Court gradually demonstrated effective sovereignty to such an extent that they regained control over Tibet’s external relations, a stark contrast from the nineteenth century when the Tibetan government had signed international treaties with such foreign countries as Nepal in 1856 and Sikkim in 1888. The Qing further hoped to demonstrate their sovereignty—not suzerainty—in Tibet by paying the Tibetan indemnity owed the British in the Treaty of Lhasa concluded when the Younghusband Expedition had reached Lhasa. Perhaps recognizing that the violence in Kham could spread to central Tibet and concerned for his safety within China proper, the Dalai Lama sought to return to Lhasa in 1909, still maintaining some hope of Russian support and expecting the protection of a Buryat escort.

Inspired by his growing understanding Tibet’s evolving status as a political entity derived from concepts encountered during his first period of exile, on returning to Lhasa, the Dalai Lama began to counter

the effects of the New Policies and more confidently assert the temporal dimension of his authority, only to flee into exile again—this time to British India—when a Sichuan army reached Lhasa in February 1910 under the pretext of protecting the trade marts opened on the British Indian border. This marked a turning point in Qing policy in central Tibet, and his second period of exile provided an opportunity for the geopolitical concepts and the burgeoning notion of a Tibetan 'national consciousness' to germinate in the Dalai Lama's understanding of Tibet's status in Inner Asia and the broader world. The Qing goal of strengthening its imperial borders and demonstrating its unequivocal sovereignty in Tibet bolstered by implementation of the New Policies ultimately failed when resistance against the Qing army, organized by the Dalai Lama during his second period of exile, succeeded in 1912. The Qing Court, once perceived as the patron and protector of Tibet, by 1910 was characterized by the Dalai Lama and Tibetan elites as both invader and colonizer, as a dangerous neighboring polity in opposition to which a Tibetan national consciousness could coalesce and be formed. The Dalai Lama's understanding of the concepts initially inculcated during his first period of exile further deepened during his time in British India. Exposure to similar influences and experiences in conversations with British, Japanese, Russians, and others thus strengthened his notion of Tibet as a state and Tibetans as a nation in the geopolitical world apparent to the Dalai Lama, prompting a strong assertion of both ecclesiastical and temporal authority on his return to Lhasa in 1912.

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Russian Sources on the Thirteenth Dalai Lama's Secret Buryat Escort in Khalkha Mongolia (1905–1906)

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Introduction

Russia and Tibet were connected to each other through Russian subjects, the Buryats and the Kalmyks, who were converted to Tibetan Buddhism about 250 years before the events discussed in this study. Eventually, a pro-Tibetan “lobby” emerged in Russia which consisted not only of representatives of these two peoples, but also of Russian Orientalists and some governmental and military officials. Consequently, various expansionist projects concerning Tibet also arose, and the Tsarist government generally treated them with consideration.¹ In the early 20th century, the so-called Russo-Tibetan rapprochement was initiated by the Buryat lama Agvan Dorzhiev (1853–1938),² which served as a pretext for the British military expedition to Lhasa led by Colonel Francis Younghusband (1863–1942) in 1904.³ As a result, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama Tubten

* I thank the Natinasia project for supporting my archival research in the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (AFPRE), Moscow (Rus. Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi imperii Архив внешней политики Российской империи) in Autumn 2023. I am very grateful to Fabienne Jagou, Bianca Horlemann, and Scott Relyea for their very useful comments and constant help in revising this paper and improving the English of the text. I also thank Uradyn Bulag for his help in identifying the persons met in the paper. Any error remains mine.

¹ For example, a well-known project on the “peaceful annexation” of Mongolia, Tibet and China was authored by Petr Badmaev (1851–1920), a Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, see Andreev 2006: 70–71.

² Agvan Dorzhiev had gone to Lhasa in the 1880s to continue his Buddhist studies and eventually became one of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama's confidants and his main representative in Russia.

³ The British expedition to Tibet (1903–1904) was the temporary invasion by British Indian Armed Forces led by Col. Francis Younghusband, with a view to

Gyatso (Thub bstan rgya mtsho, 1876–1933)—who did not trust that Qing China would help—fled to Mongolia hoping to receive Russian assistance to resist the British military invasion.

When, in November 1904, news that the Thirteenth Dalai Lama was approaching the Mongolian border reached the Russian imperial court in St. Petersburg, the bureaucratic machine began to work with its usual diligence despite the military difficulties of the ongoing Russo-Japanese war.⁴ In addition to various levels of Russian officialdom, the Dalai Lama's arrival in Mongolia aroused great interest among Russian Orientalists, as well as great excitement among Russian Buddhists, namely the Buryats and the Kalmyks. One of these enthusiasts was the well-known explorer of Inner Asia, Captain Petr Kuz'mich Kozlov (1863–1935), who travelled from St. Petersburg to Urga (modern Ulaanbaatar) in early spring 1905 to greet the Tibetan hierarch on behalf of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society (IRGS).⁵ Another one was the Russian Sanskritist Fedor Ippolitovich Shcherbatskoi (1866–1942), who went to Mongolia as a representative of the Russian Committee for the Study of Inner and East Asia,⁶ a unit under the auspices of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (RMFA).⁷ Surely, both wanted to take advantage of the Dalai Lama's stay in Mongolia, and also for personal reasons: Shcherbatskoi wanted to learn more about Sanskrit Buddhist manuscripts in Tibet, while Kozlov endeavored to accompany the Dalai Lama back to Lhasa by providing a Russian military convoy under his command. Kozlov's ambitious plan, however, could not be fulfilled. Instead, a secret escort consisting of Russian Buryat Cossacks, disguised as Buddhist pilgrims, was organized to accompany the Dalai Lama at least until late 1906 and probably beyond. To this day, we know surprisingly little about how and when this obscure escort was formed. In this study, I demonstrate that the Buryat escort did, indeed, exist and even with—although unofficial—support from the Russian authorities and personal knowledge of the tsar. Furthermore, I argue that the secret escort was of great significance for the Dalai Lama for two reasons: first, to successfully resist persistent attempts by the Qing Court (1644–1912) to remove him from Mongolia

establishing diplomatic relations with the Dalai Lama and counter the Russian Empire's perceived ambitions in Tibet.

⁴ The Russo-Japanese war (1904–1905) was due to rival imperial ambitions in Manchuria and the Korean Empire. It resulted in the crushing defeat of the Russian navy.

⁵ Rus. Imperatorskoe Russkoe Geograficheskoe Obshchestvo Императорское Русское Географическое Общество (ИРГО).

⁶ Rus. Russkii komitet dlia izucheniiia Srednei i Vostochnoi Azii Русский комитет для изучения Средней и Восточной Азии (РКИСВА).

⁷ Rus. Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Министерство иностранных дел (МИД).

and away from Russian influence, and second, to protect the Tibetan Pontiff from perceived Qing Chinese and British threats to his life.

By using rare Russian archival documents—such as those from the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire in Moscow (AFPRE)⁸—and the understudied travel diaries of the explorers Kozlov and Shcherbatskoi, I shed new light on these issues. The AFPRE holds a number of unique documents on the history of the Russo-Tibetan rapprochement and the Anglo-Russian Great Game from the late 19th to the early 20th century. A special collection (Rus. *opis' onuch*) titled “The Dalai Lama and Tibet” contains thirty-four files (Rus. *dela dela*) of various documents, eleven of which are related to the Dalai Lama's sojourn in Mongolia, including correspondence between the Dalai Lama and Russian Tsar Nicholas II (1868–1918), memorials of Vladimir Lamsdorf (1845–1907), the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, correspondence between Agvan Dorzhiev and the ministerial officials, and diplomatic reports from Urga, Beijing 北京, Calcutta, and London. In 2005, Russian scholar Evgenii Belov published 122 documents from the AFPRE in *Rossia i Tibet: sbornik russkikh arkhivnykh dokumentov, 1900–1914* (Russia and Tibet: A Collection of Russian Archival documents, 1900–1914).⁹ Among them, documents nos. 23–70 are related to the Dalai Lama's stay in Mongolia.⁹

These AFPRE materials have already attracted the attention of several Russian scholars, but under different research foci, such as Tatiana Shaumian's chapter “The Dalai Lama's Sojourn in Mongolia Gauged through Russian Diplomatic Activity,” and Aleksandr Andreev's chapter “Prebyvanie Dalai Lamy v Mongolii” (The Dalai Lama's Sojourn in Mongolia), which describe in detail the Tibeto-Russian relations during the Dalai Lama's sojourn in Mongolia according to Russian official diplomatic sources. A thorough and critical study of the Russian policy towards the Thirteenth Dalai Lama during his flight to Mongolia is provided by Inessa Lomakina in her *Velikii Beglets* (The Great Fugitive), while the most recent studies by Sergei Kuz'min, namely “Prebyvanie Dalai-lamy XIII v Mongolii i plani provozglasheniia nezavisimosti” (Sojourn of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama in Mongolia and plans for the proclamation of independence) and “The Tibet-Mongolia Interface in the First Half of the Twentieth Century. Data from Russian Archives,” mainly focus on Russian sources in the context of the Tibetan and Mongolian independence movements.¹⁰

⁸ Rus. Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi imperii Архив внешней политики Российской империи (АВПРИ).

⁹ Belov 2005.

¹⁰ Shaumian 2000; Andreev 2006; Lomakina 2001; Kuz'min 2014; Kuz'min 2022.

I, for my part, found additional and previously unresearched and unpublished documents in the AFPRE that reflect the dynamics of the often contradictory and changing Russian policies towards the Dalai Lama in Mongolia and on the escort matter. The most important among these documents are reports written by Vladimir Lamsdorf and Alexandr Izvolskii (1856–1919), Ministers of Foreign Affairs; Pavel Lessar (1851–1905) and Dmitrii Pokotilov (1865–1908), the Russian envoy plenipotentiaries in Beijing; Vladimir Liuba (1861–1928), the Russian Consul in Urga (1904–1906), and Mikhail Kuzminskii (1875–1938), a Secretary of the Russian Consulate. Furthermore, these AFPRE documents help understand how Tibet and the Dalai Lama became a new focus for Inner Asian politics for Qing China, Great Britain, and Russia, and also shed light on the political atmosphere in Urga at that time, marked by controversy and intrigues. They also reveal that, besides the above-mentioned parties, another party, namely the Buryats, had its own interests and played an important role in the course of events.

Kozlov's plans as expressed in his diary

Captain Kozlov, author of the *Travel Diary to Mongolia, April 1905*, was a well-known explorer of Inner Asia.¹¹ During his lifetime, Kozlov led six long expeditions to the mountain range Nanshan 南山 on the border to the modern Provinces of Gansu 甘肅 and Qinghai 青海, to Sichuan 四川 and eastern Tibet, namely Amdo (A mdo) and Kham (Khams), to Eastern Turkestan/modern Xinjiang 新疆 and Mongolia, and published about seventy articles and books. Following the example of his teacher, the famous Russian explorer Nikolai Przhevalskii (1839–1888), Kozlov was a staunch supporter of Russia's Forward Policy in Asia and, like his teacher, cherished a passionate dream of reaching Lhasa, the Tibetan capital. For him, the Dalai Lama's arrival in Urga was the "historical moment" (Rus. *istoricheskii moment* исторический момент) that might help him fulfil this lifelong desire. Kozlov spent two months, from June 6 (May 24) to August 31 (August 18), 1905, in Urga.¹² He kept a detailed diary of it, which is preserved at the Archive of the Russian Geographical Society in St. Petersburg. For political reasons, he did not use these diary notes in the book he published in 1920, entitled *Tibet i Dalai-lama* (Tibet and the Dalai Lama), after having been stripped of all his former tsarist titles in

¹¹ For Kozlov's biography, see, e.g., Andreev and Yusupova 2015.

¹² The dates in the Russian sources are according to the Julian calendar, used in Russia until 1918. I converted the dates used in the sources into the modern Gregorian calendar and left the old-style dates in brackets for convenience.

Soviet Russia. However, this important diary was more recently re-edited by Sergei Kuz'min under the title *Dnevnik po poezdke v Mongoliu, aprel' 1905 goda* (Travel Diary to Mongolia, April 1905).¹³

The published diary is 31 pages long. At the beginning, Kozlov relates how those interested in Tibet, i.e., mainly Orientalists and Yakov Shishmarev (1833–1915), the former Consul General in Urga (from 1882 to 1904), met privately in St. Petersburg and all agreed that the Dalai Lama's arrival in Urga was the "historical moment" they could not miss. Therefore, they began to discuss the issue with some leading officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the General Headquarters, the Russian Empire's highest body of the Armed Forces' military-strategic administration.¹⁴ Eventually, these entities decided to send Kozlov to Urga as a representative of the IRGS, with the following mission: a) to greet the Dalai Lama and offer him some gifts, in recognition of his hospitality during the IRGS's 1899–1901 expedition;¹⁵ b) to find ways to assist Tibet; and finally, c) to conduct some covert intelligence in eastern Mongolia.¹⁶

The main personal reason for Kozlov's travel to Urga was, however, to furnish a Russian escort for the Dalai Lama under his own command—an idea that Kozlov came up with in St. Petersburg, before his departure to Mongolia, and one that very much pleased the Dalai Lama when it was introduced to him, as the explorer noted.¹⁷ This will be discussed in more detail further below. Kozlov's diary covers a wide range of topics such as his several meetings with the Dalai Lama, Dmitrii Pokotilov's arrival (1865–1908), the new Russian Ambassador in Peking (from 1905 to 1908), and the latter's meeting with the Tibetan Pontiff, various gossip about the "drunkenness and debauchery" of the Eighth Jebtsundamba Khutagt, Agwaan luwsan choiji Nyima danzan wangchug (Tib. Ngag dbang blo bzang chos kyi nyi ma bstan 'dzin dbang phyug, 1870–1924), the Dalai Lama's complaints regarding the Russian Consulate and the Khutughtu, the drawing of portraits of the Dalai Lama by painter Nikolai Kozhevnikov (n.d.), and, last not least, the Dalai Lama's and his own disappointment caused by the Russian authorities' refusal to provide the planned convoy for the Tibetan Pontiff.

¹³ Kozlov [1905] 2004.

¹⁴ Rus. *Glavnyi stab* Главный штаб.

¹⁵ See Kozlov 1906. Towards the end of the expedition, in April 1900, Lhasa sent two envoys with a large retinue who apologized to Kozlov on the Dalai Lama's behalf for not allowing the expedition to enter Tibet, and who then provided assistance to the expedition. For more details, see Garri 2020.

¹⁶ Kozlov [1905] 2004: 101.

¹⁷ Kozlov [1905] 2004: 105.

Shcherbatskoi's observations

Fedor Shcherbatskoi, who also kept a diary during his stay in Urga, had other reasons for his journey.¹⁸ He was a well-known Sanskritist and the first to study the Indo-Tibetan Buddhist philosophy in Russia. In 1903, he published his first major work *Teoriya poznaniya i logiki po ucheniyu pozdneishih buddistov* (A Theory of Knowledge and Logic According to the Teachings of Later Buddhists),¹⁹ then a Tibetan translation and a Sanskrit text of Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu*,²⁰ the only published treatise on Buddhist logic in the West at that time. A full-fledged study of Buddhist philosophy required, however, an extension of the source base. His hopes therefore turned to Tibet, where ancient Sanskrit manuscripts were allegedly preserved. To investigate this issue, Shcherbatskoi—together with Sergei Oldenburg (1888–1940), Secretary of the Russian Academy of Sciences and initiator of the Russian expeditions to Inner Asia²¹—trained a young Buryat student named Bazar Baradin (1878–1937) for three years.²² The latter was supposed to make a trip to Tibet disguised as a Buddhist pilgrim, just as his fellow countryman Gombozhab Tsybikov (1873–1930)²³ had done in 1900. Incidentally, the Dalai Lama's arrival in Urga provided a very fortunate opportunity to both teacher and disciple to directly encounter the Tibetan Buddhist world for the first time already in Mongolia and through its most famous master.

After returning to St. Petersburg, Shcherbatskoi published a three-page long "Summarized account of a trip to Urga"²⁴ in which he very briefly recounted his acquaintance with the Dalai Lama, adding he would later write a more detailed article (which he did not). From this account, we learn the Dalai Lama would welcome further Russian

¹⁸ Excerpts of this diary have been published in Andreev 2017.

¹⁹ Shcherbatskoi 1903.

²⁰ *Nyāyabindu* 1904; *Nyāyabindu* 1918.

²¹ Oldenburg was a Russian orientalist and Sanskritist, the founder of the Russian School of Oriental Studies, and head of the Ethnographic Department of the IRGS (from 1904 to 1928).

²² Bazar Baradin was a Buryat scholar, politician, writer, and People's Commissar of Education. Together with Zhamtsarano he studied at St. Petersburg University under the guidance of Shcherbatskoi and Oldenburg from 1902 to 1905. Later on, he stayed with the Dalai Lama in Mongolia, then went to Labrang Tashikhyil (Bla brang bkra shis 'khyil) Monastery in Amdo for research purposes from 1906 to 1907. He also kept a diary, see Baradin 2002 and I. Garri and A. Andreyev in this RET issue

²³ Gombozhab Tsybikov was a Buryat-Mongolian scholar and politician. In 1900, he made a secret journey to central Tibet under the guise of a Buddhist pilgrim. For his travel account, see Tsybikov [1919] 1981.

²⁴ Shcherbatskoi 1906.

expeditions to Tibet and personally invited Shcherbatskoi to accompany him on his return journey to Lhasa.

More information about Shcherbatskoi's trip to Urga can be found in his unpublished diary that his widow donated, along with other papers, to the USSR Academy of Sciences Archive after his death in 1942.²⁵ "Notes" from the diary were mentioned for the first time in the issue of selected works by Shcherbatskoi, published by I. V. Vasil'kov, which includes the above-mentioned "Summarized account of a trip to Urga."²⁶ Thereafter, the diary was referred to and cited by Inessa Lomakina and, finally, excerpts from the diary were published by Aleksandr Andreev.²⁷

Although far detached from politics, Shcherbatskoi had no choice but to fully immerse himself in political matters. Being a man with a critical mind, Shcherbatskoi keenly noticed everything around him and put it down in his diary, such as his meetings and conversations with the Dalai Lama and the latter's entourage, mainly with the Dalai Lama's Buryat interpreter Namdak Dylykov,²⁸ as well as with Kozlov and Russian Consulate officials. He also recorded rumors about the debauchery of the Jebtsundamba, about the *gurum* (a magical ritual) performed against the Dalai Lama and allegedly sponsored by the Jebtsundamba, the Russian military escort issue and other controversies and intrigues around the Dalai Lama. His observations are often very critical of Russia's Tibet Policy and the Russian consulate officials who were responsible for contacts with the Dalai Lama. Like Kozlov,

²⁵ Rus. Arkhiv Akademii nauk SSSR Архив Академии наук СССР. Unfortunately, I did not get access to the diary during my field research in September 2022, because the St. Petersburg Branch of the Archive of the Russian Academy of Sciences was closed, due to the relocation of the archive.

²⁶ Vasil'kov 1989: 250–253.

²⁷ Lomakina 2001; Andreev 2017. As mentioned by Andreev in his introduction, the diary is a black leather notebook, 18 x 22 cm in size, with entries on forty-two pages. Shcherbatskoi's handwriting is extremely difficult to read.

²⁸ Namdak Dylykov (n.d.) played a very important role in the events described in this article. Mentioned in the biography of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama as Namdak Noyon/ Rnam dag no yon (Ishihama 2022), Dylykov was a Buryat public and political figure. According to the biography written by the director of the National Archive of the Buryat Republic, based on the National Archive's collections (Zhal-sanova 2015), Dylykov graduated from the Nerchinsk district school in 1877. He then served as an interpreter for Mongolian people at the Chita District Police Department and as a Mongolian language teacher at the Aga Parish School. From 1890 onwards, he held several political offices. Interestingly, Zhal-sanova does not mention that Dylykov served as the Dalai Lama's interpreter during the latter's sojourn in Mongolia in 1904–1906. Most likely, this has not been recorded in the Buryat archives. However, there is plenty of evidence of it in the sources used in this article. In 1898, Dylykov had also travelled to St. Petersburg, together with Dorzhiev, for an audience with Tsar Nicholas II (1868–1918).

Shcherbatskoi was deeply distressed by the failure of the plan to organise a Russian convoy meant to protect the Dalai Lama.

The escort issue

"Kozlov will command the convoy, [and] instead of Dorzhiev there will be Dylykov attached to the Dalai Lama. Then Baradin and Zhamtsaranov²⁹ would be right there. I pictured some solemn procession of the Dalai Lama back to Tibet with a half-Russian retinue," wrote Shcherbatskoi in his letter to Oldenburg in 1905.³⁰ This plan, however, was never implemented. Instead, a secret Buryat Buddhist escort to the Dalai Lama was organised eventually in lieu of Kozlov's desired official convoy.

We still know surprisingly little about this mysterious escort. Shaumian sporadically mentioned a "Russian convoy" and "Buryat agents."³¹ A "security squad" (Rus. *okhrannyyi otriad* охранный отряд) and "Buryat volunteers" (Rus. *buriaty-dobrovol'zy* буряты-добровольцы) are mentioned in the collection *Rossia i Tibet* edited by Belov.³² Moreover, Andreev suggests that the idea of the Russian convoy originated from Agvan Dorzhiev and that the Russian Tsar personally supported it.³³ Apart from these references, there is no other information on this squad or convoy in the published Russian sources as far as I know. I shall now try to examine this issue in more detail.

Before Kozlov's and Shcherbatskoi's arrival in Urga in May 1905, the Dalai Lama had already stayed there for six months, while waiting anxiously for a favorable Russian response to his appeals for support. His position was rather difficult. Pavel Lessar, the Russian Ambassador in Beijing and Lamsdorf, the Foreign Affairs Minister, were reluctant to interfere in the Tibet Question, in consideration of the ongoing Russo-Japanese war. However, they tried to keep the Dalai Lama well-disposed toward Russia by showing him ostensible concern. In contrast to the Foreign Affairs Ministry, the Pro-Tibet "lobby"—the General Headquarters, the Orientalists, and most of all the Russian Buryat Buddhists—favored more active assistance to the Dalai Lama.

Primarily, the Buryat party was headed by Agvan Dorzhiev, but the leader of the Buryat Buddhists, Khambo Lama Choizon Iroltuev

²⁹ Tsyben Zhamtsarano / Zhamtsaranov (1881–1942) was a Buryat scholar and politician, a member of the Buryat National Committee and a deputy minister of Mongolia's Internal Affairs Ministry. From 1903 to 1905, he was a student at St. Petersburg University.

³⁰ Letter to Sergei Oldenburg, July 11, 1905, published in Vigasin 2008: 291–292.

³¹ Shaumian 2001: 165–172.

³² Belov 2005: 75, 84.

³³ Andreev 2006: 148.

(1843–1918), also fully supported the Dalai Lama. Iroltuev personally came to Urga with hundreds of Buryat Buddhists to greet the Tibetan Pontiff and met with the Dalai Lama privately on December 1 (November 18), 1904.³⁴ To help the Dalai Lama, Dorzhiev and Iroltuev managed to attract several Buryats, whom they trusted and considered capable.³⁵ The Russian government, however, trusted neither Dorzhiev nor Iroltuev, suspecting that both were only acting in their own Buryat Buddhist interest. Lessar wrote to Lamsdorf:

There is no doubt that Iroltuev, Dorzhiev and others intend to incite a big movement among the Mongols with the arrival of the Dalai Lama in Urga. All these individuals, ignorant of the current political situation, hope that if they manage to involve Russia in these affairs, they will be able to carry out the most expansive, probably little-thought-out plans, not to mention the fact of ordinary greed, many of them mostly thinking about the possibility of receiving a subsidy from Russia. As a result, unrest will inevitably occur, very undesirable for us and probably disastrous for the Dalai Lama himself. Of those persons who are telegraphing, each tries to involve all their good and close acquaintances among the Russian Mongols who know of the affair, while for us it is necessary to solve it from *the Russian point of view and in Russia's best interest* (italics added) in the Far East.³⁶

³⁴ All sources are unanimous in recording the great influx of Buddhist pilgrims to Urga at that time (70 to 80 percent of them were Buryats), and according to the report of Qing Amban Yan-zhi 延祉 ((1848–1924), then just appointed Xining amban, Yan-zhi was redeployed to Urga in 1904 for handling the Dalai Lama affair; Urga amban from 1904 to 1909). According to the Thirteenth Dalai Lama's biography, six hundred Russian pilgrims (*ru yul mi*) came to meet the Dalai Lama in Urga, see Ishihama 2022: 45–46. For more information on Iroltuev, see Ishihama in this issue.

³⁵ These persons were Buda Rabdanov (1853–1923), Tsokto Badmazhapov (1879–1937), Bimbaev (n.d.), Dabdanov (n.d.), and Galsanov (n.d.). Buda Rabdanov was a Buryat scholar, Gombozhav Tsybykov's teacher, and a member of the Potanin expeditions. In 1904, he was sent to Dartsedo (Da rtse mdo) in Kham (Kham) by the RMFA as a secret agent on Agvan Dorzhiev's recommendation. Tsokto Badmazhapov was a Buryat Cossack, an explorer and permanent member of the Kozlov expeditions to Inner Asia, who discovered the ancient city of Khara-Khoto. As for Bimbaev, Dabdanov, and Galsanov, we know very little about them. According to a note in Belov (2005: 103), they were "Tsarist secret service agents who stayed in Van Khüree during the Dalai Lama's sojourn there." In fact, they served as interpreters, guides, and low-level officials, and were also Agvan Dorzhiev's confidants. For instance, Dorzhiev asked the authorities to transfer the above-mentioned Buda Rabdanov from Dartsedo to Urga, while Iroltuev telegraphed to the authorities it would be very desirable to bring back both Yakov Shishmarev, former Consul General in Urga, and a certain "Peking Gomboev."

³⁶ APPRE, f. Kitaiskii stol, Secret telegram from Lessar, Peking, November 11, 1904, op. 491, d. 1454, l. 44. The Tsar noted on the document: "To be reported."

To implement this “Russian point of view” for handling the Dalai Lama affair in Urga and to contain Dorzhiev’s Buryat party, Lessar promoted Vladimir Liuba as the new Consul to Urga. Thereafter, Liuba became the main actor on the Russian side.

Apart from the Russians, Qing China also sent several imperial envoys to handle the Dalai Lama affair, such as the above-mentioned former Xining and newly appointed Urga Amban Yan-zhi. His main task was to remove the Dalai Lama from Mongolia, away from Russian influence, and he acted accordingly. From a report written by Liuba, we learn that, on December 14 (December 1), 1904, Amban Yan-zhi visited the Dalai Lama and requested him in the Qing Emperor’s name to leave for Xining immediately.³⁷ The Dalai Lama and the Buryat party felt both scared and outraged by such a categorical request by Yan-zhi and began to think about moving on to Selenginsk instead, located in the neighboring Russian dominated Transbaikal region, where the Buryat Khambo Lama resided.³⁸ In this tense situation, even the RMFA decided to support the Dalai Lama. Lessar told Lian Fang 聯芳 (1835–1927), the then Qing Foreign Vice-Minister (from 1903 to 1904)³⁹ that the Dalai Lama’s removal to Xining, which Lessar equated to imprisonment, “would inevitably lead to huge unrest in Mongolia and Siberia, and Russia would be obliged to take retaliatory measures.”⁴⁰ In response, the Qing backed down and allowed the Dalai Lama to spend the winter in Urga.

Eventually, on February 1, 1905, Lamsdorf summarized his views concerning the Dalai Lama in his memorandum to the Russian Tsar.⁴¹ He examined in detail four options for the Tibetan Pontiff: 1) to stay in Urga, 2) to go to Xining, 3) to relocate to Russia, and 4) to return to Tibet. He concluded that the fourth option would be the best solution, but without mentioning any kind of official Russian support. In case the fourth option was chosen, as outlined by Lessar, the Russian government’s main responsibility would be to ensure the Dalai Lama’s security on his return trip to Lhasa. Meanwhile, as Liuba reported to Lamsdorf, Amban Yan-zhi ordered the Dalai Lama to immediately return to Tibet, designating March 20 (March 7), 1905, as the last day for

³⁷ AFPRE, f. Kitaiskii stol, Secret telegram of Liuba, December 9, 1904, op. 491, d. 1454, l. 81.

³⁸ AFPRE, f. Kitaiskii stol, Secret telegram of Liuba, November 26, 1904, op. 491, d. 1454, l. 69.

³⁹ Lian Fang was Vice-Minister (*zuoshilang* 左侍郎) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*waiwubu* 外務部).

⁴⁰ AFPRE, f. Kitaiskii stol, Secret telegram of Lessar, December 2/15, 1904, op. 491, d. 1454, l. 75.

⁴¹ Memorandum of Lessar, February 1, 1905 in Belov 2005: 67–68.

his departure.⁴² However, according to Liuba, the Dalai Lama refused to leave Urga without any security guarantees from Russia and told Consul Liuba that he preferred to go to Russia instead.⁴³ At that point, even the RMFA began to seriously consider the possibility of relocating the Dalai Lama to Russia, as a measure of last resort, since the idea was supported by the Russian military and, of course, by the Buryat community.⁴⁴ In fact, Khambo Lama Iroltuev already began with preparations for the Tibetan Pontiff to be received in Transbaikalia.

Nevertheless, the Dalai Lama continued to wait for more substantial support from Russia regarding the British, particularly for security guarantees, and sent Dorzhiev to St. Petersburg for this purpose.⁴⁵ To gain time and after long negotiations, he promised to the Qing Court to leave Urga on May 17, 1905.⁴⁶ Just at that time, Kozlov turned up in St. Petersburg, his mind set on staging a Russian convoy to accompany the Dalai Lama back to Tibet. It was then that Lessar, an advocate of the Wait-and-See Policy toward Tibet, suddenly passed away in Beijing on May 4 (April 21). These new circumstances instilled the Dalai Lama with new hopes, and he once again postponed his departure, claiming he was down with a cold and therefore could not travel.

Kozlov left Moscow on April 30 (April 17), 1905. Before his departure, he submitted his convoy plan to Evgenii Alekseev (1843–1918), Governor General of the Far East. Then, on his journey to Urga, he met Agvan Dorzhiev in Verkhneudinsk (modern Ulan-Ude, Buryatia), and when they heard of the Russian naval defeat by the Japanese at Tsushima⁴⁷, it “struck them terribly.”⁴⁸ As Kozlov noted in his diary, the Dalai Lama knew all about Kozlov's convoy plan through his correspondence with Dorzhiev.⁴⁹ Eventually, Kozlov arrived in Urga on June 6 (May 24), 1905. Shcherbatskoi had already been there since May 30 (May 17).

Upon Kozlov's and Shcherbatskoi's arrival in Urga, they found the Russian Consulate officials and the Tibetans eagerly waiting for

⁴² Secret telegram of Liuba, February 26, 1905 and Secret telegram of Lessar, February 28, 1905 in Belov 2005: 68.

⁴³ Secret telegram of Liuba, March 6, 1905 in Belov 2005: 69.

⁴⁴ For more details about the Dalai Lama's relocation to Russia, see Shaumian 2001: 133–156.

⁴⁵ Dorzhiev had been trying to go to St. Petersburg starting from early May 1905, which Consul Liuba endeavored to prevent. Unyielding, Dorzhiev overcame all obstacles however, and finally arrived in the Russian capital in October 1905.

⁴⁶ Bulag 2013: 7.

⁴⁷ The battle of Tsushima was the final naval battle of the Russo-Japanese war, fought on May 27–28, 1905. It ended with the devastating defeat of the Imperial Russian Navy.

⁴⁸ Kozlov [1905] 2004: 102.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

Dmitrii Pokotilov (1865–1908), the new Russian Ambassador to China in Beijing, who was on his way from St. Petersburg to replace the deceased Pavel Lessar, hoping that a change in ambassadors might also bring a change in Russian politics. On June 13 (May 31), 1905, a meeting was held between the Dalai Lama and Pokotilov. The new Ambassador presented gifts from the Russian Tsar, namely a ring with the Emperor's portrait encrusted on it, together with thirty big diamonds and a watch, and also conveyed assurances of the Emperor's goodwill toward Tibet's ruler.⁵⁰ Pokotilov promised him to obtain guarantees from China and Great Britain regarding his personal safety.⁵¹ On the next day, June 14 (June 1), Kozlov met the Dalai Lama for the first time and presented gifts from the IRGS. According to Kozlov, the Dalai Lama warmly welcomed the idea of a Russian military convoy, all the more so as half of it would consist of Buryat "lamaists," and also his Tibetan entourage was very pleased about the goodwill shown by Russia to the Pontiff. Shcherbatskoi only met the Dalai Lama for the first time on June 18 (June 5).

Intrigues in Urga

After meeting the Dalai Lama, Kozlov and Shcherbatskoi were eagerly awaiting the decision of the Russian higher authorities regarding the convoy issue. Meanwhile, Kozlov was looking for a painter to draw the Dalai Lama's portrait, while Shcherbatskoi was busy studying religious life in Urga and pondered on the Dalai Lama's difficult situation. As Shcherbatskoi's diary reveals, the relations between all the parties involved in the Tibet issue and present in Urga were rather strained. The Russian Consulate turned out to be a hotbed of various intrigues, including corrupt consular officials. The Tibetan party was most unhappy with Consul Liuba's disrespectful attitude towards the Dalai Lama.⁵² The Consul apparently envied the two "outsiders" Kozlov and Shcherbatskoi. The Tibetans did not like Kozlov and curiously enough, Shcherbatskoi also disliked him.⁵³ Not to mention the

⁵⁰ Kozlov [1905] 2004: 103–104; Shaumian 2017: 102–104.

⁵¹ Shcherbatskoi in Andreev 2017: 60.

⁵² That Liuba as the representative of the Russian government in Urga had not welcomed the Dalai Lama personally on his arrival, but had sent the official Dolbezhev instead, had offended both the Tibetans and the Buryat party.

⁵³ In his diary, Shcherbatskoi noted a curious story about a Buddha statue of amazing Chinese artisanship. Kozlov himself liked the statue very much, but he one day asked the Dalai Lama to present it to General Alexei Polivanov (1855–1920). The Dalai Lama was reluctant to give the statue as a present, arguing he had received it from a Mongolian prince and friend. The next time they met, Kozlov told the Dalai Lama that Polivanov had become the head of the General Headquarters, and on that occasion it would be very nice to endear himself by making such a special

intrigues of the Jebtsundamba Khutagt and the Chinese amban... Obviously, the atmosphere in Urga at that time was fraught with tension.

Before long, on June 23 (June 10), the Russian Consul Liuba conveyed some bad news to the Dalai Lama and to Kozlov. However, he tried to present them as good ones. According to Kozlov, Liuba said "the authorities considered the Kozlov expedition to Tibet to be untimely, because it could jeopardize the good outcome just achieved for Tibet, i.e., that the British formally waived the 1904 Lhasa Convention, so that the Dalai Lama could safely return home."⁵⁴ When Kozlov met the Dalai Lama the next day, the latter confirmed the Russian government had assured him the British would give up those rights in Tibet that were specified in the 1904 Convention. Although this information later proved false, the Dalai Lama therefore decided to leave Urga in early July 1905. At the end of his meeting with Kozlov, the Pontiff expressed his regret that Kozlov's convoy plans had failed.

As the alleged "good news" clearly outweighed the bad, the Dalai Lama and Kozlov were not too disappointed. The latter at least received permission from the Russian authorities to go to Tibet separately from the Dalai Lama, while the Tibetan side—together with the Buryat party—decided to secretly organize an escort for the Dalai Lama. It was to be made up of Buryat Cossacks disguised as Buddhist pilgrims under the command of an experienced sergeant.⁵⁵ While stationed in Lhasa, this bodyguard would be sponsored entirely by the Dalai Lama.⁵⁶

Very soon, however, the Dalai Lama began to realize that things were not going as smoothly as the Russian Consul kept reassuring him. He was very worried because both the Chinese and the Russians were hiding from him the full contents of the Anglo-Chinese negotiations taking place in Calcutta, in which the British agreed not to annex any Tibetan territory and not to interfere with the Tibetan

present. "As a result, the Dalai Lama gave Polivanov the *burhan* (Buddha) as a present, but Kozlov, most likely, appropriated it for himself," wrote Shcherbatskoi (Andreev 2017: 62–63). The latter's suspicions probably proved to be right as Kozlov ([1905] 2004: 119) noted in his diary: "On the 13th there was almost a farewell audience with the Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama presented gifts to the Geographical Society—cult objects. For me personally—a wonderful *burhan* with (kashmir) cloth."

⁵⁴ Kozlov [1905] 2004: 108. Unfortunately, I did not gain access to the original report by Liuba (stored at the AFPRE).

⁵⁵ It seems that the Dalai Lama's Buryat party did not really deplore that Kozlov could not lead the convoy as originally planned. Lomakina (2001: 107) cites from Shcherbatskoi's diary about talks in the Russian Consulate: "Dylykov [a Buryat] told Griaznukhin [a Russian] about Kozlov: 'We got rid of this guy'." She suggests that this quote probably refers to Kozlov's planned lead of the convoy. Dylykov apparently preferred the idea of a secret Buryat Cossack escort without Kozlov.

⁵⁶ Kozlov [1905] 2004: 121.

administration in return for indemnity payments.⁵⁷ The Tibetan Pontiff also seriously feared the Chinese would assassinate him on his way back to Tibet, out of revenge for seeking independent relations with Russia.⁵⁸ Besides, he suspected the Russians regarded the Tibet issue as of minor importance and accordingly disregarded his wishes. Shcherbatskoi described the situation as follows:

At present, the Gegeen [Jebtsundampa Khutagt], the Chinese government, and the Russian Consul are unanimously zealous to remove the Dalai Lama from Urga to Lhasa. The Gegeen for financial reasons, the [Russian] Foreign Ministry to get rid of the problem and the Chinese government for some obscure reasons. Negotiations are currently under way in Calcutta between Chinese officials and the British viceroy [of India] to work out an agreement to replace the withdrawn Younghusband, i.e., Lhasa Convention. However, the Chinese government does not inform the Dalai Lama about the progress of the negotiations, but requests the Dalai Lama to leave as soon as possible [...] Pokotilov did not disclose the content of the agreement, referring to it as a state secret [...] The Dalai Lama told us: 'It is kept secret from me.'⁵⁹

Under these circumstances, the Buryat escort, if approved, would be the Dalai Lama's only safety guarantee. To press ahead with this issue, the Dalai Lama and Dorzhiev petitioned the Russian government, and requested their friends among the military and the diplomatic circles, including Kozlov and Shcherbatskoi, that this issue should be dealt with at the top level. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was reluctant, however, to approve of the escort, despite strong support on the part of the Russian military.⁶⁰ Surprisingly, Consul Liuba who, at first, had countered the matter in the ministry, suddenly backpedaled and, as Shcherbatskoi noted on July 25 (July 12), 1905, gave his consent:

⁵⁷ On these negotiations which led to the Anglo-Chinese Adhesion Agreement in 1906, see, e.g., Lamb 1986: 272–273.

⁵⁸ Shcherbatskoi (in Andreev 2017: 56) noted: "[To the question] 'What is the reason for the Dalai Lama's concerns that the Chinese may kill him while he is traveling?', Dylykov replied that the Chinese wanted to take revenge for his treachery and his relations with Russia independently from China. This is possible, the more so because, after the Japanese war, the prestige of Russia has considerably declined and the Chinese began to speak in a completely different tone, and the Mongols, who used to be afraid of Russia and thought that their joining this country was only a matter of time, all radically changed their attitude. The value of Russia, he said, has dropped considerably. Dylykov believes that these views of the Chinese and the Mongols are wrong, because Russia has not yet been wiped out and still remains a very powerful state."

⁵⁹ Andreev 2017: 58, 61.

⁶⁰ Evgenii Alekseev, governor general of the Far East, supported the convoy idea from the very beginning. Fedor Palizin, head of the General Headquarters, supported both the convoy and arms for it. See Andreev 2006: 148.

"Today, the Consul visited the Dalai Lama and said he allowed him to have a Buryat Cossack convoy, but this was only his personal permission, given under his own authority."⁶¹ So, it seems that the Russian government eventually decided to turn a blind eye on the issue and approved the convoy unofficially, considering it "a moral obligation toward the Dalai Lama."

At the same time, we must not forget that we are somehow bound by some moral obligations towards the Dalai Lama and therefore cannot help but take all measures available to us to ensure his personal safety and, as far as possible, to preserve his position and authority.⁶²

In the meantime, a Buryat monk named Shazhib Tsyrenov (n.d.) arrived in Urga from Lhasa via India on July 16, 1905. He reported the British had occupied Tibet as far as Gyantse (Rgyal rtse,) stationed a garrison, constructed a telegraph line, and built a road in Phari (Phagri) and Tuna, while "committing much violence."⁶³ This news shocked the Tibetans. "Why were the Russian Consulate and the Chinese government in such a hurry to assure me that there are no Englishmen anywhere in Tibet? ... The British occupy more than half of my domain, whereas I am assured there is no one there." This was the Dalai Lama's reaction on July 17, as quoted by Shcherbatskoi. In his diary, the Russian scholar replied: "... because they have no other aim than to get rid of the Dalai Lama as soon as possible and to go on vacation."⁶⁴

Departure from Urga and stay in Van Khüree

In this unfavorable situation, the Dalai Lama decided to leave Urga. He informed the Russian government of this decision through Consul Liuba in August 1905 and asked the Russian authorities for permission to leave Dorzhiev as his chief representative in Russia and four "intelligent" Buryats as his permanent agents in Lhasa, Dartsedo, Beijing, and Urga.⁶⁵ Moreover, he "expressed his deep gratitude for allowing Buryat volunteers to accompany him to Tibet under the guise of pilgrims" (italics added).⁶⁶ By the end of the Dalai Lama's sojourn in Urga, relations with Qing officials had become so strained that the Tibetan Pontiff

⁶¹ Andreev 2017: 62.

⁶² RMFA report on the Tibet issue of June 6, 1906 in Belov 2005: 97.

⁶³ Kozlov [1905] 2004: 122; Andreev 2017: 63.

⁶⁴ Andreev 2017: 65.

⁶⁵ These should be the afore-mentioned Badmazhapov, Bimbaev, Dabdanov, and Galsanov; see FN 35.

⁶⁶ Secret telegram from Consul Liuba to Lamsdorf of August 3 (July 21), 1905 in Belov 2005: 75.

considered it possible to leave Urga without saying goodbye to the Urga Amban, who had come to see him off.⁶⁷ Thus, without any actual guarantees from the Russian government, the Dalai Lama left Urga on September 15 (September 2), although not directly for Tibet, but first for Van Khüree, the seat of the banner of the Mongolian Prince Khanddorj⁶⁸ and its monastery (Mong. Daicin Vang-yin Kūriy-e). It was close to the Russian border, 373 km (350 *versts*) from Kiakhta and the same distance from Urga, where he arrived on September 20 (September 7), 1906.

Despite the Qing Emperor's orders and against the advice of the Russian authorities, the Tibetan Pontiff refused to return to Tibet as long as the British were there. His nearly one year-long stay in Mongolia—as well as his meetings with Mongolian princes, Buryat Buddhists, and representatives of the Russian military, diplomatic, and academic circles—had contributed to the emergence of nationalistic views of the Dalai Lama regarding Tibet's status. As testified in Russian sources, the Dalai Lama had indeed acquired considerable knowledge about modern international politics. Kozlov, for example, noted in his diary:

Other political issues were also discussed in the Dalai Lama's monastic cell. There was a discussion about the unification of Mongolia and Tibet. Now, eventually, everyone may see and understand that the present disastrous, unfortunate war for Russia in the Far East, which took Manchuria away from our country, will turn in a different and more proper direction as it was advised earlier,—namely, towards Mongolia and Eastern Turkestan. A wave of future developments and connections with the east of China through Kalgan and Beijing must be rushed in here. The Manchurian railway branch must be replaced by the Gobi one—Kiakhta-Kalgan, not Manchuria, but Mongolia must play a revitalizing role! If so, then, of course, a better relationship with the Dalai Lama will be of great importance! The latter would only help the most peaceful occupation of Mongolia and Eastern Turkestan by the Russians. The border would pass along the borderline of Tibet—side by side with the domain of the Dalai Lama. Russia should strive in that direction, not to Manchuria [...].⁶⁹

Therefore, when Agvan Dorzhiev finally managed to arrive in St. Petersburg, he straight away petitioned the RMFA on September 29, 1905, that under the current circumstances, Tibet aimed at nothing less than independence:

⁶⁷ AFPRE, f. Chinese table, Report of Pokotilov to Lamsdorf of November 9 (October 27), 1905, o. 491, d. 122, l. 69.

⁶⁸ Khando-vang in the Russian sources.

⁶⁹ Kozlov, "Dnevnik," 118.

[...] the Tibetans seek solely the protection of Russia and other powers, wishing to achieve final recognition of their autonomy and independence, and expressing their readiness to allow all states that might be interested, to send their representatives to the Dalai Lama in Lhasa, thereby facilitating the desirable communication of Tibet with these powers on trade and other matters.⁷⁰

The RMFA, however, was still not willing to get directly involved in the Tibet Question, communicating to Dorzhiev that the Dalai Lama's main objective in the current situation should still be to return to Lhasa.

Meanwhile, Qing officials suspected the Dalai Lama was contemplating fleeing to Russia and, on October 6 (September 23), 1905, delivered an urgent order to the pontiff in Van Khüree demanding him to return to Tibet immediately.⁷¹ The categorical order caused real indignation in the Tibetan camp, thus further alienating the Dalai Lama from the Chinese. Thereupon the Tibetan Pontiff and his associates wrote numerous letters to various levels of Russian authorities. The interpreter, Namdak Dylykov, reported to the RMFA that the Dalai Lama was in danger of being forcibly taken from Mongolia back to Tibet.⁷² The Dalai Lama personally wrote letters to the Qing Emperor Guangxu 光緒 (r. 1875–1908) and Russian Ambassador Pokotilov. In his petition to the Qing Emperor, sent through the Uliastai Amban, the Dalai Lama complained about the Jebtsundampa Khutagt and the Urga amban's unacceptable behavior towards him, which had caused him to leave Urga and temporarily stay at Prince Khanddorj's headquarters.⁷³ In his letter to Pokotilov (October 9, 1905) the Dalai Lama asked him to take all possible measures to forward his petition to the Emperor and to protect the said amban from the harassment that can be expected from the capital's dignitaries for submitting a report without their mediation.⁷⁴ Pokotilov himself seemed to have sympathized with the Dalai Lama. In his very polite reply, he informed the Dalai Lama that he was always glad to assist him and that he had received permission from the Qing government for the Dalai Lama to stay in Khalkha over the winter. He also promised to support the Dalai Lama's envoys in Peking in every possible way.⁷⁵

⁷⁰ Belov 2005: 72.

⁷¹ Shaumian 2017: 109.

⁷² Ibid., 111.

⁷³ AFPRE, f. Chinese table, The Dalai Lama's letter translated from Manchu, o. 491, d. 122, l. 77.

⁷⁴ AFPRE, f. Chinese table, Approximate translation of the Dalai Lama's letter to Pokotilov, September 26 (October 9), 1905, o. 491, d. 122, l. 90.

⁷⁵ AFPRE, Pokotilov's letter to the Dalai Lama, September 26 (October 9), 1905, Chinese table, o. 491, d. 122, l. 91. The correspondence mentioned above (the Dalai

On November 18 (November 5), a delegation of Khorchin Mongols from the Jirim seim came to visit the Tibetan Pontiff and invite him to their homeland.⁷⁶ The delegation was guarded by disguised Russian intelligence agents from Manchuria under officer Kostritskii (n.d.), Lieutenant-Colonel Hitrovo's assistant (1860–1921).⁷⁷ Kostritskii personally met the Dalai Lama and apparently had long conversations with him. Based on Kostritskii's intelligence data, Hitrovo reported to the Russian authorities as follows:

In the entire region traversed by him, the Dalai Lama, from Tibet to Urga within the borders to the north and west up to the frontiers of Russia, all the population is on his side, all as one. The people of Inner Mongolia, represented by the populous Jirim and Ordos seim, were eager to see him at their homes and followed him. Guided solely by justice and following the needs and natural historical desires of the vast Lamaist flock, the Dalai Lama and like-minded Khutughtu-Gegeens irrevocably decided to secede from China to form an independent union state executing this operation under the auspices and with the support of Russia, thus avoiding bloodshed (*underlined*. – E. Belov). If Russia refuses, [the Dalai Lama], without changing the decision to separate from China, will do this under the auspices of another Great Power, at the very least, Great Britain, which offers all sorts of services to the Dalai Lama.⁷⁸

As Pokotilov reported to Foreign Minister Lamsdorf, the Russian military authorities in Manchuria were in favor of using the Tibetan Pontiff in Mongolia “in order to implement the broadest political plans for this country,” i.e., “separation of Mongolia from Chinese rule and the creation of an independent Mongol-Tibetan state.”⁷⁹

Around the end of 1905, the Buryat military escort finally arrived at the Dalai Lama's camp in Van Khüree and, remarkably, with Tsar Nicholas II's approval.⁸⁰ It was probably the same detachment that

Lama to the Qing Emperor, the Dalai Lama to Pokotilov, Pokotilov to the Dalai Lama) is attached to Pokotilov's report to Lamsdorf from November 13 (October 31), 1905.

⁷⁶ Baradin, *Amdo-Mongolia*, 61–62. For more detail, see I. Garri & A. Andreev “Bazar Baradin and his Recollections of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama” in this RET issue.

⁷⁷ A.D. Hitrovo was lieutenant-colonel of the General Staff, Khyakhta border commissar, and organizer of the Tsarist intelligence service in Mongolia. Before 1906 he served in the intelligence service of the Trans-Amur military region in Harbin.

⁷⁸ Belov 2005: 109–110.

⁷⁹ AFPRE, Report by Pokotilov to Lamsdorf, January 30, 1906, Chinese table, o. 491, d. 123, l. 28.

⁸⁰ I thank Aleksandr Andreev for sharing an archival document with an excerpt from the RMFA's telegram containing the Emperor's glosse: “We should help him with the convoy,” Doc. F. 6, o. 8/2, d. 149, l. 26, Archive of the Military Historical Museum of Artillery, Engineering and Signal Troops (Arkhiv Voenno-istoricheskogo muzeia artillerii, inzhenernikh voisk i voisk svyazi Архив военно-исторического

later on trained Tsarong Dasang Damdul (Tsha rong zla bzang dgra 'dul, 1888–1959), Tibet's future Commander-General, in Van Khüree for two months.⁸¹

And, very importantly, Agvan Dorzhiev was granted a personal audience with the Russian Tsar. It happened the next year, on March 7 (February 22), 1906. On behalf of the Dalai Lama, Agvan Dorzhiev conveyed to Tsar Nicholas II assurances of “unwavering loyalty and gratitude.” He promised as well that the Dalai Lama would leave Mongolia very soon, on the Russian government's advice, while closing his address by saying the Dalai Lama would welcome Russian scientific expeditions to Tibet.⁸² It is worth quoting the words of Tsar Nicholas II in reply to Dorzhiev's appeal:

I have always held dear the interests of the millions of my subjects—the flock of His Holiness, as well as Tibet. Let them believe that I, along with Russia, am always ready to help Tibet to the extent that we have the means and strength, and I hope that, in some time, we will provide His Holiness with even stronger and more desirable assistance for Tibet.⁸³

Although these vague promises were not accompanied by any specific measures to implement them, the Tibetan side was very happy with it and paid it the highest attention, considering it as encouragement for further collaboration. On March 8 (February 23), the day after the audience, Consul Liuba reported in a secret telegram to Lamsdorf that the Dalai Lama had agreed to return to Lhasa while continuing to ask: “Is it possible, without complications with England, to fulfill the promise made to Dorzhiev regarding assigning to the Pontiff in Lhasa a Russian diplomatic official and a guard detachment (Rus. *ohrannii otriad* охранный отряд), which are already in Van Khüree?”⁸⁴

At Zaya Bandida Monastery. Covert Chinese Threats

On March 21 (March 8), 1906, the Dalai Lama—accompanied by the new Buryat escort—left Van Khüree and arrived at Zaya Bandida Monastery on March 31.⁸⁵ Shortly thereafter, the Russian Consul Liuba arrived, supposedly bringing a telegram from the Russian Tsar

музея артиллерии, инженерных войск и войск связи). For more information, see Andreev 2006: 148.

⁸¹ Tsarong 2000: 20.

⁸² Belov 2005: 83.

⁸³ Ibid., 27.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 84.

⁸⁵ Zain-khure Зайн-хурэ in the Russian sources.

Nicholas II.⁸⁶ Cecil Spring-Rice (1859–1918), a British diplomat in charge of negotiations with Russia in London, reported about the Tsar's telegram to Sir Edward Grey (1862–1933), the Foreign Secretary, as follows:

In the course of conversation with Count Lamsdorff today I alluded to the subject of the telegram sent by the Emperor to the Dalai Lama of Thibet. His Excellence informed me that the policy of his Government with regard to that country was the same as that of His Majesty's Government, namely, that of non-intervention. They wished the Dalai Lama to return as soon as possible to Lhasa, as they considered his continued presence in Mongolia undesirable, but he has fears for the safety of his person on his return and has asked for the promise of protection. The telegram has been sent in place of this promise, and was designed to reassure, not only the Dalai Lama himself, but also the Emperor's Buddhist subjects, with regard to whom the Russian government would find themselves in a very embarrassing position should any mishap befall the Lama [...].⁸⁷

Most likely, the telegram reflects what the Russian Emperor said to Agvan Dorzhiev during the above-mentioned audience. A detailed report on the conversation between the Dalai Lama and Mikhail Kuzminskii (n.d), a secretary of the Russian Consulate in Urga who visited the Pontiff on July 27 (July 14) in Sain Noyon Banner, seems to confirm this assumption.⁸⁸ According to Kuzminskii, the Dalai Lama considered this telegram as “the most significant moment in the history of relations between Tibet and Russia” and “the main guarantee for his inviolability on his return trip to Tibet.” The aim of Kuzminskii's visit will be discussed in the last part of this paper.

Meanwhile, rumours about the secret Buryat guard had leaked to the British and to the Chinese.⁸⁹ On May 7, Spring-Rice handed Lamsdorf a Memorandum on the Anglo-Chinese Agreement and then asked about “the recent incident of the Buriat Guard.” The Minister

⁸⁶ Shaumian 2017: 127–128. Describing the visit, Shaumian didn't mention the Tsar's telegram. I don't have Liuba's report at my disposal but suppose that delivering the telegram was the main reason for Liuba's arrival.

⁸⁷ British National Archives (BNA), FO 371/176-1906, Thibet Confidential: Spring-Rice to Grey, April 9, 1906, 353. I am grateful to Bianca Horlemann for sharing this and other important documents of the British Foreign Office.

⁸⁸ AFPRE, Kuzminskii, *Sekretnaia zapiska Kuzminskogo general'nomu konsulu v Urge ot 26 iul'ia 1906 goda* Секретная записка Кузминского генеральному консулу в Урге от 26 июля 1906 года [A secret note of Kuzminskii to the Consul General in Urga, July 26, 1906 (August 8)], *Kitaiskii stol*, d. 1208: 49–50. The Dalai Lama, through Kuzminskii, asked the Russian authorities to re-send this telegram officially, i.e., via the Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry.

⁸⁹ BNA, FO 371/177-1906, Thibet Confidential, Carnegie to Grey, May 7, 1906, 545.

explained to his British counterpart that the escort (in addition to the Tsar's telegram) is, actually, the only guarantee for the Tibetan Pontiff's safety the Russian government can provide:

[...] he [the Dalai Lama] had, as it appeared, refused to return unless he received some solid guarantees that his life not be in peril. These guarantees the Russian government had been unable to give him. But it was difficult for them to refuse a request proffered by the Russian Buddhists that some of their number might accompany their master to his home in order to defend him from possible attacks on his sacred person.

The Russian government, acting on the advice of the officials who had special knowledge about the temper of the Siberian Buriats, had agreed to this request, but nothing was further from their thoughts than a desire to intervene thereby in the internal affairs of Thibet.⁹⁰

Spring-Rice, for his part, explained the British attitude towards the Dalai Lama and his return to Lhasa:

I pointed out that the antecedents of the Dalai Lama were well known; that if he returned to Lhasa it was quite possible that he would take an active part in politics, and would initiate or carry out a policy directed against British interests, as had previously been the case; and that if this was his policy, and if he were known to be surrounded by an armed guard of Russian subjects who had accompanied him on his return, it would be quite impossible for His Majesty's government to remain indifferent to such a situation, and that the results would be unfortunate for those good relations which we have so much in heart, and would be quite inconsistent with those assurances which had already passed between the two governments.

Count Lamsdorff informed me in reply that there never had been any question of the Buryats remaining in Lhasa.⁹¹

It appeared that the Chinese were in cahoots with the British on the matter of the Dalai Lama's return to Tibet, not wishing him to go back to Lhasa just yet, in consideration of the just concluded agreement. It seemed that the main intention of the Qing officials in Urga, when pressuring the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet, was to remove him from the Russian border and influence. So, when the British informed the Chinese about the Russian Buryat escort, the Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry assured that "China will take all necessary steps, and will not allow the Dalai Lama to create any disturbance in Thibet or return to Lhasa for the present."⁹²

⁹⁰ BNA, FO 371/176-1906, Thibet Confidential, Spring-Rice to Grey, May 2, 1906, 545.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² BNA, FO 371/176-1906, Thibet Confidential, Carnegie to Grey, May 3, 1906, 506.

On April 21, 1906, Qing Emperor Guangxu sent the Mongol Bodisu 博迪蘇 (1871–1914),⁹³ the Grand Minister in Attendance (*yuqian dachen* 御前大臣), and Da-shou 達壽 (1870–1939), a Manchu Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Colonial Affairs (*Lifanbu* 理藩部).⁹⁴ The Qing dignitaries arrived on June 6, 1906, bringing the Dalai Lama a personal letter and presents from the Manchu Emperor.

The Emperor's letter was conciliatory. The Qing Emperor, Bogdo Khan⁹⁵ in Russian sources, admitted the Dalai Lama "maybe deeply dissatisfied with some personas or with the government", stating at the end of his message:

In view of this, we have now urgently dispatched the Adjutant General Bodisu and State Secretary Da-shou, and have ordered them to, upon arrival, most carefully take care to finding a convenient place for You to stay and to find out once and for all whether You will or will not remain in Mongolia. We order that the above be taken into consideration.⁹⁶

As Kuzminskii noted in his report, "A heavy burden for him [the Dalai Lama], and fettering the will and decision of the Pontiff to return to Lhasa, was the secrecy surrounding the agreement recently concluded between England and China on Tibetan affairs⁹⁷ and the mutual rights of the said powers to Tibet."⁹⁸ However, Bodisu and Da-shou, notwithstanding the repeated requests and insistence of the Dalai Lama, could only provide him with the following written note: "At present, Tibet is not subject to the British, and they should not interfere in its internal affairs. Otherwise, just as with interference in the internal affairs of any other country, the Middle Kingdom will not tolerate such interference. All this is firmly established once and for all."⁹⁹ The Dalai Lama was very worried when he realized there was absolutely no information on how Great Britain and the Qing Court intended to guarantee his

⁹³ Bo-gong 博公 in Russian sources. Bodisu was a high-ranking Mongol bannerman with the title of Bulwark Duke (Fuguo gong 腐國公), Rus. Bogun Боргун.

⁹⁴ Da-shou, a Manchu, was the Right Minister 右侍郎 of the Ministry of Colonial Affairs. According to the Dalai Lama, in contrast to Bodisu, Da-shou was very rude and unfriendly.

⁹⁵ Bogdo Khan (Holy Khan) is an honorific title for the Manchu Emperor (and for the Jetsundamba between 1912 and 1924) used by Mongols and Russians as well.

⁹⁶ See the Russian translation from Manchu of the Emperor's letter intitled: "A handwritten letter from the Qing Emperor to the Dalai Lama from April 22, 1906 (translation from Manchu);" Kuzminskii 1906: 60.

⁹⁷ The Anglo-Chinese Adhesion Agreement was concluded on April 27, 1906.

⁹⁸ Kuzminskii 1906: 43.

⁹⁹ Translation of the official note on the Anglo-Chinese Agreement regarding Tibetan affairs presented to the Dalai Lama by the Chinese dignitaries Bo-gong and Da-shou in Kuzminskii 1906: 76.

personal safety in case he returned to Lhasa and how his rights over Tibet would be protected as well. He was greatly disturbed because the Qing dignitaries refused to give him a full text of the Anglo-Chinese Adhesion Agreement.¹⁰⁰

Moreover, Bodisu and Da-shou arrived, accompanied by Chinese officer Li Tingyu 李廷玉 (n.d.), with thirty cavalymen who, as well, were supposed "to protect the Dalai Lama" on his way back to Tibet. In addition to presenting letters and gifts from the Emperor, Bodisu and Da-shou were entrusted with the mission of forcing the Pontiff to return to Tibet after ascertaining his loyal feelings and obedience to the Qing Emperor. As proof of his devotion to the Da Qing [Great Qing] Dynasty, the Dalai Lama had to perform a ceremony of bowing three times in the direction of Beijing, in a suitably solemn atmosphere, in the presence of the said Qing dignitaries.¹⁰¹ This was probably the same ceremony held on June 17, as described by Bodisu in his diary:

[The Dalai Lama] dispatched numerous monks who, carrying banners and blowing trumpets, invited me to enter the monastery. The Dalai Lama thereupon knelt to receive the imperial edict, while presenting two yellow ceremonial *hadags* [Tib. khatak (kha btags)], reverently passing his respects to the Emperor [Guangxu]. I then handed over the objects awarded by the Empress Dowager [Cixi 慈禧 (1835–1908)] and the Emperor, and the Dalai performed a ritual of kneeling three times and kowtowing nine times, reverently expressing his gratitude for the heavenly grace.¹⁰²

As Uradyn Bulag commented, "the Dalai Lama was obliged to do so under duress, as Li Tingyu told the Dalai Lama's Chinese speaking bodyguard that he had been ordered by the Emperor to kill the Dalai Lama if necessary."¹⁰³

As for Li Tingyu, he knew about the forty Buryat Buddhists accompanying the Dalai Lama as bodyguards from the Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry, and he quickly identified them and their officer Damdin

¹⁰⁰ According to Bianca Horlemann's paper in this RET issue, British intelligence from Lhasa stated that the Dalai Lama had learned about the Anglo-Chinese Adhesion Agreement – while still in Mongolia – in a letter from the Qing Emperor, in which the Qing government requested the Tibetan hierarch to return to Lhasa as soon as possible. The Dalai Lama then sent letters from Mongolia to the regent in Lhasa and to his superintendent, to inform them accordingly. British Library, IOR/L/PS/20/259, Political Officer, Sikkim, to Indian government, Dec. 20, 1906 and "East India (Tibet). Further Papers Relating to Tibet. In Continuation of CD. 2370," *Parliament Papers* 1910: 68–69, doc. 130, encl. 6, dated Dec. 13, 1906.

¹⁰¹ Kuzminskii 1906: 46.

¹⁰² Cited according to Bulag 2013: 8.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

(Ch. Damuding 打木丁, n.d.).¹⁰⁴ On June 22, 1906, Li Tingyu noted in his diary *You Meng Riji* 游蒙日記 (*Mongolia Travel Diary*):

When I was in Zhangjiakou 張家口, I received a telegram from the Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry. It told me that Hu,¹⁰⁵ an Ambassador to Russia, had reported in a telegram that the Dalai Lama would return to Tibet and that Russia had dispatched forty Tibetan Buddhists accompanying him as bodyguard. I have already led thirty cavalymen to compete with them in Xuanhua Prefecture. After I arrived at Zaya Bandida Monastery, tens of Russian Buryat Buddhists have come here every day. They are led by one military officer (his name is Damuding 打木丁) and some soldiers. All of them are dressing as Lamas and, on the pretext of worshipping the Dalai Lama, they remain here and have decided to escort the Dalai Lama to Tibet. I think that the forty Tibetan Buddhists mentioned in the telegram from the Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry must match with this troop. The military officer looks handsome and the soldiers have fighting spirit.¹⁰⁶

It is evident here that Li was mentioning the Buryat *escort volunteers*, actually Cossacks, who had been dispatched by the General Headquarters with covert support from the Russian government.

Bodisu met the Dalai Lama nine times, constantly urging him to leave.¹⁰⁷ Having now a Qing escort forced upon him, the Dalai Lama had no choice but to promise to Bodisu that he would leave as soon as his departure caravan was complete and ready for the journey.¹⁰⁸ Thus, the Dalai Lama left Zaya Bandida Monastery on July 18 (July 5), 1906 and arrived in Sain Noyon Banner on July 21 (July 8), where he stayed for one more month, waiting for the completion of his caravan.

In Sain Noyon Banner. A change in Russian policy

With all this happening, it is easy to imagine the Dalai Lama's mood. He was almost ready to leave Mongolia, when five days after his arrival at the Sain Noyon Banner, to the Tibetan Pontiff's great joy, the Russian consulate official Kuzminskii arrived.

¹⁰⁴ Wada 2022: 73.

¹⁰⁵ Hu Weide 胡惟德 (1863–1933) served as a Chinese Ambassador to Russia from 1902 to 1907.

¹⁰⁶ Cited according to Wada 2022: 73–74.

¹⁰⁷ Bulag 2013: 8.

¹⁰⁸ According to the report of the Uliastai Governor-general (*jiangjun* 將軍), the Dalai Lama's caravan required 300 horses, 500 camels, 30 yurts, and 20 tents. See Kuzminskii 1906: 64.

First of all, I presented the Pontiff with gifts and a khatak on behalf of the Imperial Consulate on the occasion of his departure from Mongolia, and then, after the removal of superfluous persons from the chambers, in the presence of only two of his confidants, the Emchi [i.e., his personal physician] and the Soibon Khambo Lama [**gsol dpon mkhan po*], I began to outline the final goal of my mission. Having reported that the Imperial Government had received information from entirely reliable sources about the extremely negative attitude of the English towards his return to Lhasa and about the possibility of unrest in the country, which, without a doubt, the English could use for new interference in the affairs of Tibet, I warned him on behalf of the Ambassador [Pokotilov] about the need to postpone his return to Lhasa in the process. This news greatly embarrassed the Pontiff.¹⁰⁹

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Russian government knew from the British government itself that the British rejected the Dalai Lama's return to Lhasa. Since the latter—being bound to the Anglo-Chinese Agreement not to interfere with Tibet's administration—wanted Russia to give the same assurance, the British government approached the Russian authorities in June 1906 proposing to reach an agreement on mutual non-intervention in Tibetan affairs and recognition of China's suzerainty over Tibet.¹¹⁰

The Russian government reacted favorably to the British initiative in the expectation of concessions from Great Britain on other issues, such as in Persia and Afghanistan. As for the Dalai Lama issue, Pokotilov

¹⁰⁹ Kuzminskii 1906: 42. The Emchi Khambo (Tib. *em chi mkhan po*) Lama probably refers to the Dalai Lama's personal physician, Tekhang Jampa Tubwang (Bkras khang byams pa thub dbang, 1863?–1922), and the Soibon Khambo Lama possibly to the *gsol dpon mkhan po*, the food and tea steward. For more information, see Horlemann in this RET issue.

¹¹⁰ Proposal for an agreement between Great Britain and Russia presented to the Russian Government by the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg on June 12 (May 30): 1) The Russian Government will doubtless recognize, as His Majesty's Government have done, the suzerainty of China over Thibet, engaging at the same time to respect the territorial integrity of Thibet and to abstain from all interference in its internal administration; 2) It is clear that, by reason of its geographical position, Great Britain has a specific interest in Thibet in seeing that the external relations of Thibet are not disturbed by any other Power and I have no doubt that the Russian Government will recognise that fact; 3) The British and Russian Governments to severally engage not to send a representative to Lhasa; 4) The British and Russian Governments to agree not to seek or obtain, whether for themselves or for their subjects, any concession for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining or other rights in Thibet; 5) The British and Russian Governments agree no Thibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to them or to any of their subjects; 6) It is doubtless unnecessary to add that no Russian officials should be present in Tibet in any capacity whatsoever. See AFPRE, f. Mission in Peking, o. 761, d. 402: 221.

cautiously suggested a change in Russian policy towards the Tibetan Pontiff. He wrote to the RMFA in the context of the British proposals:

We could even promise Great Britain to influence the Dalai Lama in the sense of delaying his return to Tibet. I think that our presentation to the Pontiff in this sense would undoubtedly make a great impression on him and he would think hard before deciding to return to Lhasa under such circumstances. The Tibetan Pontiff is very optimistic about the provisions of the Anglo-Chinese treaty and undoubtedly strongly counts on our support in his upcoming struggle against English influence. The Chinese government is apparently concerned about our constant relations with the Pontiff and, mainly because of their fears, wants his speedy withdrawal from our borders and return to Lhasa, where, in the opinion of the Chinese, the Pontiff will be their ally against the aggressive plans of the British. It is unlikely, however, that the Chinese will decide to resort to force against the Pontiff, and he can undoubtedly, if he wishes, remain in Mongolia for an indefinite period of time. If we were to decide to abandon the plan that we have adhered to so far in relation to the Pontiff, namely, insisting on his speedy return to Lhasa, then we could use the Pontiff's continued presence within Mongolia to strengthen and develop our influence in that country. Currently, the Dalai Lama is in the area of Zain-khure [Zaya Bandida Monastery], 400 versts [427 km] southwest of Urga, planning to move from there to Tibet in August.¹¹¹

Eventually, Alexander Izvolskii (1856–1919), who succeeded Lamsdorf as Foreign Minister, accepted Pokotilov's suggestion and Kuzminskii was sent to the Dalai Lama with the message quoted above. The latter, greatly surprised by the turn of events just before his final departure and after sharing all his concerns with Kuzminskii, decided to think carefully again and make a decision later. Thereafter, the Pontiff, clueless about the negotiations being underway between Great Britain and Russia, immediately raised the issue of the Buryat agents, asking to send them as soon as possible. He strongly petitioned to keep the Buryat escort with him as long as possible, and to place these soldiers at the locations planned for the Buryat agents. On the next day, the Dalai Lama's confidants informed Kuzminskii that the Pontiff would stay at the Sain Noyon headquarter for twenty days, as previously planned, while waiting for answers to his new petitions. Upon those results he would decide one way or the other. This meeting

¹¹¹ AFPRE, Secret telegram of Pokotilov to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 18 (June 5), f. Mission in Peking, o. 761, d. 402: 212. On June 19 (June 6) there was a discussion on the Dalai Lama's fate at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, attended by many friends and sympathizers of the Dalai Lama, such as Academician Sergei Oldenburg and Captain Petr Kozlov. According to these Tibet experts, the best place where the Tibetan Pontiff could temporary settle, was Kokonor. See Belov 2005: 95–98.

with Kuzminskii was the Dalai Lama's last direct engagement with an official Russian representative in Mongolia. On August 26 (August 13), 1906, the Tibetan Pontiff left the Sain Noyon Banner and thus, Khalkha Mongolia.

