

## Abstracts

### **Russian Sources on the Thirteenth