As for the Buryat military escort and the "Dalai Lama's agents," as Dorzhiev's confidants were called in the Russian sources, the story didn't end there. We know that the Russian government, in light of the Anglo-Russian negotiations, decided to put an end to relations between Russia and the Tibetan Pontiff in any "official or semi-official (Rus. *официозной*) form."¹¹² Therefore, the Buryat agents were dismissed from Russian official service and were not allowed to enter in the Dalai Lama's service either. As for the escort, on meeting with Arthur Nicolson (1849–1928), the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, Izvolskii assured him that the Russian government "took all measures to ensure that the Buryats, volunteering to accompany the Dalai Lama, would not cross the border of Tibet under any circumstances."¹¹³ However, the Buryats continued to assist the Pontiff unofficially while the RMFA turned a blind eye to this taking into consideration to use both of them—the Pontiff and the Buryats—in its further policy in Mongolia.¹¹⁴

After the Dalai Lama had left Khalkha Mongolia and arrived at Kumbum (Sku 'bum) Monastery in November 1906, the Buryat escort was no longer mentioned in Russian official records but continued to trouble both the Qing Court and the British. According to Wada Daichi, the Buryats continued to accompany the Dalai Lama from 1906 to 1908 and served as intermediaries between the Tibetan Pontiff and the Russians, as evidenced in Chinese and Japanese sources, and in the memoirs of Carl Gustaf Mannerheim (1867–1951), then a Finnish officer and Inner Asia explorer in the Russian army.¹¹⁵ In fact, according to Amban Lian-yu 聯豫 (1856–?; posted to Lhasa from 1906 to 1912), there were still twenty-four persons dressed in Russian military uniforms who had one thousand Russian rifles at their disposal and trained Tibetans when the Dalai Lama stayed at Kumbum in 1909.¹¹⁶ Very likely, the

¹¹² Shaumian 2017: 132.

¹¹³ Secret letter of Izvolskii to the Russian Ambassador in London Benkendorf, June 16 (June 3), 1906, in Belov 2005: 93.

¹¹⁴ Secret letter of Izvolskii to the Russian Ambassador in London Benkendorf, October 29 (October 16), 1906, in Belov 2005: 104–105.

¹¹⁵ Mannerheim who later became the first president of Finland, met the Dalai Lama at Wutaishan while he was on expedition in Inner Asia. For more details and Japanese sources on the Buryat-Tibetan relations from 1906 to 1908, see Wada Daichi 2022: 76–75 and 2019: 72–81.

¹¹⁶ *Eguo xuzhuangzhe ershisi ren ji Ejiang yiqian zhi, you Zang diaobing wang cao* 俄国戌装者二十四人及俄枪一千枝，由藏调兵往操. See Wada Daichi 2019: 79. I wish to

Dalai Lama intended to use these Buryats as military instructors in Tibet, as part of his reform plans for the Tibetan military.¹¹⁷ Thus, the Buryats not only played a very important role during the Dalai Lama's troubled sojourn in Mongolia, but continued to do so in Amdo and at Mount Wutai (Wutaishan 五台山).

Conclusion

In this study, I investigated the rather obscure case of the secret Buryat convoy attached to the Thirteenth Dalai Lama during his sojourn in Mongolia by analyzing rarely used Russian sources such as official documents from the AFPRE and the travel diaries of Petr Kozlov and Fedor Shcherbatskoi. These sources, indeed, confirm that the secret Buryat convoy was formed with the—unofficial—approval of the highest Russian authorities and Tsar Nicholas II. However, it has also been demonstrated that the Russian government's initial willingness to get more deeply involved in the Tibet issue by actively supporting the Dalai Lama politically—and practically through an official Russian military escort and military training for Tibetan soldiers—was finally given up in light of Russia's greater interest in concluding the 1907 Anglo-Russian Agreement. However, the Russian civil and military authorities in St. Petersburg and on the spot in Mongolia and China continued to be divided about the Tibet Question. It appears that, in order to make up for Russia's turnaround in her Tibet Policy, the issue of an escort for the Dalai Lama became such a heavy "moral obligation" that it led to the minimal consensus to assist the Dalai Lama at least covertly, thereby even risking new conflicts with the British and Qing China.

For the Dalai Lama, now disillusioned about the amount of support he could expect from Russia, the secret escort became of even greater significance: first, to successfully resist persistent attempts by the Qing Court to remove him from Mongolia and away from Russian influence, and second, to protect the Tibetan Pontiff from perceived Chinese and British threats to his life. As Wada Daichi remarked: "It is well known that the Thirteenth Dalai Lama has repeatedly ignored the Qing government's orders to leave, and there is no doubt that the presence of these Buryat Buddhists, despite 'modern diplomacy', was a major factor behind his ability to act in such an autonomous manner."¹¹⁸

thank Wada-san for sharing Chinese official correspondence on this matter found in the Archives of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taiwan.

¹¹⁷ See B. Horlemann's article in this RET issue.

¹¹⁸ Wada 2019: 80.

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- AIRGS: Archive of the Imperial Russian Geographic Society (Arkhir Imperatorskogo Russkogo Geograficheskogo Obshchestva Архив Императорского Русского Географического Общества (АИРГО)), St. Petersburg, Russia
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Bazar Baradin and his Recollections of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama

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Fig. 1: Bazar Baradin

* I, Irina Garri, thank the French National Research Agency (ANR) (Project ANR-21-CE27-0025-Natinasia) for supporting my archival research in the Institute of Oriental Manuscripts' Orientalists Archive at the Russian Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg (Rus. Архив востоковедов Института восточных рукописей Российской академии наук). The present paper is a result of that work. Any errors remain ours.

1. Introduction

Bazar Baradin¹ (1878–1937) is an outstanding Buryat-Mongolian scholar, politician and writer. He was born in the Russian empire's Aga district of the Transbaikalia region. In 1901, he entered St. Petersburg University's Law Department, transferring after one year to the Department of Oriental Studies, where he studied Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Mongolian, under the guidance of Professor Sergei Oldenburg (1888–1940) and Fedor Shcherbatskoi (1866–1942). From 1905 to 1907, the Russian Committee for the Study of Inner and East Asia sent him on a trip to Mongolia, then to eastern Tibet, where he spent eight months at Labrang Tashikhyil Monastery (Bla brang bkra shis 'khyil), one of the major Geluk (*dge lugs*) centres of Amdo (A mdo). From 1908 to 1917, Baradin taught Mongolian at St. Petersburg University's Oriental Studies Department. In 1917, he returned to Transbaikalia and took an active part in the Buryat-Mongolian nationalist movement.² He was a member of the Buryat National Committee (1917–1918), the first People's Education Commissioner of the newly formed Buryat-Mongolian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (1923–1926), the first Chairman of the Buryat-Mongolian Scientific Committee (1923–1929), then Vice-Chairman of that Committee (1929–1935), then head of the Buryat Language and Literature Department at the Pedagogical Institute in Ulan-Ude, capital of Buryatia. In 1936, he returned to Leningrad to work at the Institute of Oriental Studies as a researcher and at the Institute of Philosophy, Linguistics, and History, as a lecturer of Mongolian language. On February 22, 1937, he was arrested on false charges by the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and on August 24, was shot as an "enemy of the people." He was posthumously rehabilitated in 1958.

¹ Rus. Базар Барадин / Бадзар Барадийн (Badzar Baradiin).

² The Buryat nationalist movement, "national liberation movement" in Soviet historiography terms, began in the early 20th century due to the Tsarist reforms on the abolition of the Buryat traditional forms of administration (Buryat Steppe Dumas) and continued until the 1917 October revolution. The national leaders were traditionally divided into conservatives and reformers. Both were united by a negative attitude towards tsarist reforms, but they were divided by their position on the solution of the Buryat national question. The former stood for the preservation of the traditional administration system, steppe customs and religion, while the latter fought for the creation of Buryat national autonomy within Russia. The Buryat nationalist movement leaders (Buryat National Committee) were representatives of the Buryat intelligentsia and the highest Buddhist clergy, whose most prominent were Elbek Rinchino (1888–1938), Mihail Bogdanov (1878–1919), Bazar Baradin, Tsyben Zhamtsarano (1881–1942), Agvan Dorzhiev (1853–1938), Khambo Lama Choizon-Dorzhо Iroltuev (1843–1918) etc. In 1937–1938, all these persons were repressed.

One of the most remarkable parts of Baradin's life was his trip to Mongolia and eastern Tibet from 1905 to 1907. At that time, he was a young scholar, conducting field research dealing with Buddhist iconography in the Buryat Buddhist monasteries in Transbaikalia on behalf of the Russian Committee for the Study of Inner and East Asia. When the Thirteenth Dalai Lama Tubten Gyatso (Thub bstan rgya mtsho, 1876–1933) unexpectedly arrived in Urga in the fall of 1904, the Committee gave him another assignment: to go to Mongolia and join a Russian convoy under Petr Kozlov's command (1863–1935), which was supposed to accompany the Dalai Lama back to Tibet.³ Baradin's overall journey, which started in September 1905, lasted two years. On October 15, he arrived in Van Khüree⁴, the *hoshuun*⁵ (headquarters) of the Mongol Prince Khanddorj (1869–1915),⁶ where the Dalai Lama stayed on the Prince's invitation. He lived there for five months, communicating closely with the Tibetan pontiff and his entourage. Knowing that the Dalai Lama was not going to leave Mongolia in the near future, Baradin's supervisors gave him another task, which coincided with his own desire; to go to Amdo to study the spiritual life at Labrang Tashikyil Monastery. Therefore, together with two countrymen, namely his brother and another Buryat Buddhist monk, he left Van Khüree in March 1906, returned to Urga, and there joined the Alasha⁷ caravan on March 29. After more than one month of travel, the "pilgrims" arrived at the Alasha-yamen,⁸ then at Kumbum (Sku 'bum) Monastery, and finally at Labrang Tashikhyil Monastery on June 23, 1906. In his report to the Imperial Russian Geographical Society (IRGS), Baradin wrote:

The next day, I was already quite a Labrang dweller and, from that moment on, I had to work for eight months in the silence of monastic life, trying gradually to get into local life [...] At night-time, I used to sit in my monastic cell with my diary or reading Tibetan books in the company of monks or engaged in peaceful conversation with my fellow Buryat lamas or Tangut friends.⁹

³ See I. Garri paper in this RET issue.

⁴ Van-kuren' Ван-курень in Russian sources.

⁵ Mong. *hoshuun*, Ch. *qi* 旗, means *banner*, i.e., a Mongolian military and administrative entity during the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), now an administrative unit in Inner Mongolia that corresponds to *county*.

⁶ Kando-van Кандо-ван in Russian sources. Mijiddorjiin Khanddorj was an aristocrat and prominent early 20th century Mongolian independence leader.

⁷ Mong. Alasha is a region where the Oirat Mongolian tribes of the Ööled and Torghuud lived. There were two banners during the Qing named Alasha Ööled and Ejine Torghuud.

⁸ Ch. *yamen* 衙門 is an administrative governmental office.

⁹ Baradin 1909: 198.

Baradin returned to his homeland in April 1907, bringing with him a heavy load of Tibetan and Mongolian books, printed mainly at his request at Labrang Tashikyil and Kumbum monasteries. This collection of about 200 volumes is stored nowadays in St. Petersburg at the Oriental Manuscripts Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Rus. IVR RAN).¹⁰ In 1908, Baradin presented a report entitled “A Journey to Labrang (a Buddhist Monastery on the North-Eastern Edge of Tibet)” at a meeting of the IRGS members, which was published in the *Bulletin of the IRGS* in 1909.¹¹ For this work, the Geographical Society awarded him the Przhevalsky Prize (just like his predecessor, Gombozhab Tsybikov, 1873–1930). Written in Russian, this report has been translated into English and is available online.¹²

At the peak of Stalin’s (1878–1953) repressions, Baradin was arrested and sentenced to death in 1937. Afterwards, his personal papers were sent to the Oriental Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, where a special collection named after him was formed. This collection, under number 87, consists of 31 files.¹³ Among them, there are four files relating to his 1905–1907 journey (No. 28–31).¹⁴

Although all files are dubbed diaries, in fact, they are not. Only File No. 30 is Baradin’s actual diary (two notebooks) written during his journey. The other three are diary-based manuscripts written by Baradin, supposedly, for publication at a later date. The report to the IRGS mentioned above is an excerpt from these manuscripts. The first file covers Baradin’s journey from Transbaikalia to Urga, his stay with the Dalai Lama in Van Khüree, and his travel to Alasha and Kumbum Monastery. The second covers mostly his journey home from Labrang Tashikyil Monastery and provides a description of Kumbum Monastery. The third manuscript is the actual diary (two notebooks) and includes the original notes written by Baradin during his stay at Labrang

¹⁰ Institut vostochnykh rukopisei Rossiskoi Akademii Nauk Институт восточных рукописей Российской академии наук. Baradin’s collection and the Gombozhab Tsybikov Collection (333 volumes) comprise the bulk of the Tibetan Collection of the Institute of Oriental Manuscripts.

On the history and composition of the Tibetan collection of the Institute, see its home page: <https://www.orientalstudies.ru/rus/collections/tibetica/index.html>

¹¹ Baradin, “Puteshestvie v Lavran.”

¹² See <https://tibetanculture.weai.columbia.edu/a-trip-to-labrang-by-baradiin-translated-by-vahe-galstyan/>

¹³ For a description of the Baradin Collection, see Savitskii 1990: 141–160

¹⁴ File No. 28: “Amdo-Mongolia. Diary of a Buryat Buddhist Pilgrim’s Journey to Khalkha-Mongolia, Alasha and Tibet’s North-Eastern edge – Amdo. 1905–1907,” 301 pp.; File No. 29: “Diary of a Journey to Amdo,” 210 pp.; File No. 30: “Baradin’s Diary. Labrang. June 11, 1906, – January 22, 1907.” Two notebooks: 89 pp. and 113 pp.; File No. 31: “Life in the Tangut Monastery of Labrang. Diary of a Buddhist Pilgrim, 1906–1907,” 519 pp.

Tashikhyil. And the fourth is a proof-read “clean” copy of the latter, published in 2002.¹⁵

It is the first “diary”, which contains Baradin’s recollections of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama. It consists of 301 sheets, rewritten from the original diary and revised by the author, supposedly in 1908, while he was preparing his report for the Geographical Society. The title page of the file “Amdo-Mongolia. Diary of a Buryat Buddhist pilgrim’s journey to Khalkha-Mongolia, Alasha and Tibet’s north-eastern edge – Amdo. 1905–1907” does not reflect its content, for the manuscript ends in June, 1906, i.e., at the time the author arrived at Kumbum Monastery. The diary is in poor condition, the manuscript sheets are crumpled, and the ink is fading so that many pages are illegible. Therefore, reconstructing the diary is a difficult task, even though Baradin’s handwriting is comparatively easy to read. The text is written in good Russian, the author reported all events on a daily basis and added his observations and views on important matters as well. In comparison with Gombozhab Tsybikov, whose style is very dry and lapidary,¹⁶ Baradin, a future writer and playwright, wrote eloquently, using metaphors and expressing his feelings. In our opinion, this diary is a unique and very valuable document, which needs to be published and more thoroughly studied, for it is the only eyewitness account of the no longer existent Van Khüree and of the exiled Thirteenth Dalai Lama’s life in his field camp during the autumn of 1905 and the winter of 1906.

What follows is an annotated translation of several excerpts selected for the present issue from Baradin’s diary dealing with the Dalai Lama’s life in Van Khüree. This introduction, text reconstructions and notes are provided by Irina Garri. The translation from Russian is prepared by Alexandre Andreyev (A. A.). Terms in italics are selected by us. Some notes were made by Baradin himself and marked as B. B. The dates provided by Baradin are set according to the Julian calendar, which is 13 days behind the Gregorian calendar.

2. *Baradin’s Portrayal of the Dalai Lama*

At first, I could not believe I was seeing the Dalai Lama in such a simple environment and dress. Next to him was a small black dog and a small wooden table stood in front of him. The room looked very plain, without any decorations, and it served as the Dalai Lama’s daytime dwelling place, while his bedroom was in the yurt donated to him by the Ujemchin¹⁷ Prince. This yurt was located to the west of the chapel, and it was covered by a piece of yellow satin cloth.

¹⁵ Baradin 2002.

¹⁶ Tsybikov 1981: vol. 1, 1–256.

¹⁷ Ujemchin are a subgroup of Mongols in eastern Mongolia and Inner Mongolia.



Fig. 2: The Thirteenth Dalai Lama portrayed by N. D. Kozhevnikov, 1905 (Archive of the Russian Geographical Society, St. Petersburg, © A. A.).

Apparently, he was a lean young (29-year-old at that time) Tibetan lama with a strongly aristocratic face. The expression on his face and his gestures evince a sense of royal pride. He had remarkably beautiful large eyes, protruding from their sockets. He had a somewhat insinuating gaze, in which some hidden cunning could be suspected. An energetic and highly expressive, lean face, without a single trace of aristocratic effeminacy or freshness of youth, light yellow skin with noticeable traces of the former smallpox and a small black bristly moustache, all these gave him the attractive features of a man who has seen and experienced a lot, despite his young age. His lean hands, very long and tenacious fingers with nails of oblong shape indicated his nature's caution and tenacity. His hand's rather rough skin, his gestures' simple manner suggested he was not a soft-handed man. And his large, properly positioned ears spoke of his musicality, sharpness of mind and feelings. He was dressed in the typical, Khalkha-style yellow lama robe, made of sheepskin covered with yellow Russian cloth. Over his shoulder was a plain lama's shawl (*orkhimji* – B. B.), an essential part of the monastic attire.

Unfortunately, we afterwards could not get the Dalai Lama's permission to take his photo, and his only portrait drawn from life by Mr.

Kozhevnikov,¹⁸ much to my chagrin, is not good at all. The reason for the Dalai Lama's and his secretary's inexplicable perplexity at the end of my audience was found out in the evening. On Mr. Dylykov's recommendation,¹⁹ the Dalai Lama himself and the people closest to him had long been awaiting my arrival, thinking that I, apart from my scholarly plans, have a commission of political nature. Therefore, they expected to hear from me, a newly-arrived man, at least some news about the situation in Tibet. I was sorry to learn about all this, the depressing atmosphere at the Dalai Lama's camp court, who could not escape the evil irony of fate that forced him to break away from his motherland and its magnificent imperial halls, and to live in severe and unsheltered Mongolia, listening to a Buryat pilgrim's words about his distant country's fate. I found myself in an awkward situation. On the one hand, [I tried] not to compromise Mr. Dylykov in front of the Tibetans, and on the other I had to repeat that I pursued scholarly goals only, and had no political commissions with regard to the Tibet issue. While saying this, I added that, being a Buddhist, I am morally obliged to faithfully serve the Dalai Lama and would always be ready to serve him if he needed my services. By this, I once and for all explained my position for my future life at the Dalai Lama's camp and I made it clear that I was a humble seeker of knowledge.

October 17–19: Mr. Dylykov introduced me to three important persons: to the personal physician and adviser of the Dalai Lama, *emchi-khambo*; to *dulva-khambo*,²⁰ and the sovereign Prince of the *hoshuun*, Kando Dorjie Chin-van.²¹ *Emchi-khambo* is a good-looking lama under 45 years of age. He is a very polite, handsome man, with a remarkably beautiful and intelligent expression on his face and eyes. His face is subtly aristocratic, with an almost European white soft skin complexion. His voice, remarkably clear, is pleasant and radiant. He is a devoted supporter of the Dalai Lama's policy, unremittingly believing in his "holy mission," despite the fact that his own brother, being one of the important "Kalons"²² was killed in Tibet due to factional strife.

¹⁸ While in Urga (1904–1905), the Dalai Lama never permitted anybody to take his photo. However, he allowed Petr Kozlov to organize the drawing of his portrait. It was the first image of the Tibetan pontiff and it was drawn by Russian painter Nikolai Kozhevnikov, see Kozlov 2004 [1905]: 112; Lomakina 2001: 139–148.

¹⁹ Namdak Dylykov (n.d.) was a prominent Buryat public and political figure. In 1904–1906 he served as the Thirteenth Dalai Lama's interpreter. For more details, see I. Garri's and Y. Ishihama's papers in this RET issue.

²⁰ Tib. *em chi mkhan po*, Tekhang Jampa Tubwang (Bkras khang byams pa thub dbang, 1863?–1922) later abbot of the Medical College at Lhasa, and Tib. *'dul ba mkhan po*, abbot of the Vinaya College at Drepung (Tib. 'Bras spungs) Monastery in Lhasa. For more information see Horlemann in this RET issue.

²¹ For Prince Khanddorj, see FN 4. Prince: *chin-van* (Ch. *qinwang* 親王).

²² Minister of the Tibetan government (Tib. *bka' blon*).

Unfortunately, he does not speak Mongolian. *Dulva-khambo* was with the Dalai Lama as a professor and expert on Buddhism, but mainly as a Chinese interpreter when introducing Chinese officials to the Dalai Lama. He was a Mongolian from the Sinicized Khorchin *hoshuun* and held the highest Lhasa academic title of Lharampa [*lha rams pa*].

3. *Prince Kando-van*²³

On October 22 in the evening, Mr. Dylykov took me to the local sovereign prince [Kando-van/Prince Khanddorj]. We entered a huge yurt, the size of a real hall. At the north-eastern part of the yurt, in the place of honor, was sitting a handsome young Mongolian, Prince Kando-van. When he saw us, he took his princely hat with a cone and peacock feathers and put it ceremoniously on his head. The prince received us very kindly and in a simple manner. Casual conversations promptly began between us. The prince is nearly 37 years of age, and a typical, talkative Khalkha native. He is quite an educated person in his own way. Apart from his native Mongolian, he is fluent in Manchu, and to some extent, in Chinese. He is a passionate hunter and a good shot; every two weeks, he, together with his Mongols, hunts wild boars and other animals. The prince is not a simple man but seems to be a *khubilgan*²⁴ who destroys all “evil spirits” in the shape of wild boars and other beasts. At the same time, he is a zealous Dalai Lama follower. It was he who invited the Dalai Lama over here and he now generously hosts him and his numerous escorts of up to 150 people at the expense of his *hoshuun*, having provided them with nice-looking yurts and food stuff. On account of his obvious sympathy for the Dalai Lama, he more than once received threats from the Urga Khutughtu²⁵ and his followers, as well as from Manchu officials. This prince enjoys great popularity in his *hoshuun* for his easy dealing with people and modest taxes.

4. *Khorchin Mongols visit the Dalai Lama*²⁶

In the evening, a deputation of Khorchin-Mongols²⁷ from the Jirim *seim*²⁸ (one of the six *seims* in south-eastern Mongolia), headed by Toin-

²³ Baradin *Diary*, 58–60. We keep Baradin’s spelling of Prince Khanddorj’s name, i.e., Kando-van Кандо-ван.

²⁴ Mong. for incarnated person (Tib. tulku; *sprul sku*).

²⁵ The Eighth Jebtsundamba Khutagt, Agwaan luwsan choiji Nyima danzan wangchug (Tib. Ngag dbang blo bzang chos kyi nyi ma bstan ’dzin dbang phyug, 1870–1924).

²⁶ Baradin *Diary*, 61–62.

²⁷ The Khorchin are a subgroup of the Mongols, predominantly living in the north-eastern part of China’s present Inner Mongolia.

²⁸ With Rus. *seim* (Mong. *Chuulghan*; Ch. *meng* 盟) Baradin means *assembly*, or *league*.

lama, the abbot of a Mongolian monastery, came to see the Dalai Lama.

October, 21. In the morning, I went to the newly arrived deputation's living quarters, together with Dylykov. After a while, we left because today we must attend the [Mongol] people's solemn initiation ceremony into the rite of "revival in oneself of the coherent thought of *bodhi*" by the Dalai Lama, called "*semkyod choga* [in Tibetan]." ²⁹ Nevertheless, in a short talk with Toin-lama, I received a very important confirmation of the national insurgent movement among the south-eastern Mongols. The deputation came to invite the Dalai Lama to visit their motherland. At present, among all south-eastern Mongols, a movement started in favor of the unification of the whole country of Mongolia and the declaration of its independence from China. The movement had started long ago, but at that time it took a certain direction, when the possibility of the Manchu dynasty's fall to the Chinese benefit seemed more real than ever to the Mongols, and a future Chinese yoke was considered worse than Manchu domination. The delegation, with invitation letters for the Dalai Lama from various *hosh-uuns* and *seims*, correctly regarded his visit to their country as a unifying factor.

5. *Baradin and Dylykov submit a report on
the idea of a Buddhist council*³⁰

Right at this time, Dylykov and I decided to submit a report on the [planned] convocation of an ecumenical council. Having notified some of the Dalai Lama's confidants, we compiled the report in which we explained, in Tibetan, the necessity of holding such a council. By doing this, we referred to the fact that the Dalai Lama, as the only competent person, could convene, somewhere in Peking, the representatives of all Buddhist schools and sects and European scholars to discuss the present state of Buddhism in the world. This council, initiated by the Dalai Lama, would be most interesting and important in many aspects. It would discuss some current issues regarding different, still unknown [Buddhist] sects and schools, and it would start the mutual exchange of thoughts of the branches of Buddhism being in a state of geographical and racial separation. The council could be of interest for the entire political and scholarly world, and it could have the best outcomes for the Dalai Lama's present policy, as well as for Tibet's future. The immediate reason for writing the note was that the Dalai Lama himself, through his closest associates, had often revealed his mission to us—to revive Tibetan Buddhism by means of a radical reformation

²⁹ It seems to be *semkye choga* (Tib. *sems bskyed kyi cho ga*), a ritual of *bodhicitta* (mind awakening).

³⁰ Baradin, *Amdo-Mongoliia*, 124–125.

of the monastic order, whose shortcomings were clearly understood by the Dalai Lama as well as by the intelligent Tibetan, Mongolian, and Buryat Buddhists.

6. *The Dalai Lama's divination*³¹

One of these days, the Dalai Lama quite unexpectedly learned about the visit to British India by the Panchen [Ninth Panchen Lama Tubten Chokyi Nyima (Thub bstan chos kyi nyi ma, 1883–1937)]. Dylykov and I were anxious to know what the Dalai Lama thought about this unpleasant event. We received a reply from the Tibetans: *Kyimgon*³² is engaged in divination and its results will be known soon. We did not have to wait long to know the results of this divination.

The Dalai Lama, having immersed for some time into meditation, made some divinations regarding the questions of interest to him. Here are the results of his divination.

1. There were no changes in the Panchen's views after his return from British India, but his close associates did react somewhat. It should be noted that, half a year before, the Panchen had sent a letter to the Dalai Lama which was received in those days with a special courier. In this letter, long before his trip to India, he had assured the Dalai Lama of his undeviating devotion and his readiness to visit him at his request.
2. *Deva shung*³³ (the highest state institution in Tibet – B. B.) is still on his [the Dalai Lama's] side.
3. Rumors of the renewed dispatch of a military squad to Lhasa by the British present no danger.
4. A longer stay in Mongolia is alright, there is no haste to return to Tibet.
5. The deputation of people to European states to discuss the [Tibet] issue at the international arbitration tribunal is of no use, therefore the idea should be abandoned.
6. There's no need to break up relations with Russia—although it cannot help us at present, it will definitely help in future.
7. A message should be sent to the Bogdo Khan,³⁴ asking him to reply to the [Dalai Lama's] letter.

³¹ Baradin *Diary*, 129–132.

³² "Protector of the Realm" (Tib. *khyim skyong*).

³³ *Deva shung* (Tib. *sde ba gzhung*) is the traditional name for the Tibetan government.

³⁴ Bogdo Khan, Mong. for holy Khan, is an epithet commonly used in Russia and Russian sources for designating the Qing emperors.

In this letter, the Dalai Lama reproached the Bogdo Khan with his indifference to the Tibetan issue, saying that when he, the Dalai Lama, worried deeply about the fate of his people and the Buddhist faith, the Bogdo Khan ignored him and showed his sympathy for the Urga Khutughtu, elevating his wife to a princely rank as if authorizing the sacrilegious violation of the monastic celibacy rule.

The Dalai Lama revealed all [the results] of his divinations to his associates, ordering them to pass them on to me and Dylykov. After that, the associates stopped talking about the Panchen's visit to India, showing boundless trust in their Sovereign's divinations.

7. *Van-Kuren'*³⁵

Having left Van-Kuren', I would like to say a few more words about the Van-Kuren' Monastery itself, as well as about the Dalai Lama and his Tibetan entourage. Van-Kuren' stands 300 versts [about 320 km – A. A.] to the north-west of Urga, 200 versts to the west of Kiakhtha, and 10 versts from the left bank of the river Orkhon, the left-side tributary of the river Selenga. It is located on the northern slope of the hilly treeless valley facing east. This monastery is the residence of the influential *hoshuun* prince Kando-van and one of the biggest monasteries in Khalkha.

It looks like a typical Khalkha-Mongolian monastery, similar to Ganden³⁶ and Kuren'³⁷ in Urga. There are no fundamental buildings on its territory (apart from the new marble *suburgan*³⁸ in its vicinity), and all the lamas live in yurts; temples there are hastily constructed buildings made of wooden planks, which can easily be pulled down, or fastened to the buildings' main frames.

There are up to twenty temples of this kind [in the monastery]. The most important of these are the *tsogchen* (cathedral temple – B. B.), *tsannid*, *gyud*, medical and astrological [colleges].³⁹ All the rest belongs to the *aimags* (regions – B. B.) and are dedicated to some particular deity. The monastery itself is divided into *aimag*, or sections, run by

³⁵ Baradin *Diary*, 158–162. In this piece, Baradin summarizes his observations on the Dalai Lama and the Tibet issue before his departure for Labrang Tashikyil Monastery. Paragraphs headings from here and further below are Baradin's himself.

³⁶ Ganden (Tib. Dga' ldan).

³⁷ This refers to Ikh Khüree Monastery.

³⁸ Buddhist stupa (Mong. *suburgan*; Tib. *mchod rten*).

³⁹ These are the main buildings in Buddhist monasteries in Tibet and Mongolia, i.e., the assembly hall (*tsogchen*; *tshogs chen*), the philosophical college (*tsannid*; *mtshan nyid grwa tshang*), the tantric college (*gyud*; *rgyud grwa tshang*), the medical college (*manba*; *sman pa grwa tshang*), and the astrological college (*kartsis*; *skar rtsis grwa tshang*).

supervisors named "Da".⁴⁰

The entire monastery is subordinate to the monastic administration, which consists of a *khambo* (prior – B. B.), usually elected from the midst of the *noyon* (members of the princely family – B. B.) and his assistants who administer the monastery. Despite the Buddhist ban, which prohibits laymen to reside within the monastic compound, the local prince, as well as all the Mongolian princes, have large courts in the monastery, like in the prince's headquarters. The lama-residents in Van-Kuren' number up to 3,000 people. In addition, there are many elderly women among the lamas, holding the spiritual rank of *shabgansa* (*[chavgan]* nuns, in old-Mongolian).

Lamas live entirely on their own means, but they also receive some support through both voluntary and obligatory donations from laymen. The obligatory donations are annually or monthly, in the form of money, but the voluntary donations are given mainly as bricks of tea, corn bread, butter and milk products, this being a rather heavy duty for the entire *hoshuun* population of up to ten thousand people of both sexes. However, the monastery's huge income falls exclusively into the grabbing hands of a few notable lamas, whereas the vast majority of common lamas receive only a tiny part of the donations, which does not amount to much. Close to the monastery is the Horon⁴¹—an integral part of Khalkha monasteries. There live the poor renegade vagabonds of the steppe, laymen who found shelter close to the monastery and support themselves by means of petty trading, maintenance of taverns for pilgrims, needlework as well as similar minor occupations, and finally by means of prostitution.

In addition, there are about ten Chinese shops (affiliated with Urga companies). Among them is a Russian shop from Biysk.⁴² With me present, the shop drew plenty of customers, thanks to the pilgrims, yet in general the trade, which depended on the *kulaks*,⁴³ had a rather negative character. In case of proper management, an exchange of products, profitable for both sides, could develop here.

8. The Dalai Lama and Tibetans at Van-Kuren

The Dalai Lama behaved in a rather simple manner during his nomadic life at Van-Kuren'. One could even notice that he morally enjoyed this free nomadic way of living, having escaped for some time from the secluded court-life in his mysterious Potala [Palace]. He

⁴⁰ Head, leader (Mong. *daa*).

⁴¹ Region, quarter (Mong. *horoo*).

⁴² Biisk Бийск is a city in Altaiskii Krai Алтайский край, in Russia.

⁴³ Rus. *kulak кулак*, literally *fist*, refers to wealthy peasants using hired labor, rural bourgeoisie, speculators.

looked cheerful in the prime of his 30 years of age, despite the indelible moral shock he must have experienced during his forced flight from Lhasa.

He usually woke up between 5 and 6 o'clock in the morning. From 9 to 10 o'clock, he spent his time in prayer and then was served the usual Tibetan tea with a light breakfast in the form of a soup. After that, he was more or less free and received his confidants with reports. At midday, he had lunch, exclusively rice soup (or other) with some seasoning. Of course, these were not the Dalai Lama's only meals. I mentioned here only what items I reliably found out. I must say that Tibetan food is much more varied than the Mongolian nomads', who content themselves with meat and milk products. Tibetans eat a great deal of Chinese food and prepare their own seasonings; they very much like to bake meat, in its raw or slightly frozen forms. Yet, in general, the Tibetans eat relatively little meat.

After lunch, from 5 to 6 o'clock in the evening, the Dalai Lama stayed at his place or sometimes went out for a *koro*, i.e., a circumambulation on foot around the monastery, just as an ordinary pilgrim. This, of course, at the same time served as a walk for him. The Dalai Lama was fond of walking after his meal, and he often walked around the monastery in company with two or three servants or his close confidants. In this case, those who accompanied the Dalai Lama always kept at respectful distance from him, and the lower servants always walked far ahead to clear the road of outsiders, while some stayed far behind. Thus, they formed a single file with the Dalai Lama in the middle. This order can be explained by the fact that according to [Buddhist] etiquette no one could walk close to the Dalai Lama, as it would mean equating oneself with the Dalai Lama's persona. Therefore, I often saw the Dalai Lama walking right in the middle of this procession while talking to someone—he either turned back or addressed the person in front of him. Sometimes he visited the learned elder Dandaragramba⁴⁴ as an ordinary guest to have a religious conversation with him. I also remember that he peeped two or three times into the local prince's yurt, without warning the latter, accompanied by two persons, which caused turmoil in the princely family. He, however, calmed them down and spent a few minutes exchanging gracious words in Mongolian with family members. When the Dalai Lama visited private dwellings, he was always accompanied by someone who carried a chair for him. Yet the Dalai Lama refused to sit in this luxurious chair, thereby evincing simplicity. However, all this simplicity was interrupted during his solemn blessings of people since, in this

⁴⁴ Dandar-agramba (Tib. Bstan dar sngags ramps pa, 1835–1915) was a famous Mongolian Buddhist scholar.

case, strict etiquette had to be observed.

After his 7 o'clock evening prayer, the Dalai Lama spent time reading books and went to bed between 12 and 1 o'clock at night, surrounded with the long and monotonous sounds of the religious wind instrument *bishkhur*⁴⁵ from the "Nam-gye-ga datsan's court".⁴⁶ He was very demanding and strict with attendants. When someone from the midst of the lower servants was found guilty of some mischief, he made the person pray for many hours in the open, close to his chamber. Yet, one could not fail to notice that he was very gentle, sweet, and joyful with the people closest to him, although the latter displayed false servility towards the Dalai Lama in the presence of an outsider. The Dalai Lama and his Tibetan entourage were very fond of various small-size European objects, including pen-knives, and they bought these in large quantities. For example, they were very fond of Russian stearin candles, which were purchased ahead in large quantities for Tibet.

They say the Dalai Lama is fond of manual labor. They even say that, in Lhasa, he had an anvil and tools and, in his spare time, did a little bit of blacksmithing. The Dalai Lama had a lot of travel equipment—Tibetan cloths, incense sticks, books, and *burhans*,⁴⁷ packed in numerous bales. A large number of these things were meant as gifts. What Potala treasures of his he carried, we could not find out. A great number of his travel equipment was brought from Lhasa well in advance after his flight. The only thing we learnt was that the Dalai Lama carried with him one of Lhasa's main sacred objects—the statue of Logshiri.⁴⁸

About 150 Tibetans, who formed the Dalai Lama's retinue, lived in Van-Kuren'. These Tibetans were of various categories, including the high-ranking retinue of up to thirty people with their own servants, monks—up to five men, and the rest belonged to the lower class of court menials. Among the Dalai Lama's high-ranking retinue, apart from the persons already mentioned in the diary, was its leader, the Dalai Lama's executive secretary Jejab Kambo Dunyig Chemo,⁴⁹

⁴⁵ Flute (Mong. *bichkigür*; Rus. флейта, дудка, свирель).

⁴⁶ It should be Namgyel datsang (Tib. *Rnam rgyal grova tshang*), the Dalai Lama private college.

⁴⁷ Buddha, buddha's image (Mong. *burhan*).

⁴⁸ B.B.: There are three main Tibetan sacred statues: 1) of the Buddha Shakyamuni, "The Great Jowo," (Tib. *Jo bo Rinpoche*); 2) of the Buddha Shakyamuni, "The Small Jowo" (Tib. *Mi skyod rdo rje* or *Jo bo ra mo che*); 3) the statue of Logshiri, from Sanskrit Lokeshvara, (Tib. *Jig rten dbang phyug*, an epithet of the deity Aryabala, Avalokiteshvara).

⁴⁹ B.B.: Tib. *sphyi khyap mkhan po drung yig chen mo*, secretary to the most senior ecclesiastical official.

Chobon Kambo,⁵⁰ and Jamaa Kambo,⁵¹ among others. Since the Dalai Lama did not allow these people to approach him up close, all of them performed their formal duties at solemn ceremonies only, and they patiently spent one or two hours every evening in the chancery of the Dalai Lama's executive secretary without doing any work. They were on duty just for the Dalai Lama.

All these Tibetans, from the Dalai Lama himself down to the lowest Tibetan people, provide enough information to get an idea of Tibetans in general. Among them, as expected, there were no women. Tibetans would first surprise you with their excessive subservience with their masters and flattery with persons who inspire respect, showing you false courtesy, which they do not even try to hide from you. So, your first impression of Tibetans will not be in their favor. Indeed, there is some truth in this, as Tibetans—due to the existing socio-political and economic conditions of life—are strictly guided by their life rules, such as “never show your real self in the presence of other people” and “friendship with Tibetans is not an easy thing.” However, if you manage to win a Tibetan's trust, he will become your good and very sincere friend. He will now reveal to you his people's true nature—high impressionability, superstition and a sanguine temperament. Tibetans are impressionable, like kids; get easily excited and explosive in their doings, like Frenchmen. At the same time, a Tibetan has an exceptional willpower; he is able to endure any bodily suffering and he despises death. Therefore, he is patient in his work and persistent in achieving goals. He does not have the Chinaman's tenacity, accuracy, and pettiness: in this respect he is somewhat coarse and inaccurate.

A Tibetan's mind is generously gifted with imagination and fantasy, with a rather heavy and weighing ability of thinking. Therefore, during a casual conversation, which requires quickness of mind, a Tibetan will at the slightest difficulty first resort to the help of his imagination and fantasy, and his mind kicks in only after [getting] detailed explanations. The most typical feature of Tibetan mentality is striving for idealization and systematization, which is evidence of his philosophical mindset. Any simple Tibetan can boast this feature. This psychological individuality of Tibetans explains why Buddhism was so warmly welcomed in Tibet, more than in any other country, as it turned this land into a real monastic kingdom, immersed in religious ecstasy. Endowed with remarkable talent and ingenuity of mind, Tibetans produced many religious and philosophical geniuses from their ranks; they set up original philosophical sects and schools of Buddhism and created an enormous mass of literature. Studying all this

⁵⁰ B.B.: Tib. *mchod dpon mkhan po*, master of ceremonies.

⁵¹ B.B.: Tib. *ja ma mkhan po*, head cook.

will be of great interest to science in future and perhaps will shed light on many dark aspects of the history of mental life in the heart of Aryan culture—India.

This psychological peculiarity of Tibetan people is certainly not so much their racial feature, but to a larger extent the result of the age-old impact of Buddhism, which undoubtedly deserves the most serious attention from researchers, due to its originality and rich content. In general, Tibetans are gifted, simple-minded and good-natured people, spoiled only by the worst side of their habits, thanks to their hard political, economic and social living conditions. By the way, among Tibetans' negative features, we have noticed one in particular in Van-Kuren, which is worth noting here. A Tibetan, at the slightest change for the better in his situation, tries to pose as an important, hard to get person, who needs to observe formalities. This Tibetan's servants will try to assist their master by all means available, to present him as someone of importance, especially to unknown outsiders. Servants will praise their master's character. They will ask you to wait because their master is very busy, and you will have to wait so long you will finally lose patience and decide to return home. If you try to convince this inaccessible master's servants of your worth to him, you'll manage it only thanks to your good manners and words like: "I am leaving. I have no time to wait!" And if you are a man who promises nothing, you will never get to meet the master. Such demeanor is typical of Tibetan, Mongol and partly Buryat lamas (since the time of *khubilgans*), as it is a theocratic tendency... [illegible]

As regards accusations of Tibetans being greedy out of grubby lucre, this feature is not deeply rooted in their character's racial type but is rather a relic peculiar to primitive men with a childishly naive nature. As far as we know, all Tibetan highland inhabitants are still violent robber tribes. It is only the people who inhabit central Tibet, who, thanks to the Lhasa theocratic government's artful regime, have some civic spirit, although in a latent form, as they have preserved their nature as violent primitive robbers.

Thus, Tibetans still have an addiction for cold weapons,⁵² and even the Dalai Lama is no exception. I remember how, once, his physician, outwardly a humble looking Buddhist monk, could not withhold his admiration when he saw the mechanism of the bolt in the Russian three-line rifle. Even the age-long impact of Buddhism on Tibetans, calling for supreme perfection to be attained by feats of human mind and heart, could not shake the bellicose nature of the Tibetan people *en masse*.

⁵² In Russian, "cold weapons" refer to knives, swords, etc. Cold weapons are military and sporting weapons that do not use the power of flammable explosives, compressed gas, or electricity.

Therefore, Tibetans' notorious greediness can be observed in its naive childish form, originating from a simple-minded, primitive man, a recent robber, and not from any inveterate civilized trader. Judging by their physical constitution, Tibetans are rather healthy and strong people of medium height. Their hair is black and hard, and unlike Mongols, they have rich hair growth on their faces. Quite often, one can see barbels and bearded men among them. Their upper-class skin color is different from the lower-class complexion. The upper-class has a light-yellow skin, which quite often reaches European whiteness, whereas the lower class has a dark yellow color, typical of gypsies.

One can conclude Tibetans adhere to class prejudices. They have a rather secluded class of upper gentry, which allegedly descended from their famous Tsar Songtsen Gampo [Srong btsan sgam po, 605–649]. In the Tibetan type, we can observe traces of their racial connections with Aryans—a more or less oval face, a big high nose and big eyes. In Tibetan types, I did not notice any Mongoloid traces and as for their racial origin they undoubtedly are closer to Aryans than Mongoloids, although their language belongs to the Indo-Chinese group.

9. *Some biographic information about the Dalai Lama*

The present Dalai Lama, Tubten Gyatso, is the Thirteenth, and according to Tibetan records, he was born in 1876. He enjoys enormous popularity among the people, thanks to his good initiatives in Tibet, such as abolition of the death penalty, prosecution of embezzlement and bribery, etc., and his display of a totally independent character. Even his initial election in the presence of people was carried out in extraordinary circumstances. For example, people say this Dalai Lama was discovered miraculously. When the State Oracle of Tibet, when close to dying, answered the question of how to find the new Dalai Lama, this is what he said: the new Dalai Lama would present himself, so there would be no need to resort to the usual election procedure. Furthermore, Chokyong⁵³ prophesied the new “extraordinary” Dalai Lama would be found at Lake Muledengi Gyatso, in goddess Palden Lhamo's abode.⁵⁴

According to the prophesy of an oracle from Lhasa, a special

⁵³ Dharmapala, protector of faith (Tib. *chos kyong*). It means here the Nechung (Gnas chung) oracle.

⁵⁴ Tib. Palden Lhamo (*Dpal ldan lha mo*), or Shri Devi, is a tantric Buddhist goddess, the Dalai Lamas' special Dharmapala. “Then Palden Lhamo continued northwards, easily getting across India, Tibet, Mongolia and part of China, and finally settled, as some people say, on mountain Oikhan, in eastern Siberia's Olgon district. This mountain is said to be surrounded with large, uninhabited deserts, and by ocean Muliding,” see Schlagintweit 1863: 113.

delegation of lamas and officials was dispatched to that lake, which was covered with ice at that time. These people spent a whole week on the lakeside, patiently looking at the transparent ice, in the hope of seeing some miraculous sign there. On the last day of the week, in desperation, they decided to leave the lake and return home. One half of the caravan had already left the lake and only a few persons remained there, when all of a sudden the reflection of a poor Tibetan encampment appeared on the ice and, through the open door of a little house, they saw a woman with a baby boy in her arms. The miraculous vision vanished all at once.

Struck with this vision, some drew on paper what they had seen and sent their drawings to Lhasa. Two incognito officials were immediately dispatched from Lhasa to the Lhoka district (Lho kha, in central Tibet's south-eastern part), where the lake was located. The officials, disguised as simple wanderers, questioned the local inhabitants about the whereabouts of the camp, showing them the drawing. Then the locals told them the camp was in the valley called Dakpo lungpa (Dvags po lung pa).

According to Agvan Dorzhiev,⁵⁵ it is a border area between central Tibet and Kham [Khams.] One of the officials saw the camp in his dream at night, resembling the one on the drawing. He entered the house and saw a baby boy on his mother's lap. When the official took the boy in his own hands, the child slapped him in the face. The next day the officials, inspired by this dream, went to the lake and found the Dakpo lungpa Valley, exactly as it was depicted on the drawing. They stepped inside the house in the camp and saw the woman carrying a baby boy. This was how, according to folk legend, the present Dalai Lama was found. Ever since the legend came to pass, Tibetans began to regard the present Dalai Lama as the reincarnation of "The Great Fifth" Dalai Lama and they earnestly believed that, under his rule, some major event would happen for the good of Tibet. And such event did take place indeed, but it was quite different from what the Tibetans expected—the enemy invaded the country and the popular Dalai Lama fled his capital, Lhasa.

Of course, all this must have disillusioned the Tibetan people, who are now hopelessly dreading the dire consequences of their popular leader's flight. Yet, who can deny these events—no matter whether they were offensive for Tibetans themselves—will have considerable impacts in future, radically changing Tibet's history.

Undoubtedly, this push from the British was Tibet's first serious stimulus to join the rest of the world in future, and this became a

⁵⁵ Agvan Dorzhiev (1853–1938) was the Dalai Lama's teacher, confidant and representative in Russia.

turning point in Tibet's new history. It may be that Tibetans are really destined not to be mistaken in believing and expecting the event that occurred under the present Dalai Lama's rule will benefit Tibet. In any case, while China was in a state of slumber, especially at the time of the Anglo-Russian treaty that guaranteed Tibet's inviolability, the present Dalai Lama, this remarkable man and keen politician, had a great opportunity to implement the best of his intentions in his home country and introduce his gifted people to the family of cultured nations.

Of course, it is quite difficult to infuse new blood into the life of this peculiar and interesting country, especially by one person alone. However, if the popular Dalai Lama puts his shoulder to the wheel, not waiting for a new surge of Europe's and awakening China's all-devouring appetite, this can greatly benefit his successors, and they will pick up on his initiative.

*10. Some background information
about the Dalai Lama's flight from Lhasa*

According to one version, the Dalai Lama fled from Lhasa unexpectedly—he was afraid of being caught by the British, when their troops approached Lhasa. There is another version, which seems more plausible. The Dalai Lama's court was aware of the movements of the British troops since the moment they entered Tibet territory, and the Dalai Lama had secretly prepared his escape in advance, having bought at the market the best horses for himself and his retinue. When the British approached Lhasa, the Dalai Lama began to wait for the right moment to have a more convenient excuse for his flight. And that moment, he chose the time when the Anglo-Indian troops got closer to Lhasa, publicly accusing his opponents of intending to surrender him to the British and not having warned him about their approaching enemies. So, the Dalai Lama escaped from his Potala Palace.

At first, there were only a few Tibetan fugitives—the Dalai Lama himself, his confidant Agvan Dorzhiev, his physician and others, plus a few more people who had joined them. All of them were riding horses. Along the way, the Dalai Lama visited the old monastery of the Taklung gonpa sect,⁵⁶ the residence of Lama Taklung rinbuche [Rinpoche], famous for the power of his charms and said to be the incarnation of his teacher Padmasambhava.⁵⁷

The Dalai Lama told the lama to perform some sorcery against the British. However, instead, the saintly lama pleaded with him to return

⁵⁶ Taklung Monastery (Tib. Stag lung dgon pa) is a Kagyu (Bka' brgyud) Buddhist monastery about 120 km north of Lhasa.

⁵⁷ Padmasambhava is the great 8th century Indian Tantric master who subdued local Tibetan gods and made them protectors of Buddhism.

and advised him not go north. Yet the Dalai Lama was relentless; he justified his escape by referring to the holy scripture, according to which religion must spread from south to north. So, he insisted the lama should perform sorcery by all means. When the lama complied, against his will, lightning struck the four corners of his house, which led him to refuse to continue his sorcery. He said this was impossible because of Samye's⁵⁸ and other *chokkyong's* devotion to the British. Near Nakchu [Nag chu], the fugitives were met by a delegation from Lhasa, together with an armed party, which pleaded with the Dalai Lama to return and, in case he refused [they intended] to return him by force, after blocking the path. However, the Dalai Lama, unyieldingly determined to die rather than give up his plans, proudly moved ahead. Therefore, the Tibetans' party and the delegation did not dare touch the Dalai Lama's holy person and reverently kneeling in front of him, let their Master move further. Since then, the venerable fugitives travelled freely, and finally reached the Tsaidam Mongols,⁵⁹ after a rather tedious but fast march. The Tsaidam Mongols met them with all due respect, having covered the road in front of them with their felt saddle-blankets. There, the travelers changed their way-worn horses for fresh ones and hastily set out to continue their journey.

At that time, [the monks of] Kumbum Monastery had learnt the Dalai Lama was approaching. They prepared a lavish meeting for him, hoping he would visit their monastery without fail, as this was the residence of the great founder of the yellow creed doctrine. However, they were greatly disappointed when they learnt the Dalai Lama had travelled past Kumbum and cursed Agvan Dorzhiev, "the embodiment of the evil spirit". He is said to have taken hold of the Dalai Lama's soul and to have placed him in the hands of the barbarians, the Oroses [Russians—A. A.]. This is how they reached the Mongolian capital Urga, where they were met by a rather unfriendly Khutughtu, which eventually led to openly hostile relations between these two spiritual leaders of Tibet and Mongolia.

11. Background information on the arrival of the Anglo-Indian troops in Lhasa in 1904, obtained from Tibetan and Buryat witnesses

The Tibetan government was in total confusion when it learnt about the British troops approaching Lhasa. It was then decided to arm the lamas of the Three Monasteries [i.e., Sera (Se ra), Drepung ('Bras

⁵⁸ Samye Monastery (Bsam yas dgon pa) is the first Tibetan Buddhist monastery built in the 8th century.

⁵⁹ The Tsaidam Mongols are a Khoshut Oirat Mongolian tribe living west of Lake Kokonor, currently in China's Haixi-Mongol Autonomous Prefecture of Qinghai Province.

spungs) and Ganden] to create a strong army of up to 20,000 troops to defend the capital city. At that point, however, a question came up—must the Buryat lamas obey the Tibetan government's orders? This double-edged dilemma caused a lot of anxiety to the Buryat lamas, who were then in Lhasa. So, they turned for advice to their kinsman and protector, Agvan Dorzhiev. The latter exerted pressure on the Tibetan government, so that the latter decided to give up arming the lamas on purely religious grounds. As a result, the Buryats calmed down, yet the majority of Tibetan lamas, especially the young ones, the so called “*dobdak*” [*stobs bdag pa*],⁶⁰ who were eager to fight the British, were strongly offended by this decision. This is why the British troops met with no opposition when entering Lhasa.

When the British came to Lhasa, most citizens and the lamas of Drepung Monastery began to leave their dwellings. They took their belongings and scattered in all directions. So, only a few brave ones and some paupers remained in their houses, dreading great future misfortune. Only very few lamas remained at Drepung. They were the militant *dobdak*, who wanted to die with honor in their homes for the sake of their religion and motherland and they protected themselves on the rooftops of their stone houses, slingshots in hand. The Tibetan government issued an order not to attack the British *pilins* [Englishmen.] Hence, the British could move freely in the city and on Drepung Monastery territory. Once, while several British soldiers were walking around Drepung, these *dobdak* suddenly attacked them with their slingshots and hurt one soldier seriously. So, the British had to flee to their camp and immediately targeted Drepung with their weapons. Drepung then sent a delegation headed by the chief prior, to plead for the British not to attack the monastery. The chief prior of Drepung hoisted a white *khatak* [*kha btags*, a ceremonial scarf – A. A.] as a peace flag, and informed the British about the incident, which prevented further disaster. Thus, the British limited themselves to one single cannon shot at Drepung, just to frighten the brave *dobdak*. The Tibetans and the British never clashed again, except for one sad incident, when one *dobdak*, a fanatic patriot who had sworn to kill the British troops' commander, mortally stabbed a harmless doctor with his dagger. This *dobdak* was killed the moment he committed this crime, and the Tibetans honored him by proclaiming him their national hero.

At first, the Tibetans were impressed by the British peacefulness and tact, but when they left Lhasa, they began to explain their cultural opponents' sensitivity in quite a different way: “The *pilins* did not visit Ganden, because this sacred monastery's *chokyong* did not let them in.

⁶⁰ Tib. literally, endowed with strength. Here Baradin means, most probably, the so-called “fighting monks.” For more details see Goldstein 1964: 123–141.

The *pilins* did not touch our shrines and ran away from Lhasa, having achieved nothing substantial. This was thanks to our holy men in Lhasa, our protectors, *chokyong* etc., who profoundly affected the evil foreign pagans' souls."

12. The Dalai Lama faction

The present Dalai Lama and his faction's proclivity towards Russia is exceptional in nature rather than a phenomenon resulting from deep historical facts. Their inclination had nothing to do with the Tibetan people who knew practically nothing about Europe and Russia, save for their wild superstitious ideas about Europeans in general as weird barbarians from another world. Therefore, obviously, the Tibetan upper class still could not see any difference between the Russians, the British and other nations. Only the then Dalai Lama, who faced the British obtrusiveness, had to look for an external mainstay for Tibet's existence. As a result, two factions were formed at the Dalai Lama's court, one of which, headed by the Dalai Lama himself and his associate—our compatriot Agvan Dorzhiev—found it possible to stretch out its hand to the north, towards Russia. The other one, standing on more realistic ground, supported the opposite option—the policy of reconciling with the current situation, looking for illusory patronage from the Court in Beijing and compromising with the British. Thus, the Dalai Lama's faction, a very small troop, had to strengthen its position and resorted to such means as were generally acceptable to Tibetans. It is only thanks to those means, based on religion and other Tibetan beliefs, that this faction was able to act boldly and subsequently take a desperate measure: getting the Dalai Lama to flee from Lhasa.

With no real basis to justify their attraction to Russia and the Dalai Lama's escape "to the north," this Dalai Lama faction always put forth a prophecy by the Buddha. Many Buddhist *sutras* present a saying by Buddha to the effect that his religion would spread from south to north, expanding from one world to another. The Tibetans and Mongols see this prophecy confirmed because, since Buddhism had disappeared from its homeland India, it moved to Tibet and further on to Mongolia and to the Buryats in Russia. Such coincidences between the prophecy and the historical phenomenon led them to believe that the "northern land" of Russia—lying north of the Mongol and Buryat [lands]—would eventually become another typical Buddhist country. It is mainly this belief that led the present Dalai Lama's late confessor, Chamba Rimbucho⁶¹—who enjoyed great popularity in central Tibet

⁶¹ B. B.: *Byams pa rin po che* (n.d.) is the name of the Dalai Lama's late confessor and Agvan Dorzhiev's protector. He is known as a writer and one of Tibet's outstanding religious figures.

and was the predecessor of the present state oracle—to decisively influence the Dalai Lama's policy to flee to the north.

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Unexpected Actors in the Great Game: The Influence of the Theosophical and the Maha Bodhi Societies on Russian and Buryat Buddhists

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Introduction

In July 1904, with British troops closing in, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama Tubten Gyatso (Thub bstan rgya mtsho, 1876–1933), Tibet's temporal and spiritual ruler, followed the advice of his aide, the Buryat Agvan Dorzhiev (1854–1938), and left Lhasa to move northward to seek Russian support. When he came near the suburbs of Ikh Khüree (present-day Ulaanbaatar), Khambo Lama Iroltuev (1843–1918) was received by the leader of the Buryat Buddhist community. Originally, Iroltuev had hoped to welcome the Dalai Lama in his Transbaikalian region, but the Russian authorities, keen on not provoking the Qing 清 Dynasty (1636–1912) during the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), decided to forbid the Dalai Lama to cross the border. Therefore, Iroltuev was obliged to meet with him close to Ikh Khüree.¹ Regarding the Dalai Lama, he ignored the Qing Dynasty's edicts urging him to return to Tibet and remained in Mongolia, striving to find a way out of his predicament. He was able to take this decision because a large crowd of pilgrims from Mongolia, especially from Buryatia, provided him with wealth and security.²

As my previous articles reveal, by mutually cooperating in supporting the Dalai Lama's journey, Mongolia—including Qinghai, Khalkha, Southern Mongolia, and the Transbaikalian region, which had been divided by the Qing and the Russians—gained a sense of unity and several influential local community leaders, who had journeyed along with the Dalai Lama, later became national leaders. This unity led to

¹ For the activities of the Russian authorities regarding the Dalai Lama during this period, see Shaumian 2000: 88–126.

² Wada 2018, 2019.

the revival of the Tibetan Buddhist World, in which the Dalai Lama played a pivotal role. This article intends to demonstrate how the Buryats, who had been under Russian rule since the 1728 Kiakhta Treaty and separated from Tibet and Mongolia since then, chose to support the Dalai Lama in 1904 and became important actors in the revival of the Tibetan Buddhist World.

Through reading *The Theosophist* and *The Maha Bodhi Journal* (MBJ), the diary of Colonel Henry Steel Olcott's (1832–1907) experiences at the Theosophical Society, and the travel account written by Prince Ukhtomskii (1861–1921)—a Russian orientalist who accompanied the Russian Crown Prince Nicholas (1868–1918) during his 1890–1891 Eastern Journey—, together with official Russian documents (ATB, RIO, and RTS), I will first examine how the views of the Theosophical Society and the Maha Bodhi Society in India influenced the St. Petersburg Orientalists to place the Dalai Lama at the center of the spiritual world. Then, I will describe how the Russian Court came to encounter and respect Buryat intellectuals like Peter A. Badmaev (1851–1920), Khambo Lama Iroltuev, and Agvan Dorzhiev, and carefully involved them in its Far Eastern policy, appointing them as Russian agents in Inner Asia and South-East Asia. Furthermore, they shared their knowledge with them, so as to develop Buddhist studies in St. Petersburg. Finally, this paper will demonstrate how the Russian Court's devotion to Buddhism induced Iroltuev, the head of the Buryat community, to meet the Dalai Lama and the Siamese King in person.

*The Dalai Lama and Tibet as seen by the Theosophical
and the Maha Bodhi Societies*

In 1875, Helena Petrovna Blavatsky (1831–1891) and Colonel Henry Steel Olcott founded the Theosophical Society in New York with the intention of establishing a universal religion. They established lodges around the world dedicated to studying Asian religious traditions such as Hinduism and Buddhism as well as occultism. Since Madame Blavatsky attributed her doctrines to the teachings of Tibetan high priests, theosophists regarded “the Grand Lama of Tibet” as the center of the late 19th and early 20th centuries' spiritual world.³ However, at that time, since the Tibetan government enforced a strict isolation policy, Caucasian explorers—who stand out from Asian people by their looks, never managed to reach Lhasa.⁴ Under such circumstances, the

³ Lopez 1998: chap. 1.

⁴ To get information about Lhasa, British India used natives living in Sikkim and Bengal to infiltrate Lhasa, determine its location, and collect academic and

depiction of Tibet and the Dalai Lama was apt to be highly imaginative.

In 1885, Colonel Olcott and Madame Blavatsky became Buddhists in Ceylon, and the Theosophical Society changed its name to the Buddhist Theosophical Society. On May 31, 1891, Anagarika Dharmapala (1864–1933), Olcott's secretary, founded the Maha Bodhi Society to restore the Buddhist temple where Buddha had been enlightened—in Bodh Gaya—and Olcott was appointed as its president.

The following year, in Darjeeling, known as the gateway to Tibet, Dharmapala performed a symbolic ceremony that is mentioned in an article published in *The Theosophist* in August 1892. On July 11th, Lama Sherap Gyatso [Shes rab rgya mtsho (n.d.)],⁵ the head of Goom [Ghum] Monastery,⁶ left Lhasa Villa, the residence of Sarat Chandra Das [1849–1917],⁷ with the relics of Buddha in hand and Dharmapala in tow. The procession passed through the city of Darjeeling and reached the residence of Rajah Thondup, the chairman of the Darjeeling Maha Bodhi Society. There, the relics' casket was presented by Sherap Gyatso to the Rajah, who handed it to the thirteen-year-old prince of Sikkim, Srid skyong sprul sku rnam rgyal [1879–1914] who later became the king of Sikkim in 1914. The article ends with the following sentence:

Mr. Dharmapala presented one of the relics and Bodhi tree leaf [from Bodh Gaya] to the principal of the Sikkim State Monastery [whose title was "Dewan Phurbu"]; the other three being destined for Tibet. These were to be carried by messenger from Darjeeling all the way to Lhasa, and delivered into the hand of the Grand Lama of Tibet [the Dalai Lama].⁸

This ceremony was probably intended to inform the Thirteenth Dalai Lama of the activities of the Maha Bodhi Society and request him to act as its patron. In fact, until 1906, *The Maha Bodhi Journal* (MBJ) listed the Dalai Lama's name "Lozang THUB-DAN GYA-TCHO, Grand Llama of Tibet" as "Patron" above President Olcott. In other words, for the followers of the Maha Bodhi Society, the spiritual leader of the

geopolitical information about Tibet. These natives were collectively called pundits. See Waller 1990.

⁵ Parentheses indicate synonyms or revisions provided by the author of this paper.

⁶ Sherap Gyatso was the abbot of Ghoom Monastery near Darjeeling up to 1905. According to a personal communication from Ryosuke Kobayashi, he was a Buryat.

⁷ A Bengali pundit who had infiltrated Tibet twice, in 1879 and 1881, and brought back many Sanskrit and Tibetan manuscripts to India.

⁸ "Buddhism at Darjeeling" bylined by F. H. Muller dated July 14 and published in August 1892, see Huber 2008: 284.

Buddhist restoration in India was still the yet-unseen Dalai Lama.

*Prince Ukhtomskii's and Crown Prince Nicholas'
Travels in Asia, 1890–1891*

In the latter half of the 19th century, Buddhism attracted the attention of Western intellectuals. In Russia, Prince Ukhtomskii was renowned as a Buddhist studies specialist. He had studied Buddhism at the Faculty of History and Philosophy at St. Petersburg University and, in 1884, was employed in the Spiritual Affairs Department for Foreign Creeds (Департамент духовных дел иностранных исповеданий) at the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This position enabled him to scrutinize the Tibetan Buddhist community, collect Tibetan Buddhist art and travel through the Transbaikal region, Mongolia and China, from 1886 to 1890. He became known as an expert in Russian Buddhism.⁹

Owing to his reputation as an Orientalist, Ukhtomskii was selected as personal secretary for Crown Prince Nicholas' (1868–1918) Eastern Journey from 1890 to 1891. A few years later, he published a record of the Crown Prince's journey (Ookhtomsky 1900), which provides the Russian Court's view about Asia.

The Crown Prince and his party left Trieste on November 7, 1890, stayed in Egypt from November 22 to December 10, then in India from December 23 to January 12, 1891. During their 32-day stay in India, they visited Buddhist holy sites like Bodh Gaya and the Theosophical Society's headquarter in Adyar near Madras (present-day Chennai). After leaving India, they visited Ceylon (from January 11 to February 11) and Siam (from March 19 to 25) where they had dinner with the Siamese royal family, and went on to Japan (from April 27 to May 19) where Nicholas II was wounded in the Ōtsu Incident.¹⁰ Finally, his party landed in Vladivostok located in the Far East of Russia on May 23. Before returning to St. Petersburg on August 16, the group took a great journey across vast Siberia interacting with Buryat Buddhists living in the Transbaikal region.

The Crown Prince journeyed with a Buddhist expert like Ukhtomskii to India, where Buddha was born, then to Siam, the only Buddhist country that escaped colonization, and finally to Transbaikal, which probably caused the members in the Crown Prince's party to become pro-Buddhist.

⁹ The Ukhtomskii Collection forms the core of the Tibetan Buddhist art collection of the Hermitage Museum today, see Snelling 1993: 47–50.

¹⁰ An unsuccessful assassination attempt on Nicholas on May 11, 1891 during his visit to Japan.

Prince Ukhtomskii's Experience in India

In his travelogue, Ukhtomskii preached Buddhist ideas, asserted that the Indian Aryan Spirit was more homogeneous to Russia than to England, and mourned the fact that India was under the rule of materialistic England. It should be noted that the party had at first been scheduled to visit Darjeeling, overlooking the Himalaya.¹¹ When Ukhtomskii referred to his unfulfilled wish to visit to Darjeeling, he wrote the following fantasy about Russian Buddhists coming from Tibet to greet the future Czar of Russia:

From Calcutta the Cesarewitch intended undertaking (according to the original plan of the journey) a most interesting trip to Darjeeling, a sanitarium in the hills (almost on the borders of Sikkim and Thibet). This is a place which, on account of its majestic beauty and the character of its population, presents an immense artistic and ethnographic interest – an interest the greater for us Russians, in that the dominions of the Dalai Lama, while nominally acknowledging the rule of China, are practically in comparatively close communication with our own Buddhist tribes, who constantly visit the learned monasteries of Thibet, live there for long periods of time, and spread the prestige of the Russian name and the reflection of Russian civilization to some of the most isolated points on the face of the globe. I could see, in my mind's eye, the picture of the Grand Duke's visit to the Indo-Tibetan frontier: amidst the silent and absorbed crowd of Lepchas (the subjects of the Rajah of Sikkim) and Bhotanese, amidst the visitors from Dashilhunbo ([Bkra shis lhun po] the chief religious centre of Southern Thibet) and Lhasa, Buriat and Tungus pilgrims from Baikal regions stand reverently and invisibly greeting their future sovereign.¹²

His fantasy was not completely baseless, because Ukhtomskii was well-aware that the Buryats of Transbaikalia had in fact crossed the border into Tibet to study and make pilgrimages. Even if that was the case, this monologue was apparently also convenient for Russian imperialism: Ukhtomskii also argued that Russian Orthodoxy possessed deep spiritual affinities with Buddhism, which would allow Russia's expansion into Asia simply to occur as a "natural fusion", and he strongly opposed conquering Asia by military means.¹³

What made their trip to India even more memorable was that, at the very moment Crown Prince Nicholas's group visited Bodhi Gaya, the Maha Bodhi Society was about to be established by Dharmapala.

¹¹ Nicholas's visit to Darjeeling was cancelled due to the illness of his brother, Grand Duke Georgi, see Ookhtomsky 1896: chap. 20, FN 13.

¹² Ookhtomsky 1900: chap. 20: 13.

¹³ Bernstein 2013: 43.

Ukhtomskii looked favorably on this movement as shown below:

Buddha Gaya was now becoming a religious centre in the eyes of the local Theosophical Society and of Buddhists of different nationalities, who dream of building a monastery near the old temple, of opening colleges with theological and philosophical faculties, with an enlightened circle of cosmopolite zealots, the Maha-bodhi Society, with its own periodicals, libraries, and so forth; in fact, to found a whole city, a nursery of faith and knowledge in the spirit of the 'master', aimed at influencing the Brahminised world of India at taking advantage of the schism arising in it, and again leading countless multitudes into the path of the 'hermit prince.'¹⁴

Ukhtomskii was aware this society hoped to posit the Dalai Lama as their leader:

I believe it is desired that the Grand Lama should stand at the head of this intellectual and religious movement. The question, however, is whether Lhasa, self-centred and secluded, can possibly enter into any close relation with the birthplace of Buddhism. The solution of this problem is not without its political aspect.¹⁵

*Prince Ukhtomskii's first encounters
with Col. Olcott, the President of the Maha Bodhi Society*

When Prince Nicholas' party visited the Theosophical Society lodges in Benares, Bodh Gaya, Adyar, and other places, Colonel Olcott was unfortunately away on a trip to Burma. However, on January 11, 1891, Ukhtomskii managed to meet Olcott on a Russian frigate anchored in Colombo, the capital of Ceylon (present Sri Lanka). Olcott described the scene as follows:

There was lying in Colombo harbor at that time a Russian frigate on which the *Cesarewitch*, the present Czar, was making the tour of the world, accompanied by a staff of eminent men. One of these gentlemen, during the Prince's Indian tour, had called at Adyar during my absence in Burma, expressed much interest in Theosophy, and bought some of our books. I was sorry to have missed him, as also the ball at Government House, to which the new Governor, Lord Wenlock,¹⁶ had invited me "to have the honor of meeting His Imperial Highness the *Czarewitch*". Learning from the Russian Consul at Colombo that some of the Crown Prince's staff would be pleased to make my acquaintance, I went aboard

¹⁴ Ookhtomsky 1900: chap. 23, 60.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Beilby Lawley, 3rd Baron Wenlock (1849–1912), was the Governor of Madras from 1891 to 1896.

the frigate and spent an hour in delightful conversation with Prince Hespère Oukhtomsky, Chief of the Département des Cultes, in the Ministère de l'Intérieur (Chief of the Department of Worship, in the Ministry of the Interior), who was acting as the Prince's Private Secretary on this tour, and Lieutenant N. Crown, of the Navy Department at St. Petersburg, both charming men. I found myself particularly drawn to Prince Oukhtomsky because of his intense interest in Buddhism, which for many years he has made a special study among the Mongolian lamaseries. He has also given much time to the study of other religions. He was good enough to invite me to make the tour of the Buddhist monasteries of Siberia. He asked me for a copy of my Fourteen Propositions, so that he might translate them and circulate them among the Chief Priests of Buddhism throughout the empire. This he has since done.¹⁷

Olcott's and Ukhtomskii's friendly relationship continued after their meeting. In a book review entitled "Prince Ukhtomskii on Tibetan Buddhism and Col. Olcott's work" published in *The Theosophist*, Olcott highly praised Prince Ukhtomskii:

The illustrious Russian gentleman, at once diplomat, scholar and journalist who served as the present Czar of Russia's Private Secretary in his tour around the world, and who is one of the most learned men of the day in Buddhistic literature, has contributed a Preface to the work just published by Dr. Albert Grunwedel at Leipzig.¹⁸

In addition, he also quoted a book review written by Ukhtomskii:

The illustrious American, Col. Olcott, as President of the Theosophical Society, has for years energetically followed the plan of finding the links of the spiritual chain which binds together the countries in which Buddha is honored as a God. He travelled over Asia, made himself acquainted with the leading native Priests, and then composed a kind of creed for the Buddhists of the whole world. All things unessential and conventional, all things narrowly national and purely casual therein

¹⁷ Olcott 1910: Fourth Series (1887–1892), Chap. XVI, 288. The Fourteen Propositions is a set of doctrines that Olcott extracted from the diverse Buddhist thoughts for followers of Southern and Northern Buddhism, i.e., Theravada and Mahayana Buddhism, to be in solidarity with each other. In the article entitled "A United Buddhist World" (*The Theosophist*, January 1892), Olcott described how he met with high priests in Burma, Ceylon, Japan, and Chittagong, preaching his catechism, responding to their criticism and appealing to their brotherly love. Eventually, he had them accept this catechism. In a subsequent article entitled "Fundamental Buddhist Beliefs," the catechism's fourteen articles also listed the names of signatories from Japan, Burma, Ceylon, and Chittagong (*The Theosophist*, January 1892: 239–240).

¹⁸ This refers to Albert Grünwedel's *Mythologie des Buddhismus in Tibet und der Mongolei*, explaining Ukhtomskii's collection, *The Theosophist*, October 1900: 54–55.

were put aside.

Buddhism is ever ready to accept and assimilate into the forms of its cult all possible other forms and even rites, if they do not influence its central idea: the conception of the 'divine' Teacher! (i.e. Buddha) and the ways, shown by Him, which lead unto self-perfection, in connection with the bidding of the Master to gradually acquaint all beings with the 'Doctrine' by the following of which they can finally free themselves from re-birth and the sufferings connected with it. Only the essential part of the 'Doctrine' should be accepted as to this creed [...].

In Japan, Burma, Chittagong and Ceylon Colonel Olcott's platform of the Fourteen Fundamental Propositions has already been accepted. It remains to be seen how far Colonel Olcott's efforts in connection with the solidification of the spiritual ties between the Buddhist peoples in Indo-China, in Central China, in Korea and in Tibet will work.¹⁹

The fact that Olcott used the same adjective—"illustrious"—to praise Ukhtomskii as the one the latter had once eulogized the former with, goes to show that Olcott felt a strong bond with Ukhtomskii through their shared passion for the revival of Buddhism.

From the conversations with Ukhtomskii and from Russian newspapers, Olcott learnt there existed in Russia a group of Buddhists called Buryats and that their head was highly respected by Russian intellectuals. In his article entitled "Buddhism in Siberia," published in *The Theosophist*, Olcott quoted the article in *St. Petersburg Magazine* that praised D. G. Gomboeff (n.d.), the then Khambo Lama of the Transbaikalian districts, and remembered Ukhtomskii had referred to him when they met at Colombo:

He is a man with a good deal of tolerance for every other religion with broad view and great intellectual development [...]. Besides a perfect knowledge of Mongolian and Tibetan literature, D. Gomboeff possessed also the knowledge of the ancient Pali language [...]. I think this Hambo-Lama must be the very man about whom Prince Ouchtomsky [...] told me when we met at Colombo. He spoke of him as an enlightened and very admirable monk, showed me his photograph [...].²⁰

*The Russian Court's Interactions
with Prominent Buryat Buddhists (from 1891)*

Prince Nicholas came face to face with Siberian Buddhists during the final leg of his world tour in 1891: one week after their arrival at Vladivostok, Prince Nicholas participated in the groundbreaking ceremony held for the Trans-Siberian Railway, a symbol of the Russian

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ *The Theosophist* April 1892: vol. XIII, no. 7, 441.

Empire's expansion into the Far East.²¹ His party left Vladivostok on May 20 and on June 10 (22 in the Julian calendar) arrived in the Transbaikalian region, where the Buryat community's leading figures had an audience with Nicholas.²²

Actually, Ukhtomskii seemed to set great store by Buryatia. Indeed, he devoted a considerable number of pages and illustrations to the region in his travelogue.²³ He also inserted illustrations of it into descriptions of China, then unrelated to Buryatia.²⁴

The Buryats' encounters with Prince Nicholas' party opened up a new era when Buryat people started to play an active role at the Russian Court.

The Buryat Iroltuev had an audience with the Crown Prince at the Shulutskii datsan (Шулутский дацан) in Buryatia in 1891. As Nicholas was interested in Tibetan medicine, Ukhtomskii took Iroltuev to St. Petersburg in 1895 and appointed him nurse to the royal family and nobility. In the same year, Iroltuev was elevated to the rank of Khambo Lama by the Russian authorities.²⁵ In 1896, Iroltuev became the first Buryat to officially participate in a Russian Czar's coronation²⁶ and, the next year, he was awarded the Order of St. Stanislav III.²⁷

The reason why Buddhists such as Iroltuev were accepted in St. Petersburg was largely due to the fact that St. Petersburg boasted the most prominent group of Buddhist studies specialists, later known as the St. Petersburg school of Buddhist studies. It included Fedor

²¹ Ookhtomsky 1900: chap. 39, 474.

²² For the dates see *ibid.*, 477 and 478. The National Museum of the Republic of Buryatia (Национальный музей Республики Бурятия) has a group photo dated June 17, in which Prince Nicholas was surrounded by Buryats, see *Министерство культуры российской федерации* [Ministerstvo kul'tury rossiiskoi federatsii / Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation] 2012: 23. This reference refers to the program of a cultural exhibition held in conjunction with APEC in Vladivostok in 2012.

²³ The captions of these illustrations are "Buriat Women," "Buriat Tent with Altar and Royal Seat, presented to the Cesarewitch," "Chief Lama of the Buriyats." (Gomboev's picture), "Actors in the Buriat 'Tsam' i.e. Religious Dance," "Mystic Dance of Lamaïtes" and "Buriat School-Children", Ookhtomsky 1900: 497–510.

²⁴ The captions of illustrations inserted into accounts of China are "Lamaserei (Buddhist Clergy House) from a Tibetan Picture," "Buriat Lama," "Amazones in Transbaikalia," "Kalmuck Lama," "Buriats," photographs of Tibetan Buddhist bronze sculptures, "Lama Country," "Pilgrims on the way to Lhasa," "Greeting with Hadaks (Khata)," "Exterior of Temple of Lamas," "Lama Monastery in Eastern Siberia" and "Chief Lama-God of Mongolia, i.e., the Eighth Jebtsundamba Khutugtu", Ookhtomsky 1900: 325–345.

²⁵ Чимитдоржин Д.Г. [Chimitdorzhin D. G.] 2010: 91–98.

²⁶ Tsyrempilov 2022: 203–228.

²⁷ This Order's certificate is on display at the Museum of the History of Buryatia.

Shcherbatskoi (1866–1942) and Sergei Oldenburg (1888–1940), who were roughly the same generation as Ukhtomskii and, like him, had been trained in St. Petersburg. They also trained Buryat intellectuals like Gombozhab Ts. Tsybikov (1873–1930) and Bazar B. Baradin (1878–1937) at St. Petersburg University, both of whom conducted a field survey in Tibet and Amdo (Amdo, northeastern Tibet) in the early 20th century and wrote ethnographies.²⁸ These Buryat intellectuals are now honored in the Republic of Buryatia as founder of Buryat national identity through Buddhism.

*Badmaev's Involvement in Russia's Northeastern
and Central Asia Policy*

Buryat intellectuals not only contributed to the development of Buddhist studies in Russia, but also to the Russian Empire's Northeastern and Central Asia Policy. The Buryat, Petr A. Badmaev (1851–1920), an expert in Tibetan medicine and an official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Asian Department, presented his Northeastern and Central Asian policy guidelines to Alexander III (1845–1894) in February 1893. His plan was as follows: the Russian authorities were to give money and goods to Buryat merchants who traded with Tibetan and Mongol people, then make them to spread anti-Qing and pro-Russian propaganda, and finally incite Tibetan and Mongol people to lead an uprising against the Qing Dynasty. Moreover, Badmaev proposed that the Trans-Siberian Railway was to be extended to Lanzhou 蘭州, in the Amdo Tibetan region, an important strategic point for Tibetan Buddhists.²⁹ Badmaev's aim was that Mongol, Tibetan, and Chinese nobles and high priests would spontaneously pay a solemn visit to St. Petersburg and eventually submit to Russia. When his ambitious proposal had been approved by the Czar and Finance Minister Sergei Witte (1849–1915), two million rubles were handed out from the National Treasury. Badmaev established a trading house in Chita (Чита, on the Trans-Siberian Railway route) and opened nine post offices along the road between Kiakhta and Ikh Khüree in June 1895.³⁰

Badmaev's ambitious plan was probably adopted by the Russian authorities as a means of countering the Pundit Project set up by the British in India, which involved recruiting agents from Sikkim and

²⁸ Bernstein 2013: 34–60.

²⁹ Labrang Monastery (Bla brang bkra shis 'khyil), where many Buryats went to study Tibetan Buddhism and went on pilgrimage, is close to Lanzhou.

³⁰ See ATB: 49–75 for documentary sources and Андреев А.И. [Andreev A. I.] 2006: 70–75.

Bengal and sending them to Tibet to gather information. Possibly, the Russians used the same method to obtain information and sent Buryats into Tibetan territory. Moreover, at that time the Russians dreaded Tibet might fall into British hands, just as Sikkim, a country adjacent to Tibet, had recently done (in 1890).

Eventually Badmaev's project was forced to stop, because in the mid-1890s the Russian Empire, wary of Japan's emergence, shifted its interest from Central Asia to the Far East. But it had already achieved great results. Buryat agents, disguised as pilgrims sent on a mission by Badmaev to Tibet, succeeded in contacting a Buryat who was close to the Dalai Lama.

In the spring of 1895, two Buryats, Ochir Zhiguzitov and Dugar Vantinov, who had been sent to Lhasa by Badmaev, realized that many of their compatriots had studied and settled there. Among them, Dorzhiev had risen to become the debate partner (*mtshan zhabs*) of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama himself. In 1898, Dorzhiev, on his way back home from Tibet to Buryatia, reached Tianjin 天津, where Ukhtomskii summoned him to St. Petersburg and organized his audience with Nicholas II. Thus, the Russian Court had secured someone who had access to the Thirteenth Dalai Lama's Court, ahead of British India.³¹

The Russian's Court Encounter with Siam (1891–1900)

On his 1891 world tour, Prince Nicholas stopped at Bangkok, the capital of Siam, and on March 9 (20 in the Julian calendar), had dinner with King Chulalongkorn (1853–1910) and his family.³² Since the King of Siam was trying to win over Russia to prevent Britain and France from invading his country, the relationship between Siam and Russia had developed smoothly. For a start, Siamese Prince Vajiravudh (1881–1925), Siam's future king, attended the coronation of Nicholas II in 1896, and King Chulalongkorn himself visited St. Petersburg and on June 15, 1897, established official diplomatic relations between Russia and Siam. In the following year, Prince Chakrabongse Bhuvanath (1883–1920) went to Russia to study military affairs.

Prince Ukhtomskii's New Encounter with Col. Olcott at Colombo

The coronation of Nicholas II (1896) also set the stage for another important bilateral relationship. At that time, Li Hongzhang 李鴻章 (1823–1901), the delegate of the Qing Dynasty, and the Russian foreign

³¹ Андreeв А.И. [Andreev A. I.] 2006: 76–105.

³² Ookhtomsky 1900: chap. 30, 224.

minister concluded on June 3 a secret Russo-Chinese pact in St. Petersburg, meant to resist Japan's territorial expansion. With this pact, Russia obtained the right to build a railroad from Chita to Vladivostok through Qing territory—later known as the Eastern Qing Railway (*Dong Qing tiedao* 東清鐵道). In the process of implementing this secret agreement, Ukhtomskii was appointed as president of the Eastern Qing Railway and went to China. On his way to China, he met with Olcott at Colombo, in Sri Lanka, for the second time, just before King Chulalongkorn's visit to St. Petersburg.

According to the April 23, 1897 entry in Olcott's diary, this meeting was arranged at his own request and was completely non-political. Olcott spent the whole day with Ukhtomskii, and the latter left Sri Lanka later. He took him to the Kotahena Temple to see Jinawarawansa (1851–1935), a Siamese princely priest, to Mrs. Musæus Higgins, and to the Sanghamitta Girls' School, before visiting Sumangala, the Maha Bodhi Society's president. Olcott got along well with Ukhtomskii's aide, Prince Wolkonskii (1860–1937), because Wolkonskii's aunt had been acquainted with Blavatsky in 1884. Ukhtomskii was so delighted that he gave Olcott a cordial invitation to make the grand tour with him and personally discuss with the chief priests the resemblances and differences between Northern and Southern Buddhism.³³

Here, it is worth noting that Jinawarawansa was on Olcott's side. Jinawarawansa, alias Prince Prisdang (1851–1935), a grandson of Rama III (1787–1851), had submitted to King Chulalongkorn a reform proposal to modernize his country, but it had incurred the King's wrath, resulting in the King banning him from his country. The previous year (1896), the Prince had become a Buddhist monk in Ceylon and changed his name to Jinawarawansa.

*The Distribution of Buddha Relics Tightening Russia's
and Siam's Relations*

On January 20, 1898, one year after Ukhtomskii and Olcott had met, William Claxton Peppé (1852–1936), a British engineer, excavated Buddha's remains from a stupa dating back to King Ashoka's era (268 B.C.–232 B.C.), at Piprahwa, near the Nepalese border. Jinawarawansa heard about this discovery while on pilgrimage and paid Peppé a visit. He advised him these holy relics should not be treated merely as "things" but as objects of worship and that it would be appropriate to offer them to the Buddhist King Chulalongkorn, so that Buddhists around the world could worship them. British India, though

³³ Olcott 1935: vol. 6, chap. 11, 177–180.

uncooperative with the Maha Bodhi Society's activity but out of consideration for Hindus, accepted this proposal to ease Buddhist feelings. Buddha's remains were offered to King Chulalongkorn.³⁴

Since the Maha Bodhi Society had not yet succeeded in achieving their goal of building a Buddhist temple in Bodh Gaya because of the resistance of Mahant, the Hindu landowner of Bodh Gaya,³⁵ the Buddhist revival movement had already lost momentum at that time. However, this century's discovery re-energized Buddhist solidarity.

On December 16, 1899, the remains were handed over to Phraya Sukhum Naiwinit, governor of Nakhon Si Thammarat Province, at Gorakhpur, India. After welcoming celebrations at various places, like Phatthalung and Songkhla in Siam, on March 16, the remains reached the mouth of the Chao Phraya River near Bangkok. Since British India requested the Buddha relics to be distributed to Buddhist countries under British rule at that time, on January 9, 1900, King Chulalongkorn presented the Buddha relics to delegates from Ceylon and Burma at Wat Pho (Bangkok). However, prior to this offering, King Chulalongkorn voluntarily sent some of the remains to Russian Buddhists.³⁶

In fact, already in 1899 Ukhtomskii asked the Siamese Prince Chakrabongse, who was in Russia to learn about military affairs, to confer the Buddha relics to Russian Buddhists. Chakrabongse returned to Bangkok on July 1 and on August 23 took the remains to St. Petersburg. Why were Buddha's remains conferred to the Russian Buddhists before to anyone else? Hypothetically, in accordance with the June 23, 1899 Russian-Siamese Friendship Treaty between Nicholas II and King Chulalongkorn, the latter intended to create a friendly relationship between the two countries. Out of consideration for British India, this gift was kept secret till February 26, 1900. Then, on March 4, sixty Russian Buddhists, almost all Buryats, including two Kalmyks and four lamas led by Ukhtomskii, publicly received the relics from Prince Chakrabongse.³⁷

Undoubtedly, Ukhtomskii's deep knowledge of Buddhism contributed to fostering their friendship.

Khambo Lama Iroltuev's Pilgrimage to India (1900–1901)

All those events, the growing friendship between Ukhtomskii and Olcott, the success of Buryat intellectuals at the Russian Court, the

³⁴ Murashima 2022 provides detailed information about this gift based on Siamese archives.

³⁵ Togawa 2016.

³⁶ Murashima 2022: 216.

³⁷ Ibid., 225.

establishment of diplomatic relations between Russia and Siam, and the distribution of Buddha relics to Russia all contributed to Khambo Lama Iroltuev eventually making a pilgrimage to India and Siam. Through his contacts with intellectuals in St. Petersburg, Iroltuev must have been aware that Buddha was also a historical figure and, as a Buddhist, he naturally wished to go on a pilgrimage to India, Buddha's birthplace.

Iroltuev's itinerary was as follows: on December 16 (29), 1900, he landed in Colombo and arrived in Calcutta on February 7, 1901. And on February 11, he started his pilgrimage to the holy land.³⁸ After visiting holy sites like Rajgir, Bodh Gaya, Varanasi, Shravasti, Kapilavastu, Lumphini, Kushinagar and Vaishali, on March 13, Iroltuev left Calcutta for Bangkok to express his gratitude for the receipt of Buddha's remains, and then travelled back to his native Siberia, via Japan.³⁹

The original travel plans provided he was to go to Tibet to meet the Dalai Lama, but as we will see below, he had to abandon this project to avoid suspicions on the part of British India.⁴⁰

European Orientalists Supporting Khambo Lama Iroltuev's Pilgrimage

According to the article "The Great Llama of Eastern Siberia," published in *The Maha-Bodhi Journal*, in May 1901 Iroltuev had enlisted the help of European Orientalists to make his pilgrimage into British India. It says:

Grand Lama's Sanskrit name is Vagendra Dharmadhara. He is the head of the Buriat Buddhists of Eastern Siberia, and the Chief of 15,000 Buddhists monks, and he is known as a scholar and esteemed by Orientalists like Professors Sergius d'Oldenbourg and Sylvan Lévi of St. Petersburg and Paris. In London he met Mr. Tawney, Librarian of the India Office.⁴¹

Vagendra Dharmadhara is the Sanskrit translation of Iroltuev's Tibetan name, Ngawang Chozin (Ngag dbang chos 'dzin). Oldenburg and Sylvain Lévi (1863–1935) were then leading orientalists and Charles Henry Tawney (1837–1922) was an English Sanskrit scholar. The Mongolian Institute of Buddhism and Tibetology (Институт Монголоведения Буддологи и Тибетологии) in Verkhneudinsk (modern Ulan-Ude, Buryatia) keeps a letter from Tawney to a man

³⁸ RTS, paragraphs no. 37 and 50.

³⁹ Iroltuev's arrival date at Calcutta is based on MBJ, March 1901: 103; all other dates are based on MBJ, May 1901: 5.

⁴⁰ RTS, no. 50, December 22, 1900.

⁴¹ MBJ, May 1901, 5.

named Maheja asking to support Iroltuev's pilgrimage to Buddhist sites.⁴²

According to *The Maha Bodhi Journal*, before starting for India via Turkey and Ceylon, Iroltuev travelled to St. Petersburg, then to Germany, France, and England, and again returned to Russia⁴³ carrying with him several introduction letters from Paris and London.⁴⁴ This implies Iroltuev had carefully prepared his pilgrimage to India by travelling first around European countries to collect letters of introduction from leading Orientalists like Tawney, Oldenburg, and Lévi.

From the latter part of the above-mentioned article, we learn that Iroltuev had also taken the initiative of getting portions of Buddha relics from the Siamese King and that he wanted to visit Siam to thank the Siamese King for his gift:

The relics of His body, discovered in the Nepal Terai a few years ago, were presented by British Indian Government to the King of Siam, who had them distributed in small portions to the Buddhists of Burma, Ceylon, Japan, and of Eastern Siberia. The Grand Lama (Iroltuev), having read in the Russian newspaper reports of the distribution, sent a deputation to the Prince of Siam, who was then in St. Petersburg. The young prince communicated the matter to his royal father, the king who graciously sent a portion of the sacred relics to the Grand Lama, who is now on a friendly visit to the King of Siam.⁴⁵

Moreover, the following article reveals that Iroltuev preferred to be hosted by the Maha Bodhi Society rather than by the French Consul:

In Russia he (Iroltuev) had heard of the Maha-Bodhi Society,⁴⁶ and when he arrived in Calcutta on the 7th of February, Priest Sumedhankara, Mr. Narendra Nath Sen and Anagarika Dharmapala were waiting at the dock to receive him. The French Consul with his Russian interpreter was also waiting to receive him; but the Grand Lama preferred to accept the

⁴² "INDIA OFFICE WHITEHALL. S.W." is stamped on the front of the envelope. The telegram is dated September 28, 1900. Its contents is as follows: My dear Maheja / I take the / liberty of introducing to /you the Right Revence / Khambo-Lama (Bishop)/ of the Burjats - Vag-indra-Dharmadhara / He is going / on a pilgrimage to /(sic.), and Buddha/Gaya - Please help /him if you can.

⁴³ MBJ, March 1901, 102.

⁴⁴ The letter from Oldenburg to Iroltuev containing the information from Sylvain Lévi was included in Russian official documents. The official documents related to Iroltuev's Indian pilgrimage are kept in the RTS and RIO, RTS no. 50, December 22, 1900 and RTS no. 56.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 102–103.

⁴⁶ A possible source from which Iroltuev received information about the Mahabodhi Society is through the *St. Petersburg Vedomosti* (Санкт-Петербургские ведомости), an influential newspaper at that time, which was edited and published by Ukhtomskii.

hospitality of the Maha-Bodhi Society. Messers, Narendra Nath Sen and Neel Komal Mookherjee have shown the Grand Lama extreme cordiality during his sojourn in Calcutta. He is visiting the sacred sites and is expected in Calcutta shortly.⁴⁷

According to the report from Vasili Klemm (1861–1938), the Russian Consul in Bombay, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Iroltuev had been given a room in the Maha Bodhi Society's building in Calcutta.⁴⁸ In other words, Iroltuev entertained a good relationship with the Maha Bodhi Society members in India.

Iroltuev's Pilgrimage from the Perspective of the Maha Bodhi Society

From the Maha Bodhi Society's perspective, Iroltuev's pilgrimage meant a great deal as evidenced here:

Since the formation of the Maha-Bodhi Society, Buddha-Gaya is being visited regularly by pilgrims from Burma, China, Japan, and Ceylon. The present visit of the Grand Lama of Eastern Siberia as a pilgrim to the Indian Buddhists shrines is an indication of the sympathy that exists between Russia and England. [...] The visit of the Grand Lama is indeed significant, since it shows the strong attachment the Buddhists of Siberia have for the holy land of the Buddhists. There have been other Indian religious Teachers, yet they were little known outside Indian territory; but the glorified name of Sakya Muni is revered by millions upon millions of people outside India. The closing year of the nineteenth century has brought the Buddhist nations of Ceylon, Japan, Burma, Siam, and Siberia together; and the cord that binds them is the unparalleled life of the great Teacher (Sakyamuni) who was born in Kapilavastu about 25 centuries ago.⁴⁹

The next month, the Maha Bodhi Society declared the following to their subscribers and friends:

For the first time in the history of modern Buddhism, within a period of thousand years, an attempt is being made to propagate the sweet and sublime doctrine of the Tathagato in non-Buddhist countries by the Maha-Bodhi Society. Ceylon, Burma, Siam, Japan, Tibet, and Arakan have all taken a share in the work of the Society, hitherto ignored and forgotten, has been added to the Maha-Bodhi map---Eastern Siberia. The

⁴⁷ MBJ, March 1901, 103; Little is known about Sumedankara and Narendra. Neel Comal Mookerjee was a close friend of Dharmapala, a Bengali who settled in Calcutta. He was the first person who supported Dharmapala's movement, see <https://mbsiindia.org/babu-neel-comul-mukherji/>.

⁴⁸ RIO, No. 37, dated February 19, 1901.

⁴⁹ MBJ, March 1901: 102.

visit of the Grand Lama to our holy land is full of significance.⁵⁰

This declaration shows that Olcott regarded Iroltuev as the Russian Buddhists' representative and thought that the Society's activities had spread to Russia.

In the same issue, another article entitled "Maha Bodhi Dharamashala" gave an estimate of a pilgrimage lodge (dharamshala) under construction that should serve as a base for pilgrims visiting Bodh Gaya.⁵¹ Until then Buddhist pilgrims visiting Bodh Gaya had stayed at the cramped lodge built in 1877 by King Mindon Min of Burma (1808–1878). As the number of pilgrims in Bodh Gaya increased due to the Maha Bodhi Society's activities, Mahant, a Hindu landowner in Bodh Gaya, appealed to the Indian government to remove Ceylonese monks from the pilgrimage lodge. As soon as the order that met Mahant's wish was issued on April 9, 1896, Buddhist countries like Burma and Japan at once protested against it, claiming it to be a case of religious oppression. Then, the Indian government withdrew it. In view of this situation, the Buddhists planned to build a new pilgrimage lodge.⁵²

Dharmapala tried to involve the Russian government in this construction project. In his letter dated May 14 to Klemm, the Russian consul in Bombay, he requested Russian financial support, arguing it was necessary to build rooms dedicated to future Russian Buddhists coming from Siberia.⁵³ According to the May 22, 1901 report from Russian Consul Klemm to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in St. Petersburg, Klemm replied to Dharmapala that "Siberia is so remote that many pilgrims would not come to India anyway, so let us wait and see what happens." He then voiced his own thoughts: "if we make a small donation towards this lodge, the Buddhists would be pleased since the Maha Bodhi Society has great influence on Indian Buddhists, but the British Indian government would be suspicious of it."⁵⁴

Since the Russian consuls prohibited Iroltuev from participating in assemblies of the Maha Bodhi Society, Olcott was unable to meet with Iroltuev face-to-face. In an undated letter from Olcott to Iroltuev, he expressed his wish to have met with Iroltuev, described his mission as "integrating diverse Buddhism from all over the world," and suggested they continued to cooperate with each other and keep in touch, beyond the language barrier, through their mutual friends, Prince Ukhtomskii and Shcherbachev. Besides, he praised Iroltuev's

⁵⁰ MBJ, April 1901: 118.

⁵¹ Ibid., 119–120.

⁵² About the pilgrimage lodges, see Togawa 2016.

⁵³ RIO, no. 38.

⁵⁴ RIO, no. 39.

education compared to Theravada Buddhist monks.⁵⁵

After Iroltuev left India, the Maha Bodhi Journal again published an article titled "The Great Lama of Eastern Siberia." In this article, Iroltuev expressed his sorrow at seeing Mahant's servants killing animals as offerings in the holy land, and his discomfort at being prevented from making a pilgrimage to Nepal while having to be under constant surveillance.⁵⁶

*Khambo Lama Iroltuev's Desire to Go to Tibet and the Russian Diplomacy:
Fear of British India's Reaction*

In contrast to Olcott and Dharmapala, who welcomed Iroltuev's pilgrimage as an attempt to unify the Buddhist community, the Russian Consulate in India was puzzled by his appearance. The reason is that on September 30, about three months before Iroltuev's arrival at Colombo, the then capital of crown colony British Ceylon, Dorzhiev, one of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama's close aides, had for the second time an audience with Nicholas II at the Livadia Palace in Yalta. At that time, British India had tried to contact the Dalai Lama on numerous occasions to ask him to implement the treaty related to the border between Sikkim and Tibet, in vain.⁵⁷ Therefore, the news that Dorzhiev had contacted the Russian Czar caused Britain to stiffen.⁵⁸ Furthermore, if Iroltuev, the Russian Buddhists' representative, contacted the Dalai Lama, Britain would certainly become even more hostile towards Russia.

Based on the report from Vice-Consul Schneider to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated January 6, 1901, the Russian consuls laid bare their distrust of Iroltuev. In short, since it was unclear whether Iroltuev would act in Russia's national interest, the Russian consul had him put up not at a hotel but at a wealthy Parsi's house and he put him under the surveillance of the consulate agent (консульского агента), named Shcherbachev, in order to prevent him as much as possible from contacting the British. Moreover, Schneider told Iroltuev how the British exploited and hated the locals and made him believe that Russians were better than the British. In his report, Schneider said that he finally

⁵⁵ RTS, no. 55. Shcherbachev was an agent and interpreter provided by the consulate.

⁵⁶ MBJ, May 1901: 4–5. This article was translated into Russian and sent to Russia by the Consulate, see RIO, no. 40.

⁵⁷ The Convention between Great Britain and China Relating to Sikkim and Tibet, signed in 1890. The convention recognized a British protectorate over Sikkim and demarcated the Sikkim-Tibet border.

⁵⁸ This news provoked Britain and led to the Anglo-Indian invasion of Lhasa in 1904 (Younghusband [1910] 1985: 67–68). It also shook Japan which was in a tense relationship with Russia since the Triple Intervention (*Sangoku Kanshō* 三国干涉) and prompted Narita Yasuteru to enter Lhasa in November 1901, see Ishihama and Wada 2020: 5.

won Iroltuev's "trust," but he didn't forget to add a few words: "Like all Asians, you cannot completely trust a lama who tells only half the truth" and "Buddhists in the region, incited by Olcott, welcomed Iroltuev, but he was not sent by the government, but an individual, and we banned him from participating in celebrations and speeches."⁵⁹ Furthermore, Oldenburg's letter warned Iroltuev that "it would be impossible for him to go to Tibet because the British were afraid of Dorzhiev, and that if he tried to go to Tibet under disguise, the British would suspect he would do so with a bad purpose." Consequently, Iroltuev's trip to Tibet was cancelled.⁶⁰

The Russian Consulate did not trust Iroltuev as a Russian citizen at all, nor did it respect Iroltuev's actions as a Buddhist because of political considerations.

Conclusion

The Theosophist and Maha Bodhi Societies contributed to the revival of Buddhism in India and brought northern and southern Buddhism close together and spread the importance of the Dalai Lama among his followers.

First, Prince Ukhtomskii, a Russian expert on Buddhism witnessed the beginning of the Maha Bodhi movement in India during Prince Nicholas' world tour and through face-to-face exchanges with Col. Olcott, the president of the Maha Bodhi Society, they shared their passion for the revival of Buddhism. Second, during the final leg of his world tour, Prince Nicholas's encounter with Buryats paved the way for Buryat intellectuals like Khambo Lama Iroltuev, Dorzhiev, and Badmaev to play an active role within the Russian Court. Third, when Russia established diplomatic relations with Siam, thanks to Jinawarawansa, the Siamese princely priest, who was a friend of Col. Olcott and of Prince Ukhtomskii, Buddha relics that had been excavated in India and owned by King Chulalongkorn, were presented to Russian Buddhists earlier than to any other country.

During this process, Iroltuev, the head of the Buryat Buddhist community learned of the revival of Buddhism in India and began to hope to make a pilgrimage to Buddhist sites and to meet the Dalai Lama and the Siamese King in person. With the help of European Orientalists, Iroltuev completed his pilgrimage to India and Siam in 1901.

Prince Ukhtomskii believed that the people from the Transbaikalian region would naturally fuse with the Russian Empire because Russian Orthodoxy was homogeneous with Buddhism, but the Russian

⁵⁹ RTS, no. 54.

⁶⁰ RTS, no. 56.

consulate viewed Iroltuev's behavior with suspicion. Ukhtomskii's way of thinking was not something that had permeated all Russians. The same is true for the Buryats. No matter how much Russian people glorified the Russian emperor, the Dalai Lama was the more attractive icon to Buryats. Therefore, when the Thirteenth Dalai Lama appeared in Mongolia with Dorzhiev in 1904, Khambo Lama Iroltuev and other Buryats rushed across the border towards the Dalai Lama like a dam that lets go.

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The Thirteenth Dalai Lama's Sojourns at Kumbum Monastery between 1906 and 1909: (Further) Lessons on International Politics, Necessary Reforms in Tibet, and the Dalai Lama's Role in Amdo*

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Introduction

he Younghusband expedition from British India to Tibet in 1904 and the subsequent flight of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama Tubten Gyatso (Thub bstan rgya mtsho, 1876–1933) is generally considered a major turning point in Tibet's 20th century political history and has therefore attracted considerable academic research and discussions.¹ The Thirteenth Dalai Lama was ill-advised by the Buryat monk Agvan Dorzhiev (1854–1938) when he fled Lhasa for Mongolia in the hope of receiving protection and an invitation from the Russian tsar Nicholas II (1868–1918). These never materialized due to Russia's own international and domestic crises, namely the 1904–05 Russo-Japanese War and the 1905 Russian Revolution.² Furthermore, the Tibetan hierarch had underestimated the Manchu Qing Court in Beijing and considered it too weak to effectively support Tibet against British India. Quite to the contrary, the Qing Court took advantage of his absence from Lhasa to strengthen its own grip on Tibet. To make

* This article is published in an issue edited within the frame of the Natinasia project which has received funding from the French National Research Agency (ANR-21-CE27-0025).

¹ See, for example, Mehra 1968; Lamb 1986: 222–285; Goldstein 1989; Dawa Norbu 1990; Smith 1996; McKay 2009. I wish to thank my co-editors and anonymous peer reviewers for their insightful suggestions and comments on a previous version of this paper. Of course, any mistakes and misinterpretations remain mine.

² Agvan Dorzhiev, also spelled Dorjiev and Agwan Dorjiev, was called Ngawang Lobzang (Ngag dbang blo bzang) in Tibetan. The Dalai Lama had already met him in Lhasa in the late 1880s, when Dorzhiev became his assistant tutor for debate and his unofficial teacher for “foreign affairs.” For more detailed information on this important personage, see Jampa Samten and Tsyrempilov 2012; Tsyrempilov 2011; Andreyev 2003 and 2008; Snelling 1993; Kuleshov 1996; see also <https://treasuryoflives.org/biographies/view/Agvan-Dorjiev/13510>, accessed May 15, 2023.

matters worse, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama and his Mongolian host, the Eighth Jebtsundampa Khutagt (1870–1924)—also often referred to as the Bogd Khan—did not get along well.³ Therefore, after about two years of exile at different locations in Mongolia, the Tibetan hierarchy moved on to Amdo. Although it was presumed he would only pass through Amdo on his way back to Lhasa, the Buddhist ruler remained at Kumbum (Sku 'bum) Monastery at the Sino-Tibetan border for over a year from November 1906 to December 1907. Thereafter, instead of returning home, he first went on an extended pilgrimage to the sacred Buddhist site of Mount Wutai (Wutaishan 五台山) in Shanxi 山西 Province from February 1908 to September 1908 and from there to Beijing.⁴ When the Dalai Lama left Beijing in late December 1908 to finally return to Lhasa, he once again passed through Amdo and stayed for another three to four months at Kumbum Monastery from mid-February to early June 1909. Altogether, he spent about eighteen months of his five years in exile in Amdo but, surprisingly, this long spell has not attracted much academic attention and is usually summarized in a few sentences.⁵

After leaving Urga, the Dalai Lama travelled in Amdo giving teachings. He stayed primarily at Kumbum (sku 'bum) Monastery, which marks the spot of Tsongkhapa's birth. There he received a de-legation from Lhasa which brought news of events in Lhasa and urged him to return. The Dalai Lama decided instead to go to Beijing, leaving in the summer of 1908.⁶

In contrast to what might be expected from the short notes like the one quoted above, I argue that the Dalai Lama's sojourn in Amdo was of major importance for his future policies for Tibet for three reasons. First, the Dalai Lama gained further important lessons on international

³ Ishihama 2019a and 2022. His Mongolian name was Agwaan luwsan choiji nyima danzan wangchug (Tib. Ngag dbang blo bzang chos kyi nyi ma bstan 'dzin dbang phyug).

⁴ For the Thirteenth Dalai Lama's stay at Wutaishan, see Sperling 2011: 389–410, for his stay in Beijing, see Jagou 2009: 349–378.

⁵ The Thirteenth Dalai Lama's first exile lasted from July 1904 to December 1909. Of those five and a half years, the Dalai Lama spent two years in Mongolia, one and a half at Kumbum Monastery, half a year at Wutaishan and about three months in Beijing. The rest of the time was spent traveling.

⁶ Tsering Shakya, <https://treasuryoflives.org/biographies/view/Thirteenth-Dalai-Lama-Tubten-Gyatso/3307> accessed May 15, 2023. In Tada Tokan's, Glenn Mullin's and Charles Bell's otherwise quite detailed biographies of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama we find the same brevity when they recount the Dalai Lama's sojourn in Amdo. Tada 1965: 46; Mullin 1988: 71–72; Bell 1946: 69.

At that time, Urga, which later became known as Ulaanbaatar, was called Ikh Khüree in Mongolian, Da'a Khu ral or Da khral in Tibetan and (Da) Kulun 大庫倫 in Chinese.

relations and power politics by meeting, for the first time, several non-Russian Westerners at Kumbum Monastery and, most importantly, by engaging with a new foreign advisor, i.e., the Japanese Buddhist monk Teramoto Enga 寺本婉雅 (1872–1940). Thereby further widening his outlook, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama not only discarded his former policy of avoiding personal contacts with Westerners, but he even began to pro-actively seek new contacts with representatives of other foreign powers besides Russia. Second, as demonstrated in Teramoto's travel diary, the Tibetan reform plans—in addition to the projects for Tibet's military and foreign relations—also included more autonomy, if not complete independence, from Qing China (1644–1911), and were the topic of controversial debates among the Dalai Lama's close advisers. The rift into two opposing factions among the Tibetan entourage was widening, while the Dalai Lama was still wavering between the different options. And last not least, I argue that the Tibetan hierarch's experiences with the Gansu and Amdo elites, foremost the conflict with the head of Kumbum Monastery, forced the Dalai Lama to re-examine the limits of his religious and temporal power in Amdo. Accordingly, this study is divided into three main parts, followed by a short conclusion.

As for sources, the Tibetan ones include the biographies of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama and of those in his entourage who accompanied him into exile, as well as of some high-ranking Amdo reincarnations.⁷ Regarding Chinese primary sources I mainly rely on the official Chinese historical works for the Qing period, i.e., the *Qing shilu* 清實錄 (Veritable Records of the Qing Dynasty, QSL) and the *Da Qing huidian* 大清會典 (Collected Regulations and Statutes of the Great Qing, DQHD). The Tibetan and Chinese sources are complemented by various foreign sources: among these Teramoto Enga's travel diary is the most detailed and insightful for this study followed by the diary of the Buryat intellectual Bazar Baradin (1878–1937).⁸ Apart from the

⁷ These include the biographies of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama (Phur lcog 2010), the Fourth Jamyang Zhepa (Dros dmar tshe ring rdo rje 2013) and the Third Gurong (Bstan 'dzin 1994). Please note that for many important personages of early 20th century Amdo, such as the Fifth Akya Khutugtu and the Seventh Changkya Khutugtu, we only have short summative biographies, if any at all. Furthermore, the existing biographies often provide disappointingly little information about the Thirteenth Dalai Lama's stay in Amdo. As for biographies of the Dalai Lama's entourage, see, for example, Byams pa 'phrin las 1990 and Tsarong 2000.

⁸ Teramoto's *Zōmō Tabi Nikki* 藏蒙旅日記 [Travel Diary to Tibet and Mongolia] was published by his nephew in 1974. Although Teramoto sometimes confused people and events, his diary is an essential source of information not found elsewhere. The diary has recently been translated into Chinese and published in Taiwan. Baradin's *Life in the Tangut Monastery of Labrang*—published in Russian—contains

accounts of these two Tibetan and Mongolian speaking foreign Buddhists and intellectuals, we also have at hand a few reports by foreign Christian missionaries stationed in Lanzhou 蘭州 and Xining 西寧, as well as those of a handful of foreign explorers who were visiting the Sino-Tibetan border area at that time. Last not least, Chinese, Tibetan, and Nepalese primary sources were occasionally quoted in diplomatic official correspondence, i.e., in the files of the British Foreign Office and the India Office as well as in those stored at the Political Archives of the German Foreign Ministry. These provide details not found elsewhere.⁹

1. *Further Lessons on International Relations*

Most studies on the Thirteenth Dalai Lama's first exile have focused on his stays at Wutaishan and in Beijing in 1908 and, more recently, on his sojourn in Mongolia from 1904 to 1906. The latter have already started to refute the former assumption that the Dalai Lama only seriously extended his knowledge about international power politics while at Wutaishan and in Beijing.¹⁰ Indeed, the Dalai Lama had already been confronted with international power politics in the late 19th century, when conflicts with British India occurred on the Tibetan border to Sikkim. Moreover, the Tibetan hierarch had started to learn more about the Western world through the Russian imperial lens of his Buryat tutor and adviser Agvan Dorzhiev in Lhasa. As early as from 1898 to 1901 did Dorzhiev travel to a number of European capitals as some sort of diplomatic envoy for the Dalai Lama. The Tibetan hierarch had possibly already then started to grasp the imminent danger that Tibetan passivity in "international relations" beyond the Tibetan Buddhist world posed for the Tibetan pre-modern state. Thus,

some interesting gossip from, and observations about Labrang Tashikhyil (Bla brang bkra shis 'khyil) Monastery on the eve of the Dalai Lama's arrival in Amdo. Baradin was a student of the famous Russian Indologist Fedor Shcherbatskoi (1866–1942) and employed by the Russian Committee for the Study of Central and East Asia when he traveled to Labrang. See Snelling 1993: 124 and Garri in this RET issue. I wish to thank Xenia de Heering for her support with the translation of excerpts of the Russian text by Baradin, and Maki Takano for reading important excerpts of Teramoto's travel diary with me. Any mistakes and misinterpretations remain, of course, entirely mine.

⁹ For this paper I was able to access British and German archives and I wish to thank the French National Research Agency (ANR) (Project ANR-21-CE27-0025-Natinasia) for supporting my research there. Important documents from Russian, Buryat, and French archives are discussed in other articles of this RET issue. I also thank Rahel Tsering for sharing her knowledge about the German Foreign Office files with me.

¹⁰ Jagou 2009: 369; Bell 1946: 74; Palace 1998; Sperling 2011: 395; Bulag 2013; Kobayashi 2019 and Ishihama 2022.

Dorzhiev was already trying to secure some goodwill if not support for Tibet from other European governments against the British threat long before the Dalai Lama went into exile.¹¹

However, it was only during his exile that the Thirteenth Dalai Lama started to personally interact with foreign powers other than Tibet's direct neighbors. Several more recent studies already highlight how both Russian officials and the Tibetan hierarch seized the opportunity to get into direct contact in Urga, where the Dalai Lama personally met with Russia's consuls, its new ambassador to China Dmitrii Pokotilov (1865–1908) on his way to Beijing, and different members of Russian expedition teams like Captain Petr Kuz'mich Kozlov (1863–1935) and the less studied Russian Indologist Fedor Shcherbatskoi (1866–1942).¹² Since the Dalai Lama had refused to receive any non-Buddhist foreigners in Lhasa, these Russians were the first Westerners the Dalai Lama directly interacted with. They thus set the scene for those who met the Tibetan hierarch later at Kumbum, not only relating to protocol but also to the hierarch's expectations to meet with a foreign official envoy—or at least semi-official envoy—when he granted an audience to a western foreigner.

1.1. *Teramoto Enga*

One of the key players at Kumbum who needs to be introduced in more detail was the aforementioned Japanese Buddhist monk Teramoto Enga. The also politically active Teramoto was connected to the Higashi Honganji, a Japanese Buddhist sect that had launched a missionary enterprise in China as early as in 1876.¹³ Teramoto arrived in Beijing in 1898 and began studying Chinese, Mongolian, and Tibetan as well as Tibetan Buddhism at the famous Tibeto-Mongolian Monastery, the Yonghegong 雍和宮, in Beijing. Teramoto repeatedly travelled back and forth between Japan, Beijing, and Amdo until 1909. Thanks to his networking skills, he easily befriended Qing officials, Japanese diplomats in Beijing and many high-ranking Tibetan and

¹¹ Dorzhiev traveled to Paris and possibly London in 1898 and repeatedly to St. Petersburg between 1898 and 1905. He apparently also tried to make contact with the German Prince Friedrich Leopold of Prussia (1865–1931) when the latter passed through Urga in about 1905, see Political Archives of the German Foreign Office (GFO), PAAA_RZ201_018056_052-053, German Legation report of Apr. 16, 1909. Teramoto met Dorzhiev in Beijing in November 1908 and occasionally mentioned him as Gaawan (Agvan) in his diary; Teramoto 1974: 207, 221, 231. For more detailed information on Dorzhiev, see the references in FN 2.

¹² For more information, see I. Garri's contribution in this RET issue.

¹³ For more information on the origin and role of the Higashi Honganji 東本願寺 in China, see Chen 2009.

Mongolian Buddhist monks alike, among them the Fifth Akya Khutughtu Lobzang Tenpai Wangchuk Sönam Gyatso (A kya/kyA/rkyA ho thog thu Blo bzang bstan pa'i dbang phyug bsod nams rgya mtsho, 1869/74–1909) of Kumbum Monastery and the Thirteenth Dalai Lama. Teramoto was critical of both Russia and Great Britain and believed in Pan-Asian ideas and the so-called Okuma Doctrine, namely, that Japan should save other Asian nations from Western imperialism and help them modernize. For Teramoto, the Dalai Lama was the natural leader to unite Asian Buddhists, but he felt that the Dalai Lama's flight had been a serious mistake and had damaged the latter's religious and political power. He therefore feared that Tibetan Buddhism was in decline and that a weak Dalai Lama would also curtail the influence of Buddhism in Asia as a whole. In order to counterbalance these negative developments, Teramoto attempted to convince the Tibetan hierarch and his entourage to get into closer contact with Japan which could act as Tibet's new protector, and to reconcile with Qing China. In addition, Teramoto hoped the current situation might at least lead to the modernization of Tibet and Tibetan Buddhist institutions, which he considered as too backward to meet the challenges of modern times.¹⁴

After two years of preparations at Kumbum Monastery between February 1903 and February 1905, Teramoto travelled to Lhasa in May 1905 and then left Tibet via India after a surprisingly short stay of only two to three months, supposedly because the Dalai Lama was already in exile.¹⁵ By April 1906, Teramoto was back in Beijing and then returned to Kumbum as soon as he learned that the Dalai Lama was to stay at that monastery. He arrived there in September 1906, about two months before the Dalai Lama, and by late November 1906 he was already acquainted with the Tibetan hierarch and his close attendants and became their discussion partner on international politics and reform ideas for Tibet. What probably served as a door opener for Teramoto was a complimentary letter by Abbot Ōtani Kōei 大谷光瑞 (1876–1948), the head of the Higashi Honganji Buddhist sect in Kyoto, which he presented to the Dalai Lama during his first audience.¹⁶ That another Buddhist leader from Asia—apart from Buryats and Kalmyks in Russia—was seeking his contact must have been comforting for the

¹⁴ Berry 1995: 58–79; Kobayashi 2019: 41–47; Teramoto 1974: 203, 207, 214.

¹⁵ Teramoto apparently also managed to meet the British Trade Agent William Frederick O'Connor (1870–1943) in Gyantse (Rgyal rtse), the British Political Officer Charles A. Bell (1870–1945) in Chumbi and Lord George Curzon (1859–1925) in Simla; Berry 1995: 67–71.

¹⁶ Ōtani Kōei was the head of the Higashi Honganji Buddhist sect, a sub-sect of the Japanese Pure Earth Sect (Jōdo Shinshū 浄土真宗, Ch. Jingtū 淨土). See also FN 13.

Dalai Lama in his predicament of exile and he began exchanging letters with Ōtani Kōei while in Amdo.¹⁷

Moreover, Teramoto urged the Dalai Lama to visit Japan and to open diplomatic relations with Japan, proposals the Dalai Lama and his advisors apparently seriously considered but which did not materialize.¹⁸ To this end, Teramoto later also arranged the Dalai Lama's meetings with Ōtani Sonyū 大谷尊由 (1886–1939), the brother of Ōtani Kōzui, at Wutaishan and with various Japanese embassy and military officials in Beijing in 1908.¹⁹ It seems that the Japanese government was only indirectly interested in the Dalai Lama and in Tibetan affairs, namely only insofar as they related to their political interests in Mongolia and Manchuria. Furthermore, Japan was bound by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 which—although mainly directed against Russia's expansionary policy in Asia—also prohibited direct involvement in Tibetan affairs.²⁰ Therefore, it is not entirely clear whether Teramoto's agenda for Tibet and the Dalai Lama actually concurred with that of the Japanese government and whether Teramoto was in fact a Japanese spy or acted on his own behalf. It is evident, however, that Teramoto did have a political agenda when meeting with the Dalai Lama and his advisors and that he attempted to influence them accordingly.²¹

1.2. *Western visitors*

The first western foreigners who happened to cross paths with the Dalai Lama within days after his arrival at Kumbum in early November 1906 were, ironically, British citizens, namely, the Xining based Christian missionary H. French Ridley (1862–1944) and explorer Lieutenant John Weston Brooke (1880–1908). Not surprisingly, Brooke described

¹⁷ For the Buryat and Kalmyk Buddhist connections, see Ishihama 2019a and Takehiko 2019.

¹⁸ Teramoto 1974: 236–237.

¹⁹ Qin 2005: 122–125, 128–129.

²⁰ For Anglo-Japanese relations and the repercussions for their respective Tibet Policies, see Klein 1971–1972.

²¹ For Teramoto's activities in China and Tibet, see also Berry 1995, Kobayashi 2019, Tafel 1914 vol. 2: 91–92, and Qin 2005: 131. The German Legation in Beijing considered Teramoto as a Japanese spy; GFO, PA AA RZ 201-018055-70, German Legation report of Apr. 9, 1907. Baradin also mentions that many monks at Kumbum eyed Teramoto with suspicion; Baradin 2002: 164. We do know that Teramoto regularly reported to the Japanese military attaché and Vice-Chief of Staff, General Fukushima in Beijing while he was in Amdo because the letters are listed in his diary. For more information on Fukushima, see Saalen, 2018: 69–86 and Esenbel 2018: 87–117. Tada, on the other hand, mentions Teramoto only as an interpreter for the Japanese delegation at Wutaishan; Tada 1965: 48.

the Dalai Lama as rather stiff and unfriendly at their joint audience. Brooke endeavored to receive permission for his expedition to travel to Lhasa but, not unexpectedly, was unsuccessful. One or two months later in early 1907, the German explorer Dr. Albert Tafel (1876–1935) paid his respects. To Tafel's surprise the Dalai Lama made small talk and was well informed about Germany's location in Europe. However, he evaded the political topics Tafel tried to discuss. Unfortunately, Tafel did not record which topics he had raised with the Dalai Lama, but it is very likely Tafel had hoped to elicit statements on the Tibetan stance on Great Britain, Russia, and China and the Dalai Lama's future plans.²²

It is especially noteworthy that, while contacts with Buryat, Mongolian, and Japanese monks in Lhasa before 1904 had apparently followed the traditional Tibetan court protocol, these rules were then slowly changed for non-Buddhist visitors during the Dalai Lama's exile. During their some twenty to thirty minute audiences, Ridley, Brooke, and Tafel were still expected to stand in front of the Dalai Lama's elevated throne where he sat cross-legged, and they were not allowed to take a photo of him. These rules were already considerably loosened in early 1908, when the Dalai Lama stayed at the Buddhist sacred site at Wutaishan where he met with about ten foreigners from different countries and, in addition, adopted another foreigner as his unofficial adviser, namely the American ambassador and Tibetologist, William W. Rockhill (1854–1914).²³ When the Russian explorer Captain Kozlov, who had already made the Dalai Lama's acquaintance in Mongolia in 1905, again met the Dalai Lama at Kumbum in March 1909—after the latter's return from Beijing—Kozlov described the ambiance at the audience and their numerous subsequent informal meetings as very relaxed. The Dalai Lama allegedly even shook hands with Kozlov who was not only allowed to take a photo of the Dalai Lama but was also invited to Lhasa. They apparently repeatedly talked at length about European affairs for which the Dalai Lama showed a keen interest, and Kozlov also mentions that the Dalai Lama possessed an atlas with Tibetan notes—apparently an atlas from the Russian geographer Eduard Petri (1854–1899)—which they consulted during their meetings.²⁴ Therefore, we see a stark contrast to the stiff protocol followed with Brooke, Ridley and Tafel two years earlier and a clear shift

²² Tafel 1914: vol. 2, 92–94.

²³ Rockhill had already started a correspondence with the Dalai Lama in 1905, spent a week with him at Wutaishan, and repeatedly saw the Dalai Lama during his stay in Beijing. Rockhill 1910: 91; Sperling 2011; Meinheit 2011; Kobayashi 2019.

²⁴ The atlas was most probably the 1903 edition of the *Uchebnyi Geograficheskii Atlas* (Manual Geographical Atlas), published by Marks in St. Petersburg. I wish to thank Irina Garri for this information.

towards a Dalai Lama who felt considerably more relaxed with western foreigners.²⁵

1.3. The Dalai Lama's new diplomatic initiatives

As mentioned above, by the time that the Dalai Lama reached Kumbum in late 1906, he had already made his first indirect and cautious steps into the western diplomatic and academic community by exchanging letters and presents with foreign governments, particularly with the Russian tsar through Dorzhiev. Moreover, the new Russian and Buryat contacts in Mongolia had informed the Tibetan hierarch about the recent surge in academic interest in Buddhism, and notably Tibetan Buddhism, by Western and Asian countries in addition to geographic and other scientific interests in Tibet. Teramoto and the Westerners whom the Dalai Lama met at Kumbum and later at Wutaishan, confirmed this academic interest, which seems to have encouraged the Dalai Lama and his advisors to actively reach out to other nations besides Russia.²⁶

Indeed, in every meeting with foreign explorers at Kumbum, the Dalai Lama now actively inquired whether they carried messages from their governments for him, apparently hoping that foreign governments would secretly offer support or at least would try to get into direct contact with him. However, only Kozlov could answer this question in the affirmative.²⁷ Thus, with no obvious foreign support forthcoming but an occasion of sending a new "tribute mission" to Beijing in early summer 1907,²⁸ a by now presumably rather frustrated Dalai Lama and his advisers decided to pro-actively contact the representatives of several imperial powers in Beijing, namely the USA, Russia, Japan, France, Germany and, last not least, even their foe Great Britain. To this end, the Tibetan hierarch wrote personal letters to several Western ambassadors and dispatched them with his "tribute envoys" to Beijing. As a complete novelty, he invited several foreign dignitaries to meet him at the Buddhist sacred site at Wutaishan, where he planned to travel before his return to Tibet.

It seems that the aforementioned Russian Indologist Shcherbatskoi played an important role in this major shift in the Dalai Lama's

²⁵ For the Dalai Lama's changing attitudes towards foreigners, see also Mannerheim 2008: 764–766; d'Ollone 1912: 305; d'Ollone 1988: 363; Kozlov 1925: 219–224.

²⁶ See, for example, Kobayashi 2019.

²⁷ Brooke in Fergusson 1911: 5–6; Teramoto 1974: 218, 237; Tafel 1914: vol. 2, 92–94; Kozlov 1925: 219–224.

²⁸ This new mission was sent in response to an edict received from the Qing Emperor Guangxu 光緒 (1871–1908) through the Dalai Lama's returning first mission sent from Mongolia in 1905 or 1906; Teramoto 1974: 234–236.

attitudes, because he was the one who had already suggested to the Dalai Lama during his stay in Urga in 1905 to get into contact with W. W. Rockhill in Beijing.²⁹ The Dalai Lama followed this recommendation and thus gradually started to build an international body of advisers. While at Kumbum, the Dalai Lama continued to receive advice not only from the Buryat Dorzhiev and the circle close to him, but by then also from a Japanese monk, namely Teramoto, and, possibly in writing, by an American diplomat.

The Dalai Lama's two emissaries who left Kumbum in late June 1907, were called Lobzang Tenzin (Blo bzang bstan 'dzin, n.d.) and Jamyang Tenpa ('Jam dbyangs bstan pa, n.d.) who I have not been able to identify with certainty yet. Lobzang Tenzin was—according to Teramoto—a third rank Tibetan official, and he described himself as belonging to Drepung ('Bras spungs) Monastery in Lhasa and as having been in personal attendance of the Dalai Lama throughout his exile. All we learn about Jamyang Tenpa is that he was Lobzang Tenzin's deputy, spoke good Chinese and had travelled between Beijing and Lhasa by land and sea already four or five times.³⁰ According to the Dalai Lama's biography, however, Jamyang Tenpa seems to have been the higher-ranking official, bearing the title of *sku bcar* ("favorite") *mkhan che* and Lobzang Tenzin of *mkhan chung*.³¹ After arriving in Beijing, both envoys started their visits to the aforementioned foreign

²⁹ Kobayashi 2019: 43–44; I. Garri in this RET issue.

³⁰ In Chinese, the tribute envoy (*gongshi* 貢使) Lobzang Tenzin is named Luosang-Danzeng 羅桑丹增 and titled *nangsu* 囊素 (Tib. *nangso*), see Zhongguo diyi lishi dang'anguan 2002: 129, doc. 155. For further references to Lobzang Tenzin and sometimes Jamyang Tenpa, see, for example, Lobsang Dansong Nangsu (GFO, PA AA RZ 201/18055 161–166, German Legation report of Feb. 5, 1908), Lo Sang Tan Tseng (British Library (BL), IOR/L/PS/20/259, "East India (Tibet). Further Papers Relating to Tibet. In Continuation of CD. 2370," *Parliament Papers* (hereafter quoted as BL, IOR/L/PS/20/259) 1910: 146, doc. 233, Jordan to Edward Grey, Feb. 4, 1908, *da kanbu* (*mkhan po*) Rosan tanjin and Jamian danba (Teramoto 1974: 237), *Khenpo* Lobzang Tendzin (Mannerheim 2008: 764), Khampo Lozang Tenzin (Meinheit 2011: 417–418), and Sba yer mkhan po Blo bstan (Sperling 2011: 394). He might possibly be identical with the Sixty-second abbot of Drepung Gomang, Lobzang Tenzin (Blo bzang bstan 'dzin, abbot 1909–1913); see online <https://www.drepunggomang.org/monastery-s-abbots?view=article&id=401&catid=9>, accessed Apr. 28, 2023.

³¹ Phur Icoq 2010: vol. 2, 40–41, 104. *Mkhan che* usually designated a high monk official of the third rank in the traditional Tibetan government, whereas *mkhan chung* was a rank/title for monk officials that corresponded to the fourth rank (Tib. *rim bzhi*) officials in the lay aristocratic side of the traditional government bureaucracy, <https://www.loc.gov/collections/tibetan-oral-history-project/articles-and-essays/glossary/#s>, accessed Dec. 12, 2023.

legations in late January 1908.³² They delivered presents and a complimentary letter from the Dalai Lama to the German Legation on January 25, 1908, and in this letter the Dalai Lama expressed his wish to meet with the German ambassador at Wutaishan.

The Dalai Lama's letter read:

[... Salutory address ...]

I have found peace and quiet during my travels so far. When I now send the abbot Lobsang Dansong Nangsu with presents (one painting, one hata [i.e., khatak (kha bdags)], ten bunches of Tibetan incense, and three bolts of cloth) to Your Excellency, then this is in accordance with the customs of my country.

Your Excellency highly respects the teachings of the Buddha, which gives me hope that a good relationship will develop between us. Should your Excellency have any instructions or requests, I beg to communicate this order to Abbot Lobsang Dansong Nangsu, who will inform me about it. I would be very happy if I could talk to your Excellency personally after my arrival at Wutaishan.

[... Closing phrase ...]

(The Dalai Lama's personal seal)

Dated 12th day of the 5th month (June 22, 1907, according to the Chinese and early Sept. 1907 according to the Tibetan calendar). (My translation from German)³³

The British Minister John N. Jordan (1852–1925) received the same two emissaries a few days later, on January 28, 1908, with a merely “complimentary letter of good-will” by the Dalai Lama, which, however, apparently did not contain an invitation to Wutaishan. If it did, then Jordan made no mention of it. The letter and oral messages to Jordan indicated that the Dalai Lama planned to return to Lhasa and to arrive there in late 1908, after a three-month visit to Wutaishan. A visit to Beijing was not planned, it said.³⁴

Jordan also mentioned that the French and Japanese Legations received similar letters. I have not seen the letters to the legations of

³² For a table listing the Dalai Lama's personal meetings in Beijing in late 1908, see Kobayashi 2019: 49. However, the meetings with the Germans and the French are not listed.

³³ GFO, PA AA RZ 201/18055 166, German Legation report of Feb. 5, 1908. The original letter in Tibetan—together with its Mongolian translation prepared by a monk from the Yonghegong in Beijing—has unfortunately been lost. I wish to thank Dr. G. Keiper of the GFO Political Archives for investigating and sharing this information. The Tibetan date provided by the Embassy translator, Erich Hauer, is incorrect: it should be June 23, 1907 instead of “early September”, see <https://www.lotsawahouse.org/Cgi/phugpa.pl?year=1907>.

³⁴ BL, IOR/L/PS/20/259, 1910: 141, doc. 222, Jordan to Grey, Jan. 29, 1908 and 146, doc. 233, Jordan to Grey, Feb. 4, 1908.

France, Japan, the US and probably Russia, but I assume they also included invitations for a personal meeting at Wutaishan. This invitation was apparently only accepted by the US Minister Rockhill, although he claimed he himself had suggested to the Dalai Lama to meet at Wutaishan. Notably, although the other legations did not send their ambassadors, all had—accidentally?—at least one of their citizens visit Wutaishan privately, and all requested an audience with the Dalai Lama.³⁵ It must have been very frustrating for the Dalai Lama that the foreign nations he had contacted through his envoys in Beijing, were all friendly but non-committal and that most of them already indicated they regarded Qing China as Tibet's rightful sovereign and the Dalai Lama only as the religious head of Tibet.³⁶

Despite the poor results of this and other diplomatic initiatives of the Dalai Lama, it is evident that already during his sojourn at Kumbum in 1907, the Tibetan hierarch tried to reach out to the other main imperial powers—in addition to Russia—through their representatives in Beijing in order to test who he could expect support from and to what degree. Moreover, as we learn from various sources, the Dalai Lama actively sought more information about the international treaties concerning Tibet, about China's reform plans for Tibet, and general advice on how to proceed with Qing China.³⁷ By fleeing in 1904, the Dalai Lama had evaded personally participating in the negotiations with British India for the Lhasa Convention. In hindsight this might have been purposely misinterpreted by Great Britain and China as a license not to involve the Tibetan ruler in any of the Tibet-related treaties that were subsequently concluded during his exile. Among these were the Anglo-Chinese Adhesion Agreement of 1906 and the Anglo-Chinese-Tibetan Trade Regulations of 1908.³⁸ Another important

³⁵ For Japan, the Buddhist priest Ōtani Sonyū, came with several other Japanese (including Teramoto); for Great Britain, District Officer Reginald F. Johnston (1874–1830); for Russia, explorer and military officer Carl G. Mannerheim (1867–1951) and possibly the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aleksandr Izvol'skii (1856–1919); for France, explorer and military officer Henri d'Ollone; and for Germany, Consul Hubert Knipping (1868–1955) from Tianjin. See BL, L/PS/10-147, Jordan to Grey July 9, 1908, and BL, IOR/L/PS/20/259, 1910: 159, doc. 249, Jordan to Grey, July 21, 1908; Teramoto 1974: 283–284; Jagou 2011: 29; Meinheit 2011: 416; Sperling 2011: 394–400.

³⁶ Rockhill to Theodore Roosevelt Nov. 8, 1908, British National Archives (BNA), FO 535/12-1909; GFO, PA AA RZ 201/18055 166, German Legation report of Feb. 5, 1908; BL, IOR/L/PS/20/259, 1910: 141, doc. 222, Jordan to Grey, Jan. 29, 1908 and 146, doc. 233, Jordan to Grey, Feb. 4, 1908.

³⁷ Teramoto 1974: 244; BNA, FO 535/12-1909, Rockhill to Roosevelt Nov. 8, 1908; BNA, FO 535/12-1909, Jordan to Grey Nov. 25, 1908; BL, L/PS/10-147, Jordan to Grey June 30, 1908; Meinheit 2011: 416.

³⁸ British intelligence from Lhasa stated that the Dalai Lama, while still in Mongolia, had learned about the Anglo-Chinese Adhesion Agreement in a letter from the

treaty was the Anglo-Russian Treaty of August 1907 which, of course, only indirectly concerned Tibet but was of major importance to Tibet, because both Russia and Great Britain explicitly acknowledged Chinese suzerainty over Tibet.³⁹ All of these agreements have been studied before and I will therefore not discuss them again.⁴⁰

One important but concealed element of the new Anglo-Russian understanding about Tibet, which already started in mid-1906 long before the actual agreement was signed in August 1907, was to keep the Dalai Lama away from Lhasa. According to rumors circulating in Gyantse (Rgyal rtse) in central Tibet, in July 1906 the Dalai Lama had started planning his return from Mongolia to Lhasa. From the outset British India had no interest in the Dalai Lama returning to Lhasa anytime soon, lest this would complicate their negotiations with both China and Russia. When in the autumn of 1906 the British learned from the Russian Legation in Beijing that the Tibetan hierarch was already in Gansu Province, they immediately asked for reassurances that China had no intention of allowing the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet for the time being.⁴¹ Meanwhile, the British ambassador to Russia in St. Petersburg, Sir Arthur Nicolson (1849–1928), was striving to ascertain the Russian stance in this matter. While the Russians in June 1906 still stated an interest in having the Dalai Lama back in Lhasa, already one month later, i.e., in July 1906, the new Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Aleksandr Izvol'skii (1856–1919) suggested to the British ambassador in St. Petersburg that the two governments should mutually agree not to take steps for facilitating the Dalai Lama's return to Tibet, leaving China to do as she wished.⁴² Thus, the Russians tried to please both the British and Qing China at the same time and quickly adjusted their politics as needed while also trying to keep the Dalai Lama favorably disposed towards Russia, even though they did not

Qing Emperor in which the Qing government requested the Tibetan hierarch to return to Lhasa as soon as possible. The Dalai Lama then sent letters from Mongolia to the regent in Lhasa and to his superintendent to inform them accordingly. BL, IOR/L/PS/20/259, 1910: 68–69, doc. 130, encl. 6, dated Dec. 13, 1906, Political Officer, Sikkim, to Indian gov., Dec. 20, 1906.

³⁹ The Dalai Lama apparently only received a copy of the Anglo-Russian Treaty of August 1907 from the British legation in late 1908; Smith 1996: 167; Mehra 2012: 125.

⁴⁰ Lamb 1986: 262–274; Mehra 1968: 287–349; Smith 1996: 160–164. See also the detailed German legation report of Apr. 8, 1908, about the Anglo-Chinese-Tibetan Trade Agreement, GFO, PA AA RZ 201/18055 172–185.

⁴¹ BNA, FO 371/23 and BL IOR/L/PS/20/259, 1910: 63, doc. 115, Jordan to Grey, Oct. 31, 1906 and 62, doc. 109, Jordan to Grey, Dec. 5, 1906 and 76, doc. 126, Jordan to Grey, Dec. 29, 1906.

⁴² Farrington 1980: F14 and G4; BNA, FO 371/176-1906; FO 371/177-1906. Izvol'skii even claimed that the Russians had let the Dalai Lama know that his return to Tibet was undesirable at present. BL, L/PS/10-147, Nov. 26, 1906.

offer him the kind of political support he expected. This is also evident from Irina Garri's contribution to this RET issue.

Russia did, however, remain in contact with the Dalai Lama during his stay in Amdo, both openly through Kozlov, for example, and covertly through special envoys, who brought at least five letters in 1907. Apparently, the Dalai Lama also secretly sent envoys from Kumbum via Mongolia to Russia.⁴³ Furthermore, the Dalai Lama received at least some assistance from Russia in the form of military training and possibly for the purchase of modern weapons. More on this later.

While the Dalai Lama was now actively reaching out to Western imperial powers and Japan to establish or intensify initial contacts, he certainly already had future meetings with the Manchu Guangxu 光緒 Emperor (r. 1875–1908) and Empress Dowager Cixi 慈禧 (1835–1908) in mind, as well as with foreign ambassadors in Beijing. Although the Tibetan hierarch kept denying his intention to travel to Beijing until mid-1908, he had already requested his regent⁴⁴ in Lhasa in mid-1907 to send him a large quantity of valuable items like tiger skins, ivory etc. which made suitable gifts for the Manchu Court. And according to District Officer Johnston, who met the Dalai Lama on July 5 at Wutaishan, the Dalai Lama had even started to study Chinese with a teacher from Beijing.⁴⁵ Thus, Teramoto was evidently mistaken when he repeatedly noted in his diary that the Dalai Lama secretly continued to trust only in Russia for support. Moreover, Teramoto did his best to convince the Tibetan hierarch and his advisors of the opposite, namely that Russia was weak and unreliable whereas Japan now offered itself as a suitable substitute.⁴⁶

2. *Reform Plans for Tibet*

In various conversations with Teramoto at Kumbum, the Dalai Lama and his close advisors readily acknowledged the necessity to reform Tibet's military and its foreign relations, thus averting further threats from British India and aiming at more, if not complete, independence from Qing China. Moreover, the modernization of Tibet's religious

⁴³ Teramoto 1974: 227, 233, 244.

⁴⁴ The Eighty-sixth Ganden Tripa Lobzang Gyeltsen (*Dga' ldan khri pa* Blo bzang rgyal mtshan, 1840–n.d., died after 1909) served as regent.

⁴⁵ BL, IOR/L/PS/20/259, 1910: 141, doc. 222, Jordan to Grey, Jan. 29, 1908, and 146, doc. 233, Jordan to Grey, Feb. 4, 1908; BNA, FO 371/223-1907, report of the Nepalese Representative dated July 29, 1907; BL, IOR/L/PS/20/259, 1910: 159, doc. 249, Jordan to Grey, July 21, 1908.

⁴⁶ Teramoto 1974: 225, 227, 233–234, 244, 246.

institutions was also discussed, but unfortunately, Teramoto's notes do not provide any details on this point.⁴⁷

Although the Dalai Lama in exile remained the temporal leader of the Tibetan government in the eyes of most Tibetans and continued to rule through his appointed regent, namely the throne-holder of Ganden (Dga' ldan) Monastery,⁴⁸ China at the same time further increased its authority in Lhasa through its amban, Lian-yu 聯豫 (1858–?; posted to Tibet from 1906 to 1912) and the special envoy Zhang Yintang 張蔭堂 (1860–1935) who were both busy developing their own reform proposals for Tibet. Apart from this rivalry, governing from exile posed numerous other difficulties for the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government, one major one being slow communication and the circulation of many rumors. When the Dalai Lama and his advisors deliberated possible reforms for Tibet while at Kumbum, it is questionable how well informed they were, indeed, about the latest events in Lhasa and Kham (Khams). We do know the Dalai Lama definitely kept involved in central Tibetan affairs and even dismissed and appointed several government officials in Lhasa while in exile.⁴⁹ Furthermore, he followed developments in Lhasa with regard to both Chinese and British activities through a handful of official delegations, among them the so-called “tribute delegations” from Lhasa to Beijing which stopped at Kumbum on their way back and forth. These not only brought the latest news—albeit weeks or months old—but apparently also continued to implore the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet. The Dalai Lama, on the other hand, sent at least two advance caravans to Lhasa from Kumbum and, like the Lhasa government, the Dalai Lama could easily send emissaries disguised as pilgrims.⁵⁰

As regards official Tibetan delegations, we know, for example, that a delegation of the Tibetan governing council (Kashag, *bka' shag*)

⁴⁷ “Today [May 26, 1907] at 9 o'clock I [Teramoto] paid a visit to the Dalai Lama's personal physician Raaman [Tib. *bla sman*] in order to confirm how mature the plans were to reform the Tibetan Buddhist institutions,” see also Teramoto's conversation with Sorupon [Tib. *gsol dpon?*]; Teramoto 1974: 231.

⁴⁸ See FN 44.

⁴⁹ The Dalai Lama reinstated three former kalon (*bka' blon*) while in exile, and dismissed other officials, among them the Nechung oracle who had accompanied him into exile, see Shakabpa 1988: 221; BNA, FO 371/223-1907, report of the Nepalese Representative dated July 29, 1907. See also FN 77.

⁵⁰ Tafel 1914: vol. 2, 83. For a likely example of covert envoys, see FN 77. Unfortunately, the role of the Dalai Lama's high commissioner in Amdo (Amdo *gar pön*/ (A)mdo *sgar dpon*) who was based at the important trade mart of Tongkhor (Stong 'khor), some 20 km west of Xining, remains understudied. In the 19th/20th century he probably and essentially served as a trade and tribute agent (*tshong dpon*/ *tshong spyi*) and possibly as the Dalai Lama's quasi “ambassador” to the Qing Court. On the role of the 17th century Amdo Garpön, see Tuttle 2023: 571.

arrived at Kumbum from Lhasa on November 30, 1906, just a month after the Dalai Lama. Furthermore, an unnamed emissary of a “Kaar-ron,” i.e., a Tibetan cabinet minister (Kalon, *bka' blon*), from Lhasa is mentioned by Teramoto for February 1907 as was a tribute delegation returning from Beijing for May 1907.⁵¹ Presumably, Kashag trade agents also came to meet with the Dalai Lama, and the German explorer Tafel mentions he saw many Tibetan aristocrats from central Tibet among the crowds at Kumbum.⁵² Unfortunately, we know next to nothing about possible communications between the Thirteenth Dalai Lama and the Ninth Panchen Lama Tubten Chokyi Nyima (PaN chen bla ma Thub bstan chos kyi nyi ma, 1883–1937), who both the Manchus and the British tried to use as the Dalai Lama’s substitute for conducting Tibetan affairs. Interestingly, the Panchen Lama went to visit British India in 1906, when the Dalai Lama was still in exile in Mongolia. One Chinese source mentions the Panchen Lama sent envoys from Tashilunpo (Bkra shis lhun po) together with the Kashag delegation that visited the Dalai Lama in Mongolia at the end of 1905 or in early 1906. This raises the question of whether the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama did not, in fact, have a secret understanding on testing the British attitudes while the Panchen was in India and on how to react towards the Qing Court.⁵³

⁵¹ Teramoto 1974: 221, 224–225, 235; Ya 1991: 255.

⁵² Tafel 1914: vol. 2, 83, 94; Phur Icoq 2010: vol 2, 110.

⁵³ As has been pointed out by Fabienne Jagou, both the Manchu and the British considered the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama to have equal powers in their respective territories, i.e., in U (Dbus) and Tsang (Gtsang). According to Geluk hierarchy, the Panchen Lama was second behind the Dalai Lama and in case of conflict or absence of a Dalai Lama, the Qing Court had previously asked the Panchen Lama for his advice although the Panchen Lama traditionally did not exercise temporal power in Tibet. Nevertheless, after the Dalai Lama had fled into exile in 1904, both the Manchus and the British tried to diminish the Dalai Lama’s role by using the Panchen Lama as his substitute for conducting Tibetan affairs. Maybe in order to evade growing Manchu pressure, the Panchen Lama decided to visit British India in January 1906, which delighted the British but angered the Manchu government. The Panchen Lama’s unexpected visit to India also led to numerous rumors. In Amdo, for example, it was rumored that the Panchen Lama had been abducted to India by the British and put into jail, and that only through various miracles performed by the Panchen Lama himself, the British not only freed him but even escorted him, with a guard of honor, to Tibet’s border. Then in late 1906, the Panchen Lama proactively asked to visit Beijing, probably to account for his trip to India, but the Qing Court was hesitant. Only in March 1907, it was decided that the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama should be invited for an audience to Beijing, however, their arrivals should be delayed further. Then in spring 1908 was an invitation for the Panchen Lama seriously considered by the Qing Court but it never materialized, probably because the Qing Court only intended to use the visit of the Panchen Lama as an incentive for the Dalai Lama to come to Beijing. See Jagou 2009: 355–357, 373 FN 22; Rockhill 1910: 75–76 FN 2, 77; Teramoto 1974: 207; BNA, FO 371/23-1906; BL IOR/L/PS/20/259, 1910: 157, doc. 243, Jordan to Grey May

2.1. Qing reform plans for Tibet

We might surmise that the Dalai Lama and his advisors were well aware of the general existence of reform programs by the Qing government for Tibet through communications from Lhasa and possibly through Tibetan contacts in Beijing. In 1907, these—although often competing—programs by both the Amban Lian-yu and Zhang Yintang also found their way into Chinese newspapers. For example, the mostly positive responses of various Chinese ministries to one of Lian-yu's early 1907 proposals, which focused on the military and minting, was published in detail in the *Beijing Gazette* on July 19, 1907. However, only in November 1907 did the Dalai Lama learn from Teramoto that the project to establish Chinese provincial administrative structures in Tibet had been postponed because of the expected high costs. Indeed, at their meeting in Beijing in 1908 Dorzhiev complained to Rockhill that the Chinese government had deliberately left the Dalai Lama in the dark about its reform plans for Tibet, especially regarding its internal administration. The project to convert Tibet into a Chinese province continued to be of great concern to the Dalai Lama, and he apparently repeatedly voiced his objections to the Qing Court.⁵⁴ Furthermore, we should recall that Chinese and Manchu official opinion about the Dalai Lama's role in Manchu reform efforts for Tibet was split into two main factions. Some argued it would be better to keep the Dalai Lama out of Tibetan politics altogether and pay him extra money for staying out. Others preferred to involve the Dalai Lama in

27, 1908; O'Connor 1931: 94; *Qing shilu* 清實錄 [Qing Veritable Records] (QSL) Guangxu juan 568, 光緒三十二年十二月壬辰 (Feb. 12, 1907) and QSL Guangxu juan 569, 光緒三十三年二月癸亥 (Mar. 5, 1907); "'Da Qing huidian' Lifanyuan shiliao (er) 大清會典理藩院史料(二)" (DQHD) 2009: 168; Baradin 2002: 158–59, *North-China Herald* June 6, 1908: 643; Sept. 19, 1908: 693; Oct. 24, 1908: 204; Nov. 6, 1909: 309. See Ya (1991: 254) for the Tashilunpo (Bkra shis lhun po) envoys to the Dalai Lama in Mongolia. See also O'Connor 1931: 126–127 where he states that the Dalai Lama was well-informed about the details of the Panchen Lama's stay in India.

⁵⁴ On Lian-yu's reform proposals and the reactions of the various Chinese ministries, see GFO, PA AA RZ 201/18055 99-114, German Legation report of July 30, 1907 and BNA, FO 535/12-1909, Rockhill to Roosevelt Nov. 8, 1908. Lian-yu's proposal was made at about the same time when his opponent, the special envoy to Tibet, Zhang Yintang, drew up reform programs for Tibet as well and submitted them to the Tibetan Tsokdu (tshogs 'du; National Assembly). One proposal also focused on strengthening the military, another on recasting the Tibetan government on the Chinese pattern, see Ho 2008: 217–218 and Kobayashi 2020: 314–327. For newspaper reports on Chinese reform plans on Tibet, see, for example, the *North-China Herald* Nov. 8, 1907: 366; Feb. 28, 1908: 490; Mar. 27, 1908: 759; Apr. 16, 1908: 151–12; May 16, 1908: 399–400; June 6, 1908: 643; Sept. 26, 1908: 753–754. We might assume that reports in Chinese language newspapers were as numerous.

the Manchu reform efforts *in* Tibet.⁵⁵ For example, the important, Shanghai based English-language newspaper *The North-China Herald* repeatedly quoted Amban Lian-yu, Zhao Erfeng 趙爾豐 (1845–1911), and other Qing officials as saying that, to execute the Qing reform plans in Tibet, it was essential that the Dalai Lama should return to Lhasa to support them.⁵⁶

2.2. Tibetan reform plans

Nonetheless, the Dalai Lama and his advisors continued to make their own reform plans for Tibet while in Amdo. One main issue was the modernization of the Tibetan army. As demonstrated by Alice Travers, some fruitful attempts at modernizing the Tibetan army had already been made starting in the late 19th century, but the renewed Tibetan defeat by British India certainly reinforced the need for further reforms. This, as mentioned above, was also a major concern for the Manchu officials in Lhasa, although for different goals, namely to assert Qing authority over Tibet.⁵⁷ In fact, in February 1907, Teramoto mentioned that the Dalai Lama planned to build a modern army of 50,000 to 60,000 troops within the next ten years and that he already had ten Russian Buryats or Mongols among his retinue whom he had hired as military instructors. Whether they belonged to the escort that was later forbidden to enter Tibet due to British—and Qing—objections is not entirely clear but seems quite likely.⁵⁸ Furthermore, the Tibetan hierarch's close attendant and future Tibetan commander general, Tsarong Dasang Damdul (Tsha rong zla bzang dgra 'dul, 1888–1959), had already received some initial military training by the Russians while in Mongolia.⁵⁹ However, these newly planned troops not only needed to be trained but also equipped. When the Tibetan hierarch sent a large advance caravan to Lhasa in early 1907 and again in 1909, it was suspected transporting considerable amounts of arms and

⁵⁵ Yudru Tsomu 2022: 641–642; GFO, PA AA RZ 201/18055 183–184, German legation report of Apr. 8, 1908.

⁵⁶ See, for example, *North-China Herald* Feb. 28, 1908: 490; Mar. 6, 1908: 558; Mar. 27, 1908: 759; Apr. 16, 1908: 151–152; June 6, 1908: 643.

⁵⁷ Travers 2021: 994–1003. See also Andreyev 2003 on early Tibeto-Russian modernization plans for the Tibetan army.

⁵⁸ BNA, FO 371/177-1906, Morley to Government of India, May 4, 1906; Zhongguo diyi lishi dang'anguan 2002: 214, doc. 273. For more information on the Buryat escort that had already been formed during the Dalai Lama's stay in Mongolia, see I. Garri in this RET issue.

⁵⁹ Teramoto 1974: 225. On Tsarong's role during the Dalai Lama's exile, see Tsarong 2000: 16–25; <https://treasuryoflives.org/biographies/view/Tsarong-Dasang-Damdul/7929> accessed May 15, 2023. Interestingly, Teramoto does not seem to mention him, at least not by name.

ammunition, probably mostly purchased directly in the Xining area, which was a well-known location for a lively under-the-counter arms trade. Due to the booming wool trade which had brought new wealth to Amdo starting from the late 19th century, there was ample demand and supply for arms and ammunition, especially among the Amdo Tibetan nomads.⁶⁰

In addition, the modernization of the Tibetan army became even more pressing with the violent Sino-Tibetan conflicts that started to erupt in the Kham area in 1905, and we might assume some of the weapons from Amdo also found their way into Kham.⁶¹ The efforts of the provincial government of Sichuan to develop its border region with Tibet in terms of agriculture, mining, and trade according to the New Policies (*xinzheng* 新政) suggested by the Qing Court had roused local Khampa opposition, sometimes violent, especially when the number of Buddhist monks in the local Tibetan monasteries was to be limited. In order to get the situation under control, the Sichuan provincial government appointed its commander-in-chief Ma Weiqi 馬維騏 (1846–1910) and the magistrate (*daotai* 道台) Zhao Erfeng to quell the uprisings. They did so with great cruelty, especially Zhao Erfeng who wiped out whole monasteries in the summer of 1906.⁶² News of these disturbing events reached the Dalai Lama both in Mongolia and later in Amdo. In 1908, the Chinese government even demanded the Dalai Lama to assist in quelling the uprisings in Kham because he was suspected of inciting the continued violent resistance.⁶³

Due to this large demand for modern military equipment, the Dalai Lama also reached out to the German Legation in Beijing in 1908 and inquired whether he could buy arms and ammunition from Germany.⁶⁴ Presumably, he asked the same question to other legations as

⁶⁰ On the Dalai Lama's attitudes towards arms and warfare, see Venturi 2014 and Travers 2021. Dorzhiev apparently sent one of his Buryat students to Kumbum to organize and travel with the advance caravan to Lhasa in 1907; Teramoto 1974: 207, 221. Even Teramoto was suspected to have furnished the Dalai Lama with five hundred rifles; Baradin 2002: 164–165. On the caravans and arms trade in the Xining 西寧 area, see Kozlov 1925: 111, 112, 135; Tafel 1914: vol. 1, 220 and vol. 2, 83; QSL, Xuantong zhengji juan 1, 宣統元年閏二月庚寅 (Mar. 31, 1909); Horlemann 2012.

⁶¹ Tafel mentioned that he saw chieftains from Kham among the crowds at Kumbum, and we can safely assume there were also many undercover envoys among the Tibetan pilgrims not only from Lhasa but probably also from Kham. Tafel 1914: vol. 1, 215.

⁶² For more detailed accounts see Relyea 2018 and Relyea in this RET issue; Sperling 1975.

⁶³ Sperling 1975: 26; Rockhill 1910: 77; DQHD 2009: 224–226.

⁶⁴ In late 1908, the envoys of the Dalai Lama—unsuccessfully—inquired about buying 30,000 to 40,000 rifles plus ammunition from the Germans; see GFO, PA AA

well. Furthermore, in 1908–1909 rumors circulated that the Dalai Lama was considering taking on international loans to finance his reform plans.⁶⁵

Politically, the Dalai Lama definitely pondered on his own and Tibet's future status regarding Qing China. There is evidence that by mid-1907/the end of 1907, the Dalai Lama once again seriously considered meeting the Manchu emperor although, outwardly, the Dalai Lama continued to negate the existence of this plan up to mid-1908 as already mentioned above.⁶⁶ The Dalai Lama's only effective means to demonstrate some independence from the Qing Court was to play his own cat and mouse game about his travel plans, namely where he would go, when and at what pace. Although the Qing Court had also repeatedly changed its mind with regard to its preferred domicile for the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan hierarch's temporizing attitude annoyed the Manchu government greatly, especially since it had no means to force the Dalai Lama to travel faster when he either feigned illness or claimed that heat or cold hindered his travel plans.⁶⁷

From his conversations with the Dalai Lama and his advisors at Kumbum, Teramoto surmised that the Dalai Lama only pretended to seek a reconciliation with the Qing Court. According to Teramoto, outwardly the Tibetan hierarch intended to apologize for his mistakes in order to keep his former position as spiritual and temporal head of

RZ 201/18055 247–252, German legation report of Nov. 5, 1908. Jordan mentioned that an officer of the German Legation guard allegedly presented an illustrated book of German arsenals to the Dalai Lama at Wutaishan; BL, L/PS/10-147, Jordan to Grey, July 9, 1908. I have not been able to verify this.

⁶⁵ *North-China Herald* Nov. 21, 1908: 462; Feb. 13, 1909: 411; Mar. 6, 1909: 558.

⁶⁶ Teramoto (1974: 215, 244) mentioned that the Dalai Lama had already requested an audience with the Manchu emperor while in Mongolia, which was then denied to him. However, the Tibetan tribute envoys to Beijing who continued their journey from Kumbum in June 1907, were not only supposed to ask for permission for the planned visit to Wutaishan, but to request once again an audience for the Dalai Lama; BL IOR/L/PS/20/259, 1910: 159, doc. 249, Jordan to Grey, July 21, 1908.

⁶⁷ *North-China Herald* Nov. 23, 1906: 441; Oct. 4, 1907: 54; Feb. 28, 1908: 490; Mar. 6, 1908: 558; Mar. 27, 1908: 726; June 20, 1908: 772; July 18, 1908: 169; Sept. 12, 1908: 634. While, at first, the Qing Court had pressured the Dalai Lama to return from Mongolia to Lhasa as soon as possible, in late 1906, it apparently explicitly ordered the Dalai Lama to remain at Kumbum Monastery for the time being and await further instructions; Ya 1991: 256. At the same time, the Manchu government was apparently in constant fear that the Dalai Lama might flee again while he was at Kumbum; *North-China Herald* Mar. 20, 1909: 686; BL, IOR/L/PS/20/259, 1910: 146, doc. 233, Jordan to Grey, Feb. 4, 1908 and 157, doc. 243, May 27, 1908. The German Legation still reported on Apr. 8, 1908, that the Dalai Lama would probably return to Lhasa from Wutaishan. In contrast, Teramoto (1974: 246–247) had already guessed in November 1907 that the Dalai Lama would travel on to Beijing. Finally, on July 19, 1908, the Dalai Lama was summoned once again to Beijing by imperial decree.

Tibet and possibly to ask for more autonomy (Jp. *jichi seido*, Ch. *zizhi zhidu* 自治制度). However, Teramoto also suggested in his diary that by 1907 the Dalai Lama was already covertly aiming at Tibet's complete independence (Jp. *dokuritsu*, Ch. *duli* 獨立) from Qing China and counted on China's inability to implement its reform plans for Tibet because of its own relative weakness.⁶⁸

The Dalai Lama has lost confidence in the Manchu Court and with Russia's support he wants to fling off the restraints of the Manchus. At the same time, he wants to repel the British from Tibet. This volition is very strong and not extricable.

[Diary entry of May 18, 1907]

[...] originally, the Dalai Lama wanted to receive support from Russia to drive the British out [of Tibet], to resist the Beijing government and to realize his dream of Tibet as an independent country. But after arriving here [at Kumbum], the Dalai Lama outwardly regrets his mistakes and therefore wants to travel to Beijing. Since the costs for installing a new provincial governor in Tibet are currently too high, the Beijing government has postponed this project for the time being. [Nevertheless,] it is a fact that the Beijing government's true intention has already been leaning towards the policy of establishing a new provincial governor. The Dalai Lama was very surprised and therefore wants to travel to Beijing with the expectation to firmly establish his rule over Tibet by urging the Guangxu Emperor [to consent] at an audience.

[Diary entry of November 23, 1907]⁶⁹

These comments by Teramoto already indicate the ambivalence that persisted in the Dalai Lama's intentions vis-à-vis the Qing Court regarding his own and Tibet's status. During his stay in Beijing in 1908, the Dalai Lama unsuccessfully requested the right to memorialize to the Qing throne directly, i.e., without the detour through and interference from the viceroy of Sichuan and the Court of Colonial Affairs (*Lifanyuan* 理藩院). This seems to indicate a willingness to accept Qing suzerainty at least in some quarters. Further examples are provided below. On the other hand, the Dalai Lama had intended to leave two or three trusted councilors to represent his interests in Beijing, thus possibly imitating the foreign legations in Beijing, but the Qing Court

⁶⁸ Teramoto 1974: 215, 224–225, 227–228, 233; BNA, FO 535/12-1909, Rockhill to Roosevelt, Nov. 8, 1908. A note in the *North-China Herald* (Sept. 4, 1909: 590) suggested that the Dalai Lama had mentioned his own reform plans for Tibet to the Qing Court.

⁶⁹ Teramoto 1974: 233, 246.

apparently declined this request as well.⁷⁰ Not only did the Tibetan hierarchy fail to achieve these goals, but worst of all, the Dalai Lama's Chinese titles were modified in such a way that the Dalai Lama clearly became subordinate to the Qing. Therefore, according to Charles A. Bell (1870–1945), Rockhill, and others, not only was the Dalai Lama himself made to feel his subordination, but he was also openly demeaned in the eyes of the interested international community.⁷¹ We might assume that the Dalai Lama's stay in Beijing thus further reinforced his inclinations to seek independence from Qing China.

2.3. The Dalai Lama's Tibetan advisers at Kumbum

Teramoto also confirmed the Dalai Lama's advisory council was already split into two main factions, namely the pro-Russian faction and the pro-Qing faction, as had already been hinted at by Richardson and others during the time before the Tibetan hierarchy had fled from Lhasa.⁷² At Kumbum, the Dalai Lama's advisors had long discussions concerning how the Dalai Lama should react to the imperial power plays of China and the foreign nations. In 1907, the pro-Russian faction, in which Teramoto also included the Dalai Lama most of the time, was still counting on Russia's active support to achieve Tibet's independence, possibly further encouraged by the Dalai Lama's important but understudied Mongol advisors such as Prince Khanddorj.⁷³ Teramoto regarded the Dalai Lama's personal senior physician, Tekhang Jampa Tubwang (Bkras khang byams pa thub dbang, 1863?–1922), as the leader of the pro-Russian faction at Kumbum. He was a close confidant of the Tibetan hierarchy and usually in attendance when the Dalai Lama received foreign visitors. He also often served as a go-

⁷⁰ BL, IOR/L/PS/20/259, 1910: 172, doc. 266, Jordan to Grey, Dec. 23, 1908; DQHD 2009: 224–226.

⁷¹ Bell 1946: 74, 77; BNA, FO 535/12–1909, Rockhill to Roosevelt, Nov. 8, 1908; BL, IOR/L/PS/20/259, 1910: 170, doc. 264, Jordan to Grey, Nov. 11, 1908; Ishihama 2019b: 88–90.

⁷² Richardson 1962: 89: "When the expedition was at Lhasa, it came to light that a large body of Tibetan officials had been opposed to the Dalai Lama's flirtation with Russia." Teramoto (1974: 233) used *Qing Lu liang dang* 清露兩黨 to describe these two factions.

⁷³ The presence of Mongolian princes in the Dalai Lama's entourage at Kumbum is repeatedly mentioned. For an unnamed prince from Khalkha who wished to meet Jordan in Beijing, see BL L/PS/10-147, Jordan to Grey Nov. 11, 1908, and for a "Hanta Wang" of the "Tushetu Khanate" who seems to be identical with the aforementioned but unnamed prince, see BNA FO 535/12-1909, Jordan to Grey, Nov. 25, 1908. Hanta Wang was obviously the same as Prince Mijiddorjin Khanddorj (or Khando-van in Russian) whose headquarters were at Van Khüree and who served as the Mongolian Foreign Minister from 1911 to 1913; Korostovetz 1926: 152–154; Bulag 2013: 7.

between and it had been Jampa Tubwang who had made the first contact with Teramoto at Kumbum shortly after the Dalai Lama's arrival. According to Teramoto, the physician who he called Raaman (transcribing his Tibetan title *bla sman*), was comparatively openminded and progressive and also supported the idea of the Dalai Lama's visit to Japan. Initially, Teramoto repeatedly discussed his reform ideas with him, including those for Tibet's Buddhist institutions and Tibet's political options in international relations. However, when Teramoto later discovered that Jampa Tubwang belonged to the pro-Russian faction, their relationship cooled off.⁷⁴

In contrast, the pro-Qing faction supported the idea of an audience with the Qing Emperor and promoted a reconciliation with the Qing Court, counting on the Dalai Lama's reinstatement to his former position and on cooperating with China in implementing reforms in Tibet.⁷⁵ The person considered to be the leader of the pro-Qing faction at Kumbum was a high-ranking Mongol *khenpo* from Drepung Monastery in Lhasa who Teramoto calls Doruwa *kanbu* in Japanese, obviously transcribing the Tibetan title Dulwa *khenpo* (*'Dul ba mkhan po*). Teramoto mentions that he was among the top five in Drepung's ecclesiastical hierarchy, and he came to replace Jampa Tubwang as Teramoto's discussion partner. With him, Teramoto also discussed reforms for Tibet's Buddhist institutions and possible support from Japan through the afore-mentioned Higashi and Nishi Honganji. Dulwa *khenpo* also served as the Dalai Lama's interpreter for Mongolian and Chinese.⁷⁶

Furthermore, a *zongli kanbu* / *zongli dachen* (superintendent/Lord Chamberlain) Chichiabu *kanbu* (*spyi khyab mkhan po*) and a Ronneru *chienpo* (*mgron gnyer chen po?*) were among the advisors of the Dalai

⁷⁴ Various sources confirm that the Thirteenth Dalai Lama's court physician was present at audiences and that Jampa Tubwang was comparatively progressive and reform-oriented. After the Dalai Lama's return from India, Jampa Tubwang's rank was elevated to *chikyap khenpo* (*spyi khyab mkhan po*, the senior ecclesiastical official, also translated as "chief abbot" and "Lord Chamberlain"). See Bell 1992: 123, 131; Snelling 1993: 124; Kozlov 1925: 272, 224, Tada 1965: 52; Tafel 1914: vol. 2, 93–94; van Vleet 2011: 356–358; Byams pa 'phrin las 1990: 414–420; and online <https://treasuryoflives.org/biographies/view/Khyenrab-Norbu/3955>, accessed June 20, 2023; and the *Who Was Who in Tibet* by Frank Drauschke http://tibet.prm.ox.ac.uk/biography_468.html, accessed Oct. 30, 2023. A photo is also published in Ishihama 2019a: 22, fig. 1–3. For Teramoto's meetings with the physician see Teramoto 1974: 222, 224–226, 231, 233–234, 244–245.

⁷⁵ Teramoto 1974: 225, 246.

⁷⁶ Teramoto 1974: 230, 232–233, 236, 238, 241, 244, 248; Phur lcog 2010: vol. 2, 20, 30; Sperling 2011: 391. Teramoto's Doruwa *kanbu* might be identical with the 19th century 'Dul ba mkhan po Blo gros, or possibly his successor. His personal name was Rta tshag yongs 'dzin blo gros, mentioned in BUDA as the teacher of the Fourth Gungthang (1824–1859). See <https://library.bdr.io/show/bdr:P2261?uilang=en>, accessed July 4, 2023.

Lama with whom Teramoto discussed Tibetan reform plans, but it is not clear what they discussed in detail and which faction they belonged to.⁷⁷ The same is true for a so-called *kantien* Sorupon (*mkhan chen gsol dpon?*) who Teramoto worked with to translate Japanese toponyms into Tibetan.⁷⁸ The rumor, however, that the Buryat adviser Dorzhiev was at Kumbum together with the Dalai Lama was mistakenly spread by the British missionary Ridley who had confused Dorzhiev with a Tibetan “minister” who he later called Im-ki Kampa.⁷⁹

Interestingly, Teramoto’s judgement about the Dalai Lama’s Tibetan advisors in general was rather negative. He considered them ignorant of modern affairs and politics but arrogant at the same time. By May 1907, Teramoto was wondering whether the conflicts between the two factions had not started to worsen day by day and whether the Dalai Lama was, in fact, well and correctly informed by his advisors. Apparently, the Dalai Lama even discharged some of his attendants precisely because he felt misinformed.⁸⁰ In contrast to Teramoto, the scholars Parshotam Mehra and Nikolay Tsyrempilov argue the designation as “pro-Russian” and “pro-Qing”—and later “pro-British”—is not how the Tibetans understood their internal conflict. Instead, the dissension was about whether to support further integration with China or strive for Tibetan independence, even if this required

⁷⁷ Ronneru followed in rank after the Dalai Lama’s superintendent, i.e., zongli kanbu/ zongli dachen Chichiabu kanbu (*spyi khyab mkhan po?*). The latter is probably identical with Yutok Puntsok Pelden *spyi khyab* (G.yu thog phun tshogs dpal ldan, b. 1860) who had accompanied the Tibetan hierarch to Urga; Teramoto 1974: 226–227, 231–232; <https://library.bdrc.io/show/bdr:P6697>; and Rahul 1962: 177. According to several reports of the Nepalese Representative dated July 29, Aug. 19, and Sept. 2, 1907, the Dalai Lama had dismissed the *spyi khyab mkhan po* together with the Nechung (Gnas chung) oracle, the Twelfth *kuten* (*sku rten*) Gobo Choje (*Go bo chos rje*) Lobzang Sonam (Blo bzang bsod nams), while in Amdo and both returned to Lhasa together with a senior attendant of the Dalai Lama called Injim Kesang (*? Kelzang). See British National Archives FO 371/223-1907. See also Im-ki Kampa in the report by Ridley; British National Archives FO 535/12-1909 who might be identical with Kalsang in the photo published in Ishihama 2019a: 22, fig. 1-3. For the Nechung oracle, see also Thubten Ngodup 2009: 216–219; <https://treasuryoflives.org/biographies/view/Lhalung-Gyeltsen-Tarchin/13725>; Phur lcog 2010: vol. 2, 41.

⁷⁸ Teramoto 1974: 231–232. Teramoto had presented a map of Japan to the Dalai Lama which Sorupon was supposed to translate into Tibetan. In a Russian autobiography of Dorzhiev, both a “soibon” and a “sobon” are mentioned as having accompanied the Dalai Lama into exile to Mongolia with “soibon” being interpreted as “attendant” and “sobon” as the tea and food steward, i.e., *gsol dpon*. See Andreyev [2001] 2008: 39; Snelling 1993: 124. For a photo of the *mkhan chen gsol dpon* see Ishihama 2019a: 22, fig. 1-3.

⁷⁹ For the incorrect rumor about Dorzhiev’s presence at Kumbum, see, e.g., Mehra 2012: 135. For Im-ki Kampa, see also FN 77.

⁸⁰ Teramoto 1974: 233–234. See also FN 77 which mentions the return of some of the Dalai Lama’s close attendants to Lhasa.

protection by a third power.⁸¹ This might also explain why even the Dalai Lama's "pro-Russian" advisors were seeking and considering the opinions of Teramoto who was anti-Russian and pro-Qing, but represented another "third power", namely Japan. As mentioned before, Teramoto preferred Tibet to remain under China's sovereignty but with Japan in the role of protector and advocate.

2.4. Modernization experiences in the Amdo-Chinese borderland

As regards possible sources for the Dalai Lama's and his advisers' reform ideas on how to further modernize the country, we should also take a short look at the general situation in the Amdo-Chinese borderland at the time of the Dalai Lama's arrival. Between 1901 and the eve of the Chinese revolution in 1911 the wider Xining and Lanzhou area was a typical example of top-down modernization projects as promoted by the Qing Court's New Policies. The local officials endeavored to modernize and strengthen their border troops, to open pastureland for cultivation, to start mining projects and to establish new schools and tax offices. In addition, Gansu governor Sheng-yun 升允 (1858–1931) who had formerly lived abroad in Europe as a Qing diplomat, had already introduced a police force, established an imperial post office, and installed streetlights in Gansu's capital Lanzhou. The major project of building the first iron bridge over the Yellow River (Tib. Rma chu, Ch. Huanghe 黄河) in Lanzhou with foreign help was also well under way in 1907.⁸² Many of these measures were facilitated by the already mentioned wool trade boom in Amdo, which had started in the last decade of the 19th century and brought many traders, also foreign, from China's coastal cities together with new ideas and new products. Some of the new wealth trickled down to the Amdo Tibetan nomads and through their offerings also to the local Tibetan monasteries. Furthermore, many of Amdo's elites had already traveled to Beijing and Shanghai—or even to Japan, such as the Fifth Akya Khutugtu—and were thus accustomed to foreigners and acquainted with many modern innovations.⁸³ It might therefore not come as a surprise that Amdo probably saw autonomous Tibetan modernization efforts much earlier than U (Dbus) and Tsang (Gsang) in central Tibet.⁸⁴ The Dalai Lama thus evidently experienced many

⁸¹ Tsyrempilov 2011: 217; Mehra 1976: 2.

⁸² Tafel 1914: vol. 1, 152–153, vol. 2, 85; Mannerheim 1969: 514, 518–531; Bruce 1907: 285–293.

⁸³ Accompanied by Teramoto, the Fifth Akya Khutugtu and his entourage traveled to Japan for several weeks in summer 1901; Berry 1995: 63.

⁸⁴ Lobsang Yongdan 2014; Horlemann 2012; Horlemann 2021.

things modern and unknown to him already in Amdo and before he traveled by train to Beijing, stayed in the highlands of British India and visited Calcutta.

3. *The Dalai Lama's Role in Amdo*

Before we turn to the Dalai Lama's role in Amdo, we should take a brief side glance at his stay in Mongolia. Initially, the Tibetan hierarch had not intended to stay in Mongolia and Amdo for any long period of time, but his unexpected and extended sojourns also offered a unique chance to reconnect with followers of Tibetan Buddhism outside of central Tibet. To revitalize these contacts during his exile was an opportunity the Dalai Lama apparently used well. However, after a long and fruitless wait for an invitation from the tsar during which sustaining the Dalai Lama and his continually growing retinue had become a heavy economic burden for the Mongol princes and people, the Tibetan hierarch finally decided to leave Mongolia and return to Lhasa via Amdo. Moreover, the Dalai Lama apparently did not get along well with the highest Living Buddha in Mongolia, the Eighth Jebtsundamba Khutagt. The latter was suspected of being jealous because valuable donations from the Mongol Buddhist followers were now diverted from him for the Dalai Lama's benefit. At the same time, the Tibetan hierarch was indignant that the Jebtsundamba disregarded major Vinaya rules by getting married, smoking and drinking alcohol.⁸⁵

In some respects, the Dalai Lama's sojourn in Amdo resembled his stay in Mongolia in that the Tibetan hierarch attracted large numbers of pious pilgrims from Amdo and beyond and received lavish donations.⁸⁶ At the same time, the Dalai Lama's extended stay at Kumbum

⁸⁵ That the relationship between the Thirteenth Dalai Lama and the Eighth Jebtsundamba was, however, much more complex than this, has already been demonstrated by Uradyn Bulag and others and is not the topic of this paper. See Bulag 2013; Tsering Shakya 2005: 144; Tsarong 2000: 17–19; Shakabpa 1988: 221; Ishihama 2019a: 19–35. Teramoto claims that the Dalai Lama had actually been advised by the Jebtsundamba to come to Mongolia, possibly with the goal to travel on to Russia, and that the Tibetan hierarch could come to Ürga without previous permission from Beijing. When this turned out not to be the case, their relationship soured; Teramoto 1974: 206, 215.

⁸⁶ The pilgrims were mainly from Alashan, the Ordos region, from Kokonor, as well as local Mongols and Tanguts mixed with Khampas and central Tibetans. With regard to Amdo Mongols, we know that princes from four Mongolian banners in Tsaidam welcomed and supported the Dalai Lama on his flight from Lhasa through Tsaidam to Mongolia in 1904. Among them, the Khuluk Beise Namdan-choikhür (Rnam 'dren chos skor, n.d.) was especially keen to help and continued to stay in contact with the Dalai Lama's court through letters and gifts. Ishihama 2022: 42–43, 47, 50–52; Phur lcog 2010: vol. 2, 28, 37.

Monastery certainly was a drain on the local economy, but apparently it caused more dissatisfaction than in Mongolia. This was probably due to the ethnically and religiously diverse population in northeastern Amdo.⁸⁷ Moreover, on the surface the Dalai Lama's conflicts with the Fifth Akya Khutughtu at Kumbum—to be examined below—resembled those with the Eighth Jebtsundamba in Mongolia.

3.1. Religious Activities of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama

Kumbum was arguably the most important Tibetan Monastery in the northeastern corner of Amdo at the time when the Thirteenth Dalai Lama visited. It is therefore quite natural that the Dalai Lama—apart from the more temporal activities already mentioned above—was also very engaged in religious activities, namely giving teachings and blessings, supervising theological exams and taking part in debates.⁸⁸ Moreover, the Dalai Lama also received teachings and empowerments from high-ranking Amdo lamas such as the highly revered Fourth Amdo Zhamar Gendun Tenzin Gyatso (Zhwa dmar Dge 'dun bstan 'dzin rgya mtsho, 1852–1912) from Lamo Dechen (La mo bde chen) Monastery.⁸⁹ However, it seems that the Tibetan hierarch mostly stayed at Kumbum and hardly ever left the monastery in 1907, unlike his later more active sojourn in Beijing.⁹⁰ Interestingly, apart from Jakhyung (Bya khyung) Monastery, where he stayed for a few days in 1909, he did not visit other major Gelukpa monasteries in Amdo such as Labrang Tashikhyil (Blab rang bkra shis 'khyil) and Chone (Co ne) Monasteries although he had received invitations shortly after his arrival at Kumbum.⁹¹ Other Amdo monasteries and sights were only visited when the Dalai Lama was passing by on his way to Wutaishan and on his return journey from Beijing to Lhasa. It is worth noting that on these occasions the Dalai Lama not only received but also made donations and offerings from his treasury.

⁸⁷ Tafel 1914: vol. 2, 82–83; 86; Bulag 2013: 8, 10.

⁸⁸ Phur lcog 2010: vol. 2, 17–47; Tafel 1914: vol. 2, 89; Teramoto 1974: 218–219, 221, 224.

⁸⁹ Teramoto 1974: 219; Karsten 1997: vol. 2, 260; Phur lcog 2010: vol. 2, 22–24. <https://treasuryoflives.org/biographies/view/Fourth-Amdo-Zhamar-Gendun-Tendzin-Gyatso/3296>, accessed Nov. 16, 2022. Teramoto transcribed Zhamar as Shamaru zon (*tsang*).

⁹⁰ Tsering Shakya (2005: 144), however, states that the Dalai Lama went on short pilgrimages to different sites while in Amdo. When the Dalai Lama was in Beijing, he visited several temples and made offerings; Jagou 2009: 368.

⁹¹ Phur lcog 2010: vol. 2, 104–107; Baradin 2002: 187, 189–190, 208–209; Farrer 1926: vol. 2, 107.

Naturally, the list of Amdo dignitaries who paid their respect—either personally or through representatives—to the Dalai Lama while he stayed at Kumbum was very long. Among them, we find the then still teenage Seventh Changkya Khutugthu Lobzang Pelden Tenpai Dronme (Lcang skya ho thog thu Blo bzang dpal ldan bstan pa'i sgron me, 1891–1957) who was the main incarnation at Gonlung (Dgon lung) Monastery. As the highest-ranking Khutugthu residing in Beijing and originally from Amdo, he later also welcomed the Dalai Lama to Beijing in 1908.⁹² The Eleventh Tongkhor Lobzang Jigme Tsultrim Gyatso (Stong 'khor Blo bzang 'jigs med tshul khri ms rgya mtsho, 1891–1909), then also a teenager, repeatedly met the Dalai Lama at Kumbum and later accompanied him to Wutaishan and Beijing.⁹³ From Labrang Monastery, Alak Nyendrak tsang (A lags Snyan grags tshang, n.d.)⁹⁴ and the Fifth Hortsang Sertri Kelzang Pelden Drakpa (Hor tshang gser khri Skal bzang dpal ldan grags pa, ?–1912?)⁹⁵ were heading two delegations sent out to invite the Dalai Lama to Labrang.⁹⁶ The Seventh

⁹² The biography of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama mentions that Changkya Khutugthu sent representatives to welcome the Dalai Lama in Amdo and gifts for Tibetan New Year. It seems as if he himself was also present at Kumbum at some point; Phur lcog 2010: vol. 2, 15, 30–33; Rockhill 1910: 78. For more information on the Seventh Changkya, see Zhao 2002 and Hamugetu 2022.

⁹³ The Eleventh Tongkhor is repeatedly mentioned in the biography of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama for the year 1907; Phur lcog 2010: vol. 2, 16–18, 29, 31. Ya 1991: 260–261 and <https://treasuryoflives.org/biographies/view/Eleventh-Tongkhor-Lobzang-Jigme-Tsultrim-Gyatso/3735>, accessed Nov. 16, 2022. Apparently, the Dalai Lama asked the Qing Court for permission to take the Eleventh Tongkhor to Lhasa so that he could continue his studies there; Zhongguo diyi lishi dang'anguan 2002: 186, doc. 246.

⁹⁴ Baradin 2002: 191. Alak Nyendrak tsang had been appointed as the head of the first Labrang delegation to the Dalai Lama. He spoke perfect Mongolian and discussed with Baradin many topics such as the Russo-Japanese war, the Russian Revolution, and the affairs of the Dalai Lama. He is also mentioned in the Thirteenth Dalai Lama's biography as having paid his respects right after the Dalai Lama's arrival at Kumbum; Phur lcog 2010: vol. 2, 18.

⁹⁵ Baradin 2002: 191–192. The Fourth Hortsang Sertri was an important reincarnation lineage at Labrang. He was chosen to head the second delegation to Kumbum. He might be the Ho tshang 'Od zer who is mentioned for Dec. 2, 1906 (17th day of the 10th month), in the Dalai Lama's biography; Phur lcog 2010: vol. 2, 20.

⁹⁶ The Fourth Jamyang Zhepa had requested to be informed immediately if the Dalai Lama refused to visit Labrang so that he could pay his respects to the Dalai Lama at Kumbum; Baradin 2002: 164–165. According to the biography of the Fourth Jamyang Zhepa, he actually met the Dalai Lama at Kumbum for a short audience in May 1907, but little detail is provided and the biography remains more or less silent on the Dalai Lama's sojourn in Amdo; Dros dmar 2013: vol. 2, 665–666. The biography of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama only mentions that the Jamyang Zhepa sent presents to the Dalai Lama for Tibetan New Year, but these were apparently presented through the Jamyang's representatives; Phur lcog 2010: vol. 2, 30; Dros dmar 2013: vol. 2, 659; <https://treasuryoflives.org/biographies/view/Fourth-Jamyang-Zhepa-Kelzang-Tubten-Wangchuk/2758>, accessed May 15, 2023.

Zhapdrung Karpo Gendun Tenzin Norbu (Zhabs drung dkar po Dge 'dun bstan 'dzin nor bu, 1873–1927), one of Lamo Dechen's main reincarnations, met the Dalai Lama at least at Wutaishan and possibly again at Kumbum in 1909.⁹⁷ When the Thirteenth Dalai Lama later inaugurated a new monastery for exoteric and esoteric Buddhism at Wutaishan, he also invited several *geshe* (*dge bshes*) degree holders from Amdo to take part in the planned debating events.⁹⁸

3.2. Contradictory Attitudes towards the Dalai Lama

Regarding the general monk community, Baradin stressed the deep devotion for the Dalai Lama expressed by the monks at Labrang. When the Fourth Jamyang Zhepa Kelzang Tubten Wangchuk ('Jam dbyangs bzhad pa (B)skal bzang thub bstan dbang phyug, 1856–1916) decided to hold theological examinations in front of the Dalai Lama, the monks were very excited and moved. After it became clear the Dalai Lama would not visit Labrang, the monks were depressed but made plans to form a large pilgrimage group to Kumbum instead.⁹⁹

On the other hand, there were also some critical voices. According to Baradin, the more senior and learned monks at Labrang were quite indifferent or even negative about the Dalai Lama and, in direct comparison, considered the Fourth Jamyang Zhepa as his equal in sanctity. For these lamas, the Dalai Lama was apparently only great in terms of his temporal power in central Tibet. Similar statements have also been reported for senior monks at Kumbum.¹⁰⁰ Moreover, Teramoto supposed that the Dalai Lama had generally lost face in Amdo due to his ill-advised flight from Lhasa and the Guangxu Emperor's dismissive attitude.¹⁰¹

⁹⁷ Kim Hanung 2019: 88 and <https://treasuryoflives.org/biographies/view/Seventh-Zhabdrung-Karpo-Gendun-Tendzin-Norbu/8861>, accessed June 23, 2023. He visited Beijing twice: once during the Qing era in 1908 and for an extended stay from 1912–1914 during the Republican era.

⁹⁸ Ishihama 2022: 41. The *geshe* degree is a Tibetan Buddhist academic degree for monks and nuns.

⁹⁹ Baradin 2002: 187, 190, 204. The biography of the Dalai Lama indeed mentions a monk delegation from Labrang; Phur lcog 2010: vol. 2, 33.

¹⁰⁰ Tafel 1914: vol. 2, 90; Baradin 2002: 104, 184–185; Teramoto 1974: 201, 203.

¹⁰¹ Teramoto 1974: 200. The flight of the Dalai Lama as a topic of discussion with and among Tibetans has been mentioned by several authors. The German explorer Wilhelm Filchner, for instance, noticed in 1904 how interested in politics and well informed the Tibetan clergy was. Filchner also pointed out that, as a result of the events in Lhasa [i.e., the Younghusband Expedition], the [Amdo] Tibetans had been severely incensed, so much so that the British missionary Ridley in Xining did not dare to get close to Kumbum Monastery anymore. Filchner 1911: 60, 239–241.

The Finno-Russian explorer and military officer Carl G. Mannerheim (1867–1951) who missed the opportunity to meet the Dalai Lama at Kumbum but later had an audience with him at Wutaishan, recorded in his travel diary on March 27, 1908:

To indicate the importance of Labrang I was told that, when the Dalai Lama reached the Sining monastery, a few days' journey from Labrang, on his flight from Tibet, the 'Gegen' of this monastery sent him the following message: 'The Saviour at Labrang [i.e., Jamyang Zhepa] invites the Saviour at Lhasa to visit him and his monastery' to which the Dalai Lama replied: 'Tell your master at Labrang that there is only one Saviour – the Saviour at Lhasa'.¹⁰²

Although this quote seems to be mainly anecdotal in nature, it indicates the Dalai Lama was perceived as arrogant by the narrator. Equally, the most important Nyingmapa (Rnying ma pa) hierarch in the Kokonor region, the Third Gurong Orgyen Jikdrel Choying Dorje (Dgu rong O rgyan 'jigs bral chos dbyings rdo rje, 1875–1932) is said to have commented rather negatively on the Dalai Lama's activities. "Speaking with reference to the Dalai Lama, Allog-Sku-rin [i.e., Alak Gurong] claimed that this Pope of Buddhism concerned himself too much regarding unnecessary affairs; it were better for him if he attended strictly to his religious duties."¹⁰³ Of course, in the Third Gurong's Tibetan hagiography, we do not find a similar quote, but in the rather short paragraph on the Dalai Lama's stay in Amdo it is mentioned that apart from listening to as many of the Dalai Lama's initiations and teachings as possible and apart from making large and expensive offerings, the Third Gurong rejected an invitation by the Dalai Lama to accompany him to China which can be interpreted as an expression of his displeasure with the Tibetan hierarchy.¹⁰⁴

The high costs of the Dalai Lama's travel to and extended stay in Amdo were openly discussed not only among the Chinese population but also within the monastic communities. Teramoto and others mention that the Chinese villages along the Dalai Lama's travel routes complained bitterly about the extra taxes which were levied.¹⁰⁵ But also the Mongolian and Tibetan populations in the wider Xining area were obliged to pay taxes in kind to the Chinese administration to cover the costs for the Dalai Lama's visit. We do not learn, however, whether the

¹⁰² Mannerheim 1969: vol. 1, 566.

¹⁰³ C&MA missionary Snyder in *Alliance Weekly* Feb. 17, 1912: 313.

¹⁰⁴ Bstan 'dzin 1994: 152. For more information on the Third Gurong, see Horlemann 2021.

¹⁰⁵ Teramoto 1974: 206, 211, 213–215; Bulag 2013: 8; Tafel 1914: vol. 2, 82, 86–87; Brooke in Fergusson 1911: 2; GFO, PA AA RZ 201/18055 52–53, German Legation report March 7, 1907.

latter did so readily or as grudgingly as the Chinese.¹⁰⁶ Regarding the attitudes of monastic communities, Baradin relates that when the Fourth Jamyang Zhepa wished to invite the Dalai Lama to Labrang Monastery and discussed this idea with Labrang's monastic council in late October 1906, the majority of the lamas on the council apparently objected, referring to the monastery's empty treasury. Only when the Jamyang insisted on the invitation was it decided to divide the expected costs among the monk population and Labrang's dependent estates.¹⁰⁷ Kumbum Monastery, which had renovated the Dalai Lama's living quarters as well as the prayer hall and other locations within the monastery compound before the hierarch's arrival, attempted to cover its expenses by fixing minimum prices for an audience with the Dalai Lama for certain groups such as incarnations and chieftains.¹⁰⁸

3.3. *The conflict between the Dalai Lama and Akya Khutugtu*

However, the major source for controversy and unease among Kumbum's monastic community and beyond seems to have been the conflict between the Thirteenth Dalai Lama and the Fifth Akya Khutugtu Lobzang Tenpai. The latter was the highest-ranking reincarnation of Kumbum Monastery and the representative head and proprietor of the monastery. Although Akya spent most of his time in Beijing and Dolonnor in Inner Mongolia, he travelled to Amdo in 1907 presumably to pay his respects to the Dalai Lama at Kumbum.¹⁰⁹

The conflict between the two hierarchs was apparently sparked by the Dalai Lama's dissatisfaction with monastic discipline at Kumbum, which he found slack.¹¹⁰ He, therefore, tightened it by issuing a total of three or four sets of new monastic constitutions (Tib. *bca' yig*) for Kumbum Monastery, i.e., one each for the Medical and the Esoteric Colleges at Kumbum in 1907, and one for the Kalacakra School and possibly a general one in 1909.¹¹¹ In addition, he replaced the abbot (*khri chen* /

¹⁰⁶ Teramoto 1974: 211.

¹⁰⁷ Baradin 2002: 158–159.

¹⁰⁸ Baradin 2002: 184–185, 189; Tafel 1914: vol. 2, 89 and Anon. 1909 Apr. 3: 17: Minor reincarnations and chieftains were supposed to pay between eight and twenty taels for an audience with the Dalai Lama.

¹⁰⁹ However, Akya himself did not reside at Kumbum but moved to one of Kumbum's branch monasteries or hermitages, i.e., to Senge qiubu si 森格秋布寺 (Katakana: Senge ruchiyubu, probably Tib. Sengge sgrub), 15 *li* from Kumbum which served as a hermitage for the Akya lineage. See Teramoto 1972: 232; Karsten 1997: vol. 1, 298. I would like to thank Wu Chen for sharing several sources concerning the Fifth Akya Khutugtu with me.

¹¹⁰ Phur lcog 2010: vol. 2, 108–109; Bell 1946: 78; Schram 2006: 385; Teramoto 1974: 230.

¹¹¹ It is not entirely clear whether the "general" monastic constitution for Kumbum was in fact a new set or refers to the three other sets as a whole; Ishihama 2022: 38, 56–57; Phur lcog 2010: vol. 2, 37. For outsiders like Tafel (1914: vol. 1, 217, 227 and

mkhan po; Ch. *fa tai* 法台) and two other important monastic officials at Kumbum, namely the disciplinarian (*dge bskos*) and the chant master (*dbu mdzad*), all without consulting Akya Khutughtu.¹¹²

Although Berthe Jansen's and Yumiko Ishihama's research shows that the Vinaya rules were a passion of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama and dear to his heart—he had already presented *bca' yig* to several monasteries in Mongolia and would later present new monastic constitutions to monasteries in central Tibet as well¹¹³—in Amdo these activities were regarded as the Dalai Lama clearly overstepping his authority at Kumbum. Akya Khutughtu who was a few years older than the Dalai Lama and, as the reincarnation of Tsongkhapa's father, highly revered in Amdo, Mongolia, and at the Qing Court in Beijing, apparently did not accept being lectured and criticized by the Dalai Lama about the management of his monastery. In fact, in May 1907 Akya sent a letter in Mongolian to the secretariat of Kumbum Monastery to protest against the changes the Dalai Lama had introduced at Kumbum and requested that Akya's personal loan of 80,000 taels to the monastery should be reimbursed to him.¹¹⁴ The conflict between the two hierarchs became such an embarrassment and local scandal that the Chinese officials in Lanzhou and Xining decided to get involved

vol. 2, 89) and Kozlov (1925: 128, 217), however, the monks at Kumbum seemed to strictly follow the Vinaya rules and everything to be very orderly at the monastery.

¹¹² The elected abbot was apparently the Fourth Anjasu Lobzang Gendun Tenpa Rinchen (An 'ja' su Blo bzang dge 'dun bstan pa rin chen, 1874–1912?) who was replaced first by Ushidrak Zhabdrung Sonam Gyeltsen Nyima (U shi/shud brag Bsod nams rgyal mtshan nyi ma, 1861–?) and later by the Fifth Taktser Lobzang Tsultrim Jigme Gyatso (Stag mtsher blo bzang tshul khriims 'jigs med rgya mtsho, 1856–1916/20?) and/or the Sixth Sertok Lobzang Tsultrim Gyatso (Gser tog Blo bzang tshul khriims rgya mtsho, 1845–1908/1915); Phur lcog 2010: vol. 2, 42, 109. Ushidrak had studied for some time, probably in the late 1880s, at Sera Monastery in Lhasa. The Fifth Taktser was close to, or at least well acquainted with, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama since the 1880s and had already served as Kumbum's elected abbot twice, i.e., from 1880 to 1883 and again from 1892 to 1894. He is said to have helped the Dalai Lama to institute the new regulations at Kumbum. See Mullin 1988: 11–14 and the foreword by the Sixth Taktser Lama Tubten Jigme Norbu (Stag mtsher thub bstan 'jigs med nor bu, 1922–2008) in Mullin 1988; Karsten 1997: vol. 1, 276, 292 and vol. 2, 16, 224, 254; Tafel 1914: vol. 1, 235; Ishihama 2022: 38; <https://treasuryoflives.org/biographies/view/Fifth-Taktser-Lobzang-Tsultrim-Jigme-Gyatso/2393>, accessed Mar. 02, 2023. Ushidrak Tulku is repeatedly mentioned in the biography of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama for the year 1907 and the Fifth Taktser is called Kumbum's "top" tulku (Sku 'bum dang rtse sprul sku) while Akya is mentioned by name—as A rkya ho thog thu—only once. See Phur lcog 2010: vol. 2, 18, 21, 31, 41–42, 108–109.

¹¹³ Jansen (2018: 21, 134) mentions further *bca' yig* of the Dalai Lama which were all written after 1920. Ishihama (2022: 56–57), on the other hand, lists twenty-three *bca' yig* composed by the Dalai Lama up to 1909 with the earliest dating from 1888. She also lists three more for monasteries in *mdo smad*.

¹¹⁴ Teramoto 1974 : 230.

and sent the Amdo-Tibetan speaking Muslim Ma Fuxiang 馬福祥 (1876–1932), the then military commander of Xining (Xining *zhenzong-bing* 鎮總兵), to mediate. After several fruitless attempts to convince Akya to come to Kumbum and after Teramoto, who had known Akya for many years, had offered to serve as an additional mediator, Akya and the Dalai Lama finally met for one short formal audience on July 15, 1907.¹¹⁵ Although the heated situation at Kumbum apparently calmed down thereafter, the meeting at the audience did not lead to reconciling the two hierarchs. Therefore, the Qing Court recalled Akya to Beijing—apparently according to his own wishes.¹¹⁶

However, the matter did not end there. More than a year later, after his return from Beijing to Kumbum in February 1909, the Dalai Lama wrote to the Xining Amban Qing-shu 慶恕 (1840–1919) in early March or April and requested the Guangxu Emperor to discharge Akya Khutughtu on grounds of the latter's immoral conduct, just as the Dalai Lama had done earlier with regard to the Jebtsundamba in Mongolia. It seems that Akya had returned to Kumbum before the Dalai Lama and, during the latter's absence, had revoked the changes made by the Dalai Lama. This, of course, had infuriated the latter.¹¹⁷ Akya then

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 150, 238; Phur lcoḡ 2010: vol. 2, 41.

¹¹⁶ Teramoto 1974: 232, 238, 244; QSL Guangxu juan 576, 光緒三十三年七月甲寅 (Sept. 2, 1907).

¹¹⁷ QSL, Xuantonḡ zhengji juan 1, 宣統元年閏二月壬辰 (Apr. 2, 1909) and Zhongguo diyi lishi dang'anguan 2002: 205, doc. 269; Karsten 1997 vol. 2: 7; Jagou 2009: 370. In the QSL, the memorial of Qing-shu is noted under April 2, 1909, the Zhongguo diyi lishi dang'anguan, which provides a much longer and detailed version of the Dalai Lama's complaint, however, gives 宣統元年二月十一日 (Mar. 2, 1909). The charges against Akya were very similar to those that we found in Chinese and international newspapers against the Dalai Lama and the Jebtsundamba in Mongolia, i.e., that Akya was fond of luxury, drank, smoked tobacco, and hunted. In the account of the CICM missionary Cyriel van Belle, who lived in Gansu from 1885 to 1918, the Dalai Lama is said to have criticized Akya as being lax (i.e., in his Buddhist duties) and in love with luxury and money and demanded that Akya should send some of "the exuberance of means" to Lhasa. See van Belle 1921: 651–652. Ridley mentions that Akya was supposed to have gone hunting one morning while the Dalai Lama stayed at Kumbum and that Akya resented the Dalai Lama because he diverted all the donations to his own treasury. At the same time, he calls Akya "a genial, large-hearted gentleman" who "has a good name among the people in the lamasery and district round Sining"; Ridley (Anon. Apr. 3, 1909: 17). Louis Schram also provides a pro-Akya account of the conflict as he might have heard from the Kumbum lamas in 1911–1912 when Schram stayed at Kumbum to study Tibetan. He stated that "the Dalai Lama cut a sorry figure in Hsining in 1909" in his conflict with Akya. Furthermore, he added that "the Dalai Lama left, and the three appointed officials also left as quickly as possible for fear of being killed by the Kumbum lamas. The deposed officials assumed their jobs again, but Achia, deeming that he had irretrievably lost face, cut his throat. Several times I heard this

passed away in April 1909, after the Dalai Lama had sent his letter.¹¹⁸ The sudden death of Akya provoked two theories, namely, a. that Akya committed suicide because he had irretrievably lost face and b. that he was killed through sorcery by the Dalai Lama. In fact, several monks at Kumbum requested an investigation by the Xining amban's yamen. Before he left on June 3, 1909, the Dalai Lama apparently reinstated his new monastic rules and replaced the monastic officials once again. However, these officials, including the Fifth Taktser Lobzang Tsultrim Jigme Gyatso (Stag mtsher blo bzang tshul khrim 'jigs med rgya mtsho, 1856–1916/20?), left Kumbum soon after the Dalai Lama had left.¹¹⁹

In the Thirteenth Dalai Lama's biography by Phur lcog, the whole affair with Akya is summarized under the general topic of lax monastic discipline and the personal conflict between Akya and the Dalai Lama is glossed over. Akya's name and title is, in fact, mentioned only once or twice in connection with the Dalai Lama's stay at Kumbum and then only inconspicuously with regard to Akya's audience with the Tibetan hierarch. The affair was obviously too embarrassing to describe in more detail because it quite clearly demonstrated that the Dalai Lama did not have unquestioned religious and administrative authority over Amdo monasteries as the Dalai Lama himself might have assumed. That the Dalai Lama insisted on this authority nevertheless and even asked the Qing Court to intervene on his behalf and discharge Akya Khutughtu made the Dalai Lama look rather powerless. Moreover, it also implies that the Dalai Lama still accepted Qing authority, at least over Amdo's ecclesiastical elite, even if we explain the Dalai Lama's actions relating to Akya Khutughtu as an over-reaction to vent his frustrations. Namely that his position and status as the superior religious and political head of the Tibeto-Lamaist world had not only been questioned in Mongolia by the Eighth Jebtsundamba and by the Manchu Imperial Court while in Beijing, but even in Amdo which the Dalai Lama considered as part of his domain. Akya, on the other

tragic story, told by the Amban himself and by the officials at Kumbum," Schram 2006: 385.

¹¹⁸ After the death of the Fifth Akya another conflict ensued over his rightful successor, see Ridley in Anon. Feb. 8, 1919: 332; van Belle 1921: 652. The Sixth Akya Lobzang Lungtok Jigme Tenpai Gyeltsen (Blo bzang lung rtogs 'jigs med bstan pa'i rgyal mtshan, 1910–1948) was recognized only in 1915, see Karsten 1997: vol. 2, 11.

¹¹⁹ See the memorial of Xining Amban Qing-shu in *Zhongguo diyi lishi dang'anguan* 2002: 218, doc. 280; Ding 2000: 44; Jagou 2009: 370; Karsten 1997: vol. 2, 8; Schram 2006: 385. The Dalai Lama's departure from Kumbum is described by Ridley in Anon. July 17, 1909: 140. Another, more plausible cause for Akya's death which is stated in the account of van Belle (1921: 652), is that Akya who was reportedly not in good health, died prematurely because the conflict had further afflicted his health. For the Fifth Taktser Rinpoche see FN 112.

hand, probably saw the Dalai Lama as a rival for influence and power in Amdo, Inner Mongolia, and in Beijing where Akya's religious position so far had only been surpassed by the above-mentioned Seventh Changkya Khutughtu.

Moreover, Yudru Tsomu's research highlights that the Thirteenth Dalai Lama received very negative reports in the Chinese language press while in exile in Mongolia and in China. The reports mainly focused on the Dalai Lama's collusion with Russia, his and his retinue's alleged arrogance and the substantial economic burden on the Qing Court and local economies along his route. In addition, the accounts were also often derogatory in terms of the Dalai Lama's personality.¹²⁰ We might thus wonder to what degree the Dalai Lama, his retinue, and Amdo Tibetans were aware of these comments and how this knowledge might have influenced their own perceptions and actions.

4. Conclusion

I have argued here that the Dalai Lama's long sojourn in Amdo had major effects on three important aspects that shaped the Thirteenth

¹²⁰ Yudru Tsomu 2022: 629–655. This negative image was frequently mirrored in the foreign press and in diplomatic correspondence. The Australian journalist George E. Morrison who worked for the British *Times* in Beijing reported: "Chinese newspapers are waging a campaign against the Dalai Lama and his mission, and casting scorn upon his country. The provincial officials of Shanxi, in which Wutaishan is situated, grumble loudly at the burden imposed on the provincial treasury by the entertainment of the Dalai Lama and his following. The Tibetans complain quite as feelingly of the treatment to which they are subjected by the Chinese authorities, and declare that of the sums alleged to be allotted to the treasury only a small proportion reaches them." Bell 1946: 71. And the US Minister in Beijing cum Tibetologist W. W. Rockhill later added: "The Dalai Lama Töbtsän-gyats'o has been depicted by recent writers, none of whom have, however, ever met him or heard much of him except from Tibetans (sic!) who had suffered through the acts of officials of his government and who naturally held him responsible for these acts, as a bloodthirsty, cruel, revengeful tyrant, an intriguer of the deepest dye, a criminal who ignores all law and justice, and who has deliberately plunged his country into the troubles of the last ten years which have resulted in the 'loss' of Tibet's independence' and the 'fostering on it of China's yoke,'" Rockhill 1910: 89–90. However, Rockhill himself also gave a very negative but seldomly cited description of the Dalai Lama in his letter to the US president of November 1908. "[...] the Dalai Lama cared very little, if at all, for anything which did not affect his personal privileges and prerogatives, that he separated entirely his cause from those of the people of Tibet, which he was willing to abandon entirely to the mercy of China. He did not care particularly concerning the contemplated administrative reforms, so long as he could feel assured that his personal honors and privileges were safe, and, if possible, slightly added to." See Bell 1946: 67; BNA, FO 535/12-1909, Rockhill to Roosevelt, Nov. 8, 1908. Moreover, Tafel (1914 vol. 2: 86) mentions rumors about the Dalai Lama having affairs with women, circulated by local Chinese and Tsaidam Mongols in 1906–1907.

Dalai Lama's future policies for Tibet, namely on Tibet's international relations, on Tibet's reform policies and on Tibet's claim of authority over Amdo.

While the Sikkim border conflict with British India in the late 19th century had been a wake-up call for the Dalai Lama and his government about the need for military reforms, the Younghusband Expedition and the subsequent exile propelled the Tibetan hierarch and his government into the realm of international powers politics. They had started to realize that they needed more and new allies to successfully deal with the double-crisis at home, namely the growing influence of British India and Qing China in central Tibet. Especially, the Dalai Lama's frustrations with the Qing government had kept growing during his long exile. Therefore, in a completely unprecedented move, as early as in 1907–1908, the Dalai Lama pro-actively reached out to other nations besides Russia, namely Japan, the US, Germany, France, and, quite remarkably, even to his former foe Great Britain in the hope of gaining more political leverage vis-à-vis Qing China. In 1908–1909 the Tibetans also asked for practical support, be it weapons from Germany and possibly other countries, military instructors, international loans etc. as has been demonstrated above. This major change in attitude, i.e., to loosen Tibet's self-imposed isolation, had certainly been initiated also by the Dalai Lama's new personal encounters with Russians in Mongolia and other Westerners at Kumbum. Especially his new political advisors, such as his Russian acquaintance Shcherbatskoi in Urga who had introduced him to Rockhill, played an active role and last not least, the Japanese monk Teramoto.

In addition to the Dalai Lama's efforts to improve his political and religious position vis-à-vis the Manchu Court, we notice his growing inclination to more radically redefine both his own and Tibet's relations with Qing China. Based on Teramoto's observations made at Kumbum Monastery in 1907, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama had apparently already begun pondering over the possibility of seeking complete independence from Qing China while, ostensibly, he was still negotiating for more autonomy. Nevertheless, the actions of the Tibetan hierarch still remained ambivalent. For example, the Tibetan hierarch's requests to the Qing emperor to change the procedures for sending memorials to the Qing Court and to revoke the Khutughtu title of the Jebtsundamba in 1905 and of Akya in 1909 seem to indicate a willingness to accept Qing suzerainty at least in certain quarters.

With regard to the Dalai Lama's role in Amdo we have seen that not only his temporal power but even his religious authority was questioned by influential Amdo elites. This became particularly evident through the conflict with Akya Khutughtu. After the violent abolition of the Lobzang Tenzin (Blo bzang bstan 'dzin) Revolt in the 18th

century, Manchu influence in the wider Kokonor region had grown considerably and thereafter, Mongolian and Tibetan elites in north-eastern Amdo—both religious and secular—had started to have regular contacts with local Manchu and Chinese officials on various occasions. They thus quickly learned how to co-exist with the local Qing administration and also knew how to take advantage of it.¹²¹ Simultaneously, Lhasa's influence over important Amdo Geluk monasteries such as Kumbum and Labrang, had been in steady decline since the 18th century. Amdo's religious elites typically entertained triangular relations with central Tibet, Mongolia, and Qing China and they were as much—or possibly even more—oriented towards China and Mongolia as towards Lhasa.¹²² The most important religious link between Lhasa and Amdo were the monk students from Amdo who received advanced religious training at the three large monasteries of Lhasa, i.e., Drepung, Sera (Se ra), and Ganden (Dga' ldan), and later typically returned to their home monasteries. Among these were also high-ranking Amdo incarnations such as the Fourth Jamyang Zhepa of Labrang Monastery who, nevertheless, also paid his respects to the Chinese emperor during an extended visit to Beijing and Wutaishan. Others, however, such as the Fifth Akya Khutughtu and the Seventh Changkya Khutughtu, never visited Lhasa and had continued their studies in Beijing instead.

In addition, it should be noted that large stretches of Amdo, i.e., what are now the Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures (TAP) of Golok (Mgo log) and Yushul (Yul shul) in modern Qinghai Province, were more or less independent of both the Chinese and the central Tibetan government until the 1920s. Thus, at the time when the Thirteenth Dalai Lama stayed at Kumbum Monastery, Amdo was *not* under the political control of the Dalai Lama's government in Lhasa, although, it still entertained manifold religious, cultural, economic, and historic bonds with central Tibet as it did with Kham. That the temporal and religious power of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama in Amdo was not only questioned by the Manchu government but even by Amdo Tibetan elites while the Tibetan hierarch was personally present must have been especially bitter for the Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama probably had expected just the opposite, namely that his presence might bind Amdo closer to Lhasa again.

The exile certainly forced the Dalai Lama to rethink the theoretical and practical limits of his spiritual and temporal power in central Tibet

¹²¹ Oidtmann 2016a and 2016b. Regarding occasions for regular contacts, see, for example, religious festivals and the Kokonor sacrifice. This will be the subject of a forthcoming article titled "Ma Qi, the First Muslim Warlord of Early 20th Century Xining, His Network of Contacts to Tibetan Elites, and the Tibet Question."

¹²² Karsten 1997: vol. 1, 173; Schram 2006: 338; Kim Hanung 2019: 84, 94.

as well as in Amdo and Kham. Consequently, the delineation of clear borders with Qing China and British India became a new pressing issue as demonstrated just a few years later during the negotiations for the Simla Convention in 1913–14.

English Translation of Excerpts from the Travel Diary of the Japanese Buddhist Monk Teramoto Enga 寺本婉雅 (1872–1940),¹²³

1. Entry for February 17, 1907 (p. 225):

Tonight I met with the personal physician of the Dalai Lama, Raaman kanbu [i.e., *bla sman mkhan po*, Tekhang Jampa Tubwang (Bkras khang byams pa thub dbang, 1863?–1922)],¹²⁴ and we talked about the Tibet Question. The *khenpo* said: ‘Whether the Dalai Lama will return to Tibet, will be known after the 6th Chinese month [i.e., July 1907]. The Chinese officials who came to Lhasa, are still negotiating with the Tibetan officials. If the Beijing government gives the Tibetans the right of overall control [jp. *tōkatsuken* 統管權] and allows the Dalai Lama to remain in the position as Tibet’s ruler as before, then he will return to Tibet. If it is not like this, then the Dalai Lama will not easily return to Tibet.’¹²⁵ From this, we can see that the Dalai Lama will only return to Tibet under these preconditions.

2. Entry for February 25, 1907 (pp. 227–228):

Report to Vice-Chief of Staff, General Fukushima¹²⁶ [based in China]:

[address...] Last year, after my audience with the Dalai Lama, the Dalai Lama sent a personal letter in response to the abbot of the Higashi Honganji [Temple in Kyoto], Ōtani Kōei [1852–1923],¹²⁷ and thereafter, my relationship with the Dalai Lama became closer as well as the exchanges with the Dalai Lama’s superintendent [*zongli kanbu*

¹²³ *Zōmō Tabi Nikki* 藏蒙旅日記 [Travel Diary to Tibet and Mongolia]. Tokyo: Fuyō Shobō, 1974. I wish to thank Maki Takano for reading important excerpts of Teramoto’s travel diary with me. Any mistakes and misinterpretations remain, of course, entirely mine.

¹²⁴ For more information on the personal physician see FN 74.

¹²⁵ It is not clear where the direct quote ends, because the second quotation mark is missing. However, the next sentence seems to be Teramoto’s thought.

¹²⁶ For more information on Fukushima Yasumasa (1852–1919), see Saalen 2018: 69–86; and Esenbel 2018: 69–86.

¹²⁷ Ōtani Kōei was the head of the Higashi Honganji Buddhist sect, a sub-sect of the Japanese Pure Earth Sect (Jōdo Shinshū 浄土真宗, Ch. Jingtū 淨土). For more information on the origin and role of the Higashi Honganji 東本願寺 in China, see Chen 2009.

總理堪布]¹²⁸ and the Ronneru chienpo [Tib. *mgron gnyer chen po?*]¹²⁹ (a secondary official, Jp. *jikan* 次官) to whom I offered advice for developing Tibet. The Dalai Lama and his officials listened to my reform proposals and recognized that they should request help from Japan via the Qing government. At the same time, they still respect Russia, but the relations are not as close as before [...].

Since the Dalai Lama has arrived here in the ninth month of last year [i.e., November 1906], Russia has already sent five letters by special courier to the Dalai Lama. But some officials have not forwarded the Russian letters to the Dalai Lama, because they think that in the current situation the relationship with the Qing Dynasty and Japan should be improved. 'The Russian letters have been received by the Dalai Lama. But the officials are not in the position to force the Dalai Lama to answer the letters.' This was their response to the [Russian] envoys.

[... Summary: the Russians still try to entice the Dalai Lama to go north to Russia by using the Buryat Mongols who all speak Russian and bring presents for the Tibetan officials...] However, the Dalai Lama's intention to go north has changed since I [Teramoto] have translated a summative account of the history of Buddhism in Japan and the history of Japan into Tibetan. Although the Dalai Lama seems to plan to return to Tibet under the Qing Dynasty's order, I assume that he [now] trusts in Japan's leadership for the reform plans for Tibet. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance [1902–1922] does not permit Japan to openly intervene in Tibetan affairs, but after the expiration of the alliance he will lean on Japan, this becomes more and more certain [...].

3. Entry for May 18, 1907 (p. 233):

Today, I visited the Kantien Sorupon [i.e., *Khenchen* Sorupon (*mkhan chen gsol dpon?*)]¹³⁰ and the Doruwa kanbu [i.e., *Dulwa khenpo* ('*Dul ba*

¹²⁸ He is also called Chichiabu kanbu (*spyi khyab mkhan po*) and probably identical with Yutok Puntsok Pelden *spyi khyab* (G.yu thog phun tshogs dpal ldan, b. 1860) who had accompanied the Tibetan hierarch to Urga; Rahul 1962: 177; and <https://library.bdr.io/show/bdr:P6697>. According to several reports of the Nepalese Representative dated July 29, Aug. 19, and Sept. 2, 1907, the Dalai Lama had dismissed the *spyi khyab mkhan po* together with the Nechung (Gnas chung) oracle while in Amdo and both returned to Lhasa; see British National Archives FO 371/223-1907.

¹²⁹ The still unidentified Ronneru followed in rank after the Dalai Lama's superintendent, i.e., the *zongli kanbu*; see FN 77.

¹³⁰ "Kantien Sorupon" is not a personal name but the transliteration of a Tibetan official's title. In a Russian autobiography of Agvan Dorzhiev, the Dalai Lama's Buryat adviser, both a "soibon" and a "sobon" are mentioned as having accompanied the Dalai Lama into exile to Mongolia with "soibon" being interpreted as "attendant"

mkhan po)).¹³¹ I wanted to find out whether their intention that the Dalai Lama sends some people to Japan, is real. But the Dalai Lama and his adviser and personal physician are full of worries and not yet awoken from their dream of [having strong] relations with Russia. Their inclinations towards the north [i.e., Russia] are [still] very strong. Twenty days ago, they secretly sent two envoys with secret letters, one to Russia via Ganzhou 甘州 [i.e., modern Zhangye 張掖] and Liangzhou 涼州 [i.e., modern Wuwei 武威] and one to Dong Fuxiang 董福祥 [1839–1908]¹³² who lives in the vicinity of Alakexie 阿拉克謝 [i.e., Ch. Alashan 阿拉山] in Mongolia. [Summary: Teramoto voices his assumptions about Russian and Mongolian intrigues against Japan and that the Dalai Lama still counts on Russia to repel the British from Tibet. However, the Dalai Lama is skillfully maneuvering between Japan and Russia, and nobody knows what he really thinks.] He [the Dalai Lama still] expresses his wish to send people to Japan and exchanges letters with the Honganji for this purpose. On the surface, he wants to establish exchange with Japan, but secretly he still trusts in Russia. The Dalai Lama has lost confidence in the Manchu Court and with Russia's support he wants to fling off the restraints of the Manchus. At the same time, he wants to repel the British from Tibet. This volition is very strong and not extricable [...].

4. Entry for November 16, 1907 (p. 244):

Russia still has dealings with the Dalai Lama as before; this has not changed. Although, lately, it is being said that the Dalai Lama will travel to Beijing for an audience with the Qing Court, the Russian faction in the Dalai Lama's camp is still secretly consulting with Russia about [certain] issues. In March this year, two Buryat Mongols from Russia arrived here to negotiate something with the Dalai Lama. In April they returned to Buryatia as ordered by Russia. [However,] on the 25th of the ninth lunar month [i.e., October 31, 1907] these two people hurried from Buryatia to come here to negotiate with the Russian faction [again]. [Summary: Teramoto saw them at audiences with the

and "sobon" as the tea and food steward, i.e., *gsol dpon*; see Andreyev [2001] 2008: 39; Snelling 1993: 124. For a photo of the *mkhan chen gsol dpon* see Ishihama 2019a: 22, fig. 1-3.

¹³¹ Teramoto's "Doruwa kanbu" might be identical with the 19th century 'Dul ba mkhan po Blo gros, or possibly his successor. His personal name was Rta tshag yongs 'dzin blo gros, mentioned in BUDA as the teacher of the Fourth Gungthang (1824–1859); see <https://library.bdrc.io/show/bdr:P2261?uilang=en>, accessed July 4, 2023. Dulwa Khenpo, considered to be the leader of the pro-Qing faction at Kumbum, was a high-ranking Mongol *khenpo* from Drepung Monastery in Lhasa who also served as the Dalai Lama's interpreter for Mongolian and Chinese.

¹³² A former, but still influential Chinese general exiled to Gansu.

Dalai Lama. They secretly stay at the residence of the Dalai Lama's personal physician Raaman. Teramoto is not able to identify them, but he describes their appearances ...]

5. Entry of November 19, 1907 (p. 245):

Today arrived the news that the Dalai Lama received the imperial order to travel to Wutaishan in Shanxi [Province] on December 3 [...].¹³³

6. Entry of November 23, 1907 (pp. 245–247):

[...] Assumedly, if the Dalai Lama is soon leaving for Wutaishan, then he will also visit the Qing Court next year and will also express friendly feelings for me as Japanese. [Summary: Teramoto describes how he has promoted good relations between the Dalai Lama and Japan ...] The arrival of the present imperial order for the Dalai Lama to move on to Wutaishan and that of last winter to come here to Ta'ersi [i.e., Kumbum Monastery] has provided [the opportunity for] exchange with the people of the Qing faction about the utmost necessity for the Dalai Lama personally to benefit from [the occasion of] the Dalai Lama paying respect to the Qing Court in Beijing. When the Dalai Lama fled from Tibet to Urga in the previous year, why would he not receive the order to travel directly from Urga to Beijing or to Wutaishan? Needless to say, at that time the Dalai Lama did not wish to pay his respect in Beijing or at Wutaishan. His original intention was to associate with Russia and to rely on Russia to drive the British back to India. [Only] thereafter did he [start to] defy the Beijing government and wanted to realize his dream of Tibet as an independent country. But after arriving here [at Kumbum], the Dalai Lama outwardly regrets his mistakes and therefore wants to pay his respect to Beijing. Since the costs for installing a new provincial governor in Tibet are currently too high, the Beijing government has postponed this project for the time being. [Nevertheless,] it is a fact that the Beijing government's true intention has already been leaning towards the policy of establishing a new provincial governor. It seems that the Dalai Lama was very surprised [by this news] and therefore wants to travel to Beijing to firmly establish his rule over Tibet by urging the Guangxu Emperor [to consent] at an audience [...].

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¹³³ This news was sent in a telegram from the Japanese Legation in Beijing via Teramoto's friend Okajima in Lanzhou.

BNA: (British) National Archives, Kew, UK

GFO: Political Archives of the German Foreign Office (Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes), Berlin, Germany

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Dancing for Joy on a Clear Day: Anti-imperialist Rhetoric and Perceptions of Chinese Policy in Kham

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忠觀入城
巴夷勘定
鳳大臣之忠觀至打箭鑪，鳳夫人啓棺審視遺骸僵而不腐，惟腦
後及足趾為彈丸洞過。項下復有刀傷。因既改殮如禮，於十月
四日抵省。
督軍憲暨文武各官營尊于南關外武侯祠。入城之時素旌載道觀
者環堵。妖巢運盡，終歸谷吉之喪。絕幕功成，當瞑荀瑩之目
矣。

Martyr's Coffin Enters Chengdu

Batang Barbarians Defeated.


When Commissioner Feng's loyal coffin reached Dartsedo, Feng's wife on opening it and closely examining the body found his remains to be stiff but not decayed; the cavities of bullets evident only in his toes and the back of his head; a knife wound in the nape of his neck. His body then encoffined according to rites reached Sichuan on the fourth day of the tenth month [31 October 1905].

The governor-general and each civil and military official gathered respectfully at Wuhou Temple beyond the south gate. When his coffin entered the city, onlookers crowded the route lined with white banners. With the fortunes of the nest of demons exhausted, the body of Gu Ji has finally returned. With the curtain of his life closed, his exploits successful, Xun Ying may now close his eyes in peace.¹

* This article is published in a volume edited within the frame of the Natinasia project which has received Funding from the French National Research Agency (ANR-21-CE27-0025).

¹ Anon. "Zhongchen rucheng," *Sichuan guanbao* 28 (November 16, 1905): 1a. Gu Ji (d. 45 BCE) was killed in Xiongnu territory after accompanying a Xiongnu envoy to the Western Han dynasty (206 BCE–9 CE) during his return journey. Xun Ying (d. 560 BCE), aka Zhi Ying 智瑩, was a loyal general and adviser to Duke Dao (Dao Gong 悼公) of Jin state (Jin Guo 晉國) during the Spring and Autumn period of Chinese history (771–476 BCE).

Introduction

n the morning of April 5, 1905, Assistant Amban to Tibet Feng-quan 鳳全 (1846–1905) met his fate in a site known to Sichuanese as *yinggezui* 鸚哥嘴, the Parrot's Beak.² Known to locals as *Degodraklam* (Sde mgo brag lam), this narrow section of the southern road stretching eastward across Kham (Kham) toward Dartsedo (Dar rtse mdo; Ch: Dajianlu 打箭爐)³ and onward to Chengdu 成都 is situated some 20 *li* 里 southeast of Batang ('Ba' thang; Ch: Batang 巴塘) Town, near Sichuan 四川 Province's border with Tibet. On reaching this spot, which clings to the rockface nearly 100 meters above the floor of the narrow valley, Feng-quan confronted some 500 Khampa men who had lain in wait for many hours. As boulders tumbled down the steep cliff to his left, another group of Khampas appeared from behind to block his retreat along the rocky path. With volley upon volley of gunfire converging from all directions, all but two of the more than 70 men in his retinue were killed, many plunging helplessly into the raging river to his right. According to an oft-repeated legend, on emerging from his shattered palanquin, Feng-quan turned in the direction of Beijing, knelt thrice and kowtowed nine times before his Khampa assailants converged on him, Lungpon Namgyel (Lung dpon rnam rgyal, ?–1905) striking the final blow with a bullet shot point-blank into the back of the Assistant Amban's head.⁴ What precipitated this violent outburst and what were its ramifications for the Sino-Tibetan relationship before and after the impending Xinhai Revolution (*Xinhai geming* 辛亥革命)? This chapter will focus on both assertions and perceptions regarding sentiments and events that contributed to historical interpretation of Feng-quan's slaughter. This interpretation morphed into a narrative transcending this single event which rhetorically cast any local opposition to Qing 清 (1644–1912) and later Chinese rule as instigated by external actors.

In the days following Feng-quan's demise, the two *depa* (sde pa, governor) of Batang affixed their seals to a petition addressed to the

² In some Chinese sources, this site is referred to as Hongtaizi 紅台子.

³ Known today in Chinese as Kangding 康定.

⁴ See Sichuan sheng Batang xianzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui 1993: 252; The (British) National Archives (BNA), FO 228/2571 D1, Enclosure in No. 23, Consul General Wilkinson to the Marquess of Lansdowne, June 30, 1905; *Qingdai Zangshi zoudu* (QZZ), "Bafei qianghai Feng-quan mou luan yi chi hanfan guanbing yanfang zhe," May 31, 1905: 1208–1209; *Qingmo Chuandian bianwu dang'an shiliao* (QCBDS), No. 0036, April or May 1905: 49–52. In Chinese documents, his name was rendered 隆本郎吉 Longben-Langji.

Dartsedo magistrate (*tongzhi* 同知), Liu Tingshu 劉廷恕 (n.d.), and directed at the Qing Emperor Guangxu 光緒 (1871–1908). Explaining the situation, pleading for both understanding and forgiveness, the petitioners sought acknowledgment that their violent action did not undermine imperial Qing authority in Kham, rather protected it. Although initial assessments by regional Qing officials centered on Feng-quan himself, his actions and demeanour toward the residents of Batang, they could not—or would not—perceive the Assistant Amban's slaughter as representative of resistance to shifting Qing policies toward borderland regions in the early 20th century. Such shifts were indicative of new concepts of governance and authority emanating from both the Court in Beijing 北京 and the provincial government in Chengdu. Rather, analysis by both regional Qing officials and later Chinese historians displaced the explanation articulated in the Batang petition, instead injecting into the historical narrative an external catalyst for what became known as the “Batang Incident” (*Batang shibian* 巴塘事變). By absolving both the Assistant Amban and the newly shifting Qing policies which he sought to intensify in Batang and throughout Kham, this narrative forged a template for interpreting future unrest across the Tibetan Plateau, thus effecting characterization of resistance to Qing and later Chinese authority in subsequent decades as instigated by external actors from central Tibet, though not necessarily “foreign.” In doing so, this narrative template simultaneously drained the agency of Khampas in the Batang Incident and later Tibetans more generally, who were perceived as acting not of their own accord. This displaced blame from intrusive Qing and later Chinese policies and actions in the region onto an external abstraction.

Rhetorically depriving Khampas of agency in resisting Feng-quan's actions complemented early 20th century perceptions—shared by both Qing officials and foreign missionaries posted to Kham—of an indigent population oppressed and manipulated by local Tibetan Buddhist monasteries, typically condemned as the agents of outside forces in Lhasa or later the Thirteenth Dalai Lama Tubten Gyatso (Thub bstan rgya mtsho, 1876–1933) himself. Pointing to the simultaneous destruction of the French Catholic mission in Batang in 1905, this narrative erroneously came to posit a parallel link between the Batang Incident and resistance in central Tibet to British invasion during the earlier Younghusband Expedition (1903–1904), with Batang's monasteries serving as conduits of instigation. Yet temporal proximity cannot alone demonstrate causation, particularly as there is no evidence of Batang residents, known as “Bapas” or local Qing officials equating the two events. Nevertheless, even before the Xinhai Revolution of 1911 replaced Qing claims to authority with those of the

Republic of China (ROC), the British would assume the narrative's role of external instigators throughout Kham and ethnographic Tibet,⁵ sometimes alone, sometimes in concert with the Dalai Lama or central Tibetan monasteries.

As detailed below, the petition submitted by Batang leaders did employ the character *yang* 洋 (foreign) in its condemnation of Feng-quan and his implementation of shifting imperial policies but did not claim that either he or the policies *were* foreign. Rather, the petition asserted that both the man and his policies were anomalous and thus detrimental to local society and Qing rule therein. The narrative of the Batang Incident that later coalesced among Sichuan officials, subsequently entrenched by historians, miscast the petitioners' use of "foreign" to absolve Feng-quan and especially the shifting imperial policies he endeavored to intensify in Batang. In fact, some aspects of the policies could be considered "foreign" in that they reflected the influence of newly globalizing norms of governance and authority pervading the New Policies (*xinzheng* 新政), which were transforming Qing military, government, and society in the decade before the Xinhai Revolution. It was these unfamiliar aspects which the Batang petitioners perceived as anomalous when compared with longstanding Qing borderland policy in Kham.

Another legend, likely apocryphal, nonetheless reflects local perceptions of Feng-quan's malice toward the people of Batang, a malice which they believed permeated his intensification of shifting imperial policies. At dawn on many a day during his stay in town, it was said Feng-quan could be spotted dancing atop the roofs of Batang's stone houses, peering upward into the sky and exhaling. Many Bapas interpreted his action as praying for the heavens to align the clouds and prevent rains from visiting the valley, which would have further wilted crops already damaged by a drought for which his arrival was deemed partly responsible.⁶ In accord with the narrative coalescing after 1905, the Batang Incident indeed was provoked by an actor external to Kham, an actor whose intrusive policies the local population deemed detrimental and anomalous, thus improper. Yet contrary to this narrative, the slaughter of Feng-quan was neither precipitated by foreign incursion into central Tibet nor prompted by misperceptions of the Assistant Amban's "foreignness," nor instigated by external actors—whether in Lhasa or in Calcutta—projecting their will onto the Khampas through local monasteries or missionaries, respectively. As

⁵ In this article, "ethnographic Tibet" encompasses both the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and the predominately Tibetan regions of today's Chinese provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, Qinghai, and Gansu.

⁶ *Batang xianzhi*, 251–252.

the narrative evolved in the years following 1905, the latter two presumed catalysts—external and “foreign”—morphed into unidimensional, anti-imperialist rhetoric prevalent following the Xinhai Revolution, rhetoric which persists in displacing blame for unrest and resistance on the Tibetan Plateau away from Qing and later Chinese policies and actions.

Reclaiming “Eden”

How is it that a Khampa dog can sport a peacock feather atop his head? I [Master Feng] already can see that you will not sport those butter-buttons for much longer!

— Feng-quan, December 24, 1904⁷

蠻狗頭配戴紅領花翎？
鳳老子看你這個酥油頂
子已快載不久了！

When Feng-quan and his bodyguard of fifty men first arrived in the Batang Valley 102 days, before events in the Parrot’s Beak, both the senior *depa*, Trashi Gyeltsen (Bkra shis rgyal mtshan, n.d.), and the junior *depa*, Drakpa Gyeltsen (Grags pa rgyal mtshan, n.d.), greeted him on the outskirts of town. Described as “loyal and submissive” to Qing authority by Wu Xizhen 吳錫珍 (n.d.), the Qing-appointed *liangtai* 糧台 (commissary) in Batang, both indigenous rulers held *tusi* 土司 (local headman) titles and seals granted by the Qing Emperor, typically wore Chinese dress, and had taken Chinese names.⁸ Yet as they kowtowed before their visitor, he stepped forward, prevented Drakpa Gyeltsen from rising, and uttered the words above as he rapped the red cap perched atop the junior *depa*’s head. Several weeks earlier, Feng-quan had greeted the Litang *depa* on a bridge leading into that town with similar disdain. Whacking the Litang ruler atop the skull with the stem of his pipe, he observed, “If you [Khampas] don’t all again submit, then I will certainly chop off your heads.”⁹ Before the Assistant Amban’s arrival, the two Batang *depa* had willingly provided land and assistance to Wu’s initially limited implementation of *kaiken* 開墾, the reclamation of “wastelands” for transformation into cultivable land,

⁷ *Batang xianzhi*, 251. The red cap with peacock feathers and buttons of different colors was a symbol of high status during the Qing officially awarded only by the emperor.

⁸ Anon., “Weiguan Batang liangwu tongzhi Wu Xizhen kaiban kenwu liu tiao qingxi,” *Sichuan guanbao* 8 (May 24, 1904): 4a. The senior *depa*’s Chinese name was Luo Jinbao 羅進寶, the junior *depa*’s Chinese name was Guo Zongzha 郭宗扎. When their Tibetan names were referenced in Chinese documents, Trashi Gyeltsen was rendered 扎西吉村 Zhaxi-Jicun and Drakpa Gyeltsen was rendered 扎巴吉村 Zhaba-Jicun.

⁹ *Batang xianzhi*, 251.

an intrusive policy which however rankled the *khenpo* (*mkhan po*, abbot) and influential monks of Ba Chode Monastery ('Ba' chos sde dgon pa; Ch: Dinglinsi 丁林寺).¹⁰ With his rather pointed affront, Feng-quan not only soured the sympathy of potential allies in Batang, his subsequent actions also provided one spark for igniting a conflict which rhetoric would reverberate across the Tibetan Plateau for decades.

In a letter written from Dartsedo in late October 1904, before setting out for Batang, Feng-quan described Kham as a land ruled by "*manyi* 蠻夷 (savages) and monks" wherein no one followed the Confucian five relationships.¹¹ Though acknowledging that the indigenous rulers reportedly esteemed Confucianism, the disdain with which he greeted the two Batang *depa* was not unique, rather informed by widespread perceptions of Khampas as both uncouth and utterly beholden to the monks of local monasteries, who were especially denigrated by both Sichuanese and many foreigners. Official Qing documents and opinion pieces published in periodicals from Sichuan and across the empire in subsequent years persisted in describing Khampas and Tibetans as either "simple-minded and muddle-headed" (*hunhun'e'e* 渾渾噩噩) or as "ignorant and uncivilised" (*mengmei* 蒙昧).¹² An article from 1908 even derided them as mere "marionettes" (*mu'ou* 木偶).¹³

Qing and foreign missionary observers attributed the "ignorance" of the Khampas to monastic oppression, both corporeal and spiritual. Indeed, after visiting Batang in 1894, Hou Yongling 侯永齡 (n.d.), a resident of Yazhou 雅州, blamed local defiance to Qing authority on such subservience to monastic control.¹⁴ In 1909, years after Qing reprisals and efforts to restructure authority in Kham, then Sichuan Governor-general Zhao Erxun 趙爾巽 (1844–1927) wrote, "*manren* 蠻人 (i.e., Khampas) are bewildered and ignorant without knowledge and follow all that the lamas say. The lamas are thus able to use their religion in the light of day to achieve benevolent goals and in the shadows to spread evil schemes."¹⁵ And in 1911, the Canadian missionary

¹⁰ In some Chinese documents, the monastery is referred to as Dingningsi 丁寧寺. The monastery is known today in Chinese as Kangningsi 康寧寺.

¹¹ *Feng-quan jia shu jianzheng* (FJJ), "Pingzi Letter no. 1," October 15, 1904: 42.

¹² See, for example, "shuxi fensheng chuyan," *Guangyi congbao* 194 (March 1, 1909): 1a–2b; Zhao *Erfeng Chuanbian zoudu* (ZECZ), "Chuandian bianwu shi yi jun guan jinyao ju shi," July 20, 1907: 46–54; ZECZ, "Qing chibu banfa zhu Zang dachen guanfang pian," April 7, 1908: 171.

¹³ Anon., "Xizang yu Sichuan qiantu zhi guanxi," *Sichuan* 2 (January 15, 1908): 45.

¹⁴ Hou, "You Batang ji," *Wanguo gongbao* 125 (1899): 20–24.

¹⁵ ZECZ, "shouhui Chunke Gaori jiaohui tusi yinxin jingnei Langji Ling yibing gaitu guiliu zhe," November 15, 1909: 304.

W.N. Fergusson (1869?–1954) observed, “These people are oppressed on every hand by their spiritual fathers, by their chiefs and princes, whose lands they have to cultivate and harvest *gratis*, and often by their Chinese superiors, who always speak of them as dogs and barbarians.”¹⁶

The Amban You-tai 有泰 (1846?–1910) was perhaps cognizant of simmering unrest across the region beneath the veneer of Qing authority, a climate that would contribute to Feng-quan’s demise. “The lamas [sic] of each monastery are terribly conceited, and the power of their abbots is greater than that of local Qing officials.” Crossing Kham en route to Lhasa in 1903, several months before Feng-quan reached Batang, he observed that the *depa* of Batang and Litang (Li thang; Ch. 理塘) though “obedient” to the Qing Emperor were ultimately quite powerless. “If [the lamas] are unsatisfied even just a little bit, then they gather a crowd and run amok. They savagely oppress the people who are supposed to be under their protection.”¹⁷ Perhaps aware of his superior’s views, Feng-quan may have perceived the two *depa* not as allies, rather as irrelevant in either aiding or obstructing his ambitious plans for Batang. Just days before their first encounter, Feng-quan wrote, “In large monasteries there are as many as four or five thousand lamas, and for many years it has been their enduring habit to use coercion in order to control the chieftains and oppress the people.”¹⁸ The Assistant Amban’s perception of the local population and the monastic establishment in Batang, as well as his demonstrated disdain for both *depa* threatened to undermine the delicate support Wu Xizhen had extracted from both lay and religious leaders for his limited initial endeavor to farm reclaimed land.

In early September 1903, before You-tai departed for Lhasa and three months before Francis Younghusband’s British Indian army crossed into Tibetan territory at the Jelep Pass (Tib. Rdzi li la) north of Sikkim, an imperial edict alerted the future Amban to the dangerous situation in Kham. Suggesting the influence of a series of rejected memorials submitted in the last years of the 19th century by then-Sichuan Governor-general Lu Chuanlin 鹿傳霖 (1836–1910), who in 1903 sat on the Grand Council (*junji chu* 軍機處), the edict advised limited establishment of mines and wasteland reclamation colonies (*tunken* 屯墾) in

¹⁶ Fergusson, “Anterior Tibet; or, The Mantze Marches,” *West China Missionary News* 13, no. 12 (December 1911): 24.

¹⁷ QCBDS, No. 0006, February 12, 1904, vol. 1: 7–8.

¹⁸ QCBDS, vol. 1, No. 0027, January 26, 1905: 40–41.

Batang.¹⁹ Sichuan Governor-general Xi-liang 錫良 (1853–1917) responded to this edict in December 1903, a year before Feng-quan offended the Batang *depa* and several days after Younghusband entered Tibet. Citing the potential for Indian tea to undermine Sichuan's tea monopoly on the Tibetan Plateau among his concerns, Xi-liang expressed his support for the policies as a means to both "protect Tibet and strengthen Sichuan" (*baozang guchuan* 保藏固川), thus directing Wu Xizhen to investigate.²⁰ Though perhaps not yet aware of British incursions, his support mirrored Lu Chuanlin's persistent concerns for British influence penetrating Sichuan through Batang's border with Tibet, both while Sichuan Governor-general and while a member of the Grand Council.

After several months investigating the implementation of these policies with two officials dispatched by the Sichuan mining office, in April 1904, Wu submitted a memorial urging selectivity in recruiting farmers to effect reclamation. Despite verdant, productive fields carpeting the Batang valley and dotting other polities in Kham, he explained, "since the local people are foolish and ignorant of agriculture, it is absolutely necessary to recruit men from *neidi* 內地 (China proper)."²¹ Subsequent negotiation with the town's three powers ultimately yielded support from both *depa* and later tenuous acquiescence by the monastery, prompting Wu to promulgate regulations for land reclamation in June.²² With the more fertile lands closer to town and stretching along the banks of the Drichu ('Bri chu; Ch. Jinsha jiang 金沙江) and tributaries already cultivated by Bapas and controlled by either the monastery or either of the two *depa*, Wu initiated limited reclamation near the village of Tsasho (Tsha shod) some 20 *li* southwest of Batang town along the southern road stretching westward

¹⁹ *Qing shilu* (QSL) 58: 855. On Lu Chuanlin's earlier proposals for colonization in Kham, see Relyea 2019: 184–187. Lu served as Sichuan Governor-general from 1895–1898.

²⁰ *Xi-liang yi gao* (zou gao) (XYGZG), No. 342: 365–366. Xi-liang served as Sichuan Governor-general from 1903 to 1907.

²¹ Anon., "Weiguan Batang liangwu tongzhi Wu Xizhen kaiban kenwu liu tiao qingxi" (1904): 4b. The Qing polity's core comprises the 18 provinces commonly called "China proper" in historical literature and designated *neidi* (inner lands) by Qing officials, merchants, and soldiers in contrast to contiguous territory "beyond the passes," administered by the *Lifanyuan* 理藩院 (Court of Colonial Affairs). In relation to Kham, those traveling west of Dartsedo were said to *chuguan* 出關 (cross the pass), i.e., leave *neidi*.

²² QCBDS, No. 0010, June or July 1904 and No. 0011, July or August 1904: 11–14.

toward Lhasa.²³ Since the *khenpo* asserted that there were no lands available for reclamation, whether on the plains or in the mountains, aside from pastures where horses and cattle grazed, much of which also fell under monastic control, Wu shifted his efforts closer to and up the mountain slopes. Irrigation proved more difficult, but opening such lands generated less consternation in the monastery and for the two *depa*.

While Wu seemed to share Feng-quan's negative perception of Khampas, with no Han settlers likely to ascend the plateau that summer, he recruited locals to work alongside soldiers from the Qing garrison in Batang, roughly 200 men in all. By September 1904, they had cleared 200 *mu* 畝 (more than 130 acres) of land and constructed residences for future farmers. With buckwheat already growing on some 80 *mu*, Wu considered seeking more land for reclamation, which Alexander Hosie (1853–1925), observed was "not regarded with a favourable eye by the lamasery, which sees its percentage of land and crops being lessened and its profits likely to be curtailed."²⁴ Since Wu had initially promulgated regulations and started reclamation without the monastery's explicit agreement, he contended that expansion could move forward even if approved only by the two *depa*, but favored prudence.

After barely a month in the valley, in late January 1905, Feng-quan sought to test both the delicate balance that had facilitated initiation of limited reclamation and Wu's assertion that an absence of monastic acquiescence for expansion could be ignored. Having identified potentially cultivable land during his journey through Dartsedo and Litang, Feng-quan proposed initiating reclamation endeavors across Kham, but reserved highest praise—and his greater ambition—for Batang, a land once dubbed the "Eden of Eastern Thibet" by the English traveller T.T. Cooper (1839–1878).²⁵ He advocated immediately expanding reclamation to 1,000 *mu* (nearly 700 acres) in 1905 in the Tsasho village area and throughout the valley.²⁶ Training local recruits was a task

²³ Today, this village is known as Chaxue 茶雪 in Chinese; in the Republican era, it was known as Chashushan 茶樹山.

²⁴ BNA, FO 228/1549, Report by Mr. A. Hosie, His Majesty's Consul-General at Chengtu, on a Journey to the Eastern Frontier of Thibet, August 1905: 45. See also *Batang xianzhi*, 11 and 250–251 and "Huiyi Batang liangyuan bing zunban kenwu bing ni zhangcheng yingzhun zhao ban xiangwen," *Sichuan Guanbao* 20 (September 19, 1904): 8a–9b. Hosie was the British consul general in Chengdu from 1903 to 1908.

²⁵ Cooper, *Travels in Western China and Eastern Tibet*, JMS 10/43, Royal Geographical Society, London, 1870.

²⁶ QCBDS, No. 0025, January 26, 1905: 38–39. For Wu's estimates, see Jin Fei, "Qingmo Xikang kenwu dang'an shican," *Bianzheng* 9 (July 1932): 11.

which Feng-quan deemed even more critical to strengthening Qing authority in Kham than land reclamation—and one perhaps more alarming to both lay and ecclesiastical rulers in Batang. After receiving the Court's second edict while in Dartsedo, it was a subject which permeated both Feng-quan's letters to family and memorials to Xi-liang.

The initial edict appointing him Assistant Amban in late May 1904 mentioned neither these tasks nor Younghusband's army, which had entered Tibet some five months earlier, slaughtering Tibetan soldiers at every encounter on its northward march to Lhasa. But the Court's second edict, issued on October 3, less than a month after Younghusband had compelled the Tibetan government to sign the Lhasa Convention, explicitly enumerated his mandate. Forwarded to Feng-quan by Xi-liang on October 24, the edict first decried Younghusband's invasion of a land which had been under imperial oversight for more than two centuries before emphasizing two tasks—"land reclamation and training soldiers"—as essential to strengthening Qing authority in Kham. After delineating the territory under his jurisdiction, the edict advised him to utilize soldiers as farmers in reclaiming and cultivating wastelands and reaffirmed Feng-quan's posting to Chamdo (Chab mdo; Ch: Chamuduo 察木多).²⁷

By highlighting the dire situation in Kham, the edict seemed to embolden in Feng-quan a sense of duty and obligation, though he was equally anxious not to dishonour the emperor's favour. "In these times when the country is weak and affairs difficult, who dares return home to comfort and ease?" he lamented in a letter to his wife. "Yet as my old illness worsens day by day and I cannot endure cold and fatigue, if I am really forced to stay in this place, I can only try my best."²⁸ Though willing to remain in Kham, even before departing Dartsedo, Feng-quan was wary of assuming his post in Chamdo, situated northwest of Batang beyond the Ningjing Mountains (Ningjingshan 寧靜山) which at the time marked the boundary between Sichuan and Tibet proper.

Before receiving the emperor's inspiring edict, Feng-quan perceived greater difficulty training soldiers in the colder, harsher climate of Chamdo, standing 3,200 meters above sea level, some 700 meters higher than Dartsedo and 500 meters higher than Batang. This belief was strengthened after spending only two weeks in the Batang Valley. Though yet to visit Chamdo, he lamented in a mid-January letter to his wife the impossibility of accomplishing anything in such a cold place

²⁷ For the initial edict, see *Guangxu Xuanton liang chao shangyu dang* (GSLXD) 30, No. 609: 168. Chamdo is known today in Chinese as Changdu 昌都.

²⁸ FJJ, "Pingzi Letter no. 3," November 26, 1904: 86–89.

with no viable land to reclaim, no capable men to train as soldiers, and located too far from sites further east in Kham which he had deemed of strategic importance and in which he planned to pursue mining and land reclamation. While his poor health and the comparatively temperate climate of the Batang Valley may also have influenced Feng-quan's appeals either to remain in Batang or to split his time between Batang and Dartsedo, both proposals were rejected by the Court, which commanded him to proceed to Chamdo.²⁹ Nonetheless, he continued to linger in the valley, especially focused on training local military recruits, which he found more difficult than anticipated.

Whereas Feng-quan, like Wu, ultimately sought to entice commoners from *neidi* to cultivate reclaimed lands in Batang and elsewhere, he came to believe that he should rely primarily on indigenous recruits for his frontier battalion. He observed that soldiers from Sichuan proper were intolerant of the plateau's bitter cold, could easily fall ill, and preferred to consume rice, which was expensive to transport and difficult to cultivate at high altitudes. By contrast, Khampa men were already acclimated to the harsh climate of Kham and would eat local grains and produce. Despite some difficulty communicating in Chinese, a language unfamiliar to the Khampas, Feng-quan was apparently pleased with the quality of potential recruits in Dartsedo, assigning 50 men, half of the armed escort which had accompanied him from Chengdu, to train them after his departure for Batang.³⁰ After consulting with the Dartsedo magistrate, Liu Tingshu, he anticipated recruiting some 400 men in Batang, Litang, and Dartsedo, but after arriving in Batang was less impressed. Complaining in a letter to his wife from January 1905, that the locals had no desire to learn civility, their character little better than that of livestock, Feng-quan exclaimed that among the pool of indigenous men, "The many unwilling to wear trousers are certainly unwilling to engage in military drills!"³¹ His impression of the local population only seemed to deteriorate further during his 102 days, as did the patience of both the monastery and two *depa* for his continued presence in Batang, lingering longer than the usually allotted single week for Qing officials transiting en route to Lhasa.

From the moment he reached the valley, both his demeanor and his actions intensified perceptions of his malicious intent among Bapas,

²⁹ FJJ, "Pingzi Letter no. 2," 27 October 1904 and "Pingzi Letter no. 7," January 13, 1905: 58 and 137–138, respectively; QZZ, "Kan ban tunken bing qing biantong yi zhu zhe," January 26, 1905: 1274–1275; and QCBDS, No. 0025, January 26, 1905: 38–39.

³⁰ FJJ, "Pingzi Letter no. 2," October 27, 1904: 64 and QCBDS, No. 0024, November 27, 1904: 37.

³¹ Qin Yongzhang 2005: 136–137.

who were already suffering, perhaps lending local credence to tales of him dancing atop their roofs. Characterised by fellow officials as arrogant and obstinate and described by British Acting Consul General C.W. Campbell as “headstrong,” Feng-quan ignored the Court’s order to proceed to Chamdo, ignored Wu’s advice to move more slowly in land reclamation, and increasingly ignored simmering local opposition, especially to the monastery policy he proposed in January 1905.³² A poor harvest earlier in 1904 had depleted local granaries, threatening famine, but Feng-quan decreed that all grain—including reserves—be sold only to his soldiers and to workers recruited locally and from nearby communities to engage in reclamation. Under threat of outright seizure, in less than three months, Batang residents asserted that he extracted more than 2,000 *taels* worth of their physical labour and such basic provisions as beef, lamb, eggs, firewood, and soy products.³³ Yet it was his memorial of January 26 seeking to finally implement a policy first proposed some two centuries earlier by then-Sichuan Governor-general Nian Gengyao 年羹堯 (1679–1726) that worsened the climate in Batang. Decrying communities that reached nearly 5,000 in Litang, Feng-quan proposed limiting to a mere 300 the resident monk population first in Ba Chode Monastery—then in all monasteries across Kham. To achieve this number, and eyeing an increase in the population of taxable commoners, his proposal forbade the monastery from accepting new initiates for a period of twenty years and proclaimed that all monks younger than thirteen should immediately be sent home to resume a life of farming.³⁴ In response, many Bapas drafted petitions pleading with the Assistant Amban to reverse his policy, only to endure scoldings laced with foul language and accusations of being but bandits foolishly following the monks. One resident was even flogged.

Seeking to defuse percolating passions in the valley, the *khenpo* and two *depa* all pleaded with Feng-quan to proceed to Chamdo as instructed by the Court, but he only cursed them too. By contrast, the French missionary Henri Mussot (1854–1905) (Ch. Mushouren 牧守仁), who seemed to support any effort to weaken the French Mission’s monastic nemesis in Batang, advised the Assistant Amban to request

³² See Zha Qian 1990, vol. 2: 1b and BNA, FO 228/2571, D1, No. 12, Acting Consul General Campbell to Sir E. Satow, March 30, 1905. Campbell was one of two Acting Consuls General reporting from Chengdu while Hosie was traveling.

³³ QCBDS, No. 0030, April 6, 1905: 43 and “Lettre du P. Giraudeau, Tatsienlou,” May 24, 1905 (quoted in Deshayes 2008: 139).

³⁴ First Historical Archives, Beijing 499/45 *Lifanyuan dang’an* No. 699 and QCBDS, No. 0027, January 26, 1905: 40–41. On Nian’s proposal, see Herman 1993: 141.

reinforcements.³⁵ In correspondence with Dartsedo magistrate Liu Tingshu on March 1 and again in a more urgent letter on March 14, Feng-quan indeed requested the immediate dispatch to Batang of the fifty men he had tasked with training recruits in Dartsedo, as well as another 200 soldiers recently stationed there under Battalion Commander Zhang Hongsheng 張鴻聲 (n.d.).³⁶ His second appeal was intercepted by Bapas, only further exacerbating the situation.

As suffering intensified for residents of Batang, Feng-quan ignoring their pleas as extraction of labour and grain increased, frustration finally boiled over. On March 26, 1905, some 500 residents of villages situated upstream from Batang town torched reclaimed fields near Tsasho Village, killing several Han farmers. Despatched in reprisal and led by Commander Wu Yizhong 吳以忠 (d. 1905) a group of soldiers encountered what Feng-quan characterised as unprovoked gunfire while passing Ba Chode Monastery, injuring several of his men.³⁷ Noting potential danger around the monastery, one corner of which stood on a cliff above a sharp bend in the river below, an American missionary had once observed that “no Chinese dared go near [this place] in those days, or they were unceremoniously dumped into the river.”³⁸ The Bapa petitioners, however, asserted that the monks’ gunfire came in response to Wu leading an assault on the monastery, which destroyed the outer wall of the neighbouring nunnery and left more than ten monks dead.³⁹

Three nights later, at around two in the morning, Mussot left the compound of the French mission, never to return. On hearing the news later that morning, the junior *depa* sent four soldiers to search for the wayward Frenchman, but they too never returned.⁴⁰ According to a Batang soldier quoted in an obituary for Mussot, the priest was taken to Ba Chode Monastery on April 1 or 2, where he remained in chains for three days before being flogged with thorns and finally shot. His severed head and hands were then purportedly hung as trophies

³⁵ QCBDS, No. 0030, April 6, 1905: 43–44; Ganzi Zhouzhi biancuan weiyuanhui 1997: 107; Fu Songmu 1988 [1912]: 7a; and Pekin 37 “Lettre du P. Bourdonnec au P. Maire, provicaire de la Mission du Yunnan, Weixi,” April 18, 1905 (quoted in Deshayes 2008: 140).

³⁶ QZZ, “Zhihan Liu Tingshu qing cui guan dai Zhang Hongsheng xuan dai ying yong chuguan,” March 1, 1905, and “Zhihan Liu Tingshu qing cui diao weidui fu Batang zhufang,” March 24, 1905: 1279–1280.

³⁷ QCBDS, No. 0032, April 11, 1905: 47.

³⁸ “History of the Tibetan Mission Events in their order of 1903–1904,” Disciples of Christ Historical Society Library & Archives, Nashville, Tenn., Tibet Mission: DOM Tibet Administration, Box 2.

³⁹ QCBDS, No. 0030, April 6, 1905: 44.

⁴⁰ QCBDS, No. 0036, April or May 1905: 49–50.

above the monastery's main door.⁴¹ While the French priest suffered at the hands of Batang's monks, Feng-quan and his fellow Qing officials were besieged by as many as 3,500 Khampas from throughout the valley and as far away as Litang.

Following a clandestine meeting in a village east of Batang Town, as the clock struck eight in the evening on April 2, the sounds of gunfire started to reverberate through the dusty streets.⁴² Roughly half of the angry crowd surrounded the French mission, which was situated on a slight hill south of town, overwhelmed guards posted by Feng-quan, scaled the walls and set the small internal chapel ablaze. Described as visible for several kilometers, the raging flames thrashed the stone walls in an intense dance of brilliant oranges and reds, creating the illusion that the chapel was suspended in mid-air, crumbling at the center of a vengeful inferno. As the fire spread, so too did the Bapas, in search of converts living near the mission who were reportedly killed where they stood. The other group headed for central Batang Town, first encircling Feng-quan's residence, riddling its walls with bullet holes until realising he was not there. They then surrounded the home of Wu Xizhen. "The more rebels gathered like ants, the more wild grew the gunfire," wrote Wu, who was trapped inside with some twenty Han residents and no weapons.⁴³ On learning Feng-quan's location, most of the crowd abandoned the siege of Wu's home, instead encircling the yamen compound. Forsaken by his hundred Batang recruits, the Assistant Amban and the bodyguards who had accompanied him from Dartsedo fought valiantly through the night, losing more than ten and killing more than one hundred assailants.

Around four in the morning on April 3, local soldiers loyal to the senior *depa* successfully rescued Feng-quan, his bodyguard, and the injured junior *depa*. Reportedly tossing Indian rupees into the air to distract the assembled crowd, the former captives burst through the yamen's rear gate and hurriedly fled to the senior *depa*'s residence. After storming the yamen, the Khampas killed Wu Yizhong and any remaining men before torching the compound and moving on to

⁴¹ Giraudeau, "Obituary, M. Mussot, Missionnaire Apostolique du Thibet," l'Institut de recherche France-Asie (accessed September 17, 2023, <https://irfa.paris/en/missionnaire/1486-mussot-henri/>).

⁴² The following is drawn from: QCBDS, No. 0036: 49–52; Zha 1990: vol. 2, 3a–3b; BNA, FO 228/2571 D1, "Enclosure in No. 23"; QZZ, "Bafei qianghai Feng-quan mou luan yi chi hanfan guanbing yanfang zhe": 1208–1209; Fu 1912: 7a–7b; *Batang xianzhi*, 252; Bacot, "Réunion du 19 Février: Conférence de M. Jacques Bacot," *Bulletin Mensuel du Comité de L'Asie Française* (1908): 58; BNA, FO 228/2571 D1, No. 24, Acting Consul General Goffe to Sir E. Satow, June 10, 1905. Herbert Goffe was one of two Acting Consuls General reporting from Chengdu while Hosie was traveling.

⁴³ QCBDS, No. 0036: 50.

encircle the senior *depa's* residence, which they also threatened to set ablaze unless their nemesis and his men were immediately handed over. Negotiation between a representative of the senior *depa*, and monastery leadership later that day yielded an agreement presented to Feng-quan more as an ultimatum than a suggestion—the crowd would withdraw only if he immediately departed for Sichuan with his bodyguard, never to return.

In the early evening of April 4, the road in front of the senior *depa's* residence was cleared, Feng-quan and his remaining bodyguard joined by several other Qing officials set out with the two *depa* and the *khenpo* as escort—and a crowd of Bapas following close behind. With all the pomp and circumstance properly due a high imperial official, carried aloft, seated in a decorous palanquin, passing through the streets to the beat of drums and horns, the Assistant Amban and his procession marched to the junior *depa's* residence, where his escort bade him farewell. The procession then marched out of Batang town, continued to the edge of the valley, and turned southeast along the rocky southern road as it climbed into the surrounding mountains. Ever defiant, Feng-quan planned to despatch a message as soon as possible to request reinforcements from Dartsedo meet him at Litang from whence he would return to teach the Khampas of Batang a lesson once and for all.

(Mis)Construing "Foreignness"

Our character is like dogs and goats, born stupid and foolish. After much consideration, we determined there was no other course of action. We know only of the Great Emperor of the Qing Dynasty and that this corrupt official certainly was a calamity for the state, causing trouble in our locality. Therefore, we did not surmise that this would be a crime, and in a moment of derangement killed two Chinese officials and also one foreigner. Truly with no recourse, we took this action in order to rid the state of calamity. We plead for good judgment, leniency, and kindness, not militancy conflict.

— Representatives of the residents of Batang
(6 April 1905)⁴⁴

爲夷性犬羊，蠢愚生成，再四思維，無法可施，只知有清朝大皇帝，此乃是爲國內之禍患，擾害地方之貪官故耳。不揣有罪，一時錯亂，以將漢官二員及洋人一并誅戮。此番原爲國除害，實出無奈。求乞恩宥善辦，無生兵衅。

⁴⁴ QCBDS, No. 0030, April 6, 1905: 44.

The authors of the petition knew their audience well. By exploiting derogatory perceptions of Khampas widespread among Sichuan officials in the above quote, they affirmed both their reverence for the Manchu emperor and his munificence, while demonstrating that the people of Batang in fact acted in desperation—and on his behalf—to protect the integrity of his rule. Nonetheless, their appeal could not dissuade the emperor from sending soldiers in reprisal, could neither prevent the slaughter of monks fleeing a burning Ba Chode Monastery nor the arrival in Batang of a perhaps even more disastrous Qing official who would earn the moniker “Butcher of Kham.”⁴⁵ The language of the petition, however, endeavoring to shift culpability for their slaughter onto the victims, proved both influential and enduring. The petition sought to accomplish several goals—both explicit and implicit.

By focusing on Feng-quan, his improper actions and aggressive intensification of Wu’s land reclamation policy, the petition deftly shifted culpability away from loyal Bapas—both monk and commoner—and also away from newly intrusive Qing policies. The petition only briefly referenced the *yang* (foreign) character of Feng-quan’s method of drilling both his bodyguard and indigenous recruits, juxtaposed with the historical presence of French missionaries, to reinforce their assertion of the illegitimacy of his presence in Batang. This minor point would come to contribute the core assertion of a historical narrative that coalesced in the years after 1905, forging a template for characterising resistance to Qing and later Chinese authority on the Tibetan Plateau in subsequent decades. Yet neither Feng-quan nor his “foreignness” were the true catalysts for resistance articulated by the petitioners. Although overtly blaming shifting Qing borderland policies would have contradicted the narrative of Bapas acting out of loyalty for the emperor, thus undermining their effort to avert imperial reprisals, the following discussion argues that the content of the petition implicitly attributed their resistance to this very catalyst. Ultimately, for the petitioners, it was the policies themselves that were perceived as illegitimate, an assertion evinced by the petition’s closing threat of continued resistance.

The petition needed to justify not only Feng-quan’s slaughter and the demise of Batang’s French missionaries, but also explain why Wu Xizhen lived while Wu Yizhong did not, though both had been posted to Batang long before the Assistant Amban’s arrival. Translated from

⁴⁵ See Relyea 2015 and Edgar 1908: 16. As the emperor’s army entered Batang on July 28, in order to prevent Qing soldiers from sacking and looting Ba Chode Monastery, its monks hurried to remove statues and other treasures from the compound before pre-emptively setting it and the nearby bridge ablaze. On later representations of Zhao, see also Suh 2016.

Tibetan into Chinese, the text was written properly in the tone of a loyal subordinate humbly addressing his most benevolent emperor, on the strokes of whose brush rested their fate.⁴⁶ The first substantive section of the petition opened with acknowledgment of Wu Xizhen as a Qing official legitimately posted to Batang initiating a land reclamation policy properly decreed by the Court. Though implying some disquiet among the people of Batang with a policy which already had reclaimed some 300 *mu* (more than 200 acres) of land amidst fields cultivated by local farmers, the authors emphasized that no Batang commoner dared obstruct Wu. His cautions, gradual implementation during 1904, as well as his ultimately successful effort to gain at least the tenuous acquiescence of the two *depa* and the monastery ensured an initial peace which the petition next asserted was impossible following Feng-quan's arrival.

Midway through the text, the authors informed the emperor of the Batang commoners' deep devotion to Buddhism and the longstanding loyalty of the 1,500 monks inhabiting Ba Chode Monastery, constructed many years before.⁴⁷ The authors affirmed that these monks never failed to reverently pray for the boundless fortune and long life of many generations of Qing emperors, thankful for his grace, proclaiming that they could therefore never commit any offence. From the moment of his arrival in Batang, the petition contended, Feng-quan demonstrated his contempt for Buddhism. One prime example was his proposal—perceived as a proclamation and condemned by the petitioners—reducing the population of Ba Chode Monastery to 300, thus ordering some 1,200 monks to return to secular life. Feng-quan purportedly warning, “Those who do not abide by this order, will certainly be executed,” ultimately compelled some Bapas to threaten the tranquillity of the valley.

Through a parallel construction, the authors contrasted legitimacy, reverence, and loyalty—Wu Xizhen, the commoners and monks of Batang—with illegitimacy, arrogance, and corruption—Feng-quan, the French missionaries—as part of justifying the petition's shift in culpability. The authors simultaneously, and subtly, also distinguished the nature of these two threats—Feng-quan and the French. “Soon after [arriving], Feng-quan bade his soldiers to drill indigenous recruits with *yang* (foreign) techniques, and the recruits to learn a *yang* (foreign)

⁴⁶ For the full text of the petition and quotes therefrom used in the following discussion, see QCBDS, No. 0030, April 6, 1905: 43–44.

⁴⁷ The monastery was established in 1659 by the Fifth Dalai Lama, Ngawang Lobzang Gyatso (Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mstho, 1617–1682). *Kangningsi gaikuang* (bilingual sign in Tibetan and Chinese outside Kangning Monastery, Anon. photograph taken on September 8, 2006).

language and salute in a *yang* (foreign) way." Furthering criticism of his new, unfamiliar, and thus illegitimate policies, the authors next asserted that the Assistant Amban took it upon himself to initiate a population register of all Batang commoners, both Han and indigenous. Then with no linguistic or causal connection, in its next phrase the petition abruptly shifted to denounce the long-standing presence of French missionaries, whom the authors accused of "offending the gods and defiling heaven and earth" ever since their arrival.

The first French Catholic priest, Jean-Charles Fage (1824–1888), reached Batang in 1864, renting a house with a second priest, Jean-Baptiste Goutelle (1821–1895), who arrived in 1866, four years before an earthquake struck the region. Although the priests helped rebuild the town, rewarded by one of the *depa* with a plot of land on which to build a permanent structure, their presence was ultimately blamed for both an earthquake and subsequent drought which struck the valley in 1872. As a result, from September to October 1873, the monks of Ba Chode Monastery, supported by the two *depa*, incited Bapas to desecrate the French cemetery, destroy the mission's buildings, and drive the priests out of town. In January 1875, several months after the priests had returned to Batang, a newly-appointed Qing official coerced both *depa* and the *khenpo* to jointly prepare two proclamations admitting the errors of the local population and acknowledging the priests' right to reside and proselytize wherever they chose.⁴⁸ Translated into French by Goutelle, one proclamation assured, "there will be complete harmony and perfect friendship on both sides" and "we undertake not to allow our subjects, either secular, or religious, to in any way harm the Europeans in the future."⁴⁹ Joseph Chauveau (1816–1877), the Apostolic Vicar of Tibet at the time, concluded from these proclamations that the people of Batang were not at fault, rather they were incited by both the monastery and the *depa*, a conclusion which would underlie the narrative of the Batang Incident coalescing after 1905 among Chinese historians and foreign observers alike.

Even before this first assault in Batang, French missionaries believed that the main monasteries in Lhasa sought to slow their spread of Catholicism in Kham, citing a message purportedly disseminated to the region's monasteries: "as long as the Europeans" remained in the region, the monks would receive "no further respect ... in Lhasa."⁵⁰ Another apparent pronouncement from Lhasa received in Batang in

⁴⁸ Deshayes 2008: 82–83 ; 85–88.

⁴⁹ Desgodins, "Rétablissement des stations de Bathang et de Bommé," *Les Missions catholiques: Bulletin hebdomadaire de l'Œuvre de la propagation de la foi* 7 (January–December 1875): 354–356.

⁵⁰ "Lettre de F. Biet, Tsékou," December 4, 1873 (quoted in Deshayes 2008: 85).

1887 and shared with Pierre Giraudeau (1850–1941) by a local monk, called for the expulsion of all Europeans, blamed for yet another drought then ravaging the region, promising support to those who obeyed. “If you tolerate the Europeans any longer at your side ... greater evils will come again, there will be great trouble among the people.”⁵¹ That same year, an edict posted outside Ba Chode Monastery declared, “Jesus Christ and Buddha cannot rule the same country together; Tibet belongs to Buddha, the religion of Jesus Christ must be destroyed there without leaving the slightest trace of it.”⁵² By summer 1887, the *depa* were unable to stop the monks from inciting Bapas to again desecrate the French cemetery, destroy the mission’s buildings, and drive the priests out of town. In each case, the French described the Qing official in Batang as either powerless to intercede or, as in 1887, grudgingly aiding the priests’ flight in adhering to stipulations to protect missionaries in the unequal treaties imposed on China.⁵³ Each incident, in 1873 and 1887, also reinforced the dual perception, reflected in Feng-quan’s response to Bapa reports opposing his limit on the population of Ba Chode Monastery, that Khampa commoners were wholly subservient, manipulated and incited by the monastery, and that its *khenpo* and monks were themselves acting at the behest of “external” forces—the monasteries in Lhasa.

The brief sequence of phrases at the outset of the 1905 petition juxtaposed denunciation of the illegitimate presence of French missionaries with identification of the *yang* military methods favored by Feng-quan, quoted above, implying association or perhaps a shared “foreignness” among them. However, not only did the bulk of the text articulate a different catalyst for violence erupting in late March, the authors also implicitly distinguished the “foreignness” of Feng-quan and the French. In a petition of nearly 1,100 total characters, the authors used the character *yang* only six times, four within the brief sequence of phrases, which also included the sole use of *faguo* 法國 (France), in reference to mission buildings, thus affirming that this observation was not a catalyst for events in the Batang Valley culminating in the Parrot’s Beak.

Distinguishing the French in Batang from the perhaps merely peculiar “foreignness” enveloping Feng-quan and his unfamiliar demeanour, the missionaries were styled *waiguo yangren* 外國洋人, which roughly equates to “foreigners from outside the country.” Interestingly, Pierre-Rémi Bons d’Anty (1859–1916), the French Consul

⁵¹ Launay 1903: 221.

⁵² Deshayes 2008: 102.

⁵³ Ibid., 102–103.

General in Chengdu from 1905 to 1916, translated these four characters as “*Étrangers européens*” (foreign Europeans), rendering *yang* as “European” throughout his translation of the petition.⁵⁴ Some scholars suggest that *yang* at this time conjured images of the “West” or “Europeans” among Qing officials, rather than the merely “foreign.”⁵⁵ The leather boots and Western-style uniforms worn by Feng-quan’s bodyguard, formerly police cadets in Chengdu, certainly resembled those of European constables in Shanghai or Berlin, but the authors of the petition made no mention of their clothing, only their actions.⁵⁶ Without the original Tibetan, we can assess any distinction between Feng-quan and the French and their respective “foreignness” perceived by the Bapas only through the Chinese translation, however the narrative which coalesced soon after Feng-quan’s slaughter and the template for characterizing Tibetan resistance which emerged thereafter both were forged exclusively from the Chinese text. The sparse use of *yang* in the text corresponds with the relative unimportance of Feng-quan’s perceived “foreignness” to the authors of the petition as a meaningful catalyst for resistance and ultimately violence.

Indeed, after this brief sequence of phrases, the petition returned to its primary concern, Feng-quan’s improper actions, such as the population register, and the shifting policies he intensified, attributing the arrival of both his bodyguard and additional reclamation workers recruited from nearby communities by Wu Yizhong for exacerbating local suffering. Although there is no mention of the Assistant Amban dancing atop Bapa roofs, his malicious disregard for the local population was demonstrated by his exclusive appropriation of all grain in Batang and refusal to import grain to supplement swiftly depleting stocks. According to the petition, Feng-quan threatened “to send his soldiers and workers to eat within the homes of any who refused to sell their grain to him.” The authors emphasized the futility of commoners and officials alike, presumably including Wu Xizhen, to mitigate the impending disaster.

Midway through the text, contrasting the piety of local commoners and the monks of Ba Chode Monastery with Feng-quan’s perceived

⁵⁴ (French) Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (FMAE), 148CPCOM/70, Annexe no. 2, Dépêche no. 39, Bons d’Anty à la Légation de la République Française en Chine, May 25, 1905.

⁵⁵ See Fang 2013: 61–62 and Chen 1990: 301–310. Fang explains that *yang* first equated only with “overseas” in the 19th century but came to mean the “West” or “Europeans” by its last decades as the character was used to signify “progress” or the “modern,” as for example in *yangxue* 洋學 (western learning).

⁵⁶ Stapleton 2000: 87. Even Xi-liang, a strong advocate of the New Policies and police reform in Chengdu, had criticized the new police uniforms as “too foreign” on arrival in the city.

contempt for Buddhism, evinced by his plan to limit the latter's population, both introduced above, the petition's tone continued to intensify, mirroring escalating concern and desperation among the local community unfolding in March. As the Assistant Amban continued to berate them, ignoring the deteriorating situation, several soldiers reportedly spread a rumour that their impending deployment would begin with an attack on the monastery before torching the homes of Bapas. The authors then cast the subsequent late March gathering in Batang of representatives from each village as a discussion centered on once again submitting petitions to Feng-quan in an effort to "bring tranquillity to the region" and foster "harmony among Qing officials and local people." Perhaps offering justification for his slaughter, the text emphasized that Wu Yizhong personally led soldiers to attack the peaceful meeting before assaulting the monastery on March 26. As noted above, Qing reports, however, asserted that Wu's soldiers were responding to the gathered Bapas destroying reclaimed fields and killing Sichuanese farmers. His illegitimacy now comparable to that of his recently arrived superior, the authors of the petition accused Wu Yizhong of colluding with Feng-quan "to thoroughly transfer the people of Batang—Han and Khampa, commoner and monk—to the dominion of *yangren* 洋人 (foreigners)."

Zha Qian 查騫 (n.d.), who assumed the *liangtai* post in Litang several months after events in the Parrot's Beak, pointed to a similar rumour spreading throughout the valley as the catalyst for Bapas attacking reclamation fields. "[T]he short uniforms of his bodyguard (*weibing* 衛兵), their *yang* (foreign) drums and *yang* (foreign) drills all introduced by *yangren* (foreigners) indicated that Feng-quan was not an imperial commissioner sent by the Emperor." According to this rumour, "He will confiscate our land, livestock, and property and bequeath them to *yangren* (foreigners)."⁵⁷ Having likely read the petition, Zha appears to conflate its statements in associating the "foreignness" of the Assistant Amban's soldiers with Bapa perceptions of his illegitimacy, but throughout the text, its authors instead credited his improper actions—and his soldiers' assault on the monastery led by Wu Yizhong. Nevertheless, Zha's characterization did highlight a new concern for the foreign presence in Batang perhaps more significant than offending the gods or Lhasa monasteries—falling under their dominion. But was this a reference to the French or the British? Writing in 1902, the French missionary Jean-André Soulié (1858–1905) (Ch. Sulie 蘇烈), who visited Mussot in Batang in late March 1905 and was himself tortured and killed near his mission station in Yarigang

⁵⁷ Zha 1990: vol. 2, 2b.

(Yar ri sgang; Ch. Yarigong 亞日貢) in mid-April, observed, "Due to its geographical position, the principality of Batang, close to Yunnan, seems destined to enter the zone of countries under French influence."⁵⁸

Available records cannot confirm the nature of Feng-quan's relationship with the missionaries in Batang, though he apparently had good rapport with the French during his time in Chengdu and environs.⁵⁹ Both he and the French perceived Ba Chode Monastery as the greatest impediment to their respective pursuits, thus the missionaries likely supported his efforts to weaken the monks' apparent domination of both the commoners and the two *depa*. As noted above, Mussot provided advice to the Assistant Amban on at least one occasion, and as the climate in the valley deteriorated, Feng-quan advised the priest to vacate his mission and seek refuge in the junior *depa*'s residence, though he never arrived.⁶⁰ As with previous Qing officials posted to Batang, including Wu Xizhen, Feng-quan was bound by treaty to ensure the safety of the missionaries, which may have been perceived as his privileging them over the Bapas. But aside from the brief sequence of phrases juxtaposing the two, the petition drew no explicit connection between Feng-quan and the French missionaries.

The narrative which coalesced in the years immediately following the Batang Incident, both within China and beyond, focused on British, not French imperial designs on the Tibetan Plateau.⁶¹ Representative of this perspective, in a 1910 article detailing the previous decade's events in Kham, the French explorer and diplomat Charles Eudes Bonin (1865–1929) erroneously credited Feng-quan for initiating land reclamation, mistakenly portraying this and his appointment as the Qing's direct response to the Younghusband Expedition.⁶² The emperor's second edict reaffirming Feng-quan's appointment on October 3, 1904, indeed implicitly associated British incursion and the signing of the Lhasa Convention with the new Assistant Amban's mandate. Demonstrating his awareness of these events in central Tibet, Feng-quan, too, mentioned the Convention in an October 27 letter to his wife, but only as a factor in deciding if British presence should influence

⁵⁸ BNA, FO 228/2561 D48, Enclosure No. 1 in Mr. Hoffe's letter No. 16A to Sir E. Satow, March 19, 1906.

⁵⁹ Forges 1973: 75.

⁶⁰ Deshayes 2008: 140.

⁶¹ Note that the only provocative action in Tibetan regions of either imperial power was Younghusband's march to Lhasa, and that British Indian rupees passed current throughout much of Kham in 1905, see Relyea 2016.

⁶² Bonin, "Le tueur de lamas," *Revue de Paris* 12 (March-April 1910): 658.

whether to reside in Chamdo or in Batang.⁶³ Yet the origins of each component of his mandate predated the Younghusband Expedition, and the emperor's initial appointment edict months earlier made no mention of the British.

In October 1903, two months before the British Indian army crossed into Tibet, Feng-quan's immediate predecessor, Gui-lin 桂霖 (b. 1848), submitted a memorial several months into his tenure as Assistant Amban proposing to move the post from Lhasa to Chamdo, where he planned to recruit and train local soldiers. Two months earlier, a group of Sichuan officials submitted a memorial seeking appointment of a high-level official to manage the Sichuan-Tibet border region and initiate both mining and land reclamation, the latter investigated as early as December 1903 by Wu Xizhen at Xi-liang's direction.⁶⁴ Notably, neither the Batang petition nor official reports of the Batang Incident mentioned British incursion into central Tibet, nor did they suggest Bapa actions were influenced by Lhasa's monasteries, to which French missionaries had attributed previous instances of persecution. Rather, the catalyst for action, the motivation to violence when all other recourses had seemingly evaporated, arose within the Batang Valley, among the Khampas, both commoner and monk, in reaction to the intensification of shifting Qing policies, the perceived illegitimacy of an Assistant Amban, the improper actions of Feng-quan and his bodyguard from Chengdu, as well as the actions of Wu Yizhong. The petition asserted that Feng-quan's actions, such as the population register, threatened not only indigenous, but also Han commoners, thus reiterating that Bapa actions sought to preserve—not challenge—the emperor's legitimate authority. The petition's final section evinced an even greater desperation, but also a hint of defiance, revealing the root catalyst for Bapa resistance.

Though his article conflated several actors and events, producing historical errors, Bonin cast the Bapa petition as less an appeal for mercy than an expression of the "lamas' insolence," almost daring the Qing to attack, capturing both the text's closing tone and the climate in Batang in the aftermath of April 5.⁶⁵ Tucked between lengthy, solemn pleas for leniency, contingent admissions of guilt, and praise for the Emperor's benevolence, one of which is quoted above, the petition warned the Emperor not to send another official leading soldiers into Batang. The text threatened abandonment of all imperial courier

⁶³ FJJ, No. 243 in *Guangxu Xuanton liang chao shangyu dang* 30: 61 and "Pingzi Letter no. 2," October 27, 1904: 58.

⁶⁴ Mei Xinru 1934, 213; QCBDS, No. 0001, November 16, 1903: 1–2; XYGZG, No. 342: 365–366.

⁶⁵ Bonin 1910: 659.

stations between Litang and Ladun (Lha mdun; Ch. Nandun 南墩) at the border with central Tibet southwest of Batang, thereby obstructing Qing correspondence with Lhasa. "We are prepared to exterminate the people and devastate the land, leaving nary a chicken, dog, or blade of grass. We vow to uproot everything with no regret." Indeed, even as its authors composed the Batang petition, Khampa men, some armed with matchlocks, fortified strategic mountain passes leading into Batang and along the southern road toward Litang.⁶⁶ The petition ended with a final pledge of obeisance—only if the emperor pardoned their actions would the people of Batang acknowledge their guilt, allow imperial correspondence to travel unfettered, forever remember and submit to his grace.

While the petition carefully enumerated the Assistant Amban's improper actions as the justification for resistance later dubbed the Batang Incident, this final threat revealed the root catalyst for both resistance and the penultimate act—the slaughter of Feng-quan in the Parrot's Beak. It was not the "foreignness" of Feng-quan, his bodyguard or his drilling methods, nor his perhaps favouring the true foreigners in their midst—French missionaries. Both were mentioned in only a brief sequence of phrases early in the petition. It was not his improper actions nor his perhaps dancing atop Bapa roofs. Rather, it was the authors' warning of apocalyptic consequences if another Qing official were to arrive with soldiers not merely to punish the community, but also to expand the land reclamation plans cautiously initiated by Wu Xizhen many months before Feng-quan's arrival, or to implement other new policies like the population register and limiting the population of monasteries. Through the petition, the people of the Batang Valley implicitly declared their opposition to any Qing official henceforth seizing land on which the commoners and monasteries depended for livelihood and revenue, intensifying settlement of Batang with Sichuanese farmers, strengthening imperial authority by introducing Sichuanese soldiers and training indigenous recruits. In effect, they opposed the implementation of policies inflected by the New Policy reforms then sweeping China proper and only beginning to trickle into its frontier regions.

Needing not only to justify the slaughter of Feng-quan and Wu Yizhong, but also to dissuade the Emperor from retribution, the petition sought to appease him with reverence and recognition of imperial dominion by contrasting the legitimate Qing official—Wu Xizhen—with the illegitimate Feng-quan. Thus, since its authors could not directly criticize Wu's cautious initiation of land reclamation, which was the

⁶⁶ QCBDS, No. 0036: 52.

emperor's policy, the petition instead displaced the focus onto the egregious, improper actions of the Assistant Amban and his bodyguard in support of aggressively intensifying a legitimate policy. Whether planned or not, violence near Tsasho Village in late March effectively halted if not also curtailed land reclamation in Batang, an outcome which the petition's quixotic forbiddance of new Qing officials sought to preserve. However, by displacing the cause of violence onto Feng-quan himself, by briefly mentioning his drilling both bodyguards and indigenous recruits in a foreign style, juxtaposed with denouncement of the French presence in Batang, the petition opened the door for others to misconstrue the catalyst for resistance and violence in the narrative coalescing in subsequent years. The Khampas by killing not only Mussot in Batang and Soulié in nearby Yarrigang, but later two French priests near Dechen (Bde chen; Ch. Adunzi 阿敦子) in Yunnan,⁶⁷ provided further legitimacy for the coalescing narrative's focus on the "foreign."

After Sichuan Provincial Military Commander Ma Weiqi 馬維騏 (1845–1910) had fought his way along the southern road at the head of an army of 2,500 soldiers, reaching Batang town on July 26, 1905, he immediately seized both the junior and senior *depa*. Though they had offered to mediate between the Qing general and the monks of Ba Chode Monastery, Ma, like Zha Qian and other officials, believed that the pair shared culpability for plotting Feng-quan's demise with the primary instigator, the monastery's *khenpo*, who was captured on August 14.⁶⁸ All three were beheaded, along with the man accused of striking the final blow in the Parrot's Beak. Yet the petition asserted that the slaughter of both Wu Yizhong and Feng-quan occurred "in a moment of derangement." Offering some corroboration, though of uncertain reliability, a man who purportedly "escaped" from Batang blamed the Assistant Amban's last words to the local community for his own death. While departing the senior *depa*'s residence for the last time, Feng-quan reportedly pointed to a Khampa child and proclaimed, "Just wait until I return, this child certainly will not live, and I will command that nary a chicken or dog remain in this place." According to the tale, a man who heard these defiant words relayed them to a group of Khampas who then followed the Assistant Amban and his retinue out of the valley.⁶⁹ Perhaps Feng-quan's slaughter in the Parrot's Beak was not preordained.

⁶⁷ Known today in Chinese as Deqin 德钦.

⁶⁸ QCBDS, No. 0047, September 11, 1905: 61–64; and "Batang jiyao," *Sichuan guanbao* 24 (October 18, 1905): 1a.

⁶⁹ You-tai 1988: vol. 9, 34b.

From “Foreign” to “External” to “Imperialist”

Recently, the *khenpo* spread deceptions to incite the Batang people to rebel, compelling Feng-quan to send his soldiers to impose heaven's punishment. Although his soldiers fought bravely without support, the angry mob swelled swiftly, ferociously achieving its evil scheme, annihilating the upright official and his soldiers. Zhong Jun died unexpectedly when the Nanyue people attacked Han envoys, and Zhou Chu perished suddenly when the Western Qiang people raised a disturbance on the Jin frontier. It is the same today as in ancient times, misfortune befalls loyalty.

— Imperial inscription on Feng-quan's memorial tablet⁷⁰

昨者巴塘構釁，堪布
譸張，爾以牙兵，往
申天討，雖孤軍敢
戰，而群醜滋多，逞
其惡上之凶，奄致殲
良之酷。南越之攻漢
使，竟殞終軍，西羌
之擾晉疆，頓亡周
處。忠誠遭禍，今古
同符。

The imperial inscription on his memorial stele embedded Feng-quan's sacrifice in China's long history of loyal officials martyred in frontier disturbances. Like the Assistant Amban, both Zhong Jun 終軍 (133–112 BCE), a Han Dynasty scholar, and Zhou Chu 周處 (236–297 CE), a Jin Dynasty general, were celebrated as virtuous officials stoically confronting impossible odds in service to their emperor. While posted as envoy to the Nanyue Kingdom in 112 BCE, accompanied by 2,000 soldiers, Zhong Jun perished in a “rebellion” led by the prime minister who opposed his pressuring the newly enthroned king to acquiesce to Han imperial dominion. Four centuries later, in 297 CE, Zhou Chu died at the head of an army of 5,000 soldiers despatched to Liangshan 涼山 to suppress some 70,000 Qiang “rebels.” Outnumbered in a distant corner of the empire, Zhou Chu perhaps knew he was doomed, like Feng-quan, as he confronted armed locals by early April. Zhong Jun was perhaps unaware of the magnitude of opposition to Han intrusion simmering within Nanyue society, like Feng-quan when he decided to intensify land reclamation and diminish the monastery's population and power soon after arriving in Batang.

From the Emperor's perspective, Zhong Jun, Zhou Chu, and Feng-quan all were killed by a community deceived by powerful, ungrateful leaders, unwilling to accept the civilizational benefits of imperial grace—and defiantly obstructing either the expansion or

⁷⁰ FJJ, “Feng-quan Batang xunnan”: 327.

strengthening of imperial authority in their lands. Though period maps, both Chinese and foreign, depicted the region of Kham from Dartsedo west to Batang and the Ningjing Mountain boundary with Tibet proper as part of Sichuan Province, other than Dartsedo, no Kham polities were ruled directly as part of Qing bureaucratic administration, thus limiting real imperial authority.⁷¹ While initial assessments partly blamed the Assistant Amban himself, paralleling the Batang petition's displacement of focus away from shifting Qing borderland policies, these two legends complemented the narrative beginning to coalesce as Feng-quan's coffin reached Chengdu more than six months after his demise. By citing the *khenpo's* "deception," the inscription absolved Batang's commoners of culpability, reflecting widespread perception of Khampa subservience to the monasteries' will, but did not displace blame to distant, "external" forces based in Lhasa, as had French narratives of their earlier persecutions. This would change in the years following the Xinhai Revolution of 1911.

In diary entries from the weeks following Feng-quan's slaughter, You-tai assessed various reports from Batang, suggesting that the Assistant Amban bore some responsibility for events spiralling out of control. In an entry from April 30, he praised a report from a local official, possibly one of the two *depa*, who complained that the Assistant Amban should not have treated him poorly and questioned why the emperor would appoint such an abominable person as his commissioner in the region. The Amban's entry from the very next day related a report blaming Feng-quan's demise on his drilling both bodyguards and recruits with foreign weapons and his plan to defrock some 1,200 monks of Ba Chode Monastery, neither reportedly supported by the two *depa* or the Qing officials in town. Nevertheless, You-tai emphasized the Assistant Amban's condescending demeanour toward the Bapas while focusing on increased opposition to his monastery policy.⁷² Indeed, Zha Qian observed that Feng-quan had grown accustomed to insulting any Khampa he encountered, apparently unconcerned about potential reprisal, while Bons d'Anty observed, "Feng is a sadist, unbalanced and quick to enter into fits of uncontrollable rage."⁷³ Such sentiment, though, was absent from official assessment of the Batang Incident, including a memorial in which You-tai integrated several reports received from local informants.

Though the amban centered blame squarely on the primary instigators of the violence, the *khenpo* and the two *depa*, his memorial did not seem to fully exonerate the Assistant Amban. Accordingly, he advised

⁷¹ Relyea 2015: 989–990.

⁷² You-tai: vol. 8, 37a–38a.

⁷³ Zha 1990 : vol. 2, 2b and FMAE, 148CPCOM/70, Annexe no. 5, Dépêche no. 37, Bons d'Anty à la Légation de la République Française en Chine, April 29, 1905.

the emperor to execute only the “heads of the bandits” while eschewing punishment for residents of the Batang Valley, which reflected widespread, underlying perceptions of Khampas lacking agency, utterly beholden to the monasteries. But in characterising their resistance as “unusual,” You-tai perhaps alluded to Feng-quan’s disruptive presence and abusive demeanour, implicitly suggesting his partial culpability. He observed that Tibetans, though often belligerent could nonetheless be amenable to imperial authority when treated with respect, which was not forthcoming from the Assistant Amban.⁷⁴ Although Ma Weiqi similarly implied that Feng-quan might have exacerbated the situation, Xi-liang perceived that he bore no accountability whatsoever, implicitly also absolving imperial policy as catalyst for the disturbance.

Describing for the Japanese traveller Yamakawa Sōsui 山川早水 (n.d.) the climate in Batang when the Assistant Amban arrived, General Ma focused on the same trio as You-tai. “At that time, the local rulers and head lama were extremely brutal, treating the people harshly and tyrannising the women, wielding their power to abuse everyone.” Though noting his support for seizing control of gold mines as possible cause, Ma firmly asserted that it was Feng-quan’s threatening posture toward the monastery, his angering the monks that ultimately incited the violence that ended in his demise.⁷⁵ In neither of his first two memorials from late April or early May 1905 did Xi-liang credit Feng-quan’s actions or policies as catalysts for violence, rather emphasizing that he died for a “just cause,” but his September 11 memorial detailing final suppression of the rebellion did introduce the Assistant Amban’s desire to dramatically expand reclamation. The Governor-general, though, seemed to discount this as catalyst, instead, like Ma, focusing on local reaction to the Assistant Amban’s plan to limit the monastery’s population.⁷⁶ By his final memorials on the matter from October and December, Xi-liang referred to Feng-quan as a “martyr,” expressly blaming the *khenpo* for inciting violence, colluding with both *depa* to spread nefarious rumors against the imperial policy of land reclamation.

The text of these two memorials seemed also to counter specific assertions in the Batang petition, as well as criticism of the Assistant Amban’s character. Praising him as a loyal and brave official, thoroughly devoted to his duties, the Governor-general explicitly affirmed

⁷⁴ QZZ, “Bafei qianghai Feng-quan mou luan yi chi hanfan guanbing yanfang zhe”: 1208–1209.

⁷⁵ Yamakawa 1909: 155.

⁷⁶ QCBDS, No. 0035, April 25, 1905: 49; and XYGZG, No. 443, May 8, 1905: 477–479 and No. 474, September 11, 1905: 512–516.

that Feng-quan “never severely punished a single person nor harshly enforced a single policy” in Batang. Indeed, in every official post, he demonstrated a selfless commitment to protect the people from external bandits, just as in Batang. By relating his actions to those of Lu Chuanlin and Xi-liang’s predecessor, Cen Chunxuan 岑春煊 (1861–1933), the October 1905 memorial embedded Feng-quan’s actions in a decade of efforts to strengthen Qing authority in Kham, thus confirming Feng-quan as the Emperor’s legitimate commissioner taking proper action to enact the Emperor’s policies.⁷⁷ This displacement of blame from the Assistant Amban, however, perhaps inadvertently acknowledged newly implemented imperial policies as the root catalyst for Bapa resistance, though the coalescing historical narrative would center on a different part of the petition.

You-tai included a report about Feng-quan’s bodyguard and recruits drilling with foreign weapons in his May 1 diary entry, but no mention of “foreignness” appeared in his May 31 memorial to the Emperor, suggesting the Amban perceived this as insignificant to understanding the cause of violence in Batang.⁷⁸ Xi-liang also mentioned the Assistant Amban drilling his soldiers in foreign methods in a late July memorial that quoted from the concluding section of an alternate version of the Batang petition analysed above. This version, perhaps addressed to the Sichuan Governor-general, prefaced a similar warning of dire consequences if—in this case—Sichuan were to send soldiers into the valley, by relating Feng-quan’s slaughter to both drilling and his purportedly privileging foreigners in Batang.⁷⁹ Nevertheless, since reference to perceptions of the Assistant Amban’s “foreignness” were absent from Xi-liang’s subsequent memorials, it would seem that he, like You-tai, perceived this as insignificant to understanding the catalyst of the Batang Incident.

The first memorial to explicitly link this perception of Feng-quan with Khampa resistance in 1905 was prepared by Fu Songmu 傅嵩炆 (1870–1929), the second and last Qing official to hold the post of Sichuan-Yunnan Frontier Commissioner (*Chuandian bianwu dachen* 川滇

⁷⁷ QCBDS, No. 0051, 4 October 1905: 66–67 and XYGZG, No. 496: 538–540.

⁷⁸ See You-tai: vol. 8, 37b–38a and QZZ, “Bafei qianghai Feng-quan mou luan yi chi hanfan guanbing yanfang zhe”: 1208–1209.

⁷⁹ QZZ, No. 474: 514. The people of Batang reportedly prepared four different versions of their petition; the one analysed here and available in QCBDS was addressed to the magistrate of Dartsedo, Liu Tingshu, but intended for the Emperor’s eyes. Bons d’Anty translated a second, much shorter petition which text encompassed only the desperation and defiance, the implicit threat with which the petition analysed above concluded, FMAE, 148CPCOM/70, Annexe no. 2, Dépêche no. 39.

邊務大臣). A comprehensive history of Kham from the beginning of the 20th century, the memorial never reached the emperor, arrested in Chengdu by the advent of the Railway Rights Protection Movement and broader Xinhai Revolution in late 1911. However, his characterization of events in Kham spread widely when *Account of the Establishment of Xikang Province* (*Xikang jianshengji* 西康建省記) was first printed for distribution in 1912, then republished in serialised form the following year in the Shanghai periodical *Eastern Miscellany* (*Dongfang zazhi* 東方雜誌). Under the section, “A history of bureaucratization in Batang” (*Batang gailiuji* 巴塘改流記), Fu wrote, “The bodyguard accompanying Feng-quan all drilled in *yang* (foreign) ways and played *yang* (foreign) musical instruments. Suspecting that they were foreign officials, local residents obstructed land reclamation.” Though the petition articulated no such causation, a Batang informant quoted in You-tai’s diary presented a similar suspicion.

The entry from late July, nearly two months after the amban had submitted his memorial on the incident, included details contradicting an oft-repeated legend of Feng-quan’s last moments. Forced out of his chair and to the ground on reaching the Parrot’s Beak in this tale, the Assistant Amban was left stomping his feet and sighing as the informant and his accomplices fled with the empty palanquin. With his body crumpled to the ground after a bullet pierced his temple, his Khampa assailants proceeded to pluck every hair of his beard while musing aloud whether he was truly the Emperor’s commissioner or in fact a foreigner in disguise.⁸⁰ Writing in 1918, Zha Qian transformed these musings reported to You-tai and the suspicions related by Fu into fact by citing a rumour from the time, quoted above, which explicitly asserted that the “foreignness” of the Assistant Amban’s soldiers was the catalyst not only for obstructing reclamation, but also violent unrest.⁸¹ In his introduction to a selection of Feng-quan’s memorials published in the early 1980s, Wu Fengpei 吳豐培 (1909–1996), an astute scholar of Tibet since the 1930s and strong proponent of strengthening ROC rule in Kham and Tibet, further crystallised this narrative of the Batang Incident. Praising the Assistant Amban’s actions as essential to reinforce Sichuan authority in its borderlands thereby protecting Tibet, Wu condemned as “slander” You-tai’s criticism of the Assistant Amban in his diary but did not follow Xi-liang in casting the Assistant Amban as a martyr. Instead, like Fu and Zha, he focused on the brief observation in the petition to affirm that Feng-quan drilling his bodyguard and indigenous recruits with foreign methods was the catalyst

⁸⁰ You-tai: vol. 9, 32b–33a.

⁸¹ Zha 1990: vol. 2, 2b–3a.

for discontent among the monks and others, sparking unrest culminating in the Parrot's Beak.⁸²

Even if describing Feng-quan's condescending demeanour toward the Khampas, even if mentioning his effort to reduce the monastic population or his intensification of land reclamation in the valley, subsequent discussion of the Batang Incident followed this narrative, blaming the "foreignness" of Feng-quan for Khampa resistance. A detailed discussion of his 102 days in Batang in the *Batang County Gazetteer* (*Batang xianzhi* 巴塘縣志) epitomises this. Embellishing parts of the petition and rumors purportedly spread by angry monks, both discussed above, and asserting that the local population was "disgusted" by Feng-quan's many "foreign ways," even claiming that the hairs of his beard were red, the gazetteer text unequivocally stated that many believed he was in fact a foreigner.⁸³ Foreign scholars, too, came to accept this narrative, for instance S.A.M. Adshead who wrote later in the century, "Anti-foreignism produced the final outbreak."⁸⁴ Although this narrative displaced focus from newly implemented Qing policies, the root catalyst for resistance articulated in the petition, the influence of global concepts transforming these policies was perhaps greater and more distressing to the people of Batang.

Land reclamation in frontier regions implemented by farmer-soldiers was not new in Chinese imperial history, indeed such settlements appear in the historical record as early as the Han dynasty (202 B.C.E – 220 CE).⁸⁵ Proposing to limit the population of monks in Tibetan Buddhist monasteries also was not new, as discussed above, nor was training indigenous recruits to serve as imperial soldiers protecting its frontiers. The main tasks in the Assistant Amban's mandate, employing soldiers as farmers in reclaiming and cultivating wastelands and training recruits, thus was embedded in two millennia of imperial frontier policy. Yet Feng-quan's methods in 1905 reflected the influence of European and Japanese models on Qing New Policy reforms. More significantly, the method and goals of their implementation also responded to a changing global reality touching the Tibetan Plateau with the 19th century emergence of the "Great Game" in Central Asia between the Russian and British Empires, joined by the Qing in the first years of the 20th century.

A trio of memorials submitted in July 1901 by Zhang Zhidong 張之洞 (1837–1909), Governor-general of Huguang Province 湖廣省, and

⁸² QZZ, "Feng-quan zhu Zang zougao": 1273.

⁸³ *Batang xianzhi*, 251–252.

⁸⁴ Adshead 1984: 66

⁸⁵ Yu 1986: 377–462.

the influential official Liu Kunyi 劉坤一 (1830–1902), dubbed a “blue-print” by the Court, articulated two of the central concerns in the New Policies: modernization of the army and administration of the Qing territorial bureaucracy.⁸⁶ Though the latter focused primarily inward through judicial and constitutional reform, in Kham and other imperial frontiers like Xinjiang 新疆 and the Mongolian grasslands north of Beijing, these reforms manifest during the first decade of the 20th century in the extension of that bureaucratic structure accompanied by the infusion of settlers from *neidi*. The resultant strengthening of Qing authority internally and its demonstration of governmental competence within these territories externally satisfied in principle the newly globalizing norm of territorial sovereignty, which demonstration could forestall global imperialist incursion.⁸⁷ Lu Chuanlin recognised this relationship in the last years of the 19th century when he recommended replacing indigenous Khampa rulers with magistrates appointed from *neidi*, a long-standing imperial frontier policy known as *gaitu guiliu* 改土歸流 (bureaucratization). This would become a central component of the actions of Zhao Erfeng 趙爾豐 (1845–1911) in the aftermath of the Batang Incident, one which success depended on an influx of Han commoners from Sichuan settling on continuously expanding reclaimed lands.⁸⁸ With Xi-liang’s support, Feng-quan too had planned to recruit Sichuanese commoners to tend reclaimed fields in the Batang Valley, and he had expressed support while in Dartsedo for replacing indigenous Khampa rulers.

From the beginning of his tenure as Sichuan Governor-general in September 1903, Xi-liang initiated New Policy reforms. He focused first on training new-style army units (*xinjun* 新軍), which he deemed essential to the Qing Empire’s survival in general and to “halting lawlessness” within the province. He then turned to training a modern police force, which he deemed essential for maintaining peace and regulating morality among the urban populace and quelling the sprouts of calamity outside towns and cities.⁸⁹ Such new army soldiers accompanied Ma Weiqi on his punitive mission to Batang and formed the core of Zhao Erfeng’s frontier army afterward, but it is important to note that new army soldiers did not accompany Feng-quan on his journey west. Foreign instructors, many from Japan, in newly established

⁸⁶ Reynolds 1993: 129–130; Li 2007: vol. 2, 210–213.

⁸⁷ On the relationship between the New Policies and the emerging principle of sovereignty in Qing China’s frontier regions, see Relyea 2017.

⁸⁸ On the consolidation of territorial authority through settlement in Kham, see Relyea 2019.

⁸⁹ On Xi-liang’s implementation of the New Policies in Sichuan, see He 1995 and XYGZG, No. 520, March 29, 1906: 566–567.

schools and training academies not only educated these soldiers and police officers, but also supported Xi-liang's parallel effort to improve agriculture and bring peace and stability to the hinterlands of Sichuan.⁹⁰ Wu Xizhen's limited initial endeavor to reclaim wastelands in Batang beginning in mid-1904 is a product of the Governor-general's goal of strengthening Qing authority, as was the Assistant Amban's intensification of this policy.

In the half dozen years before Xi-liang took charge in Sichuan, Feng-quan had established his credentials suppressing rebellion and bringing peace to unsettled areas. First as magistrate of Zi Sub-prefecture (Zizhou 資州), situated in the Red Basin near Chengdu, in 1898 he trained a militia of local inhabitants and others from nearby jurisdictions that eliminated a band of rebels led by Tang Cuiping 唐翠屏 (n.d.) who had been terrorizing the town. Four years later, in Jiading Prefecture (Jiadingfu 嘉定府), also near Chengdu, Feng-quan again raised a militia, this time to defeat bandits who had been disrupting commerce along the banks of the Min River. His efforts were reportedly so successful that no bandit dared enter the sub-prefecture as long as he was in charge. Under the new Governor-general, Feng-quan served as Deputy Military Commander (*fudutong* 副都統) and also headed Chengdu's newly trained police force before accepting the post in Tibet.⁹¹ Feng-quan's record and commitment to New Policy reforms may have encouraged Xi-liang to appoint him Assistant Amban, but Feng-quan's overconfidence in the power of these reforms might also have contributed to his failure to curb resistance to his perceived improper actions in Batang.

Wu Fengpei suggested that Feng-quan's impatience fostered a misbelief that marching a troop of transformed indigenous recruits through the dirt streets of Batang would awe both *depa* and the monastery into renewed submission.⁹² The 50 men comprising his bodyguard and tasked with training these recruits in Batang, however, were recent graduates of Chengdu's Police Academy, not provincial military academies. In a situation quite different from the hinterlands of *neidi*, their training likely left them unprepared to quell simmering resistance among a non-Han population in the frontier, which Feng-quan acknowledged in a March letter to Liu Tingshu.⁹³ The Assistant

⁹⁰ He 1995: 142–144. On the influence of German, Japanese, and Russian models on Qing military reforms in particular, see Wang Jianhua 1995.

⁹¹ Anon., "Duxian zouqing jianli Feng dachen zhuan ci bing qing yu shi li zhuan zhe" *Sichuan guanbao* 32 (January 4, 1906): 6b–7a; Zhao Erxun 1997 [1928]: 3229–3230; and BNA, "Thibetan Affairs," FO 228/1549, General Series No. 16.

⁹² QZZ, "Feng-quan zhu Zang zougao": 1273.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, "Zhi han Liu Tingshu qing cui diao weidui fu Batang zhu fang," March 24,

Amban too confronted conditions quite different from his previous postings in *neidi*, realising in the first days of April that the one hundred Bapa recruits were not as dependable as the militias he had trained in Zizhou or Jiadingfu. Though unfamiliar and perhaps disconcerting, neither enduring foreign drilling nor wearing different insignia alone could have compelled the recruits to abandon the Assistant Amban. Rather, when the bullets started flying in late March, they likely abandoned him because their sympathies lay with the local population reacting to his improper actions.

The Khampas resisted these policies not only because they threatened their livelihood, especially Feng-quan's extractive actions, but also their society. Seizing lands for reclamation previously overseen by the *depa* and especially Ba Chode Monastery diminished their respective financial bases and thus their local power. Hoping to populate these lands with Han settlers from *neidi*, defrocking more than 1,000 monks and disrupting the tradition that at least one male child from each Khampa family take monastic vows would similarly weaken the monastery's societal penetration and thus its influence within Batang. The resultant strengthening of Qing authority over local society was a central objective of New Policy reforms across China, evincing the influence of globalizing norms in the concomitant reorientation in the internal methods and new external goals for such old imperial frontier policies as land reclamation and bureaucratization.

Since Qing officials perceived Kham monasteries as conduits of influence either for the monasteries of Lhasa or for the Dalai Lama himself, the projection of governmental competence effected by these policies was crucial to demonstrate Qing sovereignty in Kham, whether to British India and Imperial Russia—or to Lhasa. This was especially true since the abbots of Kham monasteries were appointed from Lhasa and Qing officials perceived Khampas as subservient to their manipulation. Implementation of these policies with new external goals and transformed internal methods, both influenced by globalizing norms, was perhaps even more critical for governance in Kham and across the Tibetan Plateau during the first years of the succeeding Republic of China. Thus, in the dominant narrative of the Batang Incident, the "foreignness" of the New Policies implemented in Kham was first displaced onto the superficial "foreignness" of Feng-quan and his bodyguard—mentioned only fleetingly in the Batang petition. Following the collapse of Zhao Erfeng's frontier army and Han settlers fleeing for Sichuan proper in the aftermath of the Xinhai Revolution, however, intensified Khampa resistance to the advent of ROC rule and the reinvigoration of these policies necessitated another

displacement centered on “external” instigators, not merely superficial markers of “foreignness.”

After Ma Weiqi departed Batang, Zhao, appointed the first Sichuan-Yunnan Frontier Commissioner, quelled remaining resistance east of the Ningjing Mountains, then sent his army to expand direct Qing control west of the range, to within 250 kilometers of Lhasa. Promulgated in 1907, forty-three Regulations for the Reconstruction of Batang (*Batang shanhou zhangcheng* 巴塘善後章程) served as the blueprint for his comprehensive endeavor to transform both governance and society across Kham by further expanding the policies intensified by the Assistant Amban, thereby deepening the imprint of New Policy reforms on the region. Though much of his endeavor crumbled along with Qing imperial rule by early 1912, Yin Changheng 尹昌衡 (1884–1953), the first Republican era frontier commissioner in Kham, attempted both to resuscitate its many policies and to reinstate his predecessor’s expansive territorial control, but was largely stymied by intense—and better armed—Khampa resistance.⁹⁴ ROC authority remained ambiguous on the ground throughout Kham until the 1939 establishment of Xikang Province (Xikang *sheng* 西康省), though this ambiguity arguably continued even under the governorship of the warlord Liu Wenhui 劉文輝 (1895–1976).⁹⁵

After Feng-quan and his bodyguard perished in the Parrot’s Beak, resistance to policies implemented by Zhao, Yin, and their successors could no longer be attributed to foreign demeanour or appearance. Thus, the narrative initially fostered by the Batang Incident to explain resistance to policies intended to improve Khampas’ lives, introduce “civilization” as Zhao, Xi-liang, and others had asserted, displaced blame to the monasteries of Kham as conduits of instigation by external forces. Throughout the 20th century, this displacement onto an external stimulus oscillated between the Dalai Lama and “imperialists.” In the years following the Xinhai Revolution, the narrative focused on British imperialism, reinjecting the Younghusband Expedition as an important stimulus.

By the 1930s, “The Tibet Question” (*Xizang wenti* 西藏問題) and “The Xikang Question” (*Xikang wenti* 西康問題) had become topics of concern in ROC government and society. Five books published before 1940 carried the former title and one the latter, while dozens more publications addressed either concern in studies of China’s borderlands,

⁹⁴ For a discussion of Zhao and Yin, see Relyea 2015. For the forty-three regulations, see Sichuan Provincial Archives, Chengdu, Qing 7–74; and ZECZ, “Gaitu guiliu,” 1907: 190–197.

⁹⁵ On Xikang, see Lawson 2013.

its nationalities, or the regions themselves. Asserting its influence on events in the region, the author's foreword to *The Xikang Question* (1930) emphasized the disruptive role of British imperialism in Tibet, the text later detailing each incidence and the stipulations of all relevant treaties, including the Lhasa Convention.⁹⁶ Despite the violence wrought by Younghusband several years earlier, the Tibetan government welcomed British support following the Thirteenth Dalai Lama's flight to India in 1910, prompted by Zhao Erfeng sending part of his frontier army to Lhasa.⁹⁷ British influence in Lhasa continued to deepen alongside greater attention to the situation in Kham after negotiations at the tri-partite Simla Convention (1913–1914) stalled over the territorial extent of ROC sovereignty on the Tibetan Plateau.⁹⁸ To Chinese observers at the time—and in historical works since—any British interaction with Tibet was deemed imperialism, and indigenous resistance to Chinese actions in Kham or elsewhere on the plateau before 1950 a consequence of imperialist instigation. On Feng-quan, *The Xikang Question* stated that he and his soldiers were killed by the abbot and *depa* after the Assistant Amban's rebuke.⁹⁹ There was no mention of the people of Batang nor their obstructing implementation of new Qing policies. After stating that Ma Weiqi executed the *khenpo* and more than 500 Bapas, including Lungpon Namgyel, the text turned in the subsequent dozen pages to detailing British imperialism from the mid-19th century through the Xinhai Revolution, grounding resistance in this stimulus.

While one of the five *Tibet Question* books, that by Chen Jianfu 陳健夫, included no discussion of Kham, the other four all cited British imperialism and especially the Younghusband Expedition as catalysts for unrest in Batang.¹⁰⁰ The text by Xie Bin 謝彬, published in 1935, offered the most comprehensive discussion of Feng-quan's tenure in the valley, in a section which quoted extensively from Fu Songmu's 1911 memorial crediting his implementation of policies to strengthen Qing authority for the unrest. Paralleling *The Xikang Question*, Xie alone explicitly blamed the monasteries for inciting the Bapas to violence, while the other three texts mentioned only the people—often characterised as a mob (*zhong* 眾)—for slaughtering the Assistant Amban. The author of each text other than Xie, including *The Xikang Question*, conflated history to render the Younghusband Expedition as the sole

⁹⁶ Chen Zhongwei 1930.

⁹⁷ See Fabienne Jagou article in this RET issue.

⁹⁸ On the Simla Convention, see Acharya 2022.

⁹⁹ Chen Zhongwei 1930: 20.

¹⁰⁰ Wang Qinyu 1929; Hua 1930; Qin Moshen 1931; Chen Jianfu 1935; and Xie Bin 1935.

impetus for Feng-quan's appointment, erroneously crediting the Assistant Amban for initiating land reclamation and related policies to strengthen Qing authority. By characterising the Bapas as a "mob," a term also used by Xie, each text displaced agency from the local population, thoroughly expunging from the narrative the catalyst for resistance articulated in the Batang petition—shifting Qing borderland policies. Indeed, the people—Tibetan or Khampa—as autonomous actors were largely absent from these six texts, which instead emphasized incitement by monasteries, cast as agents of forces external to Kham—the Dalai Lama or central Tibetan monasteries—or by an abstract imperialist threat to Tibet writ large, sometimes both. As resistance to intrusive policies in Kham persisted following the Xinhai Revolution, intensifying in subsequent decades, this elision and focus on British imperialism as external catalyst pervaded other Chinese publications throughout the 1930s and 1940s.

In a 1942 history of Kham and Tibet, Ren Naiqiang 任乃強 (1894–1989), one of the most prolific researchers of the region during the Republican era, did not focus on Khampas resisting the policies of either Feng-quan and Zhao Erfeng before the Xinhai Revolution or those of Yin Changheng after.¹⁰¹ Rather, he cited British imperialism as the origin of the "Tibet Question" and blamed monks for inciting both obstruction to Feng-quan's land reclamation policies and the ensuing chaos in Batang in the aftermath of the Younghusband Expedition. On Yin's effort to reassert authority purportedly established by Zhao west of the Ningjing Mountains, Ren continued to ignore local resistance, instead focusing on the Dalai Lama seeking and receiving support from the British. Nearly a decade earlier, in the book entitled *Xikang*, Mei Xinru 梅心如 (b. 1899) similarly blamed the monks while embedding the Batang Incident within the context of previous British incursions into Tibet proper. Continuing to ignore local actors, Mei further blamed British interference for bloody fighting between Sichuanese and Khampa soldiers in 1918, detailing the British provision of guns and ammunition.¹⁰²

Writing in the early 1930s, Liu Jiaju 劉家駒 (1900–1977) subtly displaced culpability for such resistance—and violence—further from Qing and later Chinese policies and events within Kham. The son of a Han teacher in Batang and a teacher himself, he concluded in the afterword to his book *Kangzang* 康藏 that imperialism in central Tibet had exacerbated "ill feelings" (*e'gan* 惡感) between the Han and

¹⁰¹ Ren 2000: especially chapter 3.

¹⁰² Mei 1934: especially 68–70; 91.

Tibetans.¹⁰³ His belief perhaps epitomised an underlying assertion in the narrative, the persistence of late Qing perceptions of subservient Khampas, their actions manipulated and minds clouded by superstition and the interrelated influence of monks as conduits for the will of either the Dalai Lama or the government and monks of Lhasa. Two chapters discussing Tibet in a 1934 book on China's "Borderland Question" (*bianjiang wenti* 邊疆問題) integrated the narrative's fundamental displacement with this underlying assertion.¹⁰⁴ Though events in Kham are not mentioned, the authors implicitly elided local Khampa and Tibetan agency by condemning imperialism—particularly continued British interference—for introducing the concepts of self-rule and independence from Chinese authority to Tibetan polity and society. Each of these books—and those on the Tibet and Xikang "question"—represent the culmination of displacements detailed above, from misreading the Batang petition to emphasize the "foreignness" of Feng-quan and his soldiers as the catalyst for resistance established in the initial narrative of the Batang Incident, to a focus on external stimuli, and finally the instigation of external or imperialist agents.

Conclusion

As fanciful as the image of Feng-quan dancing upon the roofs of Batang houses is the narrative of external forces instigating resistance among manipulated Khampas and Tibetans to the implementation on the Tibetan Plateau of policies presumed beneficial by Qing and Chinese authorities. The instantiation of an underlying template initially crafted from a misinterpretation of the Batang petition in the first official assessments of the Batang Incident represents a tale of historical revision, of government officials and historians recasting a tangential observation in a document as its core message in support of preferred conclusions. By positing Bapa resistance culminating in violence in April 1905 as an extension of Tibetan resistance to British incursion a thousand kilometers away and more than a year earlier, Qing and Chinese officials and historians displaced the agency of local actors, instead condemned as puppets, manipulated by external instigation projected via local monasteries. By positing perceptions of Feng-quan's "foreignness" as the root catalyst of resistance, intertwined with such characterization of "external" manipulation, they further displaced local consternation with the implementation of shifting

¹⁰³ Liu 1932: 107–110.

¹⁰⁴ Ling 1934: chapters 3; 4, especially 27–29.

imperial policies, exacerbated by the egregious actions of Feng-quan in support of those policies.

The persistent implementation of increasingly intrusive policies across Kham both before and after 1911 could not be cast as the cause of the disturbance in 1905, though the Batang petition implicitly articulated the initiation of such policies and their intensification by Feng-quan as the root catalyst for resistance. Representative of New Policy reforms sweeping the Qing Empire during the first decade of the 20th century, reflecting the transformative influence of global concepts of governance and authority, these shifting borderland policies were not only deemed beneficial to the Khampas, but—more importantly—essential to strengthen Qing and later ROC authority within Kham and demonstrate sovereignty to neighbouring polities. Thus, the initial narrative of the Batang Incident absolved both the policies and their implementation by displacing blame onto Feng-quan's foreignness, while simultaneously absolving the people of Batang by displacing blame onto local monasteries. As resistance intensified following the Xinhai Revolution and the advent of ROC rule in Kham, the coalescing narrative displaced perceptions of foreignness for the primacy of monastic manipulation, characterised as instigated by external forces projected into Kham from Lhasa. With a concomitant deepening of British involvement with and support for the Thirteenth Dalai Lama and the Ganden Phodrang (Dga' ldan pho brang) government following 1911, the narrative fused external instigation via monasteries with prior perceptions of foreignness to displace the root catalyst for continued resistance to Chinese policies among Khampas and Tibetans finally onto foreign, imperialist actors with which the Dalai Lama was occasionally accused of conspiring. Although the narrative template, which coalesced from interpretations of the Batang Incident, did not initiate such rhetoric, blaming foreign or imperialist instigation for any resistance to Chinese policy in Kham and across the Tibetan Plateau, this mischaracterization of the Batang petition represents an early instance of such displacement that persists today.

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Translating Sovereignty: Early Twentieth-Century Tibet Conventions between Britain and China

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Introduction

n 2008, Britain formally recognized Tibet as a part of China, marking a luff from its earlier policy that had long described China's relationship with Tibet in terms of "suzerainty" rather than full sovereignty.¹ This shift reflects a complex historical trajectory of diplomatic negotiations and legal interpretations of sovereignty, particularly in the early 20th century, when Britain and Qing China (1644–1912) engaged in prolonged disputes over Tibet's political status. This article examines how the Qing government navigated these legal and diplomatic challenges, analyzing the role of cross-lingual legal transmission in treaty-making and these negotiation's broader implications for China's evolving claims over Tibet. By focusing on the interplay between Qing diplomatic strategies and British imperial policies, this study explores how sovereignty as a legal concept was debated, translated, and strategically resorted to in early 20th-century international law.

The historiography on China's sovereignty over Tibet has experienced significant advancements, with recent scholarship deepening our understanding of how sovereignty, legitimacy, and territorial authority evolved within the broader framework of Asian international relations. These studies increasingly emphasize the intersection of international law, diplomatic negotiations, and the transformation of China's territorial authority, shedding light on the complex processes that shaped modern China's claims over Tibet. The long-term perspectives in Chinese and Tibetan history have highlighted how sovereignty and legitimacy were conceptualized, not only in the context of Sino-Tibetan relations but also within broader patterns of historical interaction in the region. Recent work connects the Sino-Tibetan case to these

¹ The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee 2009: 79.

global dynamics, showing how sovereignty was negotiated in terms of both traditional and modern practices.²

Scholars such as Okamoto Takashi have contributed immensely to this topic by offering a detailed analysis of China's evolving diplomatic strategies, particularly during the late Qing and early Republic periods. Okamoto's focus on legal and ideological frameworks provides a crucial understanding of how China articulated its sovereignty, both through traditional means and adapted international norms.³ His edited volumes, which reevaluate the concept of suzerainty, are pivotal in framing it as a translation of indigenous practices into the vocabulary of modern international law, allowing for a more nuanced interpretation of East Asian political relations.⁴ Scott Relyea's work highlights the important role of frontier officials in the Sino-Tibetan borderlands in internalizing and indigenizing international legal concepts, such as territorial sovereignty. By emphasizing the role of these officials, Relyea's research underscores how localized practices influenced the broader statecraft of China, helping to shape the empire's legal and territorial boundaries.⁵ Kobayashi Ryosuke's examination of Tibet's political and diplomatic status during the Qing collapse focuses on the boundary-making processes, offering a critical lens through which to view the shifting territorial arrangements and diplomatic negotiations at the end of the Qing dynasty. This work adds to the growing literature that challenges simplistic narratives of Chinese territorial control, instead emphasizing the dynamic and often contested nature of borders and sovereignty in the region.⁶ Finally, Chang Chi-Hsiung explores the fundamental differences between the Sino-centric tributary system and the colonial order, which further contextualizes the Qing's interactions with Tibet and British India.⁷ Building on previous scholarship, this study provides a comprehensive foundation for understanding the Qing's assertion of sovereignty over Tibet within a broader framework of modernity and international relations. The present study seeks to further advance academic understanding of China's sovereignty over Tibet, illustrating how local, regional, and international factors converged to shape the political landscape in the late Qing and early Republican periods.

This article studies the formation and practice of the Tibet treaties between Britain and China at the beginning of the 20th century, especially the problem of sovereignty and their influences on the

² Brook *et al.* 2018; Ishihama *et al.* 2019.

³ Okamoto 2017.

⁴ Okamoto (ed.) 2019a, 2019b.

⁵ Relyea 2017.

⁶ Kobayashi 2024.

⁷ Chang 2013.

development of modernity in East and Inner Asia. Beginning in 1904, the Qing dynasty and later the Republic of China (1912–1949) continuously argued the Tibet issue with the British Empire. Before the tedious negotiations took place, notions of international law had been introduced to China and Tibet along with modern infrastructure, such as customs administrations, the telegraph, and a police system.⁸ By focusing on sovereignty controversies over Tibet, the present study discusses how international law interacted with China's traditional world order, which was more complicated than the "tributary system" generalized by previous scholarship.⁹

The encounters between modern international law and China's world order provide us with a significant perspective for understanding the British and the Qing imperial legacies in the making of modern Asia.¹⁰ In this context, the Tibet treaties served not only as legal instruments but also as sites of ideological negotiation, where competing visions of authority, governance, and territoriality were challenged and redefined. The Qing Empire sought to preserve its historical claims over Tibet by selectively adopting elements of international law, while Britain leveraged legal formalism to solidify its strategic interests in the region. Meanwhile, Tibetan elites navigated these diplomatic entanglements to assert their own political agency. By examining the legal rhetoric, treaty stipulations, and administrative measures that emerged from these negotiations, this article sheds light on the legal and political transformations that shaped the trajectory of East and Inner Asian modernity. Through this analysis, it becomes evident that the Tibet treaties were not merely diplomatic agreements but integral components of a shifting geopolitical landscape in which global legal norms intersected with indigenous political traditions. Based on the official archives of China's *Waiwubu* (Ch. 外務部, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1901), Britain's Foreign Office, and Tibet's customs house, along with personal records, this article discusses the adoption of international law in modern Tibet and China as well as the cross-lingual transmission of legal notions.

Tibet's Involvement in International Law

During the formation of global economic networks in 19th-century Asia, Tibet gradually emerged as a critical juncture between Qing China, British India, and Tsarist Russia. Following the transformation

⁸ Tuttle 2005: 43–56.

⁹ Fairbank *et al.* 1941: 135–246; Fairbank 1942: 129–149; Fairbank 1953; Fairbank (ed.) 1968.

¹⁰ Liu 1995.

of the British East India Company into “a company-state” and its decisive victory over the Mughal Empire in 1757,¹¹ the British started to shift their focus to India’s neighboring regions, such as Nepal, Kashmir, and Bhutan. The murder of Augustus R. Margary (1846–1875), a junior British diplomat traveling from upper Myanmar to southwestern China in 1875, further intensified British interest in the region. As a result, China and Britain signed *The Chefoo Convention*, which granted the British access to Tibet as compensation.¹² In their conquest of Myanmar during the 19th century, the British Raj increasingly turned its attention to Tibet, a mysterious and largely uncharted region. The British sought to explore potential tea markets in the Himalayan highlands, while simultaneously aiming to block Russian expansion into Inner Asia.¹³ Nevertheless, despite securing commercial privileges in southeastern China’s trading ports in 1843, Britain faced persistent challenges in Tibet. Religious tensions between British missionaries and Tibetan Buddhists, combined with strong Tibetan resistance, significantly hindered British ambitions and activities in the region.¹⁴

Although the British faced significant obstacles in Tibet, they did not abandon their goals. On the contrary, British India actively pursued strategies to connect trade routes to the region, recognizing Tibet’s strategic value as a gateway to expanding commercial networks across Inner Asia in the late 19th century. In October 1884, Colman Macaulay (1849–1890), a British colonial official and economist, convinced Randolph Churchill (1849–1895), the secretary of state for India, of the strategic necessity of initiating a mission to Tibet. This ambitious endeavor aimed to assess the feasibility of opening a trade route from British India into central Tibet. Macaulay envisioned a vibrant trade network in which Indian tea and British textiles would penetrate Tibetan markets in exchange for valuable commodities such as musk, gold, and wool.¹⁵ His proposal reflected Britain’s broader imperial interest in leveraging Tibet as a key node in Inner Asia’s commercial and geopolitical landscape.

In order to initiate Macaulay’s mission to Tibet, Churchill prepared a *note verbale* (diplomatic message) to Qing China regarding the opening of trade routes between India and Tibet. This note was delivered by Charles Bernard (1837–1901), a colonial administrator of British India and Burma, to Zeng Jize 曾紀澤 (1839–1890), the Qing Empire’s second ambassador to Britain. In August 1885, Zeng penned two

¹¹ Stern 2011.

¹² Wang 1940: 115.

¹³ Tuttle 2005: 34–38.

¹⁴ Younghusband [1910] 1998: 298–299.

¹⁵ Macaulay 1885: 82.

letters to Li Hongzhang 李鴻章 (1823–1901), the Beiyang minister and one of the Qing court's most influential statesmen, addressing British proposals to open the trade routes. In his letters, Zeng first paraphrased Churchill's note as an acknowledgment of China's sovereignty (Ch. *zhuquan* 主權) over Tibet.¹⁶ Furthermore, Zeng recounted the history of British-Tibetan relations and addressed the proposal, noting the previous unrealized communications between the Sixth Panchen Lama Lobzang Pelden Yeshe (Blo bzang dpal ldan ye shes, 1738–1780) and Warren Hastings (1732–1818), the first governor-general of India who had suggested Tibet be opened to British trade in 1780.¹⁷

Regarding Macaulay's mission in 1885, Zeng noted that the British expressed their interest in entering Tibet and conducting trade, while reiterating Tibet was an integral part of China, much like Mongolia, and could be treated as a separate entity. In his letter to Li, Zeng expressed his concern about China's sovereignty over Tibet in this context:

I suggest that, recently, Western powers have focused on invading and seizing Chinese client states (Ch. *shuguo* 屬國), referring to them as “non-true client states.” In contrast, China's approach to its client states is fundamentally different from that of the Western powers. China does not interfere with its client states' internal politics or external relations. Tibet, like Mongolia, is a dependency (Ch. *shudi* 屬地) of China and not a client state. However, our administration of Tibet is even more lenient than the constraints imposed by the West on their client states. In the West, Tibet is simply considered a Chinese client state and is regarded differently from China's internal provinces. If we fail to seize this opportunity to assert our authority over Tibet, there is a risk that our dependency could be misrepresented as a client state. This could lead to further mischaracterizations of client states as “non-true client states,” increasing the likelihood of encroachments.¹⁸

Here Zeng asserted the Qing Empire's sovereignty over Tibet by differentiating the idea of “client state” (Ch. *shuguo*) from “dependency” (Ch. *shudi*). Despite Zeng's well-reasoned arguments and policy

¹⁶ Zeng [1893] 1975: vol. 5, 16.

¹⁷ Zeng [1893] 1975: vol. 5, 17–18.

¹⁸ “竊思西洋各大國近者專以侵奪中華屬國為事，而以非真屬國為詞。蓋中國之於屬國，不問其國內之政，不問其境外之交，本與西洋各國之待屬國迥然不同。西藏與蒙古同，乃中國之屬地，非屬國也。然我之管轄西藏，較之西洋之約束屬國者猶為寬焉。西洋於該處亦只稱中華屬國而已，視內地省分固為有間。我不於此時總攬大權，明示天下，則將來稱屬地為屬國者，將復稱屬國為非真屬國，又有侵奪之虞矣。” Zeng [1893] 1975: vol. 5, 17–18.

proposals, the Qing court's ability to fully implement them was constrained by limited resources and internal challenges. Nevertheless, his advocacy highlighted the stakes involved in the British push into Tibet and underscored the importance of integrating Tibet more firmly into Qing administrative and diplomatic strategies. The interplay between British commercial ambitions and Qing assertions of sovereignty over Tibet would continue to shape East and Inner Asia's geopolitical landscape in the decades that followed.

Macaulay's mission was initially buoyed by *The Chefoo Convention*, which allowed British representatives to access Tibet with Qing approval. Nevertheless, the international situation changed promptly when the Third Anglo-Burmese War broke out in November 1885.¹⁹ After signing *The Convention Relative to Burma and Thibet between China and Great Britain* in 1886, the Qing Empire recognized Burma as a British territory. In return, Britain allowed Burma to continue paying tribute to China and agreed to delay the Macaulay mission's entry into Tibet.²⁰ This diplomatic compromise, however, did not prevent further tensions between the British Empire and Qing China over Tibet, which soon escalated into military action.

Turning economic liberalism into imperialist civilizing missions,²¹ the British army invaded Tibet in 1888 and 1904. Because of the British invasions, the Qing Dynasty signed a series of conventions and regulations with the British Empire from 1890 to 1908. In 1893, Britain and China made an agreement requiring the Qing to open an international market and customs house in Dromo County (Ch. *Yadong xian* 亞東縣) on the border between Tibet, Sikkim, and Bhutan. The customs system in Dromo County of southwestern Tibet was known as the Yadong Customs (Ch. *Yadong guan* 亞東關), which became one of the biggest entrepôts between China, India, and the Zomia highlands. Nevertheless, disputes over border affairs and the tea trade between Tibet and British India eventually caused the British invasion of Lhasa in 1904.²² After the British invasion, the Qing Dynasty successively sent two Chinese envoys, Tang Shaoyi 唐紹儀 (1862–1938) and Zhang Yintang 張蔭堂 (1860–1937), to negotiate with the British between 1904 and 1908 in an effort to reassert Qing authority over Tibet.²³ These negotiations brought to light significant challenges in translating and interpreting Western legal and political concepts. Tang, a Columbia University

¹⁹ Younghusband [1910] 1998: 46.

²⁰ National Palace Museum (NPM), Tibet Trade Regulations between China and Great Britain, 910000039-001.

²¹ Mantena 2010.

²² Steward 2009: 139–185.

²³ For more on Zhang Yintang, see Ma 2019.

alumnus, was particularly attuned to the difficulties in conveying terms like “sovereignty” and “suzerainty,” issues he had previously encountered in China’s dealings with Korea and Tibet in 1897 and 1905.²⁴

Following Tang’s step, Zhang sought to introduce modern legal reforms aimed at aligning Tibet’s judicial system with Western models.²⁵ However, he encountered similar problems turning China’s right of “administration” (Ch. *zhili quan* 治理權)²⁶ and Britain’s “extraterritoriality” (Ch. *zhiwai faquan* 治外法權)²⁷ into practice. Concurrently, the Tibetan mission led by Tsarong Wangchuk Gyelpo (Tsha rong Dbang phyug rgyal po, 1866–1912) faced the equally complex task of adapting international legal terminology to the Tibetan context during the 1908 convention in Calcutta. Tibetan translators involved in the convention, including Tashi Wangdi (Bkra shis dbang ’dus, n.d.), the Thirteenth Dalai Lama Tubten Gyatso (Thub bstan rgya mtsho, 1879–1933)’s English secretary, played a pivotal role in coining new terms that could encapsulate these concepts in Tibetan, shaping the evolving discourse on sovereignty and law within the framework of Sino-Tibetan-British diplomacy.²⁸ Accordingly, when Tibetan translators first translated *The Tibet Trade Regulations* from English and Chinese into Tibetan in 1908, they likewise created new terms. For instance, they translated Britain’s “extraterritoriality” as “foreign authority” (Tib. *phyi’i dbang cha*)²⁹. Consequently, a series of new ideas of international law, such as “sovereignty” and “suzerainty,” were recalibrated and reinterpreted during the negotiations between China and Britain on Tibetan issues. Following Zhang Yintang and Tsarong Wangchuk Gyelpo’s instructions, Tashi Wangdi published *Tibetan-English-Hindi Guide* to calibrate the meanings of new terms in different lingual contexts in 1909.³⁰

While Qing officials and British diplomats continued to argue about the issue of Tibet’s sovereignty after 1905, *The Convention between the United Kingdom and Russia relating to Persia, Afghanistan, and Thibet* was signed in Saint Petersburg in 1907. After long-standing competition in Inner Asia dating back to the early 19th century, Britain and Russia eventually reached the agreement that formed the basis of The Triple Entente jointly with France that set Tibet as a buffer zone under

²⁴ Wang 2018: 204–207; Cheney 2017: 769–783.

²⁵ NPM, Tibet Trade Regulations between China and Great Britain, 910000039-001: 4, Article V.

²⁶ Ibid., 910000039-004: 6–7, Article II-b.

²⁷ Ibid., 910000039-004: 13, Article V.

²⁸ Matin 2016: 101–102.

²⁹ NPM, Tibet Trade Regulations between China and Great Britain, 910000039-004: 39, Article V.

³⁰ Wangdi 1909: vii.

China's "suzerainty."³¹ As *The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907* stated in Article II: "In conformity with the admitted principle of the suzerainty of China over Thibet, Great Britain and Russia engage not to enter into negotiations with Thibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government," the Qing court was regarded as the intermediary between Britain and Russia in terms of Tibetan affairs.³²

Being reluctant to recognize China's executive power in Tibet, Britain and Russia carefully used the term "suzerainty" instead of "sovereignty" to limit the nature of China's relationships with Tibet. The British initially proposed using the term "suzerainty," rather than "sovereignty," to define China's relationship with Tibet in order to establish Tibet as a buffer zone between British and Russian powers in Inner Asia. This strategic objective was also reflected in Article II of *The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907*.³³ However, Britain's geopolitical strategy of setting Tibet as the buffer zone in Inner Asia conflicted with Qing China's claim of "sovereignty" and was consequently refused by Chinese representative Tang Shaoyi in 1906. That is to say, the debate over Tibet's legal status in 1906 not only closely related to China's border affairs and Britain's Indian policy but also became a significant precondition of the Triple Entente, whose competition with the Triple Alliance finally sparked World War I in 1914. The fate of modern Tibet has been inseparably connected with international law and global transformations since 1906.

Although the British first insisted that China merely had suzerainty instead of sovereignty over Tibet in the draft of the treaty, the terms "suzerainty" and "sovereignty" are never mentioned in the final version of *The Tibet Convention* signed in 1906. Why did the terms "suzerainty" and "sovereignty" eventually disappear from the convention? What happened in the process of the Sino-British negotiations from 1904 to 1906? What are the legacies of the debates over Tibet's sovereignty between the Qing and the British Empires in 1905? In order to discuss these questions, it is necessary to trace the origin of "sovereignty" in Chinese contexts.

Translating "Sovereignty" in Modern China and Tibet

The Chinese term *zhuquan*, corresponding to "sovereignty," underwent significant evolution during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, reflecting China's transition from a traditional empire to a modern nation-state. Historically, *zhuquan* appeared in ancient texts, denoting the

³¹ Klein 1971: 126–147.

³² Gooch and Temperley 1929: vol.4, 618–621; Bell [1924] 1968: 290.

³³ Lamb 1966: vol. 1, 227.

authority of monarchs or emperors. However, this classical usage differs from the modern concept of state sovereignty. The modern notion of *zhuquan* as state sovereignty began to permeate Chinese political thought in the mid-19th century, influenced by interactions with Western powers and the attendant need to engage with international law. This period marked China's exposure to the Westphalian system, which emphasized nation-states' sovereignty. Chinese intellectuals and officials started to grapple with these concepts, seeking appropriate translations and understandings within the Chinese context.³⁴

The idea of "sovereignty" was initially introduced to China in 1864, when American Presbyterian missionary William A. P. Martin (Ch. *Ding Weiliang* 丁韪良, 1827–1916) translated Henry Wheaton's *Elements of International Law* (Ch. *Wanguo gongfa* 萬國公法) into Chinese. Martin's Chinese translation was widely circulated in East Asian regions, including Japan (1865),³⁵ Korea (1877),³⁶ and Vietnam (1877).³⁷ The Chinese translation by Martin was further translated into Mongolian and had influences on the Mongols' understanding of international law in the early 20th century.³⁸ In the Chinese translation of *Elements of International Law*, the term "sovereignty" was translated as *zhuquan*³⁹ which can "be exercised either internally or externally."⁴⁰ Internal sovereignty can be understood as "fundamental laws" (Ch. *guofa* 國法, literally "state's law"), whereas external sovereignty "consists in the independence of one political society" (Ch. *benguo zizhu* 本國自主).⁴¹ The term *zhuquan* was coined in official Chinese sources in the late 19th century.⁴² In 1899, several foreign ambassadors asked to jointly establish a committee for renovating the roads near their embassies by themselves instead of asking Qing officials for help, but the Qing government refused their requests since "this issue relates to sovereignty" (Ch. *shiguan zhuquan* 事關主權).⁴³ In 1902, when an Italian company asked to have rights over contract coal mining in Wanping

³⁴ Jin, Liu, and Qiu 2019: 50–51.

³⁵ The Chinese version was first reprinted in Edo by Kaiseijo school in 1865. For the original copy, see National Archives of Japan, no. 311–0327. The Japanese translation was later published in 1868, see Tsutsumikoku 1868.

³⁶ Kim 1999: 27–44.

³⁷ Takeyama 2003: 217–240.

³⁸ Tachibana 2006: 85–96.

³⁹ *Zhuquan* literally means "the power of the sovereign" in Chinese.

⁴⁰ The Chinese translation is: "或行於內，或行於外。"

⁴¹ Wheaton 1866: part 1, 31–32. Martin trans. 1864: vol. 2, 17–b.

⁴² Svarverud 2007: 69–130.

⁴³ *Qing dezong shilu* 清德宗實錄 (Veritable Records of the Guangxu Emperor) (QDSL) 1986: vol. 439, 786.

County 宛平縣 near Beijing 北京, the Qing government claimed the Italians should follow China's regulations since "China's mineral rights are [related to] independence." Here *zhuquan* consists of two ideas in one term: "Independence" (Ch. *zizhu* 自主) and "rights" (Ch. *quanli* 權利).⁴⁴ It is highly possible the Chinese paraphrase of *zhuquan* was influenced by Wheaton's definition of "external sovereignty" in which "independence" is a keyword.

Notably, although the term *zhuquan* was first recorded in its modern sense in the 1860s, its usage remained sporadic until the late 19th century, reflecting the gradual introduction of Western political concepts to modern China. The term gained prominence in the aftermath of China's defeats in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) and the Boxer Rebellion (1899–1901), events that underscored the importance of national sovereignty and territorial integrity.⁴⁵ By the early 20th century, *zhuquan* had become a central concept in Chinese political discourse, symbolizing the country's struggle to redefine itself as a sovereign nation-state amidst internal upheavals and external pressures. This evolution of *zhuquan* reflects China's broader efforts to reconcile traditional governance structures with modern international norms, ultimately contributing to the nation's transformation into a modern state.

Although the words "sovereignty" and "suzerainty" were used loosely in China after the late 19th century, these Western ideas were not clearly defined in Chinese contexts and many Qing officials did not understand their meanings correctly until 1905, when the Qing and Britain started to debate over the issues of Tibet's legal status. Before 1905, Britain consistently used the term "suzerain" to refer to China's control over Tibet. In May 1903, the British Empire authorized the Government of India's mission to Tibet in order to discuss the frontier and commercial relations with the Tibetan government. According to a report sent by Colonel Francis Younghusband (1863–1942) to the Indian government in October 1903, China was first mentioned as Tibet's "suzerain," but he also pointed out that China "has openly acknowledged they were unable to keep the Tibetans to the Treaty engagement made on their behalf."⁴⁶ In the diary of Ernest C. Wilton (1870–1952), an Indian colonial officer of Tibetan affairs, he recorded the Tibetans "openly sneered at the representative of the Suzerain Power

⁴⁴ "其權利均係中國自主。" Academia Sinica, Institute of Modern History (AS). *Kuangwu dang* 礦物檔 (The Archives of Mineral Affairs), 01–11–009–03–028.

⁴⁵ Wang 2003: 21–23; Chen 2004: 65.

⁴⁶ British National Archives, Foreign Office (BNA), *Confidential Print, Tibet and Mongolia, 1903–1923*, class 535 (hereafter FO535): vol. 1, no. 35, p. 49.

(China)."⁴⁷ Here the colonial officers of the Government of India, such as Younghusband and Wilton, utilized the term "suzerain" to describe China's authority over Tibet in a passive way. In their writings, "suzerain" was used to demonstrate China's inadequate control over Tibet in order to justify British India's expedition to Tibet.

Based on the colonial officers' accounts on the Indo-Tibetan borderlands, the Government of India also used the term "suzerain" to describe the Sino-Tibetan relationship when they intended to win the mother country's support for the project of the expedition to Tibet. According to a report dated November 1903 sent from the Indian government to William St. John Fremantle Brodrick (1856–1942), the secretary of state for India, China was mentioned as "the suzerain power" that was unable to compel Tibetans to abide by the Sino-British treaty regulating the free trade between Tibet and India.⁴⁸

In the meantime, British diplomats in China were also engaging in the invention of suzerainty discourse and made it a powerful justification for the British expedition to Tibet. In February 1904, Ernest Mason Satow (1843–1929), the British plenipotentiary to China, sent the translation of a Chinese article entitled "How to Protect Tibet," published in *Shenbao* 申報, to George Nathaniel Curzon (1859–1925), the viceroy of India. According to Satow's English translation, this article suggested that the Chinese government should ally with Britain against Russia in terms of Tibetan issues, otherwise "the Dalai Lama will be hoodwinked by Russia into accepting her suzerainty."⁴⁹ Although Satow's translation highlighted the threat of Russia, which might seize China's suzerainty over Tibet, the original version in Chinese never mentioned the term "suzerainty."⁵⁰ No matter whether he made the mistake intentionally or not, Satow's translation out of a diplomatic purpose completely distorted the original meaning of the Chinese text and inserted the term "suzerainty" into his translation in order to emphasize the potential threat of Russia. As a result, China's weak "suzerainty" over Tibet was exploited as a political tool to justify British India's intervention in Tibet once again.

⁴⁷ BNA, FO535/1/42/79.

⁴⁸ BNA, FO535/1/29/36.

⁴⁹ BNA, FO535/3/27/62.

⁵⁰ The Chinese version was published in *Shenbao* (no. 11066) on February 6, 1904: "以達賴喇嘛之愚而無識，惑於俄必受其欺誑，倚於英亦不足圖存 [Due to the Dalai Lama's clumsiness and ignorance, he will be hoodwinked by Russia. Even though he tries to rely on Britain, he will not be able to strive for survival]."

The Qing's "Sovereignty Crisis" in Tibet

The discourse that portrayed China as an incapable "suzerain" created by the colonial officers eventually legitimized the British invasion of Tibet.⁵¹ When the British army led by Younghusband invaded Lhasa in 1904, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, Tubten Gyatso had already escaped to Urga in Mongolia through Kokonor.⁵² Therefore, Younghusband urged other political and religious leaders, especially Tibetan regent Lhamoshar Lobzang Gyeltsen (Lha mo shar Blo bzang rgyal mtshan, 1840–?), to sign an armistice on behalf of the Dalai Lama.⁵³ In the meantime, Younghusband also tried to persuade You-tai 有泰 (?–1910), the Qing's amban (representative) in Lhasa,⁵⁴ to sign the treaty together with the Tibetans. According to his diary, You-tai was invited to the Potala Palace, and he witnessed the British and the Tibetan officials signing the treaty on September 7, 1904. At that time, he did not prevent the Tibetans from signing the treaty with the British, but he did not sign the treaty on behalf of the Qing Dynasty because he had to wait for the emperor's permission.⁵⁵

On the same day, the Qing Ministry of Foreign Affairs received a telegram, sent from You-tai along with a copy of *The Treaty of Lhasa*. According to his telegram, You-tai proved to be eager to immediately sign the treaty with the British to resolve the problem as soon as possible.⁵⁶ Nevertheless, the Qing Ministry of Foreign Affairs promptly ordered him not to proceed. On September 8, the Ministry informed You-tai, "The ten treaty articles enacted by the British will impair China's

⁵¹ Michael Carrington 2003: 81–109.

⁵² In a telegram dated September 3, 1904, the Government of India explained that the Dalai Lama decided to escape to Mongolia because of his inclination to seek Russia's protection. There was even a rumor circulated in Lhasa to the effect that the Russia Tsar had converted to Buddhism and would support the Tibetans against the British invaders: "The reason why [the] Dalai Lama has fled is in consequence of his having, without the knowledge or sanction of the Council or National Assembly, committed himself with Russia, and he is now afraid of binding himself by concluding a Treaty with us. Many Tibetans were inclining to turn towards Russia, owing to reports which had reached Lhasa, of the Czar's conversion to Buddhism." BNA, FO535/4/72/121. See I. Garri paper in this RET issue.

⁵³ BNA, FO535/4/76/132. Lhamoshar Lobzang Gyeltsen served as the 86th Ganden Tripa (Tib. *Dga' ldan khri pa*) from 1900 to 1907, and he was appointed as the regent of Tibet by the Thirteenth Dalai Lama in 1904. For his role in the convention of 1904, see Shakabpa 1984: 215–219; Shakabpa 2010: vol. 2, 678, 692, 1134.

⁵⁴ The Manchu term "amban," literally "your excellency" or "lord," is a Manchu title for Qing officials. This title was frequently used to name the Qing's representatives in Tibet.

⁵⁵ You-tai 1992: 115.

⁵⁶ AS, *Xizang dang* 西藏檔 (The Archives of Tibetan Affairs; hereafter AS, XZD), 02–16–001–05–023.

sovereignty (*zhuquan*) and you should not sign [the treaty].”⁵⁷ Two days later, the Ministry reiterated this directive to You-tai, emphasizing the necessity of protecting China’s sovereignty over Tibet.⁵⁸ This telegram, dated September 10, was intercepted by British authorities, as all communications between Tibet, India, and China relied on British-controlled telegraph lines. Given the nature of intelligence-gathering rather than diplomatic communication, the British intelligence agency aimed to literally translate the Qing government’s wording and pass it to the Foreign Office for internal reference. In this specific context reflecting its own internal understanding instead of advancing a specific diplomatic argument against China, the British translated the Qing government’s order to You-tai as: “Great Britain should not conclude a Treaty directly with Tibet as, in so doing, China loses its *suzerainty*.”⁵⁹ Namely, the British translator rendered the Chinese term *zhuquan* as “suzerainty” in English for intelligence analysis purposes in 1904.

It is important to note that, while the Qing employed the term “sovereignty” to assert its sovereignty over Tibet, the British, in the course of intelligence analysis, mistranslated it as “suzerainty.” This discrepancy in translation reflected not only linguistic differences but also the broader political divergence between the two powers over Tibet’s legal status. The mistranslation stemmed from the ambiguities surrounding the Chinese translations of “sovereignty” and “suzerainty” during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, highlighting the complexities of cross-cultural legal interpretation in a rapidly shifting geopolitical landscape.

While the concepts of “sovereignty” and “suzerainty” had circulated in China since the late 19th century, their Chinese translations remained unsettled during this period. In 1864, under the Qing court’s patronage, William A. P. Martin translated Henry Wheaton’s *Elements of International Law* into Chinese, rendering “sovereignty” as *zhuquan*. Subsequently, several Chinese and British dictionaries published in East Asia between the 1860s and 1890s adopted *zhuquan* as the standard translation for sovereignty.⁶⁰ However, the meaning of *zhuquan* remained ambiguous in Chinese discourse, even after the turn of the century. For instance, in *An English-Chinese Standard Dictionary* (Ch.

⁵⁷ “英員開送十條，有損中國主權，尊處切勿畫押。” AS, XZD, 02-16-001-05-024.

⁵⁸ AS, XZD, 02-16-001-05-026.

⁵⁹ BNA, *General Correspondence: Political, 1906-1966*, FO371/1751. The original Chinese counterpart is: “不應由英國與番眾徑行立約，致失主權。” AS, XZD, 02-16-001-05-026.

⁶⁰ Jin, Liu and Qiu 2019: 51.

Yinghua dacidian 英華大辭典) published by Yan Huiqing 顏惠慶 (1877–1950) in 1908, *zhuquan* was used to translate “suzerainty.”⁶¹ This indicates that, in the late 19th century, *zhuquan* could refer to either “sovereignty” or “suzerainty,” depending on context. These divergent interpretations of a single term contributed to the diplomatic impasse between Qing China and Britain over Tibet’s legal status.

On September 14, 1904, You-tai went to the British mission in Lhasa and met Younghusband and Wilton together with other British officers, including John Claude White (1853–1918) and William F. T. O’Connor (1870–1943). *You-tai’s Diary in Tibet* records that he had “a joyful talk” with the British officers and explained to the British why he could not sign the treaty. Here You-tai wrote, “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not let me sign [the treaty] for fear of losing *zhuquan* and the foreign officers strongly disagreed [with this point]. We asked each other to send telegrams to Beijing to ask [people there] what to do.”⁶² According to another telegram sent from You-tai to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on September 19, You-tai once again asked them to authorize him to sign *The Convention of Lhasa*. In this telegram, You-tai wrote, “It seems that [*The Convention of Lhasa*] will not impair China’s rights. Although I am not familiar with the issues of treaties, I have done my best to mediate [between the Tibetans and the British] and straighten out [the problem].”⁶³ However, in a telegram dated on September 26, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs insisted that You-tai should not sign the treaty since, if the Qing Dynasty recognized Britain’s privileges regulated by *The Convention of Lhasa*, other foreign powers would also force the Qing to recognize their privileges in Tibet according to their most-favored-nation status. Also, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs specifically asked You-tai to negotiate with Younghusband to add a claim to the treaty that Britain “had no intention to infringe China’s *zhuquan* and annex Tibet’s territory.”⁶⁴ Satow immediately acquired the full content of this telegram in Beijing and sent its English translation to Foreign Secretary Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice (1845–1927) on the same day. According to Satow’s translation, the claim proposed by China mentioned above was translated as “No appropriation of Thibetan territory or infringement of Chinese *suzerainty* is intended.”⁶⁵ Here Satow again mistranslated the Chinese term *zhuquan* (sovereignty) as its

⁶¹ Yen 1908: 2282.

⁶² “外務部不令余畫押，恐失主權，洋官大不以為然。商酌彼此給北京打電，問如之何。” You-tai 1992: 116.

⁶³ “似無碍於中國之權，泰於條約一事，素未諳習，然此番調停開導，實已力盡精疲。” AS, XZD: 02–16–001–05–030.

⁶⁴ “不侵中國主權，不佔西藏土地。” AS, XZD, 02–16–001–05–032.

⁶⁵ BNA, FO535/4/110/193.

counterpart “suzerainty.” In order to respond to China’s proposal of claiming its *zhuquan* over Tibet, Brodrick sent a telegram to the Government of India in order to seek their opinions.⁶⁶ Although Satow mis-translated the term *zhuquan* into “suzerainty” instead of “sovereignty” and passed the wrong translation to Brodrick, it seems that the Indian government correctly realized China’s claim of sovereignty probably through direct communication between Younghusband and You-tai in Tibet. Therefore, the Indian government later took a very strong standpoint, refusing China’s sovereignty over Tibet as shown below in their September 29th reply to Brodrick:

We venture to think that both history and present experience prove that China does not possess full sovereignty in Thibet [...]. As to most-favoured-nation treatment, question cannot arise, since Treaties made with China alone are not valid in Thibet, as has been proved by our experience.⁶⁷

In this telegram, the Indian government merely recognized that China possessed “undefined suzerainty” instead of “full sovereignty” over Tibet.⁶⁸ As a result, the disagreement over sovereignty and suzerainty between Britain and China seriously obstructed the negotiation regarding the validity of *The Treaty of Lhasa*, which was drafted by Younghusband and Tibetan leaders without getting the signature of the Qing’s representative in 1904. Considering the stalemate in the negotiation, the Qing Dynasty realized it was impossible to solve the problem through You-tai, who was “not familiar with the issues of treaties.” Consequently, the Qing decided to rely on professional diplomats, who were more experienced in foreign affairs.

“Sovereignty” or “Suzerainty”: Translating International Law in 1905

After realizing You-tai, the Mongolian amban from a celebrated bannerman family, was incapable of solving the sovereignty crisis of Tibet, the Qing Dynasty immediately delegated Tang Shaoyi, who had studied abroad at Columbia University as a member of the Chinese Educational Mission, with a view of becoming the plenipotentiary of Tibetan affairs in October 1904. Tang had been an essential assistant to Yuan Shikai 袁世凱 (1859–1916) in Korea and Shandong 山東. He also became a close friend of Herbert Hoover’s (1874–1964) after 1899, when Hoover rode a train from Tianjin 天津 in China, as a mining engineer.

⁶⁶ BNA, FO535/4/118/199.

⁶⁷ BNA, FO535/4/119/200.

⁶⁸ BNA, FO535/4/119/200.

In his memoir, Hoover complimented Tang's abilities and character:

Tong [Shao-yi] courteously invited us to ride with him, and there began a firm friendship which was to have many curious developments in after years. He was an alumnus of Columbia University, a man of great abilities, fine integrity, and high ideals for the future of China.⁶⁹

Compared with You-tai, Tang Shaoyi was more familiar with Western cultures and could communicate very well with Westerners. As the Tibetan affairs' plenipotentiary, Tang did not go to Tibet directly. Instead, according to Tang's report to the Qing Court, he departed from Hong Kong (Ch. Xianggang 香港) on January 31, 1905, heading for Calcutta on the *Sui Hsiang*, a British steamship.⁷⁰ After arriving in Calcutta on February 16, Tang met British representative Stuart Mitford Fraser (1864–1963) and they decided to hold their first formal meeting on March 2, 1905.⁷¹ The Qing Dynasty also dispatched Vincent Carlile Henderson (1873–1910), the Chinese commissioner of customs at Dromo, who traveled from Lhasa to Calcutta in order to assist Tang Shaoyi's work.⁷²

Before Tang arrived in Calcutta in January 1905, Satow met with Hošoi Prince Qing Yi-kuang (Ch. Heshuo Qing qinwang Yi-kuang 和慶親王奕劻, 1838–1917), the leader of the Qing Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Beijing and later submitted a memorandum of their conversation to Britain's Foreign Secretary in November 1904. According to his memorandum, Satow intended to clarify the power relation between the Qing and Tibet by asking Yi-kuang a fundamental question about the meaning of "suzerainty" in the Chinese context. He asked: What was the proper technical term in Chinese to express the relations of Thibet to China? In English China was described as the "suzerain" of Thibet. How was the idea expressed in Chinese?

This is what the Prince replied:

There was no proper word to express this. The Thibetans called the Emperor of China their "Huangshang," not "Ta Huangti," as a foreign nation would say. The word "suzerain" he (Prince Qing himself) supposed implied the "shang kuo," the "upper nation." The superiority of the Emperor over the Dalai Lama was demonstrated in his appointment by

⁶⁹ Hoover 1951: 39.

⁷⁰ AS, XZD, 02-16-001-06-002.

⁷¹ AS, XZD, 02-16-001-06-008; AS, XZD, 02-16-001-06-036.

⁷² AS, XZD, 02-16-001-06-009.

patent “chih shu” ([Ch. *chishu* 敕書] imperial edict).⁷³

The conversation between Satow and Yi-kuang profoundly reflected how the differences in languages brought about the various interpretations of the relations between China and Tibet. While Satow was using “suzerain” to describe the Sino-Tibetan relationship, Prince Qing could not find its exact counterpart in China. Yi-kuang supposed “suzerain” might mean “upper state” (*shangguo* 上國) in Chinese,⁷⁴ which could not fully describe China’s superiority over Tibet. According to Yi-kuang, Tibet was not a foreign nation outside of China. On the contrary, China had full power over Tibet, which was more likely “sovereign” than “suzerain,” because the Dalai Lama was appointed by the Qing emperors’ edicts. Being confused by Yi-kuang’s reply, Satow further made a detailed inquiry into whether the Chinese emperors issued imperial edicts to the Shōguns of Japan during the Ming period (1368–1644). Yi-kuang said he “believe[d] so, though in that case it did not imply any claim to sovereignty over Japan on the part of China, but was merely the act of a big Power to a small one.”⁷⁵ Although Satow and Yi-kuang failed to reach a consensus on the nature of Qing authority over Tibet, their exchange marked the beginning of the sovereignty/suzerainty dichotomy that would come to define British and Chinese diplomatic discourse in the early 20th century.

The dispute of “suzerainty/sovereignty” was immediately brought from the meeting in Beijing to the conference table in Calcutta after Tang Shaoyi arrived in India in February 1905. According to letters dated March 5, 1905, sent from Henderson to Robert Hart (1835–1911),⁷⁶ the British representative recognized that China was the suzerain of Tibet but did not have sovereignty over Tibet.⁷⁷ On the other hand, Tang refused to accept Britain’s claim that China only had suzerainty rather than sovereignty over Tibet and he intended to make a new proposal regarding the treaty between Britain and China respecting Tibet. According to telegrams sent from Tang to the Qing court on

⁷³ BNA, FO535/5/95/125.

⁷⁴ The origin of the Chinese term “shangguo” (upper state) is still unclear, but it was used to refer to “feudal lord” in Chinese texts by the 2nd century AD. It may have later been used to translate the English word “suzerain” in the late 19th century. “Suzerain” derived from middle French “souserain” and Latin “sursum,” which is composed of two roots: “sur” (up) and “versum” (towards). For the bibliography of the philologist discussions of “suzerain” and “sovereign,” see Liberman 2010: 829.

⁷⁵ BNA, FO535/5/95/125.

⁷⁶ Hart served as the inspector-general of China’s Imperial Maritime Customs Service between 1863–1911. His life has been well studied by historians of modern China, see Wright 1950; Bickers 2006: 691–723.

⁷⁷ *Zhongguo di'er lishi dang'anguan* (ed.) 2000: vol.2, 971–974.

May 14, 1905, "The State of Britain recognizes China as Tibet's 'shangguo' (upper state)⁷⁸ rather than its 'zhuguo' (Ch. 主國, sovereign state)."⁷⁹ Tang further explained that "shangguo" is the Chinese translation of "suzerainty" (Ch. *susuolunti* 蘇索倫梯), whereas the term "zhuguo" should translate as "sovereignty" (Ch. *saofulunti* 搔付倫梯).⁸⁰ Tang Shaoyi refused to accept the term *shangguo* (suzerainty) that was used by the British to describe the relations between China and Tibet. He gave an insightful explanation: "If we recognized ourselves as the suzerain [of Tibet], it was to relegate Tibet to a more alienated place, a status similar to what Korea, Vietnam, Ryuku, and Myanmar used to have."⁸¹ Here, Tang's previous experiences of Korean affairs led him to draw an analogy between the 1904 British invasion of Tibet and the 1894 Japanese invasion of Korea. He reckoned that, if the Qing acknowledged their "suzerainty" instead of "sovereignty" over Tibet, the British would get a chance to occupy Tibet, exactly as the Japanese and the French had respectively done over Korea and Vietnam.

Although Tang eventually clarified China's claim of "sovereignty" instead of "suzerainty," the British did not recognize it. As explained in a report sent from the Indian government to Brodrick:

A draft Convention stipulating for recognition of sovereignty, not suzerainty, of China over Thibet has now been formally submitted by Tang [...]. In these circumstances we are refusing to consider Tang's draft Convention, and are informing him that His Majesty's Government are unlikely to be willing to go beyond the terms of our draft.⁸²

The controversy over "sovereignty/suzerainty" eventually caused the negotiation in Calcutta to reach an impasse. When he met Natong 那桐 (1857–1925), the Qing's deputy minister of foreign affairs, in August in 1905, Satow asked why the negotiation in Calcutta could not move on:

I [Satow] then inquired what the points were on which the two Plenipotentiaries [Tang and Fraser] differed, and he [Natong] spoke of the dispute as to which of the two terms "sovereignty" or "suzerainty" was to be used. The other points he appeared not to remember; perhaps he

⁷⁸ AS, XZD, 02-16-001-06-037.

⁷⁹ AS, XZD, 02-16-001-06-045.

⁸⁰ AS, XZD, 02-16-001-06-041.

⁸¹ "若自認為上國，是將西藏推而遠之，等西藏於昔日之韓、越、球、緬也。"

AS, XZD, 02-16-001-06-061.

⁸² BNA, FO535/6/37/58.

thought them of little importance.⁸³

According to this paragraph, it is obvious that the difference between using "sovereignty" or "suzerainty" was the key to the debate between Tang and Fraser in 1905.

After a long deadlock, Tang proposed to remove the terms "sovereignty" or "suzerainty" in the treaty in order to lay aside the unsolvable debate.⁸⁴ As a result, the final version of *The Convention Between Great Britain and China Respecting Tibet* (Ch. *Zhong Ying xuzeng Zang Yin tiaoyue* 中英續增藏印條約) in 1906 does not contain the terms "sovereignty" or "suzerainty."⁸⁵

Now why did Tang Shaoyi propose to delete the term "sovereignty" in the treaty respecting Tibet? Tang suggested that the Qing should tentatively postpone the argument for sovereignty and wait for a proper opportunity to exploit Britain's internal conflicts. First, Tang clearly noticed the British government did not support British India's military activities. Tang explained that the viceroy was exactly the person who planned to invade Tibet and denied China's sovereignty over Tibet.⁸⁶ Since British representative Fraser was Curzon's subordinate, it was impossible for the treaty to clearly claim China's sovereignty over Tibet. However, Tang keenly pointed out that the Liberal Party (Ch. *kaizhi dang* 開智黨), which did not support India's military invasion of Tibet, would replace the Conservative Party to lead the British government in the coming spring of 1906. In the meantime, Curzon's five-year term would expire in the same year. Therefore, it would be beneficial to the Qing to delay the sovereignty controversy until the Liberal Party took over.⁸⁷ Tang's knowledge of British politics, such as the rotation of the ruling parties and the British liberals' political views, significantly influenced his negotiating strategy.

Compromising between the Qing and British Empires

Beginning in March 1905, the negotiation between the Qing and Britain came to a deadlock due to the controversy over the translation of "sovereignty."⁸⁸ Finally, in July 1905, Tang Shaoyi made two suggestions to the Qing Court. First, he requested that the Qing Ministry of Foreign

⁸³ BNA, FO535/6/67/83.

⁸⁴ BNA, FO535/6/93/112; AS XZD, 02-16-001-06-047 and 048.

⁸⁵ NPM, *The Convention Between Great Britain and China Respecting Tibet*, 910000035.

⁸⁶ AS, XZD, 02-16-001-06-066.

⁸⁷ AS, XZD, 02-16-001-06-066.

⁸⁸ *Zhongguo di'er lishi dang'anguan* (ed.) 2000: vol.2, 971-972.

Affairs should replace him with a new plenipotentiary and allow him to return to China. Tang suggested that substituting representatives was a common way to make a diplomatic compromise for Westerners. Tang quoted the British case of 1815, when the British government let Arthur Wellesley (1769–1852) substitute for Viscount Castlereagh (1769–1822) as the first Congress of Vienna plenipotentiary. Also, he thought that replacing representatives was a more reasonable solution than protesting against Britain.⁸⁹

Furthermore, Tang suggested deleting the first article of the treaty that claimed China enjoyed “sovereignty/suzerainty” over Tibet. While the Qing claimed that China was the “sovereign” (*zhuguo*) of Tibet, Britain insisted that China was merely Tibet’s “suzerain” (*shangguo*) in the negotiation. According to the letter sent by Fraser to Tang, the British firmly refused to recognize China’s sovereignty over Tibet, since the British were able to sign *The Treaty of Lhasa* directly with the Tibetans in 1904.⁹⁰ Based on Fraser’s argument, Tang proposed to the Qing Ministry of Foreign Affairs to omit the terms “sovereignty” or “suzerainty” in the treaty. Tang was clearly aware that the *Treaty of Lhasa of 1904* jointly made by the British and the Tibetans without China’s permission would be detrimental to China’s claim of sovereignty over Tibet. Based on his previous experiences of the Japanese invasion of Korea, Tang reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as stated below:

A client state (*shuguo*) does not have the right of signing a treaty with another country; not to mention, Tibet is our dependency (*shudi*) that should be regarded as a country. Although our country did not sign [*The Treaty of Lhasa*] last year (1904), the minister You[-tai] did not prevent the Tibetans from signing the treaty beyond their authority. As a result, Britain took advantage fortuitously and utilized the event as the evidence that proves [China is Tibet’s] suzerain. The British viewing Tibet today share the same purpose with the Japanese who signed the treaty with Korea in the early Guangxu [Ch. 光緒, r. 1871–1908] period. They both harbor evil intents.⁹¹

Since You-tai’s relatively passive attitude to the conflict between the British and the Tibetans in 1904 provided Britain a good excuse to deny

⁸⁹ AS, XZD 02–16–001–06–066: The term “protest” was transliterated in Chinese “Pulutaisite” 噶魯太司特.

⁹⁰ AS, XZD, 02–16–003–01–007.

⁹¹ “查屬國無逕與他國締約之權，況藏為我屬地，不能以一國視之。去歲我國雖未畫押，惟有大臣並未阻止藏人越權締約，故英得意外之便宜，即以此為上國之證據。英今日之視藏，即與光緒初年日本與韓立約之意相同，用心叵測。” AS, XZD, 02–16–003–01–007.

China's sovereignty over Tibet, Tang Shaoyi thought it might be more reasonable to tentatively postpone the controversy of sovereignty and suzerainty, otherwise the British might take advantage of the controversy as "the basis of supporting the independence of Tibet."⁹² Consequently, Tang was inclined to remove controversial terms from the treaty, such as sovereignty and suzerainty. According to Fraser's reply to Tang in June 1905, Tang proposed to use the terms "existing authority of China over Tibet."⁹³ Fraser refused Tang's proposal once again.

The turning point of the negotiation occurred in August 1905, when Curzon resigned as viceroy because of his conflicts with Herbert Kitchener (1850–1916), India's commander-in-chief, due to their disagreements about the military administration. As Stephen P. Cohen stressed, the civil-military quarrels between Curzon and Kitchener significantly influenced Britain's and India's politics.⁹⁴ In fact, Tang was aware of this important change and its effects on British India's frontier policy. In Tang's report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in August 1905, he wrote:

Last month, Viceroy Curzon strived for the military power with the commander-in-chief and they appealed to the British court. The government's decision did not support Curzon. Moreover, public opinion and newspapers in Britain and India criticized him simultaneously and asked him to resign. I think there may be a turning point for the treaty if Curzon resigns.⁹⁵

As Tang expected, Curzon resigned in August 1905 and his position was taken over by Lord Minto Gilbert Elliot-Murray-Kynynmound (1845–1914), who had previously served as the governor-general of Canada. Tang immediately passed this information to the Qing Court and suggested the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should contact Satow in Beijing in order to restart negotiations.⁹⁶ In September 1905, Satow replied on behalf of the Foreign Office to the Qing that the British government agreed to delete the first article by which Britain had intended to clarify China's "suzerainty" over Tibet, but Britain would not make any concessions in addition to this compromise.⁹⁷

⁹² “以為將來扶持西藏獨立之基礎。” Ibid.

⁹³ “中國在西藏原有及現時享受應得之權利。” Smith 1997: 161. The Chinese counterpart (AS, XZD 02-16-003-01-007).

⁹⁴ Cohen 1968: 337–355.

⁹⁵ “前月，寇督與陸軍省大臣互爭兵權，交訴英廷，部議不直寇督，英印輿論報章同詆寇督，諷其解任。私擬寇若解任，則約事似有轉機。” AS, XZD 02-16-003-01-007:

⁹⁶ AS, XZD, 02-16-003-01-008.

⁹⁷ AS, XZD, 02-16-003-01-015.

After the British agreed to shelve the controversy over sovereignty and suzerainty, Tang asked the Qing government to allow him to return to China on the pretext of treating a fungal infection in his feet.⁹⁸ As Tang said to the Qing government, "The Europeans always pay attention to hygiene. Seeking medical advice in different places is common in Western customs. Now, I would like to ask someone to take over my job during my sick leave. It seems it is not unacceptable to international [society]."⁹⁹ Tang skillfully utilized the Western idea of hygiene (Ch. *weisheng* 衛生)¹⁰⁰ as a diplomatic tool in order to persuade the British to accept the change of Chinese representatives. At the same time, Tang also recommended Zhang Yintang, who had served as a diplomat in Japan and the United States, to take over his work.¹⁰¹ After October 1905, Zhang officially took over Tang's responsibility to resume negotiations with the Indian government, which insisted that the Chinese representative should sign the treaty immediately, without any bargaining; otherwise, the negotiation would break down.¹⁰² After Curzon stepped down, British representative Ernest Wilton was substituted for Fraser to continue the negotiations. Henderson recorded the first official meeting between Zhang and Wilton and reported to Hart. According to Henderson, Wilton was very rude to Zhang and tried to force the Chinese embassy to sign the treaty as soon as possible. Moreover, Zhang was unable to conduct negotiations due to the intervention of the new viceroy, Lord Minto.¹⁰³ While encountering many difficulties during this process with British India, the Qing government started to realize the necessity of consolidating China's sovereignty over Tibet.

The Embodiment of Sovereignty: Money and Lamas

In addition to Britain's tough stance in the negotiation of the treaty of Tibet, the Qing Dynasty had to deal with two problematic issues

⁹⁸ Tang might have been suffering from tinea pedis (athlete's foot), which was an epidemic disease prevailing in the British colonies in Asia. It was first described by a British dermatologist at King's College Hospital named Arthur Whitfield in 1908. Whitfield 1908: 237; Homei 2013: 44.

⁹⁹ "洋人素重衛生，易地就醫，西俗通例，現因病請代，似於國際尚無窒碍。" AS, XZD, 02-16-003-01-016.

¹⁰⁰ The Chinese term "weisheng" literally means "guarding life." Before the late 19th century, this term was associated with the Daoist regimens of diet and medication. In the 1880s, this term was first used to translate the Western idea of "hygiene" in books and pamphlets published in China's treaty ports, such as Shanghai and Tianjin. Rogaski 2004: 104-135.

¹⁰¹ AS, XZD, 02-16-003-01-016

¹⁰² AS, XZD, 02-16-003-01-047.

¹⁰³ Zhongguo di'er lishi dang'anguan (ed.) 2000: vol.2, 977.

simultaneously. First, the British army led by Younghusband had imposed a £500,000 (7,500,000-rupee) indemnity on Tibet in *The 1904 Lhasa Treaty*.¹⁰⁴ Although the amount of the compensation was later reduced to £166,000 (2,500,000 rupees), it would still be a heavy burden on the Tibetans.¹⁰⁵ In fact, the Qing's consideration for the indemnity was more than the amount of money. If Tibetans paid the indemnity by themselves directly to the British, this might give Britain an excuse to refute China's sovereignty over Tibet. On the contrary, if the Qing government could pay off the indemnity on behalf of Tibet, it could demonstrate China's authority over Tibet. Therefore, the Qing Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to "bail Tibet out of its difficulty in order to keep sovereignty."¹⁰⁶ In November 1905, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a letter to Satow and informed him that the Qing government would pay off Tibet's indemnity in three annual installments through the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank (Ch. *Huifeng yinhang* 匯豐銀行) beginning in 1906.¹⁰⁷

However, while the Qing Dynasty intended to demonstrate its sovereignty by paying the indemnity on behalf of Tibet, another sovereignty crisis happened. While the Prince of Wales (later crowned as George V, 1865–1936) visited British India in November 1905, the Indian government planned to invite the Ninth Panchen Lama Tubten Chokyi Nyima (Thub bstan chos kyi nyi ma, 1883–1937) to India to meet the Prince. After the late 16th century, the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama became the most powerful Buddhist leaders in Tibet. According to Chinese sources, whereas the Dalai Lama ruled over the eastern part of Tibet, the Panchen Lama was the leader of western Tibet. Although the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama belonged to the same religious tradition of Tibetan Buddhism and were each other's teachers, they also competed with each other for the sake of gaining political power, especially after the late 19th century.

Generally speaking, the Dalai Lama possessed more essential political status than the Panchen Lama, due to the importance of eastern Tibet's geopolitics. However, after the Thirteenth Dalai Lama Tubten Gyatso escaped from Lhasa to Kokonor and Mongolia due to the 1903 British invasion, the Ninth Panchen Lama became central Tibet's most powerful religious and political leader. Therefore, when the British army, led by William O'Connor, arrived in Tashilhunpo (Bkra shis lhun po) Monastery to invite the Panchen Lama to India without informing China beforehand, the Qing Dynasty was very worried about the

¹⁰⁴ BNA, FO 405/179.

¹⁰⁵ AS, XZD, 02-16-003-01-052; Mckay 1997: 40.

¹⁰⁶ “恤藏困而持主權。” AS, XZD, 02-16-003-01-048.

¹⁰⁷ AS, XZD, 02-16-003-01-050; 02-16-003-01-066; 02-16-003-02-006.

likelihood of the British kidnaping young Panchen Lama and exploiting him as a political tool against China.¹⁰⁸ Although the Panchen Lama eventually returned to western Tibet in January 1906, his visit to India caused a serious sovereignty crisis to the Qing Dynasty. According to Henderson's letter sent to Hart dated January 12, 1906, the Panchen Lama was treated kindly in India and frequently visited the vice-roy and other colonial officers, even though he claimed to the Qing that he did not have any political interactions with the Indian government. Henderson also suggested it was such a critical moment for the Chinese government to maintain its sovereignty over Tibet; nevertheless, Zhang Yintang was so inexperienced that he had done nothing to manage the sovereignty crisis until five days later.¹⁰⁹ Although Henderson criticized Zhang for his inefficiency, it seems that Zhang had his own plan to solidify China's authority over Tibet. According to Zhang's summary report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated March 1906, Zhang comprehensively collected information on the Panchen Lama's activities in India. It was also reported that the British invited the Panchen Lama to India and tried to utilize his contradictions with the Dalai Lama as well as persuade him to pursue Tibet's independence and turn Tibet into a British protectorate. Therefore, Zhang suggested abolishing Tibet's longstanding tradition of the "combination of religion and politics" (Tib. *chos srid zung 'brel*) and separate religious power from Tibet's politics. In addition to diminishing the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama's political influence, Zhang also proposed to send the Chinese army to Lhasa from Sichuan and promote the New Policies (Ch. *xinzheng* 新政) in Tibet, such as establishing new-style schools and publishing newspapers in order to let the Tibetans have faith in China's "state power" (Ch. *guojia quanli* 國家權力).¹¹⁰ At the end of his report, Zhang once again emphasized the importance of sovereignty in Tibetan affairs:

The British do not recognize our sovereignty and lure the Panchen to seek asylum. Once the significant change happened, the British proclaimed [Tibet] was a British protectorate and they acted on behalf of [Tibet]. These are the issues we have to consider. If we can first establish sovereignty in Tibet now, then the British will have no excuse to wage war.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸ AS, XZD, 02-16-003-01-050; 02-16-003-01-089.

¹⁰⁹ Zhongguo di'er lishi dang'anguan (ed.) 2000: vol. 2, 979.

¹¹⁰ AS, XZD, 02-16-002-01-010.

¹¹¹ “英既不認我主權，又誘班禪請英保護，一旦有變，英必有宣布歸英保護及代理政權等事，不可不慮。此時我能在藏先樹主權，英人萬無開釁之理。” AS, XZD, 02-16-002-01-010.

Whereas the British India government still adopted a tough stance in Tibetan affairs and intended to maintain its expansionist frontier policy, the new British government led by the Liberal Party thoroughly shifted the Empire's foreign policy toward China. After the Liberal Party led by Henry Campbell-Bannerman (1836–1908) won the United Kingdom general election in February 1906, the new British government finally decided to commission the British plenipotentiary to sign the treaty of Tibet with China in Beijing to solve the impasse of the negotiation in India, where the colonial officers discussed different opinions of Tibetan affairs with the new government. In his memorial to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tang said:

Recently Britain has a new government that has a policy of maintaining peace and is reluctant to invade its neighbors. Therefore, [the new government] ordered the plenipotentiary Satow to continue negotiations in Beijing. Since they would like to give some leeway, we should try to finish the negotiation promptly in order to protect sovereignty.¹¹²

Consequently, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested the Guangxu Emperor to permit Tang Shaoyi to sign the treaty with the British on April 24, 1906.¹¹³ The Emperor issued a bilingual edict in Manchu and Chinese immediately on the next day to authorize Tang to sign the treaty of Tibet with the British as plenipotentiary.

In this edict, several new concepts were presented in both Manchu and Chinese. First, “Chinese and Britain” (Ma. *Dulimbai gurun ing gurun Iemgi*; Ch. *Zhongguo yu Yingguo* 中國與英國) was referred as two equal states. The official title of “plenipotentiary” (Ch. *quanquan dachen* 全權大臣) issued to Tang was paraphrased as “the minister conferred with power” (Ma. *toose be aliha amban*) in Manchu. Moreover, “the treaty of Tibet” (Ch. *Xizang tiaoyue* 西藏條約) was understood as “the contract of Tibet in itemized articles” in Manchu (Ma. *wargi dzang ni hacin meyen i boji bithe*).¹¹⁴ Guangxu's edict on the 1906 treaty offers critical insight into the Qing Empire's approach to international agreements. Notably, the Manchu version of the edict introduces distinct terminology that reflects the Qing court's nuanced understanding of its relationship with foreign powers. For instance, the Manchu term “hacin meyen i boji bithe,” which was used to interpret the idea of

¹¹² “近因英國新易政府，其宗旨在保守和平，不欲侵佔隣境，是以仍飭該使臣薩道義在京續商。彼既有意轉圜，我當早圖結束，以保主權。” AS, XZD, 02-16-002-01-008.

¹¹³ QDSL 1986: vol. 556, 389.

¹¹⁴ NPM, Tibet Trade Regulations between China and Great Britain, 910000039-002.

“treaty,” underscores a more contractual rather than sovereign understanding of the agreement. As a result, on April 27, 1906, Tang and Satow eventually signed the treaty known as *The Convention Respecting Tibet between China and Great Britain* in which the terms “sovereignty” or “suzerainty” are never mentioned.¹¹⁵

The Legacies of the Sovereignty Disputes

Although the treaty of 1906 between China and Britain does not even mention sovereignty or suzerainty, the debate behind the text left profound legacies for modern China and Tibet. First of all, during the argument over Tibet’s legal status from 1904 to 1906, the difference between sovereignty and suzerainty was clarified by the Chinese officials, such as Tang Shaoyi and Zhang Yintang. Moreover, Tibet’s conflict with British India and the dispute regarding China’s sovereignty over Tibet impelled the Qing Dynasty to rely on the new-style Chinese diplomats rather than on the traditional Manchu-Mongolian bannermen to manage Tibetan affairs. Third, *zhuquan* (sovereignty) eventually became a popular idea in China not only for intellectuals but also for commoners.

When the British army invaded Lhasa in 1904, You-tai, the Qing’s highest official in Tibet, did not even understand the exact meaning of *zhuquan*. However, after the 1905 debate over sovereignty, maintaining *zhuquan* became the Qing officials’ priority in Tibet. After You-tai was removed from office in 1906, a Manchu bannermen named Lian-yu 聯豫 (1858-?) took over his position as the Qing’s amban in Lhasa. When the Thirteenth Dalai Lama returned to the countryside near Lhasa in October 1909, Lian-yu sent a memorial to the Qing court and accused the Dalai Lama of conspiring with Tibetan officials against him. Lian-yu then criticized the Dalai Lama for “attempting to directly seize our sovereignty along with the British.”¹¹⁶ Additionally, when Lian-yu sent a request to the Qing Court to appropriate funds for constructing the telegraph system in Tibet in December 1910, he wrote:

When the British army entered Tibet in the 30th year of Guangxu (1904), they installed military telegraph lines wherever they arrived, from the Yadong [Tib. Dromo] Customs to Gyantse [Tib. Rgyal rtse]. Later on, confidential events in Tibet have relied on the communication of the British telegraph lines. This is reversing the positions of the host and the guest. Through the years, the telegram expenditures have caused a huge deficit

¹¹⁵ One set of the original treaties is preserved in Taiwan, see *The Convention Between Great Britain and China Respecting Tibet*, NPM, 910000035–003.

¹¹⁶ “欲與英直接奪我主權。” Lian-yu 1979: 92

[with Britain]. Since sovereignty has been lost, the economic rights have gone as well. What a shame!¹¹⁷

According to Lian-yu's memorials to the Qing court, it was obvious *zhuquan* had already become an international law concept that was well-known to the Qing officials in Tibet and the Beijing government. Unlike his predecessor You-tai, who had first come across the idea of sovereignty in 1904, Lian-yu was very familiar with the term *zhuquan* and even utilized it to request funding from the Qing government. As a British diplomat in China named Max Müller (1867–1945) observed in 1910, "The reference to the sovereign rights of China was inevitable, as it is now the stock phrase of every Chinese official no matter what the subject of discussion with the foreigner may be."¹¹⁸ It is obvious that "sovereignty" had become the foremost concern for most Chinese officials dealing with foreign affairs by 1910.

In addition to Qing officials, the sovereignty dispute from 1904 to 1906 was widely reported by newspapers and also promoted the circulation of the idea of sovereignty in Chinese society. For instance, according to *The Vernacular News of Anhui* (Ch. *Anhui suhua bao* 安徽俗話報) published in December 1904, "It is said that after the Chinese plenipotentiary in Britain negotiated with Britain's foreign secretary, Britain has already recognized China's *zhuquan* over Tibet."¹¹⁹ Meanwhile, the journal *Lujiang News* (Ch. *Lujiang bao* 鷺江報) published in Amoy (Ch. Xiamen 廈門) also mentioned the same story.¹²⁰ Moreover, in December 1905, a report in *The Diplomatic Review* (Ch. *Waijiao bao* 外交報) also said the British government "already recognized the Chinese government had full *zhuquan* for ruling over the Tibetan region."¹²¹ It is clear that the term *zhuquan* mentioned in these reports is not the counterpart of "sovereignty," since the British government never recognized China's sovereignty over Tibet. In fact, these Chinese newspapers wrongly used the term *zhuquan* to translate "suzerainty."

Nevertheless, along with the development of the debate over sovereignty issues between China and Britain, more and more reporters could correctly understand *zhuquan* as "sovereignty." As mentioned in a report published in the journal *Zhifu News* (Ch. *Zhifu bao* 之罟報) in

¹¹⁷ "光緒三十年英軍入藏，師行所至，即設行軍電線，侵越邊界，自亞東關至江孜。其後藏中機要事件，即賴英線傳遞，反客為主。數年以來，費報外溢，為數不貲。主權一失，則利權隨之，良可慨嘆。" Ibid., 158.

¹¹⁸ BNA, FO535/13/67/53.

¹¹⁹ "聽說駐英中國公使和英國外部大臣商議以後，英國已認中國在西藏的主權。"

¹²⁰ *Lujiang bao* 1904. *Anhui suhua bao* 1904: 2.

¹²¹ *Waijiao bao* 1905: 5.

March 1905, "In terms of the negotiation of Tibet nowadays, priority must be given to regaining sovereignty."¹²² Some newspapers even reported the debate over the translation problems raised by "sovereignty" and "suzerainty." For instance, *Mainland News* (Ch. *Dalu bao* 大陸報) published a report mentioning the problems posed by the translations of "sovereign" (*zhuguo*) and "suzerain" (*shangguo*) between Tang Shaoyi and the British representative in March 1905.¹²³ Briefly, the Chinese newspapers' publications provided a broad readership access to knowledge of "sovereignty" and international law in the early 20th century.

In addition to interactions between Britain and China, the debate over "sovereignty/ suzerainty" respecting Tibet profoundly influenced relationships between Britain and Russia in the early 20th century. After Britain and China both agreed to omit the controversial terms "sovereignty" and "suzerainty" in the Sino-British treaty respecting Tibet in 1905, Britain confirmed China's authority over Tibet, where other foreign powers should not intervene without China's intermediation, even though Britain never formally recognized China's sovereignty over Tibet. Consequently, Tibet was eventually set as a buffer zone between British India and Russian inner Asia after April 1906, when *The Convention Between Great Britain and China Respecting Tibet* was signed in Beijing. As a result, Britain was able to meet the power balance with Russia in Inner Asia and could further peace talks with Russia, whose ambitions over Tibet had been regarded as the greatest threat to British India. A proposal dated October 8, 1906, sent by Arthur Nicolson (1849–1928), British ambassador in St. Petersburg, to Foreign Secretary Edward Grey (1862–1933) stated, "If both Great Britain and Russia formally acknowledged China's suzerainty over Thibet, the issue of establishing a Protectorate was ipso facto excluded."¹²⁴

Consequently, Britain and Russia did not have to strive for Tibet as a protectorate and managed to end their longstanding rivalry in Inner Asia through drafting *The Anglo-Russian Convention in 1907*, which stated: "In conformity with the admitted principle of the suzerainty of China over Tibet, Great Britain and Russia engage not to enter into negotiations with Tibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government."¹²⁵

"China's suzerainty over Tibet" provided the premise of *The Anglo-*

¹²² "今日而論西藏之交涉，則必以收回主權為第一義。" Lu Sheng, "Xizang jiao she tiao yi." *Zhifu bao* 1905: 5.

¹²³ *Dalu bao* 1905: 7.

¹²⁴ BNA, FO535/8/69/57.

¹²⁵ BNA, FO535/10/49/38.

Russian Entente in 1907, which became the basis for the formation of the Triple Entente during World War I. Namely, Tibet's sovereignty not only affected the Sino-Britain relationship but also influenced the course of world history in the early 20th century.

Conclusion

The debate over the Qing's sovereignty over Tibet sheds light on several issues. First, in the process of translating the idea of "sovereignty," *zhuquan* gradually became a significant term in the Qing's diplomatic discourse after the late 19th century. However, when You-tai and Francis Younghusband intended to clarify Tibet's legal status in 1904, after the British invasion of Lhasa, the term *zhuquan* was not clearly defined in Chinese. Therefore, while the Qing Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried to claim China's "sovereignty" over Tibet by using the term *zhuquan*, the British interpreted the Chinese word differently, implying "suzerainty." After the Qing government replaced You-tai with Tang Shaoyi to liaise between China and Britain, the meaning of *zhuquan* was finally elucidated.

In addition, adopting the idea of "sovereignty" essentially shaped the Qing's foreign policy and provides us a remarkable angle to reexamine China's world order, especially its relations with other east Asian countries. When Tang Shaoyi suggested the Qing government should not use the term *shangguo* (suzerainty) to describe China's relations with Tibet, he argued, "If we recognized ourselves as the suzerain [of Tibet], it is to sideline Tibet to a more alienated place, which is equal to the status to which Korea, Vietnam, Ryuku, and Myanmar used to be relegated."¹²⁶ According to Tang's explanation, China undoubtedly had a closer relationship with Tibet compared with those "tributary states," such as Korea and Vietnam. This can explain why Tibetan lamas had higher seats than Korean envoys' when they simultaneously met the Qianlong Emperor 乾隆 (1711–1799) in 1780—and the Qing government even ordered the Koreans to kowtow to the Panchen Lama.¹²⁷ Briefly, the Qing's logic in its relations with Tibet is very different from the tributary system, and this is why controversies over Qing's "sovereignty" occurred in Tibet but not so in other tributary states when they were invaded by Westerners.

Moreover, the sovereignty disputes between China and Britain in 1905 made "sovereignty" become popular, not only mentioned in official documents but also in Chinese newspapers. Through the newspapers' information networks, "sovereignty" was no longer an exotic

¹²⁶ AS, XZD, 02–16–001–06–061.

¹²⁷ Park 1997: 179–186.

legal term. Instead, the meaning of *zhuquan* was finally aligned with “sovereignty” after Tibet’s sovereignty issue in 1905 and it further affected China’s worldview. That is to say, through the sovereignty and suzerainty arguments, China profoundly reexamined its relations with its neighbors during the transformation from the Heavenly Dynasty to a modern nation in the early 20th century.

Finally, the debate of China’s “sovereignty/suzerainty” over Tibet profoundly shaped the formation of international law and international politics. In addition to establishing *The Anglo-Russian Entente*, the “sovereignty” and “suzerainty” concepts were clarified not only in regards to China, but also Britain during the 1905 debate, which eventually became set as a pair of ideas. As Antony Anghie argues, the formation of “sovereignty” was closely related to colonial confrontations between Westerners and non-Westerners.¹²⁸ While Britain’s colonial power intended to make use of the “suzerainty” discourse to weaken China’s legitimacy over Tibet through promoting international law as “the standard of civilization,”¹²⁹ it is worth noting that China did not passively accept Britain’s colonial discourse. Instead, China actively formed the new discourse of *zhuquan* and further exploited internal conflicts within the British Empire, such as the contradiction between the Conservative and Liberal Parties, against the colonial power.

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¹²⁸ Anghie 2007: 1–12.

¹²⁹ Gong 1984: 3–23.

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The Thirteenth Dalai Lama and the Water-Rat Year Chinese War (1912)

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Introduction

he arrival of Sichuan troops in Tibet, the establishment of a Chinese republic in 1912, the Water-Rat year Chinese war, and the expulsion of Chinese troops from Tibet put an end to the priest-patron relationship that existed between the Dalai Lamas and the Manchu emperors and led to the establishment of Tibet's *de facto* independence.¹ However, this assertion needs questioning in order to examine the emergence of a national consciousness among the highest Tibetan authorities prior to the Water-Rat year War, the mutiny by the Chinese army in Tibet and the damage caused by Manchu and Chinese soldiers. Little is known about the actions and ideas developed by Tibetans during this period, with the exception of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama Tubten Gyatso's (Thub bstan rgya mtsho, 1876–1933, reigned from 1895 to his death), which are often cryptic and sometimes contradictory; those of a few generals who valiantly defended positions; and the monastic communities', some of whom supported one side rather than another.

The sources available to me while preparing this article are of very different kinds. From a general point of view, research into relations between China and Tibet requires drawing on sources that illustrate representative theoretical frameworks, and others that involve normative ones. Studying the period and events considered in this article is no exception to this rule. Thus, regarding sources that allow

* The research leading to these results has received funding from the French National Research Agency (ANR) (Project ANR-21-CE27-0025-Natinasia). Any errors remain mine.

¹ The notion of the “union of politics and religion” (Tib. *chos srid zung 'brel, lugs zung* or conjugated order / *lugs gnyis* or dual order / *tshul gnyis*; Ch. *zhengjiao he yi* 政教合一) is usually considered as a tool for analyzing the relations established between Lhasa and Beijing in the Qing period (1644–1912), see, for instance, Ruegg 1991 and 1995; Ishihama 2004; Pirie 2017.

interpretations, two patterns are observed. The first concerns Chinese sources, namely archives, travel diaries, war accounts, and press articles that are contemporary to the events narrated. The second focuses on Tibetan sources. First, Tibetan masters' biographies, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama's, for instance and also Tibetan lay and monk officials' biographies which were mostly written—in English—many years after their subject/object deaths and their exile from Tibet. Second, we find a few arcane lines quoted in the narration of biographies written in Tibetan and in Chinese and published in China as early as the mid-1980s, when the subject/object was born before the early 20th century. The Tibetan model is normative, as is that of the Chinese dynastic annals and monographs and raises the question about the message the author intends to communicate about the subject/object of the hagiographies, his actions and his ideas, since these sources were written *a posteriori* after day-to-day notes had been taken down by people close to them. Both theoretical models are complemented by diplomatic archives. The British Raj's are obviously richer than the Chinese ones, but the French diplomats based in Southeast Asia or in China also deliver an outsider's point of view that offers a broader vision of the Asian continent's and Inner Asia's geopolitics. All these sources induce an exegesis of interpretations that also mobilizes the historiographic work already undertaken. However, the volume of information in Chinese, British, besides the French sources contemporary to the 1908–1912 period is much less substantial in Tibetan ones. The details that abound in the first sources quoted are absent from the Tibetan sources I have consulted, resulting in a certain imbalance that is difficult to restore so far, despite the British archives, which gave the translations of many documents issued at that time in Chinese or Tibetan. T.W. Shakabpa (Dbang phyug bde ldan Zhwa sgab pa (1907–1989), the Tibetan government former finance minister (from 1939 to 1950), historian, and author of the book *Bod kyi srid don rgyal rabs* [*A Political History of Tibet*] published his work in Tibetan (1976) and in its English publication (1967; which was published prior to the Tibetan one), Dorje Yudon Yuthok (1912–1998), *House of the Turquoise Roof* (1990; in English), and Dundul Namgyal Tsarong, *In the Service of His Country: The Biography of Dasang Damdul Tsarong, Commander General of Tibet* (2000; in English) are the only sources written by Tibetans that give a detailed description of the events at that time as far as I know.²

The fact remains that the Thirteenth Dalai Lama Tubten Gyatso's actions, along with their consequences as recorded in various sources,

² For this article, I use mainly the last translation of this book by Derek F. Maher 2010: 720–750; Shakabpa 1976: 167–250; Dorje Yudon Yuthok 1990: 19–27; Dundul Namgyal Tsarong 2000: 25–45.

hold our attention: his exile in Inner Asia and China (1904–1909), his negotiations with the Manchu amban (1910), his departure to British India (1910–1912) and his organization of the Tibetan resistance from India to Tibet (1911–1912).

While the Tibetan government was already politically active on the international scene (signing treaties with Nepal in 1856 and Sikkim in 1888 and sending Buryat monk Agvan Dorzhiev (1854–1938) to Europe and Russia as the Dalai Lama's emissary in the 1890s), the Dalai Lama's first exile led to his personal involvement in the international power-play then developing in Inner Asia. During his first exile, the Dalai Lama became an avid student of international power politics (and reform ideas for Tibet), but without managing to successfully intervene in the game yet, not for want of trying. However, this exile taught him where he stood as a religious and political figure, not only with regard to British India and Russia, but also to Qing 清 China, Mongolia, Amdo (A mdo), and Kham (Khams). During his second exile, the Dalai Lama was much more self-confident in dealing with foreigners (including the Manchu and later the Chinese) and he played a direct role in global interactions although the complexities of British domestic and international politics prevented him from reaching all his goals. He still lacked the terminology and conceptual understanding of global politics and Russia's, Britain's, and the Qing's machinations. However, the Dalai Lama then better conceptualized the forces at work and how Tibet might define itself within those forces, hence the negotiations that preceded the Simla Convention to draw Tibet's borders and define its status on the international stage (1913–1914).

The Dalai Lama's exile in Inner Asia and China (1904–1909)

The Dalai Lama's actions during his first exile in the wake of the 1904 British invasion of Tibet, which lasted until his return to Lhasa (Lha sa) in December 1909 confirm his determination to assert his sovereignty on the international scene and the breadth of his political power over Tibetan territory and beyond.³ During his whole exile, he was approached by many international politicians, diplomats, and emissaries from various governments, who instructed him on international issues.⁴ His travels, meetings, and decisions impacted Inner Asia's

³ For the most recent study on the Younghusband mission, see Diemberger and Hugh-Jones 2012; on the Russian in Tibet, see Andreyev 1996 and 2001.

⁴ See Bianca Horlemann's paper in this issue. Kobayashi 2019; Sperling 2011; Meinheit 2011; Jagou 2009; Andreyev 1993, and also online <https://blogs.loc.gov/international-collections/2022/10/the-thomas-wilson-haskins-digital-collection-1902-1908/>.

geopolitics and reshaped the distribution of forces at the same time as when China was losing its position as privileged spokesperson on the Asian territory.⁵

In Lhasa, during his absence and without Manchu intervention, the British negotiated the surrender of Tibet with the Regent, *Ganden Tripa* Meru Lobzang Gyeltsen (*Dga' ldan khri pa* Rme ru blo bzang rgyal mtshan, regent from 1904 to 1909) appointed by the Dalai Lama before his departure to Mongolia, China, and Amdo to sign the Lhasa Convention (1904). Under its terms the Tibetans ratified both the treaties agreed on between China and Britain in 1886 and 1890 and were forced to open two new markets for the British: one at Gyantse (Rgyal rtse), in the Tsang (Gtsang) region, and the other at Gartok (Sgar thog), in the Ngari (Mnga' ris) region; in addition to the one at Dromo (Gro mo)⁶ in the Chumbi Valley which had been established earlier under the 1890 agreement, but which had not yet been implemented. Moreover, the Tibetans committed to not negotiating with other countries without Britain's consent, and to paying a war indemnity.⁷ Then, with the signature of the Lhasa Convention, the Russians feared the establishment of a British Protectorate in Tibet and the specter of an independent and powerful Tibet, confirming that Tibet found or put itself at the center of a rapidly mutating world where alliances were being shaken up.⁸ A treaty involving Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet was then signed between Russia and Great Britain in 1907. It outlined their respective spheres of influence and included the mutual promise to "comply with Tibet's territorial integrity and to abstain from all interference with the Tibetan internal administration."⁹ In the text, both parties recognized China's suzerainty over Tibet and committed themselves to not entering into negotiation with Tibetan authorities without prior consultation with the Beijing government (*Beijing zhengfu* 北京政府).¹⁰ The British archives make it obvious that these treaties prevented the British from taking action in favor of the Dalai Lama and position towards the status of Tibet as a country.

The recognition of Manchu suzerainty over Tibet by two great powers was not enough for the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). A train of reforms was implemented by the then Amban in Lhasa, Lian-yu 聯豫

⁵ See Irina Garri's and Bianca Horlemann's contributions in this issue.

⁶ Dromo or Yatung is located in the Chumbi Valley, near Sikkim, Bhutan, and Nepal. Today, Dromo is in Yadong 亞東 County, Shigatse (Gzhis ka rtse; Ch. Rikazi 日喀則) Prefecture, Tibet Autonomous Region.

⁷ Lamb 1966: 36–51.

⁸ About the treaties signed between the British and the Chinese regarding Tibet, see Ling-wei Kung's paper in this issue.

⁹ Article 1 of the Convention, see van Walt van Praag 1987: appendix 12, 307.

¹⁰ van Walt van Praag 1987: 307–308.

(1858–?, amban from December 1906 to December 1912)¹¹ and the Assistant-Amban, Zhang Yintang 張蔭棠 (1864–1937, assistant-amban from December 1906 to March 1908) and in concert with Zhao Erfeng 趙爾豐 (1845–1911), the then viceroy of Sichuan Province.¹² Among the measures taken, a bilingual newspaper came into being, schools teaching Chinese were founded, and the project to reinforce the Tibetan army was carried out instead of sending fresh troops to Tibet by late 1907, by admitting Tibetans in the Chengdu Military School and in the Baoding Military School (*Baoding junxiao* 保定軍校). Others were also trained within the Chengdu 成都 arsenal while Manchu and Chinese officers were sent to Lhasa.¹³ It was also planned to create a 6,000-strong New Army (*xinjian lujun* 新建陸軍, abbreviated to *xinjun* 新軍) in Tibet. It was supposed to be composed of Manchu and Chinese soldiers (6 out of 10) and Mongol and Tibetan ones (4 out of 10).¹⁴

The Beijing government felt insecure regarding Tibet, and sent an army to Lhasa via the Kham Tibetan region, after failing to reach an agreement with the British to allow the New Army to go to Tibet via India.¹⁵ At the same time, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa.

Negotiations between the Dalai Lama and the amban (1910)

At least three testimonies relate the Dalai Lama's arrival in Lhasa and his behavior toward the Amban Lian-yu. The historian Shakabpa gives an account of all the receptions organized to celebrate the Dalai Lama's

¹¹ Lian-yu, from the Manchu Plain White banner, was a relative of the Grand Councilor Na-tong. He was prefect at Yazhou (*Yazhou zhifu* 雅州知府) before being appointed amban in Tibet from 1906 to 1912.

¹² Belonging to the Manchu Plain Blue Banner, Zhao Erfeng 趙爾豐 was then director-general of the Sichuan-Hubei 四川湖北 Railway and acting viceroy of Sichuan Province.

¹³ Ministère des Affaires Étrangères français (FMFA), Annex to letter no. 88, from Pierre-Rémi Bons d'Anty, the French consul at Chengdu to M. Boissonnas, the French chargé d'affaires at Beijing, December 24, 1907; Tibet's Military and Political Situation on March 1, 1908, from M. Brissaud-Desmaillet, the French military Attaché at Beijing, to the FMFA, Paris.

¹⁴ Ibid. About the Zhang Yintang project to reinforce the Tibetan army instead of sending fresh troops to Tibet from the beginning of 1906 and Lian-yu military reforms to increase the Manchu army in Tibet by recruiting Mongols and eventually Gorkhas and Tibetans, see Kobayashi 2020: 311–340. Just after the return to Lhasa of the Dalai Lama, the latter sent a letter of protest against those reforms to the Qing Xuantong 宣統 Emperor (1906–1967; reign 1909–1912) in January 1910, see *The Times*, January 14, 1910.

¹⁵ The British National Archives (BNA), *Affairs of Thibet, Further Correspondence, Part XII, 1909*, Telegraph from Sir John Jordan to Sir Edward Grey (Received November 12) (no. 183. Secret.), dated Beijing, November 12, 1909.

return to Lhasa in December 1909.¹⁶ This is a factual report that can be complemented by a few others, written by Chinese people who witnessed his arrival and deliver their own feelings about it. The first is a witness account given by a Chinese soldier named Yen-Chen-Young (Yan Chenyong?), who was part of an escort provided by the Shanxi province governor to the Dalai Lama and noted by a *Times* journalist:

When the Dalai Lama reached Lhasa, he was received outside the city walls by a large body of Tibetan dignitaries and monks. They were lined up on one side of the road, while the other was crowded with Chinese officials and soldiers. The Dalai Lama exchanged friendly greetings with the Tibetans, but he walked past the Chinese as if he did not see them, his eyes staring blankly and his head cocked to one side. 'The Chinese', the soldier recalls, 'said nothing, but their hearts were black with rage.' For three days the Dalai Lama stayed in a temple the soldier called Chiang-Po, and there was great rejoicing among the Tibetans. On the fourth day he went up to the Potala and resumed residing in his palace on the hill [...].¹⁷

The behavior described above is confirmed within a correspondence sent by Mr. Max Müller (1867–1945), the British chargé d'affaires in Beijing, who met with the Manchu Grand Councillor Na-tong 那桐 (1857–1925) who exchanged with him about what happened in Lhasa. It said the Thirteenth Dalai Lama had ignored the amban since his arrival in Lhasa, persisting with his wish to be recognized as Tibet's temporal ruler (and not only her spiritual one):

Although, on the Lama's arrival, the amban had gone to meet him, yet the former, during the fifty days he was in Lhasa, had refused to see the amban again to discuss matters amicably; had prevented the amban and his escort from obtaining the usual supplies, and by refusing transport according to regulations had endeavored to cut communications with China.¹⁸

The second Chinese testimony gives the then Amban Lian-yu's opinion about the Dalai Lama's new way of displaying his temporal power:

The Dalai Lama returned to the Potala [from China] and the flag with a lion was hoisted on top. The Tibetans created their own currency (coins have lions on both sides) and their own police. Tibetan traders have been forbidden to do business with the Chinese. Food and firewood are

¹⁶ Shakabpa (Maher) 2010: 706–707.

¹⁷ *L'Asie française*, April 1, 1910: 203–204.

¹⁸ Younghusband 1910: 400, see also Wangchen Gelek Surkhang, Tibet in the early 20th century: <https://case.edu/artsci/tibet/sites/default/files/2022-05/Tibet%20in%20the%20early%20th%20century%20-W.G.Surkhang.pdf>

rationed. Regarding administrative matters, they have started to question my decisions and power.¹⁹

According to him, "The Dalai Lama has long nurtured a different aspiration, namely to make his country independent."²⁰ As a matter of fact, the Dalai Lama was not the only one displaying his temporal power. He was supported by the Tibetan people who organized festivities to celebrate his return to the Tibetan capital and gave him a title directly, without referring to the Manchu emperor's. Moreover, the seal was deprived of the Chinese and Manchu scripts and instead the Lantsa script was added to the Tibetan's and Phakpa's ('Phags pa). The Tibetan reference mentioning this gift in the Thirteenth Dalai Lama's biography is very short and clear: "[...] offered to the Thirteenth Dalai Lama by the gods and people of Tibet."²¹ Despite the many unanswerable questions this sentence raises, its interpretation could be that "the gods" adds to the supernatural dimension of the Dalai Lama's powers, while "people of Tibet" implies recognition of the Dalai Lama's sovereignty by his people.²² Therefore, the Dalai Lama maintains the constitutive gemelity of the spiritual and temporal institution he represents, since he receives his spiritual legitimacy from his "bodhisattvic" origin, while at the same time being recognized as the temporal ruler of Tibet by the Tibetan people. According to sources, the Dalai Lama used the seal immediately or from 1913.²³

However, the threat of a Manchu army taking over central Tibet was there. The Dalai Lama sought to negotiate with the Manchu representative in Lhasa to not allow the Qing army invasion coming from Kham, where Zhao Erfeng's troops were stationed after attacking the Tibetan region and approaching the border of Kham with central Tibet to implement the Qing New policies (*xinzheng* 新政) there, and definitely colonized the region.²⁴

Back to Lhasa (December 25, 1909) and even before the Sichuan troops invaded central Tibet (February 10, 1910), the Dalai Lama and his government were informed by the Amban Lian-yu that a dispatch

¹⁹ *Lian-yu zhu Zang zougao* 联豫驻藏奏稿 (LYZG), Memorial from Lian-yu, March 30, 1910.

²⁰ LYZG, Report from Lian-yu, October 27, 1909, and March 15, 1910.

²¹ Bell [1946] 1987: 171; Ishihama 2019: 91.

²² After a conversation with Prof. Yumiko Ishihama, from Waseda University, Tokyo, it seems that this notion comes from India where the royal power was considered as coming from gods.

²³ For a short discussion about this seal, Shakabpa (Maher) 2010: 706; Ishihama 2019: 91–92; See Wangchen Gelek Surkhang who mentions that the seal was given to the Thirteenth Dalai Lama by the Tibetan National Assembly, "Tibet in the early 20th century," FN18.

²⁴ Sperling 1976.

of one thousand Manchu troops would arrive at Lhasa and they decided to resist the entry of the Qing troops inside central Tibet,

1,000 Thibetan troops have left for Lhasa from Shigatse and 700 from Gyantse, according to Thibetan trade agent at Yatung. It is estimated by the latter that 10,000 troops, stationed at different strategic points in order to stop Chinese troops' advance, have been mobilized by the Lhasa Government.²⁵

However, according to the British,

It appears that Thibetans sent considerable force to face Chinese troops to Chiamdo [Cha mdo] in order to intimidate them, but with orders not to fight. They accordingly retreated as Chinese troops advanced and at the same time the Lhasa amban promised the Dalai Lama that only 1,000 Chinese troops would be brought to Lhasa. Forty Chinese mounted infantry arrived suddenly in Lhasa.²⁶

As the Manchu and Chinese troops approached Lhasa, the Dalai Lama received Assistant-Amban Wen Zongyao 溫宗堯 (1876–1947)²⁷ after

²⁵ BNA, *Affairs of Thibet, Further Correspondence, Part XIII, 1910*, Inclosure 3 in no. 50 (India Office to Foreign Office-Received November 26). Telegraph from Major-General Maharaja Sir Chandra Shumshere Jang Bahadur Rana to Lieutenant-Colonel Manners-Smith, November 25, 1909 and Inclosure in no. 8 (India Office to Foreign Office. Received February 16), Telegraph from Government of India to Viscount Morley, February 15, 1910.

²⁶ Ibid., Inclosure in no. 29 (India Office to Foreign Office-Received March 2.), Telegraph from the Government of India to Viscount Morley, March 2, 1910. This Tibetan army mobilization and retreat before fighting under the order of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama is also quoted in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (FMFA), *Chine, Politique intérieure, Thibet*, vol. VI, 1910, P. Campon, ambassador at the French Embassy in England to S. Pichon, minister of Foreign Affairs, March 18, 1910.

²⁷ Former professor at Queen's College, Hong Kong 香港, then director of the Guangdong 廣東 Foreign Affairs and Imperial Telegraph Office, Wen Zongyao was recommended to this post by Zhao Erfeng. He spoke very good English. He has a reputation of xenophobia which, according to the FMFA, accounts for why he has been named at this post that is to say to avoid that the British take more steps into Tibet through the opening of the trade marts, FMFA, *Chine, Politique intérieure, Thibet*, vol. V, 1907–1909, Letter from J. Beauvais, the French consul at Guangzhou to E. Ronssin, the consul-general of France in India, Calcutta, February 13, 1909. Appointed on July 23, 1908, he arrived in Lhasa in early 1909, Ibid., FMFA, Annex to the dépêche no. 48, dated March 12, 1909, Press review sent from J. Beauvais, the French consul at Guangzhou to E. Ronssin, the consul-general of France in India, Calcutta, Journal Ling-Hai-pao, July 30, 1908 and annex *Tibet, Renseignements politiques et économiques* to the dépêche from Beijing to the Asia Vice-Direction, no. 305, November 24, 1909. He is described as “a gentleman of liberal ideas and popular with the Tibetans,” Teichman [1922] 2000: 22.

"the representatives of Nepal and Bhutan in Lhasa, together with some of the leading merchants and Muslim headmen in Lhasa approached them with a request that they would settle the dispute as to whether or not these troops should be allowed in Lhasa."²⁸ The meeting took place in the Potala and Nepalese representatives as well as some Tibetan traders were present (February 9, 1910).

The Thirteenth Dalai Lama's biography mentions that the amban informed the Dalai Lama of Zhao Erfeng troops' arrival, but the detailed content of this meeting is not specified.²⁹ A letter sent by Zhao Erfeng is also mentioned to provide proof of his army's arrival, so as to protect Tibet, thus taking up the argument used to justify the Qing Emperor's decisions as a matter pertaining to the priest-patron relationship.³⁰ A Chinese archive document records that Wen Zongyao and the Dalai Lama were planning to sign a seven-article treaty for the same reasons, namely to protect the Gelukpa (Dge lugs pa) School and to comfort the Tibetans.³¹

Besides declaring to the Dalai Lama that the troops coming from Sichuan would not exceed 1,000 soldiers, Wen Zongyao's proposals were:

Agreed that the distribution of the troops to guard the frontier would be considered on their arrival at Lhasa;
The Lamas would not be harmed or their monasteries destroyed;
There would be no diminution in the Dalai Lama's spiritual power;
Agreed that the Chinese troops would have no resistance offered to them;
The Tibetan troops then assembled would be dismissed to their homes;
The Dalai Lama would thank the Emperor, through the amban, for the great kindness shown him;
Great respect should, as usual, be paid by the Dalai Lama to the Chinese amban.³²

They were confirmed through a translation of the copies of correspondence that passed between the Dalai Lama and Wen Zongyao that have been given to Charles Bell (1870–1945) then the British political

²⁸ BNA, *Affairs of Thibet, Further Correspondence, Part XIII, 1910*, Inclosure 1 in no. 37 (India Office to Foreign Office, sent and received March 4, 1910), Government of India to Viscount Morley which communicate a message from Bell, March 3, 1910; Shakabpa specifies that the Nepalese representative, Captain Jit Bahadur was present at the meeting, see Shakabpa (Maher) 2010: 720.

²⁹ Phur lcog 1981: vol. 6, f. 180, l. 5–6.

³⁰ Ibid., f. 181, l. 1.

³¹ *Qingmo shisan shi Dalai Lama dang'an shiliao xuanbian* 清末十三世達賴喇嘛檔案史料選編 (QMSL), Telegraphed order from the emperor to Lian-yu and Wen Zongyao, February 23, 1910.

³² LYZG, Report from Lian-yu, March 20, 1910.

officer in Sikkim (from 1908 to 1918) by Sidkeong Tulku Namgyal (*srid skyong* Sprul sku rnam rgyal, 1879–1914), the Maharaj Kumar of Sikkim on February 10, 1910.³³

The terms of the treaty involved several considerations: Manchu recognition of the Dalai Lama's spiritual power, Manchu respect for the Tibetan people and religious property, taking into account the Dalai Lama's subordination to the Manchu emperor and his obligation to communicate with the emperor through the latter representative in Lhasa. Finally, the Chinese army would henceforth ensure Tibet's defense and the Tibetan army was to be disbanded. Yet, though the amban stated that there would be no diminution of the Dalai Lama's spiritual power, he made no mention of temporal power, an omission to which the Dalai Lama drew the amban's attention.³⁴

We don't know about Wen Zongyao's response but we understand that, as soon as Wen Zongyao was named assistant-amban in Tibet on July 23, 1908 under Zhao Erfeng's recommendation,³⁵ his ambition was to meet the Dalai Lama, then in Beijing, to discuss with him Tibet's administrative reform.³⁶ While on his way to Lhasa, via Hong Kong

³³ BNA, *Affairs of Thibet, Further Correspondence, Part XIII, 1910*, India Office to Foreign Office, Inclosure 1 in no. 46 (India Office to Foreign Office, received March 14, 1910), March 12, 1910.

³⁴ Younghusband 1910: 389. After the Thirteenth Dalai Lama was in exile in Darjeeling, a different version of the agreement, written after a meeting was organized by the Tibetans from Darjeeling under the patronage of the Raj Kumar of Sikkim, is kept within the FMFA archive. This version mentions another agreement signed between Lian-yu, Wen Zongyao, and the Dalai Lama: "Il en est résulté un accord écrit et revêtu du sceau, aux termes duquel les Thibétains devaient conserver leur pouvoir civil sur les treize provinces [?], et les Chinois occuper les deux principaux marchés du pays, c'est-à-dire Gyantsé et Gartok ; les Thibétains s'engageant en outre à reprendre le ravitaillement des troupes, qu'ils avaient cessé d'assurer depuis le commencement des troubles." The result was a written and sealed agreement, under whose terms the Tibetans were to retain their civil power over the thirteen provinces, and the Chinese were to occupy the country's two main markets, Gyantse and Gartok; the Tibetans also undertook to resume supplying the troops, which they had ceased to do since the beginning of the unrest. See FMFA, E. Ronssin, French consul-general in India, Calcutta to S. Pichon, minister of Foreign Affairs, Paris, March 10, 1910. This last agreement is different as the amban recognized "Tibetans'" (not the Dalai Lama's) power and that the advance of the troops was intended for the protection of the trade marts only. The discrepancy between the two versions reveals the way the situation was understood before and after the Dalai Lama left Lhasa.

³⁵ BNA, FO535/E312, *Affairs of Thibet, Part XI, Further Correspondence, 1908*: Inclosure in no. 106 (Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey. Sent September 21, 1908 from Beijing and received October 14, 1908), Acting Consul-General Twyman to Sir J. Jordan, Chengdu, dated August 18, 1908.

³⁶ FMFA, *Chine, Politique intérieure, Thibet*, vol. V, 1907–1909, Annex to the dépêche no. 48, dated March 12, 1909, Press review sent from J. Beauvais, the French consul

(Ch. Xianggang 香港), Calcutta, and Darjeeling, he had met with diplomats and discussed with them his colonization plan for Tibet. Although we know nothing of the exchanges he then had with the Italian consul in Hong Kong, he had presented his plan to Dr. Walter Rössler (1871–1929), the German consul at Guangzhou 廣州:

Tibet must be bound closer to China and needs to be colonized in a systematic way. For this, new traffic connections—first of all, roads—need to be built which will make it easier to reach Tibet from China. At the same time, the further development of traffic and trade relations between Tibet and India needs to be prevented. Furthermore, Chinese farmers should be settled in Tibet and Chinese schools erected.

Wen said that he will reside in Lhasa. He does not consider this assignment as a short-term assignment only but as a lifetime task and, if it was up to him, he would stay in Tibet until China has attained sizeable achievements. This will require at least ten busy years.

The power of the Dalai Lama needs to be restricted if possible. First of all, it is important that the Dalai Lama will travel to Peking [Beijing]. It would be best, if he was made to stay there for a couple of years so that in the meantime, the reforms in Tibet could be carried out without interference.³⁷

On February 10, the Dalai Lama did not sign the treaty for two main reasons: the Manchu troops exceeded 1,000 soldiers and they killed Tibetans. Amban Lian-yu denied its terms, since he considered them as having been prepared at Wen Zongyao's own initiative. The treaty, which had been drafted and discussed locally, had been approved by the Qing Court, but Lian-yu had opposed signing it. Therefore, Lian-yu was accused by Beijing of pursuing personal interests at the expense of stabilizing the Tibetan situation, while at the same time Wen Zongyao was recalled "for showing Tibetan favors."³⁸ Obviously,

at Guangzhou to E. Ronssin, the consul-general of France in India, Calcutta, *Cheu min sin pao*, October 19, 1908.

³⁷ Political Archive of the German Foreign Office PA AA RZ 201/18055–213 to 215, Report of German Consul Rössler (to Canton), sent from Hong Kong on September 14, 1908, who met Wen Zongyao in Canton (Guangzhou). I thank Bianca Horlemann for the transmission and translation of this document. This meeting is not mentioned in the FMFA while the one with the Italian diplomat is, FMFA, *Chine, Politique intérieure, Thibet*, vol. V, 1907–1909, Annex to the dépêche no. 48, dated March 12, 1909, Press review sent from J. Beauvais, the French consul at Guangzhou to E. Ronssin, the consul-general of France in India, Calcutta, *Chang pao*, October 26, 1908.

³⁸ QMSL, Telegraphed order from the Emperor Xuantong 宣統 (1906–1967) to Lian-yu and Wen Zongyao, February 23, 1910; BNA, *Affairs of Thibet, Part XIII, Further Correspondence, 1910*, Government of India to Viscount Morley, March 22, 1910. Various sources insist on the importance of the role Wen Zongyao could have

Lian-yu was more influential at the Beijing Court than Wen Zongyao.³⁹

Anyway, the Dalai Lama has taken over his government's leadership from the regent and made it clear to everyone that he was Tibet's temporal and authoritative ruler. He reinforced his government and appointed three Prime ministers (*blon chen*) who would later follow him to India. They were Shatra Peljor Dorje (Bshad sgra Dpal 'byor rdo rje, d. 1919), Zholkhang Dondrub Puntsok (Zhol khang Don grub phun tshogs, d. 1926), and Changkhyim Khyenrab Jangchub Pelzang (Chang khyim Mkhyen rab byang chub dpal bzang, d. 1920), the same three ministers he had dismissed from their office at the time of the Younghusband's raid over Tibet a few years earlier. They gained direct access to the Dalai Lama. The latter continued to take advice from the Assembly (*tshogs 'du*), which had a consultative role only. At the time, according to historian Luciano Petech, the Tibetan army lacked a central command and was composed of local militia—as the Chinese military campaign accounts tend to demonstrate and show how active these Tibetan military units were on the fields to resist the Sichuan troops as well.⁴⁰ According to Russian travel accounts, the Tibetan troops included some 3,000 militia men and 200 men of the Dalai Lama bodyguard or 4,000 regular troops, while English testimonies counted 5,000 ill-trained troops. These figures are contradicted by the 10,000 troops the Tibetan sent to counter the advance of the New Army within central Tibet that the British mentioned.⁴¹

played later to resolve what the Chinese called "The Tibet question." For instance, the journalist David Fraser mentioned Wen Zongyao in a letter to George E. Morisson, *The Times* correspondent in China, dated March 13, 1912 "Yuan [Yuan Shikai] wants him to go to Tibet as special commissioner to re-install the Dalai Lama, Lo Hui-Min 1976: 767–768. According to Xu Guangzhi (2003: 255), Wen Zongyao would have been named "Tibet Pacificator" (*Xizang xuanfu shi* 西藏宣撫使), on December 18, 1912. Later, the Chinese government wanted to send Wen Zongyao to London as special envoy with full powers to negotiate an agreement regarding Tibet, BNA, FO228, January to March 1913, Telegram no. 76, D. 93, March 27, 1913.

³⁹ According to Wu Fengpei (1988: 283) and Dahpon (2008: 230), Wen Zongyao's relationship with Lian-yu was tense and he was dismissed from his post. However, while sources agreed about the tense relationship between the two amban, according to the FMFA archives, Wen Zongyao was clearly dismissed from his post in Tibet by the Beijing government, FMFA, *Dépêche* from E. Ronssin, French consul-general in India at Calcutta to S. Pichon, minister of Foreign Affairs, Paris, March 10, 1910.

⁴⁰ Petech, 1973: 11. For instance, Chen Quzhen [1937] 1999.

⁴¹ Andreyev 2003, who quoted "A special memo on Tibet and its armed forces which was drawn up by the Main Staff on November 24, 1901 (RGVIA, Kuropatkin Collection, II. 53–54)", 173, FN 11; Andreyev 2013 who translated a text written by G. Ts. Tsybikov, "Lhasa and Central Tibet" from *Izvestia* of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society, St. Petersburg, vol. 39, 1903, pt. III, pp. 187–218: 86; Clarke 1997 who quoted the caption David Macdonald wrote for one of his photographs taken before 1910, 19 and FN 20. Melvyn Goldstein (1991: 66) and Alice Travers (2015:

The Dalai Lama's Departure to British India (1910–1912)

While Zhao Erfeng turned down his appointment as amban in Lhasa (1908), after acting as frontier commissioner for Sichuan and Yunnan (*chuandian bianwu dachen* 川滇邊務大臣), and preferred to strengthen his position in Kham, he sent Zhong-ying 鍾穎 (1887–1915), the commander of the Sichuan army's 33rd division of the New Army which was temporarily stationed in Sichuan (*Sichuan zanjian lujun di san shi san hun chengxie: zhu Sichuan Chengdu, xietong Zhong-ying* : 四川暫編陸軍第三十三混成協：駐四川成都協統鍾穎), to lead the offensive to Lhasa.⁴² At first, the plan was for this 2,000-strong army to join the Dalai Lama, while he was on his way back to Lhasa to escort him to central Tibet, in order to avoid any resistance from the Tibetans and appear as honoring the Dalai Lama.⁴³

Zhong-ying would become one of the most important Manchu protagonists alongside Lian-yu in Lhasa at that time. He was a member of the Yellow Banner and the Aisin-Gioro clan (his mother being the Xianfeng 咸豐 Emperor (1831–1861)'s younger sister and his father, Pu-chang 溥昌 (born in 1881), a direct descendant of the Qianlong 乾隆 Emperor (1711–1799). Chinese sources considered him as being a young and inexperienced soldier within the Sichuan New Army in Chengdu, probably to justify the failure of its army occupation of central Tibet. Indeed, he was later blamed and sentenced to death by Yuan Shi-kai 袁世凱 (1859–1916, who was the Chinese president from 1912 to 1915), after being accused of causing the “loss of Tibet.” However, testimonies given by Pierre-Rémi Bons d'Anty, the French consul at Chengdu, who was very well informed, specify that Zhong-ying left the city with the best-trained soldiers, leaving only recruits in the Chengdu barracks, and equipped with mountain artillery from there and a few cannons from Nanjing 南京.⁴⁴ The New Army's different

256–257) noticed 3,000 Tibetan troops between the end of the eighteenth century to 1912.

⁴² LYZG, Report from Lian-yu, May 3, 1909 which recalls a telegram sent to the Grand Council on March 4, 1909. Zhao Erfeng returned to Kham and continued his conquests there. He was made viceroy of Sichuan in 1911 again and Fu Songmu 傅嵩沐 (1869–1929) was named frontier commissioner. A few months later, Zhao Erfeng left Kham and returned to Sichuan (July 17, 1911) where he was killed by revolutionaries (December 28, 1911) after Sichuan province declared its independence from the Qing (November 27, 1911).

⁴³ FMFA, Report from P.-R. Bons d'Anty, French consul at Chengdu to S. Pichon, minister of Foreign Affairs, Paris, September 15, 1909.

⁴⁴ FMFA, Report from P.-R. Bons d'Anty, French consul at Chengdu to S. Pichon, minister of Foreign Affairs, Paris, December 20, 1909.

garrisons he led were brought successively to Lhasa in early 1910.⁴⁵ They gathered two thousand men, who first coexisted in Lhasa with the 500 Green Banner soldiers (*ying bing* 營兵; previously known as the Army stationed in Tibet *zhu Zang jun* 駐藏軍).⁴⁶ They were then deployed to the strategic places of central Tibet.⁴⁷

The treaty prepared with Wen Zongyao signed or not, the New Army continued to push forward and the first soldiers entered Lhasa on February 12, 1910, when the celebration of the Tibetan New Year, the Monlam (*smon lam*) Festival, was being held.⁴⁸ Direct Chinese and Tibetan testimonies differ considerably. They come from the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, for Tibet and the Amban Lian-yu, for China.

The Thirteenth Dalai Lama letter, quoted by T.W. Shakabpa, mentions the offensive behavior of the Manchu and Chinese soldiers:

The Eleventh Dalai Lama's nephew, Teiji Phunkhang [*Tha'i ji* Phunkhang Bkra shis rdo rje, b. 1888], and Tsedron Jamyang Gyaltsen [*Rtse mgron* 'Jam dbyangs rgyal mtshan (n.d.)], were Tibetan government officials assigned to administer the Monlam festival. On their way to the Jokhang temple, they were met by the troops, who fired on them. Tsedron Jamyang and Teiji Phunkhang's servant and horse were killed. Teiji Phunkhang was then beaten and taken away to the military camp. The people of Lhasa were so outraged that they wanted to take revenge; but I restrained them from doing so. I still hoped we could negotiate with China and avoid unnecessary bloodshed.⁴⁹

Lian-yu's memoir intends to show the Tibetan authorities were opposed to the Sichuan army's arrival, while the civilian population was more welcoming towards it:

The army was regularly attacked along the way and the Tibetans destroyed supply stations and houses held and occupied by Manchus as

⁴⁵ LYZG, Report from Lian-yu, March 5, 1910: in chronological order, on February 12, the garrison of Zhang Hongsheng 張鴻升; on February 15 and 16, the Chen-qing 陳慶 garrison, then the Zhang Baochu 張葆初 garrison, before Zhong-ying 鍾穎 garrison entered Lhasa.

⁴⁶ Shang Binghe [1913] 1983; Ma Lin 1988.

⁴⁷ LYZG, Report from Lian-yu entitled "Reinforcing the army by sending Luo Changyi 洛長禱 (1865–1911)," March 5, 1910.

⁴⁸ At that time, the Lhasa population was around 15 to 20,000 inhabitants, swelled to four or five times this number during the Monlam Festival, see Van Spengen 1995: 122. I thank Mathilde Girard et Jean-Baptiste Georges-Picot for providing this information.

⁴⁹ Shakabpa (Maher) 2010: 730 who quoted the information as coming from a message the Dalai Lama sent to Luo Changyi, the Chinese emissary to India to negotiate his return, a correspondence that is also mentioned in Phur Icoog 1981: vol. 6, f. 182, l. 4–6.

well as refused to provide the *corvée* ('u lags). Besides, the Potala [Tibetan government] gathered thousands of soldiers who were ordered to cordon off the *yamen* and eliminate the Han. On the contrary, the Tibetan population, lay people and clerics together, welcomed the troops with food and drink and formed welcoming lines in Lhasa city's streets.⁵⁰

Foreign observers including Agvan Dorzhiev, a Buryat who was the Thirteenth Dalai Lama's friend, confidant and envoy to the Russian authorities and David Macdonald (1870–1962), the British trade agent at Gyantse (and Dromo from July 1909 to October 1924) later wrote these testimonies:

At that time the Chinese capital was taken. The cruel one, Yuan Shi-kai, sent many soldiers to Tibet in order to seize the Dalai Lama, disperse the sangha and destroy the Dharma. The soldiers, once arrived in Tibet, behaved cruelly, like dogs and ferocious beasts. They were worse than the cruelest criminal Tibet had ever known and extremely violent. In Lhasa, during the fighting with the Chinese soldiers, the Tibetans were unarmed. They had not studied the art of arms. The Chinese took power. They tortured the secular and religious people who did not rise up.⁵¹

For David Macdonald:

The advance party of these troops arrived in Lhasa at the end of January 1909 [in fact, February 12, 1910], marking their entry into the city by firing on the crowd of Tibetan onlookers gathered to witness their arrival.

Whether, as the Chinese alleged later, the Tibetans interfered with their progress, or whether the trouble was deliberately brought about by the Chinese themselves, cannot now be definitively ascertained. Each party blamed the other. Among others, a certain Tibetan official was wounded. The crowd ran for cover, offering no resistance, while the Chinese marched on the *yamen* of their Ambans. These officers, as soon as they heard of the incident, made it the excuse for the immediate arrest of the Tibetan chief ministers, and sent troops to seize their persons. These latter, however, somehow found out what was afoot, and gathered at the Potala to consult with their ruler. A hasty council decided that the Dalai Lama, with his ministers, should take immediate flight to India.⁵²

From afar, the arrival of the Sichuan army in Tibet was also observed by the French colonial presence in Southeast Asia with people

⁵⁰ LYZG, Report from Lian-yu, March 5, 1911, and December 23, 1911. About the *corvée* that was denied to Chinese soldiers, Chen Quzhen [1937] 1999: 11.

⁵¹ Ngag dbang blo bzang འགྲུབ་པོ་བཟང་། [Agvan Dorzhiev] 1924: f. 49–50. On Agvan Dorzhiev, see online: <https://treasuryoflives.org/biographies/view/Agvan-Dorzhiev/13510>.

⁵² Macdonald 1932: 61.

translating a press article from *The Times*:

[...] As to what followed, the soldier knew and understood little; but one evening, very late, the Chinese army approached Lhasa, beating drums and raising a great ruckus to show its power, as is customarily done by all Chinese armies. They also lit large fires, which illuminated the whole country, as if it had been daylight. At this point, the Dalai Lama betrayed great fear, came out of his room and looked at those bright fires, which shone like daylight. At that instant he was unable to think or act, and was at a loss as what to do. He could not get round to fighting against the Chinese army, and none of the Tibetan officers and dignitaries dared venture out for fear of having to fight with the Chinese soldiers. All the Dalai Lama could think of was to flee, and he asked his ministers to gather about 200 horsemen and pack up as fast as possible, so they could escape that very night from the army that had arrived from China. This was done as instructed and the Dalai Lama fled with his ministers [...].⁵³

The reasons put forward by the Manchus for their occupation of Tibet are of several kinds. The main argument, taken up both in the archives and in various travel diaries, was to send troops to Tibet as an aid to law and order, a reinforcement of the Manchu garrisons already stationed in Tibet and a protection of the trade marts open on the border with British India.⁵⁴ Protecting the Gelukpa School and bringing comfort to the Tibetans is also referenced.⁵⁵ From the ground, Chen Quzhen 陳渠珍 (1882–1952), commanding officer of the Third Battalion of the First Regiment of the Sichuan army sent to Tibet, mentioned that the Dalai Lama himself had requested a Manchu garrison in Lhasa and that his appeal had been prompted by the presence of British invaders in Tibet who had to be repelled.⁵⁶

The Tibetans responded to these arguments by asserting that their government had enough soldiers to defend Tibet if necessary, and that they wished to get rid of the amban.

A rumor that the Manchus intended to capture the Dalai Lama to bring him back to Beijing as a hostage had spread in Lhasa. For their part, the Dalai Lama and his government feared the Dalai Lama would

⁵³ This testimony is given by a Chinese soldier named Yen-Chen-Young, who was part of an escort provided by the Shanxi province governor to the Dalai Lama, *L'Asie française*, April 1, 1910, 203–204.

⁵⁴ QMSL, Transmission by the Beijing Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Zhao Erxun 趙爾巽, the Sichuan governor-general and Lian-yu of the correspondence exchanged with J. N. Jordan, the British minister at Beijing, February 28, 1910.

⁵⁵ QMSL, Telegraphed order from the emperor to Lian-yu and Wen Zongyao, February 23, 1910.

⁵⁶ Chen Quzhen wrote about his military experience in Tibet and the rout of his battalion, Chen Quzhen [1937] 1999: 19; 45.

be held prisoner in the Potala and stripped of his temporal power.⁵⁷ The Dalai Lama therefore convened the National Assembly and the decision was taken that he should take refuge in Dromo with members of his government considering that, from there, it would be easier to negotiate with the Manchus.⁵⁸

The Dalai Lama appointed Ngawang Lobzang Tenpe Gyeltsen, Third Tsemonling Rinpoche (Ngag dbang blo bzang bstan pa'i rgyal mtshan Tshe smon gling, 1864–1919) to the position of regent and an assistant named Khenche Neushak Kyenrap Phuntsok (*mkhan che Sne'u shag Mkhyen rab phun tshogs*, n.d.). He then once again fled from Lhasa (February 13, 1910).⁵⁹ The three prime ministers and at least two ministers left with him to Dromo, then to India. The three prime ministers who followed the Dalai Lama to India were Shatra Peljor Dorje, Zholkhang Dondrub Puntsok, Changkhyim Khyenrab Jangchub Pelzang, then the Minister Sarbyung Tseten Wangchuk (Gsar byung Tshe brtan dbang phyug, 1857–1914) and the two Vice-Ministers Samdrub Podrang Kunga Tendzin (Bsam grub pho brang Kun dga' bstan 'dzin, n.d.), besides Lama Gungtang Tendzin Wangpo (*bla ma Gung thang Bstan 'dzin dbang po*, n.d.).⁶⁰ Shrugging off the regent's appointment, Lian-yu dismissed the Tibetan officials who remained in Lhasa and appointed new ones.⁶¹ He removed from their office Lobzang Trinle (Blo bzang 'phrin las, born 1860), Deki Lingpa (Bde skyid gling pa, died 1914) and Parkang Gyeltsen Phuntsok (Parkhang Rgyal mtshan phun tshogs, n.d.), and instead appointed Tenzin Chodrak (Bstan 'dzin chos grags, n.d.), Rampa Sonam Gonkyab (Rampa Bsod nams mgon skyabs, born in 1875) and Lang Tongpa (Glang mthong pa, n.d.).⁶²

From the moment the Dalai Lama left Lhasa and fled first to the Indo-

⁵⁷ Younghusband 1910: 391.

⁵⁸ Dundul Namgyal Tsarong 2000: 25.

⁵⁹ Tsemonling Rinpoche was the 87th successor of Tsongkapa (Tshong kha pa) to the Ganden (Dga' ldan) throne (1908–1914), Phur lcog 1981: vol. 6, f. 183, l. 2–3; f. 186, l. 2–6.

⁶⁰ See a photograph of the party that followed the Thirteenth Dalai Lama into exile and the Dalai Lama himself in Bell [1946] 1987: 150. The Thirteenth Dalai Lama's biography only specifies that Tsemonling Rinpoche was made regent and did not mention the ministers who followed him during his exile, Phur lcog 1981: vol. 6, f. 180, l. 6.

⁶¹ Shakabpa (Maher) 2010: 739; Dundul Namgyal Tsarong 2000: 39; LYZG, Report from Lian-yu, March 30, 1910.

⁶² The ministers named by the Manchu amban were imprisoned upon the Dalai Lama's return in early 1913 while other members of the government, such as Tsarong Wangchuk Gyelpo (Tsha rong Dbang phyug rgyal po, 1866–1912), his son Samdrub Tsering (Bsam grub tshe ring, c. 1887–1912), Khendrung Punrap (*mkhan drung Phun rap*, n. d.), Lachak Khenchung Samkhar (*mkhan chung Bsam mkhar*, n. d.), and Tseprung Lobzang Dorje (*tse drung Blo bzang rdo rje*, n. d.), were killed.

Tibetan border and then to British India, the Manchus reacted violently in Tibet, while the Dalai Lama became their number one public enemy. On the ground, the Manchu soldiers tried to capture him, dead or alive. They were successfully thwarted by a Tibetan battalion commanded by Namgang (Gnam gang), the future new Tsarong, Tsarong Dasang Damdul (Tsha rong Zla bzang dgra 'dul, 1888–1959), whose memory of the event was registered. As such, this victory marked the first act of armed resistance on behalf of the Tibetans, officially.⁶³ Indeed, it is said the Manchu troops succeeded in coming to Lhasa because the Dalai Lama would have ordered his army to not fight against them, as already mentioned. From Beijing, the Dalai Lama was stripped of his title of “Dalai Lama” and his property seized. It was the proclamation of the Dalai Lama’s dismissal that later first sparked trouble, which Lian-yu himself acknowledged.⁶⁴

The Dalai Lama’s personal effects, which were still on their way back from China, were confiscated at Nakchukha (Nag chu kha);⁶⁵ his property in his palaces, the Potala and the Norbulingka (Nor bu gling kha), as well as the Tibetan government’s vast treasury, were removed by the Manchu. The Lhasa armory and magazines were emptied, the mint and ammunition factory seized, and the houses of those ministers who had fled with the Dalai Lama systematically pillaged.⁶⁶ And, exactly twelve days after his departure from Lhasa, the Qing Grand Council (*junji chu* 軍機處) decided to strip the Dalai Lama of his Manchu titles (February 25, 1910) as had already been done in 1904 when he left Tibet to go to Mongolia, after the British raid on Lhasa.⁶⁷

The imperial decree of dismissal was as follows:

The Dalai Lama of Tibet Tubten Gyatso Jikdrel Chokyi Namgyel (Ngag

⁶³ Dundul Namgyal Tsarong 2000: 26–28; Shakabpa (Maher) 2010: 722. The event is also mentioned in Phur lcog 1981: vol. 6, f. 184 and the FMFA, Dépêche from P.-R. Bons d’Anty, French consul at Chengdu to S. Pichon, minister of Foreign Affairs, Paris, June 15, 1910.

⁶⁴ LYZG, Report from Lian-yu entitled “Tibet in critical situation: in accordance with regulations, send annual pay to troops stationed in Tibet,” March 20, 1910.

⁶⁵ Nakchukha is located in Nakchu district, in the north of the today’s Tibet Autonomous Region, about 250 km northeast of Lhasa.

⁶⁶ Shakabpa (Maher) 2010: 731 who quoted a message the Dalai Lama sent to Luo Changyi (729–732); Dundul Namgyal Tsarong 2000: 31.

⁶⁷ QMSL, Document issued by the Grand Council and signed by the four Councilors Yi-kuang 奕勳 (1838–1917), Shi-xu 世續 (1852–1921), Lu Zhuanlin 鹿傳霖 (1836–1910) and Na-tong, copy kept in the archives of the Grand Secretariat, “Order of Removal of the Title of the Dalai Lama,” February 25, 1910; Phur lcog 1981: vol. 6, f. 186, l. 1. On the Chinese deposition of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama in 1904, see, for instance, Candler 1905: 302.

dbang blo bzang thub bstan rgya mtsho 'jigs bral chos kyi rnam rgyal) has received abundant favors from our predecessors. If the Dalai was aware of it, it was his duty to devote himself to the study of Buddhist texts and to abide by the rules, in order to extend the transmission of the yellow religion. Yet, ever since he assumed the administrative affairs, he is extravagant and dissipated, cruel and despotic as never before. He knowingly manipulated the Tibetan people to gradually provoke discord, even to the point of insubordination, reckless behavior and disobedience to imperial orders. In July 1904, he fled, taking advantage of the turmoil. The amban denounced the Dalai to the Throne, as he had become infamous for his confused behavior. It was then ordered that the Dalai be temporarily stripped of his titles. The Dalai then went to Urga and returned to Xining. The court, considering he had travelled so far and would repent, ordered local officials to give him a proper welcome. Last year, he visited Beijing, where We conferred a new title on him and offered to unite Our efforts to preserve Our unity. He was also given an escort on his way back to Tibet. But the Dalai lingered on, committing exactions and causing trouble. We treated him with indulgence as an expression of Our concern. Magnanimous about the past and open to the future, Our intention was to forge solid ties. This time, the Sichuan army entered Tibet to maintain order and protect trade agencies. The Tibetans had no reason to doubt this. However, it took the Dalai to spread rumors after his return to Tibet, to be defiant, to slander the amban, to stop providing the *corvée*. Clearly, he was following a different path and turning a deaf ear. Then a telegram from Lian-yu informed Us that when the Sichuan army reached Lhasa, the Dalai secretly left on the night of February 12 for an unknown destination, without informing Us. We then ordered the amban to use all means available to catch up with him and bring him back to ensure his safety. To date, We have received no information. How dare he, as spiritual leader, once again leave his post without authorization? We also note that the Dalai is repeating his tricks and posing as an adversary. While enjoying Imperial benevolence, he has betrayed the hopes of the people. He does not deserve to be the leader of reincarnated beings. As a punishment, Tubten Gyatso Jikdrel Chokyi Namgyel is stripped of his title as Dalai Lama. From now on, no matter where he flees to or whether he returns to Tibet, let Us all treat him as an ordinary person. Let the amban in Tibet immediately seek out male children bearing divine signs, write their names on ivory sticks and place them in a golden urn in accordance with the law. The Dalai Lama's true incarnation of the previous one will then be designated. A memorial will be addressed to Us, and Imperial grace will be transmitted from generation to generation, with a view to ensuring responsibility for Buddhist affairs. The Throne exalts good and abhors evil. It observes impartial justice. Tibetan monks and laypeople are all Our children. Following the publication of this Order, let everyone respect the law, let everyone preserve public order, so that Our desire to pacify the borders and preserve

the yellow religion will be realized.⁶⁸

The Manchu analysis of the Dalai Lama's behavior is complex. The Qing Emperor seemed to assume that the Dalai Lama, as a reincarnated master of the most prestigious Gelukpa School lineage, would have complied with the Manchu imperial orders, had he followed the Buddhist precepts and been grateful for the many benefits received from the imperial lineage. Accordingly, it is likely the emperor would have expected the Dalai Lama to behave as a Buddhist master and keep to his sole religious duties. Again, from the Manchu emperor's point of view, the Dalai Lama would have placed his actions within the framework of a relationship of spiritual master (the Dalai Lama) to lay protector (the emperor). We know however that even within the priest-patron framework, the relationship was not so simple, and that it did not only include subordination of one to the other, as the protagonists' adopted a spiritual or temporal posture according to circumstances. When a Dalai Lama, as bodhisattva king, entered into a relationship with a foreign ruler, the link was said to be personal and religious, not official and institutional. It was then called a "relationship between a spiritual master and a lay protector (*mchod yon*).⁶⁹ Actually, it was an extension of the power dyarchy. Tibetans have claimed this relationship since the thirteenth century in the strict sense: the spiritual master (*mchod gnas*) transmitted teachings to his lay protector (*yon bdag*), who, in exchange, provided protection for him as well as for his monastery and school. The relationship between the Dalai Lamas and Manchu emperors was articulated on several bicephalous levels: an encounter between two political chiefs, between two bodhisattvas, and between a bodhisattva and a political chief, who was considered as the universal monarch (*cakravartin*). On the other hand, the Manchus took up this concept by highlighting the protector's superiority. From a philological point of view, the Tibetan expression *mchod yon* includes both members of the relationship, while the Chinese qualifications (*shizhu* 施主 or *futian shizhu* 福田施主 in the Qing records) apply only to the protector, hence the emperor. No Chinese translation seems to depict the Tibetan terms *mchod* and *mchod yon* at that time.

⁶⁸ My translation from *Da Qing shilu Zangzu shiliao* 大清實錄 藏族史料 (QSLZZSL), Order of the Grand Council, with copy to the Grand Secretariat, to dismiss the Dalai Lama, February 25, 1910. Some translations are available, in English by Teichman [1922] 2000: 16–17 from the *Chinese Government Gazette*, Imperial decree of February 25, 1910, reproduced in Goldstein 1999: 52–53. For French translations, see *L'Asie française*, April 1, 1910: 202–204 without the name of the translator being specified, and FMFA, Annex "Décret du 27 février 1910 déposant le Dalai-lama" to the report from M. de Margerie, minister of the French Republic in China, Beijing to M. Cruppi, minister of Foreign Affairs, Paris, February 28, 1911.

Obviously, the emperor and the amban were confronted with a new situation (by the Thirteenth Dalai Lama's seizure of power) and chose a solution identical to that which had prevailed at the time of the Sixth Dalai Lama Tsangyang Gyatso (Tshang dbyang rgya mtsho, 1683–1706): to remove the present Dalai Lama and resume the selection and recognition process.⁶⁹ Clearly, however, the Sixth and Thirteenth Dalai Lamas' life choices were different: the Sixth Dalai Lama was not interested in representing his institution either spiritually or temporally, whereas the Thirteenth Dalai Lama fully assumed his one-headed double office.

It should also be noted that the last ritual for selecting Dalai Lamas, namely by drawing lots in the golden urn imposed by the Manchus at the end of the eighteenth century as a matter pertaining to the relationship of spiritual master to secular protector, had been deemed unnecessary when the Twelfth Dalai Lama Trinle Gyatso ('Phrin las rgya mtsho, 1856–1875)'s reincarnation was selected.⁷⁰ Moreover, the emperor had accepted it, as a result the Tibetans' and the amban's conviction that this child was the "right" Thirteenth Dalai Lama.⁷¹ It seems the emperor indirectly underlined this non-observance of the rule by obliging the possible replacement of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama to take the golden urn test. He thereby also put forward this idea: if this test had been practiced during the selection of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, the "right" Dalai Lama would have been chosen and the latter would have confined his power to the spiritual sphere and to the strict observance of his subordination to the Manchu emperor. Furthermore, it seems it was the Thirteenth Dalai Lama's person who was under attack, not the institution he represented.⁷²

The issue of the Dalai Lama's maturity, his interest in politics and his desire to exercise his spiritual and temporal privileges were also new phenomena for Tibetans, Mongols, and Manchus at the late Qing.

Faced with this situation, reactions from within varied. Among the Tibetans, the Dalai Lama himself believed the Manchus had no power over him anymore and the role he was to play. In his biography, very harsh terms, such as "black power" (*nag po'i rtsal ba*), "Chinese ministers' diabolic inspiration" (*rgya blon log smon*), "evil" (*nyes*) qualify the then Manchu actions.⁷³ Thanks to journalists who shared their

⁶⁹ Kapstein 2015: 232–236.

⁷⁰ About the drawing lots in the golden urn, see Jagou 2007; Sperling 2012; Oidtmann 2018; Hui Nan 2021.

⁷¹ Kapstein 2015: 263.

⁷² The Fourteenth Dalai Lama mentions: "To me, 'Dalai Lama' is a title that signifies the office I hold. I myself am just a human being, and incidentally a Tibetan, who chooses to be a Buddhist monk.", Dalai Lama 1998: xiii. For a discussion on the Thirteenth Dalai Lama's titles, see Ishihama 2019: 83–106.

⁷³ Phur lcog 1981: vol. 6, f. 180, l. 1–2; 4.

experience, we know that Tibetan people and others continue to show their devotion to the Dalai Lama. For instance, when the Dalai Lama arrived at Darjeeling,

une foule énorme se pressait sur le parcours, brûlant de petites baguettes de parfum, faisant de très profondes révérences et jetant des grains de riz [...]. À son arrivée à Jhor [...] des fleurs jonchaient la route jusqu'à l'hôtel où l'illustre personnage doit être logé.⁷⁴

French diplomats were equally impressed,

Le Dalai Lama a fait son entrée à Darjeeling le 1^{er} Mars, à 4 heures de l'après-midi, au milieu de démonstrations extraordinaires de respect & d'enthousiasme de la part des communautés bouddhistes de la région & même de la population hindoue locale.⁷⁵

In addition to the spiritual devotion shown by the devotees, the Tibetan involvement in the battles against the Sichuan troops that followed the Dalai Lama forced exile clearly indicated their recognition of his temporal power.

Among the Mongols, the Eighth Jebtsundampa Khutagt, Agwaan luwsan choiji nyima danzan wangchug (Tib. Ngag dbang blo bzang chos kyi nyi ma bstan 'dzin dbang phyug, 1870–1924) —also often referred to as the Bogd Khan—dislike of the Dalai Lama was well-known, and it would be interesting to measure the Mongolian (or Bogd Khan's) opinion on Manchu actions in Tibet and on the Dalai Lama's person.⁷⁶ Today, we still know very little about the Mongol's reactions to the Dalai Lama's flight from Tibet and his removal from office by Beijing. However—as demonstrated by Wang Yanjia's article, which lists the Mongols and their number who visited the Dalai Lama during his stay in Beijing in 1908—it is plain that the Mongols, whether they were simple monks, reincarnated masters or civil society members, were devoted to him. The author even considers the Qing used the Mongols' influence to incite the Dalai Lama to go to Beijing in 1908.⁷⁷ Others also noted the Mongol's devotion towards the Dalai Lama when he was at Mount Wutai (Wutaishan 五臺山): “Wutai-shan is now a holy place of pilgrimage for the faithful from all parts of Mongolia. Never has the sacred mountain witnessed such throngs of devotees.

⁷⁴ Anon., “Le Dalai-Lama à Darjiling”, *L'écho de Paris*, March 3, 1910.

⁷⁵ FMFA, Dépêche no. 49 de E. Ronssin, French consul-general in India at Calcutta to M. Pichon, minister of Foreign Affairs, Paris, March 9, 1910.

⁷⁶ See Irina Garri and Yumiko Ishihama articles in this RET issue.

⁷⁷ Wang Yanjia 2020. I thank Irina Garri for transmitting this article.

The Dalai Lama is an object of great veneration."⁷⁸

For the Manchus, the Dalai Lama's insubordination was so intolerable that they removed him from office in 1910 and, at Lian-yu's request, reinstated the ex-regent, the Tenth Demo Ngawang Lobzang Trinle Rabgye (De mo Ngag dbang blo bzang 'phrin las rab rgyas, 1855–1899), who had attempted to assassinate the Dalai Lama in 1899 and whose lineage had been therefore disowned and dispossessed by the Tibetan pontiff.⁷⁹ It is therefore likely that the Manchus deplored that the Dalai Lama had passed the age of maturity and fully exercised his authority! At the same time, while Wen Zongyao, the assistant-amban, had been recalled to Sichuan, Lian-yu was appointed to be in charge of all Tibetan affairs.

As for Inner Asia as a whole, the Manchus, smarting from the signing of treaties with the British on Tibet in the late 19th century and as ever aware of their southwestern border's vulnerability, had remained vigilant and intended to keep the balance of power in Inner Asia. They had observed the Dalai Lama's movements in Mongolia and in Amdo. They had been informed of the Dalai Lama's resumption of his religious influence in the Kumbum (Sku 'bum) Monastery where he attempted to restore discipline. By this way, he undermined the local religious authorities' position, which the Manchus could interpret as a reaffirmation of his spiritual powers though his religious authority was questioned by many influential Amdo elites.⁸⁰ The Dalai Lama thereby asserted himself as a spiritual authority over territories that were not Tibetan—such as Mongolia—and over Amdo where it is questionable how far his authority actually extended. However, the Dalai Lama's removal from power by the Manchu may also have been intended to ward off the risk of an alliance of Inner Asian peoples on religious or political grounds, and to weaken his influence with the Mongols and Tibetans, in order to preserve a balance—albeit precarious—in Inner Asia.

From Beijing, the Manchu Grand Council, for its part, urged Lian-yu and Zhao Erxun 趙爾巽 (1844–1927), the Sichuan governor-general (*Sichuan zongdu* 四川總督 from 1908 to 1911) to remain on their guard, for they feared the Nepalese (Kuo'erka 廓爾喀)—who were present in Lhasa following the signing of the 1856 treaty with the

⁷⁸ Anon., "The Dalai Lama. American Minister's Visit," *The Times*, June 30, 1908.

⁷⁹ LYZG, Report from Lian-yu, May 5, 1910. On August 31, 1910, his property was returned to Demo. The Demo monks thanked the emperor for pardoning their spiritual master, LYZG, Report from Lian-yu, February 17, 1911.

⁸⁰ See the article by Bianca Horlemann in this RET issue.

Tibetans—might interfere in Tibetan affairs.⁸¹

The Manchus then tried to get the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet on several occasions and through a variety of stratagems. For example, Lian-yu sent Luo Changyi 洛長綺 (1865–1911), one of his advisors, as an emissary to Darjeeling assuring the Dalai Lama that, while he would not be punished on his return, his position as Dalai Lama would not be restored. The latter declined the proposal.⁸²

The British moves were mainly preventing any Manchu from interfering with Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim as well as protecting their trade marts in Tibet and respecting the treaty signed with Russia in 1907. These were carefully watched by the Manchus who were anxious to prevent an insurgency in Tibet that would harm their interests.⁸³ The British did not respond to the Dalai Lama's numerous appeals for political and diplomatic support.⁸⁴ Instead they sent soldiers to protect the open trade marts on the Tibetan border adding that they would not intervene between the Tibetans and the Manchus.⁸⁵ The Tibetan people hoped they would help them return the Dalai Lama to Tibetan soil, but the Manchus forbade the British from escorting the Dalai Lama with an army to Tibet, as they feared the British army would

⁸¹ QMSL, Telegram of the Grand Council enjoining Zhao Erxun, the Sichuan governor-general and Lian-yu, the amban in Tibet to comply with the treaty signed with the British concerning Tibet, March 2, 1910.

⁸² Lamb 1966: 217–218; LYZG, Report from Lian-yu, August 6, 1910. Luo Changyi became a doctor (*jīnshì* 進士) in 1895. He then got into the military school at Chengdu, Sichuan and was named border army's Fifth squadron General. In 1909, he arrived in Tibet with his squadron. Then he became the Amban Lian-yu advisor in 1910 or 1911.

The issue remained topical at least until late 1912: several dispatches sent by Zhong-ying, the commander who led the New Army to Lhasa, begged Yuan Shikai, the new Republic of China's president, to grant the Dalai Lama a title, without it being clear which one, though. This did occur in late 1912, but the Dalai Lama then refused to recognize any authority from China regarding his investiture. See, for example, Academia Sinica 032802302.1, Telegram from Shi Youming 史悠明, the Gyantse Chinese frontier officer (*Xizang Jiangzi guanjian* 西藏江孜關監) that recalls Zhong-ying's telegrams sent in the spring of the same year, November 24, 1911; Bell [1946] 1987: 155; Ishihama 2019: 91.

⁸³ QMSL, Letter from the Grand Council to the Sichuan governor-general about the fact that the policies implemented in Tibet call for a reinforcement of the border defense, May 2, 1910.

⁸⁴ Letters from the Dalai Lama to the King Emperor (whom he proposed to visit personally), and to Sir Edward Grey, the Earl of Crewe (Sec. of the State for India), December 15, 1910; Telegram from Bell to Foreign Department, Simla, June 17, 1910, in L/P&S/10/147, both quoted by van Walt van Praag 1985: 216.

⁸⁵ QMSL, Telegram from the Beijing minister of Foreign Affairs to Zhao Erxun, Sichuan governor-general, November 23, 1910; FMFA, Dépêche from P. Cambon, French consul in England at London to S. Pichon, minister of Foreign Affairs, Paris, August 5, 1910.

eventually settle there.⁸⁶

Moreover, the attempts to get help from the Russians through the mediation of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama adviser, Buryat monk Agvan Dorzhiev proved to be a dead end as Russia was bound by the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907.⁸⁷ The French diplomats analyzed the situation as follows:

Le délégué envoyé par le Dalai Lama est arrivé à Pékin avec des lettres de ce dernier adressées aux Ministres d'Angleterre, de France, d'Allemagne, du Japon, de Russie et d'Amérique en les priant d'intercéder pour lui dans le règlement de son affaire.

Seul le Ministre du Japon a déclaré que la Chine a eu parfaitement tort d'avoir retiré le titre de souverain du Thibet au Dalai Lama sans en avoir fait part aux nations Etrangères intéressées dans le Thibet.⁸⁸

In other words, the Dalai Lama's hope for foreign help was in jeopardy, and the British themselves refused to give him a military escort on grounds they would not interfere between the Tibetans and the Chinese and that the Dalai Lama should be deterred from entering Tibet.⁸⁹ Actually, from the very start, namely a few days after his departure from Lhasa, the British government had accepted the Manchu declaration that called for the Dalai Lama to lose his title and be removed from his position.⁹⁰ Moreover, a few months later, Lord Minto (1845–1914) the Viceroy of India (in office from November 1905 to November 1910) had refused to communicate directly with the Dalai Lama, whose letters were henceforth to be routed through the office of the political officer in Sikkim.⁹¹ On March 14, 1910, however, he met him while he was in Calcutta, with great pomp and circumstance, for a ten-minute meeting.⁹²

China's action was, however, frowned upon by the British because it violated the 1906 treaty that recognized that country as suzerain and not sovereign.

For many Chinese and foreigners alike, China was all the more able to reinforce its authority in Tibet as the Dalai Lama was not in the

⁸⁶ LYZG, Report from Lian-yu, August 6, 1910.

⁸⁷ See Irina Garri and Bianca Horlemann papers, in this RET issue.

⁸⁸ FMFA, Telegram, Extract from the Chinese Press, Shanghai, March 3, 1910.

⁸⁹ Telegram from C. Bell, the British political officer in Sikkim to Government of India's Foreign Secretary, July 23, 1910, L/P&S/10/147 quoted by van Walt van Praag 1985: 216.

⁹⁰ Jampa Samten 2009–2010: 361 indicates the date: February 25, 1910.

⁹¹ Jampa Samten 2009–2010: 362, who cites Foreign Department Secret, External Proceedings, no. 532 (Secretary of State to Viceroy, May 4, 1910).

⁹² FMFA, Dépêche no. 54 from E. Ronssin, French consul-general in India at Calcutta to S. Pichon, minister of Foreign Affairs, Paris, March 15, 1910.

country. Although Zhong-ying's troops were scattered throughout the Tibetan territory, his army's presence in Tibet exacerbated the already ongoing tensions between Beijing and Lhasa. Tibetan resistance, the Battle of Pome (Spo mes), lack of funding, and the fact the 1911 Chinese Revolution was favorably perceived by both Chinese and Manchu soldiers, all these factors led to the army's mutiny in Tibet, culminating in what Tibetans call "the Water-Rat Year Chinese War."⁹³

The Tibetan Resistance, from India to Tibet (1911–1912)

The average Tibetans who remained in Tibet carried out resistance actions such as refusing to pay 'u lags or sell food to the Chinese. There were many scuffles and battles.⁹⁴ As for the Zhong-ying army's soldiers, they were sent to the Pome front, which they had the greatest difficulty in quashing (from April to September 1911). There, nobody knows how, they learned that a mutiny had broken out in Lhasa and they rushed to the Tibetan capital.⁹⁵ The Gyantse garrison did the same. Back in Lhasa, they found their pay had not arrived. A recurring problem since 1905, the cash that was to be sent from Sichuan was repeatedly delayed. Lian-yu had regularly called for this from Zhao Erxun, the then governor-general of Sichuan, whose province was struggling financially.⁹⁶ The Lhasa amban had put forward new arguments, pointing out the Sichuan army had been added to the existing garrison and that the opening of trade marts in Gyantse and Dromo required additional investment. Earlier, he had pointed out that the troops based in Tibet were also mandated to open schools, clear land, dig mines, and so on. Lian-yu was concerned the army might mutiny.⁹⁷ He had asked for an emergency payment, which had been approved by the emperor.⁹⁸ The sum amounted to 400,000 taels (one tael equal around 40g. of silver) per year. A few months later, the pay was sent from Sichuan to Dartsedo (Dar rtse mdo) in Kham, where the money was exchanged. Once this had been done, it had to be transported to Lhasa. Lian-yu was worried about the limits of the corvée service, the journey's length and difficulty, the likelihood of getting lost and being attacked by Tibetans.⁹⁹ A few months later, when the cash had still not arrived in Lhasa, Lian-yu's appeal had become more and more

⁹³ Trijang Rinpoche 2018: 50.

⁹⁴ Chen Quzhen [1937] 1999.

⁹⁵ The news would have reached Lhasa after it was published in the *Times or other newspapers*, Chen Quzhen [1937] 1999: 165; Anon. *Youhuan yusheng* [1913] 1983: 121.

⁹⁶ LYZG, Reports from Lian-yu, May 3, 1909 and March 20, 1910.

⁹⁷ LYZG, Report from Lian-yu, March 5, 1910.

⁹⁸ LYZG, *Ibid.*, March 20, 1910.

⁹⁹ LYZG, *Ibid.*, April 21, 1910.

pressing.¹⁰⁰ He had recalled the emperor himself had ordered prompt payment of the soldiers' wages.¹⁰¹ However, Sichuan had persisted in its reluctance to comply. The governor had suggested that Beijing reduce its spending on border defense in the Northeast, so that it could contribute to the funding of Tibet.¹⁰² Lian-yu was concerned that, if only half of the pay (200,000 taels) reached Tibet, "it would be easier to enforce order among soldiers with empty stomachs." He had argued the garrisons along the route had been enduring difficulties and that the soldiers had courageously defended the *yamen* against Tibetan attacks, which had lasted for more than three months. He did not understand why Sichuan did not finance this development and had failed to secure the public debt. For the first time, he also proposed that the distribution of military budgets should be better apportioned from Beijing. He noted, for example, that Xinjiang 新疆 was a new province that had already existed for more than twenty years and that Tibet's needs were more urgent. Nevertheless, the Sichuan government had refused to contribute half of the 400,000-tael budget needed to maintain a Manchu force and administration in Tibet. By early 1911, Lian-yu had reluctantly disbanded the Green Banner Army (*lii bing*), which "numbered five hundred soldiers who had forgotten the art of fighting"¹⁰³ and proposed a new organization for the army stationed in Tibet.¹⁰⁴ The most capable soldiers from the Green Banner Army had joined the New Army while a bonus was given to the others who had to leave. The *yamen* guard, about 100-soldier strong, was maintained.¹⁰⁵

Many testimonies agree that failure to pay was the cause of the soldiers' mutiny. They also reveal how the facts and orders were misunderstood by soldiers, evidence of the great disorder that prevailed.¹⁰⁶ The soldiers, informed of the revolution in China by an article in the *Times*, acted violently under cover of several slogans, whose meaning they did not master.¹⁰⁷ For example, the Elder Brothers Society's members (*Gelao hui* 哥老會, also called *Paoge* 袍哥), reportedly representing nearly 75 percent of the forces, claimed the barracks and the *yamen*

¹⁰⁰ LYZG, *Ibid.*, September 15, 1910.

¹⁰¹ LYZG, *Ibid.*, June 28, 1910.

¹⁰² LYZG, *Ibid.*, September 10, 1910.

¹⁰³ Shang Binghe [1913] 1983: 137.

¹⁰⁴ LYZG, Report from Lian-yu, February 17, 1911. As early as 1904, he had already dismissed the soldiers stationed at Dartsedo, Chamdo and up to Tsang (Gtsang). He was thus able to redistribute these soldiers' salaries (which amounted to 100,000 taels) to the new army's soldiers.

¹⁰⁵ LYZG, Report from Lian-yu, February 17, 1911.

¹⁰⁶ Zhang Shaoyong and Xirao-Nima 2011.

¹⁰⁷ Chen Quzhen [1937] 1999.

should be looted in the name of the dynasty (*qinwang* 勤王).¹⁰⁸ The mutiny was therefore launched in the name of the empire but, at the same time, it attacked the headquarters and the people representing it: Lian-yu and Zhong-ying. The soldiers were totally baffled. Once the mutiny was unleashed, the garrisons, first scattered over the territory of central Tibet, that had been returned to Lhasa relayed information about the revolution and the soldiers demanded their pay under the slogan "The Great Han Revolution" (*Da Han geming* 大漢革命). The latter capitulated as soon as they received a share of it—since the wages had indeed reached Lhasa.¹⁰⁹ The soldiers were neither better fed nor better accommodated. The secret society's actions became more and more violent.¹¹⁰ After the Republic of China was created, on January 1, 1912, and the last Qing emperor deposed on February 12, 1912, the soldiers, members of the secret society, founded an assembly (*gongyi ju* 公议会) in Lhasa, to which Lian-yu and Zhong-ying handed over the yamen's seals.¹¹¹ Its existence was short-lived and the assembly dispersed. Its members were unable to resist the Tibetans and the soldiers blamed the assembly members for their misguided choice.

The war between the Tibetan and the Manchu and Chinese armies began in late 1911 and ended in December 1912, when the Manchu and Chinese soldiers and officials left Tibet (the latest was Zhong-ying, the commander who left Tibet in April 1913). The Dalai Lama began his return journey to Lhasa. He left Darjeeling on June 24, 1912 and arrived in Lhasa on January 17, 1913.

From Indian soil, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama demanded the dissolution of the Manchu army, the restoration of his position to that held by the Fifth Dalai Lama, Ngawang Lobzang Gyatso (Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mstho, 1617–1682), and the abolition of the 1890 and 1906 Anglo-Chinese Treaties the Tibetans had not participated in nor

¹⁰⁸ According to Xu Guangzhi (2003: 246), the secret society controls Tibet and 75% of the soldiers have joined its ranks.

¹⁰⁹ Two conflicting versions co-exist: Lian-yu would have embezzled them on the advice of Qian Xibao 錢錫寶 (n.d.), one of his assistants and chief of the Lhasa yamen guard, or the Elder Brothers Society would have extorted the wages under false pretenses.

¹¹⁰ *Youhuan yusheng* [1913] 1983: 127.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 125.

recognized.¹¹² Finally, he secretly organized a War Department.¹¹³ From Kalimpong, the Dalai Lama sought to strengthen the unity of the Tibetan regions and their inhabitants by sending several emissaries to convey his willingness to fight for safeguarding Buddhism and maintain his political power, while presenting himself as the “king of the religious land [Tibet].” He called on the Tibetans from Kham to take advantage of the chaos in China to act for the good of Tibet, by expelling the Sichuan army.¹¹⁴ One of these emissaries seems to have been Namgang Dasang Damdul (the future Tsarong) who organized the Tibetan resistance as the Tibetan army’s commander-in-chief (*spyi khyab chen po*) for central Tibet, before becoming the army’s commander-in-chief with the title of *jasak* in 1913, and minister (*bka’ blon*) in 1914.¹¹⁵ He had received military training by the Russians when following the Dalai Lama to Urga, and then by the British in India, while distinguishing himself during the Dalai Lama’s flight to Dromo.¹¹⁶ As soon as he arrived in central Tibet, he recruited soldiers in Tsang and they attacked the Manchu garrison stationed in Shigatse (Gshis ka rtse). From there, they won more and more victories and marched towards Lhasa.¹¹⁷ The future Tsarong is the one quoted in several documents. Except for him, our sources cannot identify the Tibetan figures who conducted the resistance movement against the Manchu and Chinese with such precision. The Chinese testimonies mention the Tibetan resistance but do not acknowledge the figures at the head of the movement. Indeed, no Tibetan name is quoted in the testimonies and even in the archive’s documents where “detachments of local militia men” are only mentioned. As I have already quoted, Tibetan testimonies about the Water-Rat Year Chinese War, such as Dorje Yudon Yuthok’s or Shakabpa’s historical narrative are the main sources I was able to get about the fighting that happened at Lhasa. Both sources point to some important Tibetan fighting figures but without much detail. Dorje Yudon Yuthok mentions the initiative taken by his uncle,

¹¹² According to the notes taken by Butler during the interview between Lord Minto and the Dalai Lama in Calcutta on March 14, 1910, the Dalai Lama “asked that he might be restored to the position of the Fifth Dalai Lama, who had negotiated with the Emperor of China as the ruler of a friendly state,” Shakabpa 1976: 231 (not in Maher 2010).

On the Fifth Dalai Lama, <https://treasuryoflives.org/biographies/view/The-Fifth-Dalai-Lama,-Ngawang-Lobzang-Gyatso/P37>.

¹¹³ Tsepon Norbu Wanggyel Trimon and the Secretary-General, Chamba Tendar, secretly communicated with the Dalai Lama directly.

¹¹⁴ Shakabpa (Maher) 2010: 735.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 739; Petech 1973: 138.

¹¹⁶ Dundul Namgyal Tsarong 2000: 20; 34.

¹¹⁷ IOR/L/P&S/11/31/P3778, Letter from W.H. Wilkinson, British consul-general in Chengdu, to Lord Hardinge, viceroy of India, July 21, 1912, quoted the *Kuo-min Pao*, July 14, 1912, 7; Dundul Namgyal Tsarong 2000: 36.

Lhagyari Namgyel Wangchuk (Lha rgya ri Rnam rgyal dbang phyug, born in the late 19th century–1912,) to “raise a volunteer regiment of more than twelve hundred soldiers from the Kongpo [Kong po] and Dakpo [Dwags po] Tibetan regions” who was killed in a battle.¹¹⁸ Shakabpa mentions Dasang Damdul, i.e., Tsarong, who “was ordered to work with the two generals in Lhasa to eject the Chinese.”¹¹⁹ Another important figure, mentioned by Shakabpa among others, was Monk-Minister (*bka’ blon bla ma*) Chamba Jampa Tendar (Byams pa bstan dar, 1870–1923), who the Dalai Lama instructed to make secret preparations for the Tibetan revolt against the Chinese. He was a fourth grade monk official and a secretary to the Dalai Lama. In July 1912, he was promoted to the rank of minister in recognition of his involvement in the 1911–1912 fighting at Lhasa, and was appointed commander-in-chief of the Tibetan troops in Eastern Tibet in 1913.¹²⁰

However, nothing is said about their actions and the organization of the war in central Tibet. Finally, I undertook to understand who, among the ministers, were promoted in 1913. This would help draw an approximate portrait of the Tibetans involved in the late 1911 and 1912 turmoil. I looked at historian Luciano Petech work *Aristocracy and Government in Tibet, 1718–1959* (1973) who quoted the Thirteenth Dalai Lama’s biography among other sources, but I overlooked the British document *Chiefs and Leading Families in Sikkim, Bhutan, and Tibet* (1915). However, no detail is given there either regarding the war strategy per se.

As it turns out, those among the officials who were promoted were very close to the Thirteenth Dalai Lama.

First, the Tibetans who either followed him during his first exile or/and were with him in India, during his second exile: for instance, Dasang Damdul, already quoted, Kyungtse Rampa (*kyung rtse* Ram pa, born in 1880) was with him before commanding the Yutok (G.yu thog) post at Lhasa during the fighting in 1912 when he was wounded. He then contributed to maintaining the Tibetan army by levying taxes in To (Stod) province (towards Ladakh).¹²¹ Trekhang Jampa Tubwang (Bkras khang Byams pa thub dbang, 1863?–1922) was the Dalai Lama’s medical and confidential adviser as well as private secretary, while he

¹¹⁸ Dorje Yudon Yuthok 1990: 19. On Lhagyari Namgyel Wangchuk, see https://treasuryoflives.org/biographies/view/Lhagyari-Namgyel-Wangchuk/TBRC_P8LS4350

¹¹⁹ Shakabpa (Maher) 2010: 739. Previous to 1912 there were only six Generals (*mda’ dpon*): two in Lhasa, two at Shigatse and one each at Gyantse and Tingri, see *Chiefs and Leading Families in Tibet* 1915: 15.

¹²⁰ Shakabpa (Maher) 2010; *Chiefs and Leading Families in Tibet* 1915: 16; for more about Chamba Jampa Tendar, see Travers 2018: 230–236.

¹²¹ *Chiefs and Leading Families in Tibet* 1915: 17.

was traveling back and forth from Darjeeling to central Tibet and became the Grand Chamberlain (*spyi khyab mkhan po*) in 1913.¹²² Shelkar Lingpa Mingyur Lhundrub (Shel dkar Gling pa mi 'gyur lhun grub, 1876–1913) was appointed vice-minister (*bka' tshab*) in 1912 before becoming a full minister (*bka' blon*) that same year.¹²³

Second, the Tibetans who invited him to come back to Lhasa on behalf of the Tibetan National Assembly were granted new titles: for example, Ngawang Lobzang (Ngag dbang blo bzang, b. 1862) was deputed by the National Assembly to urge the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet in 1910. He stayed in Darjeeling until February 1912, when he was sent back to Tibet as the Tibetan trade agent at Gyantse.¹²⁴

Third, the Tibetans who volunteered to greet and escort the Dalai Lama on his way back to Lhasa in 1912: for example, Tsogo Sonam Wangdu (Mtsho sgo Bsod nams dbang 'dus, b. 1891) who was later appointed acting general (*mda' dpon*) and sent to Dome (Mdo smad) in 1914.¹²⁵ Surkhang Wangchen Tseten (Zur khang Dbang chen tshe brtan, 1891–1953), late minister Surkhang's second son, was the officer in charge of the Dalai Lama's palanquin when he returned to Tibet. He became the chief secretary at the Tibetan Cabinet of Ministers (*bka' shag*) and in 1914 was promoted to Fourth rank by the Dalai Lama.¹²⁶

Fourth, the Tibetans who organized the resistance from within: for instance, Phunkhang Tashi Dorje, who was hurt by the Manchus in 1910, contributed money and men to the Tibetan national rising and he was upgraded to the Fourth rank in 1914.¹²⁷ Kheme Rinchen Wanggyel (Khe smad Rin chen dbang rgyal, 1874–1927), who became the co-head of the Foreign Bureau (created in 1909) and a minister in 1914 (to 1921).¹²⁸ Trimon Norbu Wanggyel (Khri smon Nor bu dbang rgyal, 1874–1945?) helped organize the Tibetan rising against the Manchus. He was appointed deputy commander-in-chief with the title of *taiji* and participated to the Simla conference (1913) to finally become a full minister (*bka' blon*) in 1914.¹²⁹

Fifth, the Tibetans who travelled back and forth between central Tibet and Darjeeling—where the Dalai Lama resided—and who fed him news from Tibet: for example, Sherchangpa Zompa pawo (Sher chang pa Dzom pa pa wo, b. 1875), who was Eastern district officer at

¹²² <https://treasuryoflives.org/bo/biographies/view/Khyenrab-Norbu/P227>; *Chiefs and Leading Families in Tibet* 1915: 17. On Lamden Khenpo, see also Bianca Horlemann article in this RET issue.

¹²³ Petech 1973: 159.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 19.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 139.

¹²⁶ *Chiefs and Leading Families in Tibet* 1915: 22.

¹²⁷ Petech 1973: 27.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 93.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 97.

Gyantse until October 1912. He raised troops to expel the Manchus from Gyantse in the spring of 1912 and in October 1912 was promoted as the Private Residence Intendant (*Bla brang phyag mdzod*).¹³⁰

Sixth, the Tibetans who played a role in the negotiations with the Manchu and Chinese army officials for the evacuation of Lhasa. The first agreement between the Tibetans and the Chinese was signed by two Tibetans (August 1912): the Sera Me official Tsatrul Rinpoche Ngawang Lobzang (Tsha sprul rin po che Ngag dbang blo bzang, 1880–1957) and *Tsedrung* Tenzin Gyeltsen (*rtse drung* Bstan 'dzin rgyal mtshan).¹³¹ Both were sent by the Dalai Lama from Darjeeling to Lhasa.¹³² According to Shakabpa, the above-mentioned Changkhyim Khyenrab Jangchub Pelzang was with the first two.¹³³ The second Sichuan army surrender agreement (December 1912) was sealed by Trimon Norbu Wanggyel, among others that still need identifying.

Finally, we have information about fighting between Tibetans and Manchus and their success in establishing contact with the Tibetan National Assembly members but not with the Cabinet of Ministers whose members had been appointed by the Manchus after the Dalai Lama left Tibet for British India.¹³⁴ Communication was then established between the War Department and the Tibetan Assembly, sometimes in consultation with the Dalai Lama in India.¹³⁵

The attack on Sera (Se ra) Monastery sparked the war. The Tibetans entered into resistance and their Secret War Department declared war openly. Impoverished and in a desperate state, the Manchu and Chinese soldiers sold their weapons and ammunition to the Tibetans, which enabled them to carry out a deliberate action to disarm the Sichuan troops. According to testimonies written by Manchu and Chinese soldiers, the Sera monks openly provoked them and refused to pay the *corvée*.¹³⁶ Soldiers were also begging for food, so the Sera monastery's supposed wealth was envisaged as the means to make up for the Chinese government's negligence. Rumor also had it among the Sichuan soldiers that Sera had a great treasure, full of valuable goods, and that it could easily be seized.¹³⁷ Finally, some decided to raid the monastery. The date of the attack on Sera remains unclear.¹³⁸ The

¹³⁰ *Chiefs and Leading Families in Tibet* 1915: 19.

¹³¹ About Tsawa Titrul, see <https://treasuryoflives.org/biographies/view/Tsatrul-Rinpoche-Ngawang-Lobzang/2418>.

¹³² Shakabpa (Maher, 2010): 749.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 744.

¹³⁴ Dundul Namgyal Tsarong 2000: 38.

¹³⁵ Shakabpa 1976: 242; Dorje Yudon Yuthok 1990: 22.

¹³⁶ *Youhuan yusheng* [1913] 1983:124.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

¹³⁸ The attack occurred on November 2, 1911 or February 5, 1912 or March 23, 1912, see Zhang Shaoyong and Xirao-Nima 2011; Transmission of a telegram dated

soldiers plundered it, destroyed the nearby hermitages and laid siege to the monastery. The Sera monks and the Lhasa Khampas joined the fighting and raided the Sichuan army barracks at Trapchi (Grwa bzhi).¹³⁹ Lhasa became the scene of a merciless war. Shakabpa, Chinese soldiers, and the Japanese military instructor Yasujirō Yajima (1882–1963), who stayed in Tibet between 1912 and 1918, give detailed accounts of the war in Lhasa, waged in two zones, one Tibetan, the other Chinese.¹⁴⁰ The Sichuan army's mutiny exacerbated its weakness, which the Tibetans exploited. The latter besieged the regiments stationed in the Tibetan Tsang province and then bought their weapons and expelled the troops to India.¹⁴¹ In Beijing, the British, through Sir John N. Jordan (1852–1925), the Minister Plenipotentiary to China at that time, intervened with the Chinese government. Beijing was informed of the Tibetan siege by telegrams sent from India by Ma Shizhou 馬師周, the Gyantse Chinese frontier officer and by Lu Xingqi 陸興祺, a trader in Calcutta and representative of the overseas Chinese in India. He was thoroughly familiar with Tibetan affairs and close to the Dalai Lama and his entourage in India.

Meanwhile, the Manchu and Chinese soldiers stationed in Lhasa were still clueless about the national political issues underlying the mutiny and the regime change in China. For instance, during the surrender of their army in Tibet, the Nepalese representative in Lhasa, in charge of negotiations, proposed that peace flags be chosen by the parties: the Manchu and Chinese soldiers opted for a yellow flag with a painted dragon (in other words, the dynastic flag), while the Tibetans presented a yellow flag with a lion painted on it.¹⁴²

Diplomats all over the world were wondering: was the Rima border post between India and Tibet challenged by its Chinese occupation? Would the British follow the case of Mongolia, which had become independent thanks to Russian support, and would they help Tibet become independent? Although the British had no wish to let the Dalai Lama be instrumentalized by the Chinese, his continued presence in Darjeeling began to stir problems for the Indian government when he made it quite clear to them that he had no intention of returning to

November 24, 1911 and received from Shi Youming, the Gyantse Chinese frontier officer dated November 21, which refers to a telegram from Zhong-ying that informs of the attack on Sera.

¹³⁹ Dundul Namgyal Tsarong 2000: 38; *Youhuan yusheng* [1913] 1983: 119–136. See also, Dorje Yudon Yuthok 1990: 20–23. About Trapchi, see Lange 2020: 277.

¹⁴⁰ About Yasujirō Yajima, see Yasuko Komoto 2020.

¹⁴¹ MYZG, Telegram from Yin Changheng to Yuan Shikai, August 3, 1912.

¹⁴² IOR/L/P&S/11/31/P3778, Letter from W.H. Wilkinson, British consul-general in Chengdu, to Lord Hardinge, viceroy of India, July 21, 1912, cited the translation of a letter from Major Jit Bahadur, August 13, 1912.

Lhasa until his powers and titles were fully restored.

Faced with the Chinese army's surrender in Tibet, as of May 1912, the Yunnan army, led by Cai E 蔡鐸 (1882–1916) as the Yunnan military government's commander-in-chief, offered to assist the Sichuan army in Tibet, while Yin Changheng 尹昌衡 (1884–1953), the Sichuan governor, a member of the Elder Brothers Society, close to the Railway Protection League and executioner of Zhao Erfeng, demanded that Beijing pay his soldiers through Ma Shizhou and Lu Xingqi, the Chinese government representatives in India.¹⁴³ The two armies advanced up to the gates of Kham. In China, mounting fears of losing Tibet were openly expressed, together with concerns that Tibet might take its cue from Mongolia, which had declared its independence. China needed Tibet to go on functioning as a buffer zone (*pingbi* 屏蔽) and warrant the protection of the Yunnan and Sichuan provinces.¹⁴⁴ Moreover, the resistance was getting increasingly organized. By then, Tibetan soldiers were numerous and armed, and attacks on Sichuan battalions were successful.¹⁴⁵ The Beijing government approved of the Yunnan military providing assistance to the Sichuan army and was grateful of the loan coming from his compatriot settled in India. It asked Lu Xingqi to borrow the money needed to pay the soldiers and provide help from the Yunnan and Sichuan armies, who advanced as far as Litang. However, the soldiers gave up as soon as the first snow fell and because they were not receiving their stipends.¹⁴⁶ It intervened with the Chinese ministry of Foreign Affairs to put an end to British interference.

However, in September 1912, just after signing the first agreement regarding the surrender of the Sichuan army in Tibet in August the same year, the State Council telegraphed to Yin Changheng to order his army to stay in Chamdo and not to advance beyond the city, as had been agreed with the British.¹⁴⁷ He urged the Dalai Lama to go to Beijing and meet with Mongolian representatives, to convey his desire that Tibet remain united with China and to organize a conference fostering the union of Mongolia and Tibet.¹⁴⁸ It is not clear here whether reference is made to the Commission for the union of Mongolian

¹⁴³ MYZG, Telegram from the Grand Council to Yin Changheng, May 9, 1912.

¹⁴⁴ MYZG, Telegram from Yin Changheng to the Beijing government, May 21, 1912.

¹⁴⁵ After mentioning that the Tibetan army was swelling in numbers in May 1912, Yin Changheng spoke of tens of thousands of Tibetan soldiers gathering at Fort Galun in August 1912, MYZG, telegram from Yin Changheng to Yuan Shi-kai, May 12, 1912 and August 3, 1912; Shakabpa (Maher) 2010, 735.

¹⁴⁶ MYZG, Telegram from Cai E to the Beijing government, September 12, 1912.

¹⁴⁷ MYZG, Telegram from the Grand Council to Yin Changheng, September 12, 1912.

¹⁴⁸ MZD, Telegram from the Grand Council to Yin Changheng, May 18, 1912, and June 7, 1912.

dignitaries (*Menggu wang gong lianhehui* 蒙古王公联合会), created in October 1911 and whose members adhered in principle to the union of the five nationalities, while seeking to preserve their past prerogatives.¹⁴⁹ Simultaneously, the first Manchu and Chinese soldiers left Tibetan soil via India and the Yunnan and Sichuan armies reached the gates to central Tibet. The Yunnan army was asked to retreat to make way for the Sichuan army.¹⁵⁰ From then on, the two armies began to compete with each other and Kham became the stage of scuffles and incessant battles between the Tibetans and the Chinese; but also between the two Chinese armies, through memoirs sent to the Beijing government claiming a series of false victories on Kham soil.¹⁵¹ Indeed, in Kham, the situation had become chaotic again. The Tibetans' fierce resistance and the overthrow of the Tibetan Cabinet of Ministers, whose members had been appointed by Lian-yu, opened the way for the Dalai Lama's return to Lhasa. It took place only after the Chinese soldiers had been expelled from Tibetan soil.

Conclusion

The Dalai Lama returned to Tibet in January 1913. He had asserted himself as Tibet's ruler, assuming the dual role of protector of Buddhism and political leader during his first and second exiles. He had first tried to negotiate directly with one of the Manchu representatives in Lhasa, thus working out the first Tibetan-Chinese agreement at the very beginning of the 20th century and since the Imperial time. The initiative was crushed in the bud. Nevertheless, the Dalai Lama participated from India in the organization of the Tibetan resistance. He thereby entered Lhasa victorious. On the return road, Yuan Shi-kai had wanted to return his titles. However, the Dalai Lama had officially declared he was not expecting to receive titles or be recognized in his rank by the Chinese.¹⁵² He was therefore recognized as the Fifth Dalai Lama's successor and the Tibetans gave him the title of Great (*chen po*), like the Fifth of the lineage.¹⁵³

The Chinese occupation of Tibet and the Tibetan resistance were scrutinized by foreign observers who feared an imbalance of power in the Asian world that risked proving detrimental to their own interests. The French diplomats kept a watchful eye but guarded from becoming involved in supporting either party. The British, constrained by treaties signed with China and Russia, welcomed the Dalai Lama to India

¹⁴⁹ Wang Yanjia 2020: 47.

¹⁵⁰ MZD, Telegram from the Grand Council to Yin Changheng, September 16, 1912.

¹⁵¹ MZD, Telegram from the Grand Council to Yin Changheng, September 18, 1912.

¹⁵² Teichman [1922] 2000: 17–18.

¹⁵³ Mullin 1988: 17.

but failed to grant him political or military aid. They even deemed his return to Tibet to be an opportunity to turn the Dalai Lama into their agent. The Russians continued their diplomatic relations with the Dalai Lama but offered him no concrete assistance. The Dalai Lama himself tried to widen the spectrum of possible supporters by contacting ambassadors in Beijing, but to no avail. The Japanese diplomats were probably the only people to openly support the Dalai Lama. Japanese emissaries joined the Dalai Lama in India and the latter chose a Japanese instructor to train his army after 1913. To my knowledge, despite the mutual recognition of their independence (1913), no document refers to any Tibetan appeal for help to the Mongols.

English Translation of Excerpts from the *Pain of a Lifetime: Notes about Things Seen and Heard during the Tibetan Disorders* (Youhuan yusheng: Zangluan shimo jianwenji 忧患余生: 藏乱始末见闻记).¹⁵⁴

These excerpts are part of a testimony published in a book that brings together four accounts of the events that shook Tibet during the years 1911–1912. These accounts are of uneven value and contain details which show that their authors were either participants or witnesses. They are exceptional in that they are among the few known written accounts of the mutiny that happened in 1911 and conducted to the Water-Rat Year Chinese War. Their authors are unknown, and their texts give no information about them personally. The circumstances in which the accounts were written have also been forgotten. It seems clear, however, that the stories are not the result of interviews, although it is difficult to rule out the hypothesis that they may have been written at the request of a third party. The only information available and specified by Wu Fengpei in the introduction to the book, is that these accounts were written in Kalimpong in 1913, when the Manchu and Chinese soldiers were being evacuated.

¹⁵⁴ "Youhuan yusheng: Zang luan shi mo jian wen ji 忧患余生: 藏乱始末见闻记 [Notes about Things Seen and Heard during the Tibetan Disorders.]" In *Min yuan Zangshi diangao; Zang luan shimo jianwenji si zhong* 民元藏事电稿; 藏乱始末见闻记四种 [Telegrams about Tibetan Affairs Exchanged at the Early Time of the Republic; Four Accounts about Things Seen and Heard during the Tibetan Disorders]. 1913. Repr. in *Xizang yanjiu congkan* 西藏研究丛刊, edited by "Xizang yan jiu" bian ji bu 《西藏研究》编辑部, 5: 120–135. Lhasa: Xizang renmin chubanshe, 1983.

The troubles in Tibet indirect cause

[p. 120] After the Batang Chode [‘Ba’ thang chos sde] in Batang was destroyed, the Tibetans considered Zhao Erfeng 趙爾豐 [1845–1911] as their mortal enemy. Then Zhao Erfeng was appointed administrator of Tibet by the emperor. However, Tibetan officials and all monasteries firmly rebuffed this appointment and seriously threatened Lian-yu 聯豫 [born 1858, amban from December 1906 to December 1912], Tibet’s current administrator. The court dreaded border conflicts and went so far as to send Zhao Erfeng there, who set up the New Policies. The Tibetan Cabinet of Ministers [*bka’ shag*] insidiously thwarted this move and the Tibetans rejected Administrator Lian-yu and the court’s orders. In Tibet, it was no longer possible to do anything to bring peace. [At the beginning] it was not envisaged to order the New Army (*xinjian lujun* 新建陸軍) to enter Tibet, as it was impossible to separate the political from the religious. When the Tibetans heard the New Army had entered Tibet, they assembled their military units on all roads. On the one hand, they obstructed the army. On the other, they surrounded the administrative office. Most of the resources usually transported there were destroyed. Inside, the firewood and rice were almost exhausted. The Chinese were eradicated from the streets. The situation worsened. Up until 3 January this year (i.e., 1910), Zhang Hongsheng 張鴻升, who led the vanguard of the army, was aware of the crisis in Tibetan affairs. With thirty horsemen, he took a small road and entered Tibet the same night. The Tibetans were taken by surprise and surrendered the very next day. They were caught like rats and ran like swine. The police force the Tibetans had created no longer existed. Abandoned uniforms, rifles and cannons were piled up in great numbers on the road. The Dalai Lama left Tibet that very night. How could he have left alone? He was waiting for an opportunity to return to Tibet. He who harbors evil designs, hides them for a long time! Later, a police force was created; schools were opened; a telegraph line was set up; a newspaper in the Tibetan language was published; a pharmacy for traditional medicine was inaugurated; an exhibition gallery was opened; a court and a post office were set up in an effort to renovate everything that had fallen into disrepair. My country created the post of administrator, initially in order to control political power. However, the Tibetans did not respect the directives. What’s more, the Chinese were not allowed to change the Tibetan people’s clothing or the language and script of the courts, nor were they allowed to interfere in these areas. The Tibetan Cabinet of Ministers had established the religious power that was at the root of its political power. If the Cabinet of Ministers had not been dismissed, there would have been no point in creating the post of administrator, as the latter would not have had any more cases to deal with. Try to find out what happened to the matters handled by the administrator over the last hundred years! [...]

Unrest in Tibet: The immediate cause

When unrest broke out in Sichuan 四川, Tibet suffered the worst consequences. The New Army's soldiers were all natives of Sichuan [p. 121] and they were at the root of the unrest that led to Commander Zhong-ying 鍾穎 (1887–1915)' dismissal, in Dongjiu 冬九. In December 1910, as Pome [Spo smad] was repeatedly attacking the Tibetan border, Commander Zhong-ying was ordered to go to Kongpo [Kong po], station himself there and pressure Pome into surrendering in order to avoid a punitive expedition. Pome inhabitants are less numerous than the Tibetans. They are very brave and have no respect for anything. At this point, Luo Changyi 洛長綺 [1865–1911], advisor of the Lian-yu Amban and from the army training bureau, was given the task of leading the army to Pome, for some unknown reason. Zhong-ying set off from Dongjiu to inspect the situation. Unexpectedly, he saw the small roads were cut off by the Pome soldiers and he was therefore forced to return to Kongpo. After being promoted to Senior Councillor, Luo Changyi asked to replace him. At that moment, Zhang Hongsheng, the head of the cavalry, and Chen Quzhen 陳渠珍 [1882–1952], the head of the 3rd Battalion, were slowly advancing towards the seat of battle. They were mutually suspicious and envious. They were not joining forces. Damage and casualties were extremely high. What's more, the horsemen and soldiers refused to respond to Zhong-ying's orders and in the end accomplished nothing. Although he had been dismissed as commander of the army, Zhong-ying returned to Tibet and tried several times to return to Sichuan, but as he had been appointed to the mint, he could not withdraw. At that time, there were only eighty bodyguards, several dozen soldiers and several dozen gunners in Tibet. All the other soldiers had been sent to Pome. Zhang Baochu 張葆初, the deputy chief, was stationed at Gyantse [Rgyal rtse] in Outer Tibet [Gtsang] (at first relations between Zhong-ying and the soldiers were good, but then military power was seized and the administrator immediately arrested. The Tibetans rounded up their soldiers on all roads, considering that New Army soldiers were undisciplined and troublemakers), including the amban guard, and those traditionally known as the arrogant ones (the members of the Paoge 袍哥, as well as officials like Wang Jiuqing 王久敬, the accountant general. The whole New Army soldiers were members of the Paoge) [...]. They supported each other and passed on messages: they told the armies stationed in Tibet there was unrest in Sichuan and that they should not go home; that they could loot the amban's office and take soldiers' pay in order to save the empire and that not only was this not a crime, it was a deserving act. Who would have dared to disobey the Paoge's orders, even those involving murder. Their orders were followed even more than those issued by the imperial court. In fact, even the wretched did not argue, because it was impossible to get rich without the troubles. At this point, the situation was very tense, and Amban Lian-yu, from what I've heard, was at a loss as to what to do [...].

This led to unrest in Tibet. On reading in the newspapers about what was happening, Guo Yuanzhen 郭元珍, He Guangxie 何光燮, Fan-jin 范金, and Li Weixin 李维新 also began to hoist the empire's flag in Trapchi [Grwa bzhi]. They borrowed at least 80,000 taels from the intendant. Once the money had been collected, the situation degenerated into a revolution. But, feeling that they were only a minority, [p. 122] they appealed to the Paoge. Now, the Paoge's sole purpose was to plunder [...]. They then ordered the armies stationed in Tsang, including Gyantse's [Rgyal rtse], to raise the Great Han Revolution's flag and incited them to come to Lhasa to kill Lian-yu and Zhong-ying. The assembly [created by the soldiers in Lhasa] responded to the Paoge's orders. The soldiers arrived in Lhasa on November 29. They prevented Lian-yu from managing affairs for another day and handed the seal to the Commander Zhong-ying. They sent a telegram to the government, then took refuge in the Drepung Monastery [Bras spung dgon pa]. Commander Zhong-ying then replaced Lian-yu [...]. Revolutionary fever led to a bit of a massacre [...]. At first it was a matter of saving the empire, then of revolution [...].

Lian-yu's escape

On November 16, 1912, Amban Lian-yu sent several urgent calls for help to Gyantse in Tsang, because everyone claimed the soldiers were due to arrive the next day to plant the revolutionary flag and had come specifically to behead Lian-yu and Zhong-ying. There were plenty of agitators within the army. The New Army had been thinking about a way to start secret negotiations with Zhong-ying for a long time. But with the news that Zhong-ying had become both commander and amban, the soldiers knew they would show no mercy should the situation demand it [...].

The miserable conditions under which Lhasa was surrounded the first time

The Chinese were totally unprepared to go to war. They thought there was money to be grabbed. Little did they know that once they were surrounded, food would run short, fodder for oxen, horses and camels would be exhausted and hardship would ensue. They did not, however, become cannibals or dog-eaters. They attacked the monastery on the south bank of the Brahmaputra River because it was full of provisions. At night, the people went to dig up edible wild plants on the south bank, often amid gunfire, and they often ate poison; I've heard that every day they counted their dead. The stock of ammunition ran out. The soldiers had no choice but to surrender. Until ammunition was distributed to every location. At first, it was known that everyone had money hidden away, and the soldiers who weren't fighting would keep it. In the end, the most pitiful were the people and civilian officials [...].

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Abstracts

Russian Sources on the Thirteenth Dalai Lama's Secret Buryat Escort in Khalkha Mongolia (1905–1906)

Irina Garri

The paper discusses the issue of a secret military escort for the Thirteenth Dalai Lama during his sojourn in Khalkha Mongolia in 1905–1906. It is based on Russian official documents of the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (Moscow), as well as on the travel diaries of the Russian explorer Petr Kozlov and the scholar/Orientalist Fedor Ippolit Shcherbatskoi. The author analyses the political situation in Urga during the Dalai Lama's stay in the summer of 1905, namely the Russian Tibet Policy, the role of the Buryats, and the idea of a Buryat military escort and its final implementation. She concludes that the secret convoy was actually formed with the approval of the highest Russian authorities. It consisted of Buryat Cossacks under the guise of Buddhist monks who accompanied the Dalai Lama during his travels in Khalkha Mongolia. The author argues that this secret escort was of major significance for the Dalai Lama's security helping him to successfully resist the persistent attempts of the Qing government to remove him from Mongolia away from Russian political influence.

The Thirteenth Dalai Lama's Sojourns at Kumbum Monastery between 1906 and 1909: (Further) Lessons on International Politics, Necessary Reforms in Tibet, and the Dalai Lama's Role in Amdo

Bianca Horlemann

After about two years of exile in Mongolia, the Tibetan hierarch moved on to Amdo and remained at Kumbum (Sku 'bum) Monastery for over a year from November 1906 to December 1907, and again from mid-February to early June 1909. However, this comparatively long period of time has not attracted much academic attention yet. In this paper, I argue that the sojourn in Amdo was of major importance for the Dalai Lama's future policies for Tibet with regard to three main aspects. First, the Dalai Lama was exposed to further important lessons on international relations and power politics by meeting, for the first time, several non-Russian westerners at Kumbum such as the Japanese Buddhist monk Teramoto Enga (1872–1940). Second, Tibetan reform plans for Tibet's military and foreign relations that also included more, if not complete, independence from Qing China, were discussed—albeit controversially—among the Dalai Lama's close advisers. And last not least, I argue that the Tibetan hierarch's experiences with the Gansu

and Amdo elites, foremost the conflict with the head of Kumbum Monastery, Akya Khutughtu, forced the Dalai Lama to rethink the limits of his temporal and even religious power in Amdo.

Unexpected Actors in the Great Game: The Influence of the Theosophical and the Maha Bodhi Societies on Russian and Buryat Buddhists

Yumiko Ishihama

In July 1904, when the British army approached Lhasa, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama Tubten Gyatso's (Thub bstan rgya mtsho, 1876–1933) followed the advice of Agvan Dorzhiev (1854–1938), his Buryat aide, to move northward to seek Russian support. When he came near the suburbs of Ikh Khüree (present-day Ulan Bataar), he was received by Khambo Lama Iroltuev (1843–1918), the leader of the Buryat Buddhist community. Then, the Dalai Lama ignored the Qing Dynasty's edicts urging him to return to Tibet and remained in Mongolia, striving to find a way out of his predicament. He was able to take this decision because a large crowd of pilgrims from Mongolia, especially from Buryatia provided him wealth and security.

This article shows that the friendship between Russian Prince Ukhtomskii (1861–1921) and Colonel Henry Steel Olcott (1832–1907), the Buryat Intellectuals' success at the Russian Court, the establishment of diplomatic relations between Russia and Siam, and the distribution of Buddha's relics to Russia in 1900, all contributed together and eventually led Khambo Lama Iroltuev making a pilgrimage to India and meeting with the Dalai Lama.

With the help of European Orientalists like Prince Ukhtomskii, a Russian orientalist who accompanied Prince Crown Nicholas (1868–1918) during his 1890–1891 Eastern journey, Iroltuev made pilgrimage to India and Siam in 1901. Though Ukhtomskii believed that the people from the Transbaikal region would naturally fuse with Russian Empire because Russian Orthodoxy was homogeneous with Buddhism, the Russian Consulate in Colombo viewed Iroltuev's behavior in India with suspicion and prevented him from going to Tibet. But no matter how much Russian authority glorified the Russian Emperor among Buryats, the Dalai Lama was a more attractive icon to Buryats. As proof of this, when the Thirteenth Dalai Lama appeared in Mongolia with Dorzhiev in 1904, Khambo Lama Iroltuev and other Buryats rushed across the border towards the Dalai Lama like a dam that lets go.

The Thirteenth Dalai Lama and the Water-Rat Year Chinese War (1912)

Fabienne Jagou

The occupation of Tibet by the Sichuan troops (1910–1912), the Manchu army mutiny, the expulsion of Chinese troops from Tibet and the establishment of a Chinese republic in 1912 put an end to the priest-patron relationship that existed between the Dalai Lamas and the Manchu emperors and led to the establishment of Tibet's *de facto* independence. This assertion is questioned in order to examine the emergence of a national consciousness among the highest Tibetan authorities prior to—and during—the Chinese Water-Rat War. The Thirteenth Dalai Lama Tubten Gyatso's actions, along with their consequences as recorded in various sources, hold our attention: his exile in Inner Asia and China (1904–1909), his negotiations with the Manchu amban (1910), his departure to British India (1910–1912) and his organization of the Tibetan resistance from India to Tibet (1911–1912). While the Tibetan government was already politically active on the international scene (signing treaties with Nepal in 1856 and Sikkim in 1888 and sending Buryat monk Agvan Dorzhiev (1854–1938) to Europe and Russia as the Dalai Lama's emissary in the 1890s), the Dalai Lama second exile in India (1910–1912) confirmed his personal involvement in the international power-play then developing in Inner Asia and he played a direct role in global interactions although the complexities of British domestic and international politics prevented him from reaching all his goals.

Translating Sovereignty: Early Twentieth-Century Tibet Conventions between Britain and China

Ling-wei Kung

This article examines the diplomatic and legal complexities of sovereignty disputes over Tibet between Qing China and the British Empire in the early twentieth century, with a focus on the Tibet Conventions between 1904 and 1906. It explores how the concepts of sovereignty and suzerainty were translated and negotiated within Chinese, British, and Tibetan legal and political discourses during the decline of the Qing dynasty and the emergence of modern international law. Drawing on archival sources from China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the British Foreign Office, and Tibetan customs records, the study highlights the role of linguistic translation and translingual legal practices in treaty negotiations. The article analyzes diplomatic negotiations led by Chinese envoys Tang Shaoyi and Zhang Yintang, showing how Qing officials reinterpreted "sovereignty" (*zhuquan*) to assert control over Tibet. Meanwhile, the British emphasized "suzerainty" to limit

China's claims and maintain Tibet as a buffer zone between British India and Tsarist Russia. This impasse was eventually resolved by excluding both terms in the 1906 Convention. Additionally, the study investigates the ideological consequences of these disputes, revealing how sovereignty debates influenced China's shift from the tributary system to modern diplomacy. It also examines how sovereignty became a key concept in Chinese public discourse, shaping national understandings of international law. By reevaluating the Qing's approach to Tibet, the article demonstrates that the sovereignty/suzerainty debate reflected broader shifts in legal thought and political identity across Eurasia. Ultimately, it underscores how the Tibet Conventions contributed to the transformation of East and Inner Asia's geopolitical landscape.

Dancing for Joy on a Clear Day: Anti-imperialist rhetoric and perceptions of Chinese policy in Kham

Scott Relyea

In April 1905, a Qing imperial official met an unfortunate fate in a narrow valley outside Batang town on the road linking Chengdu with Lhasa. Several days later, Batang's indigenous rulers and others involved in the ambush prepared a petition to the Qing Emperor seeking both to explain their actions and to forestall retribution. Although the petition could not prevent the dispatch of a punitive military expedition from Sichuan, one character appearing in the text only six times proved more influential on both historical understanding of the Assistant Amban's slaughter and opposition in subsequent decades to intrusive Chinese policies across Tibetan regions. The authors of the petition implicitly blamed policies implemented by the Assistant Amban, policies which the Bapas perceived as contrary to imperial will. Yet a brief characterization of the demeanor of the Assistant Amban's bodyguard as *yang* 洋 (foreign) came to be emphasized by Sichuan officials. A narrative thus emerged in subsequent decades that simultaneously drained agency from the indigenous residents of Batang, characterizing their opposition as inspired either by external forces—the Dalai Lama and the great monasteries of Lhasa—or by foreign imperialists—typically the British. This article explores the process by which brief characterization of the Assistant Amban and his bodyguard as “foreign” displaced the real catalyst articulated by the petitioners and established a template for interpreting all future opposition to Chinese policies in Kham and Tibet as instigated solely by external or foreign forces rather than the result of indigenous unhappiness with those policies.



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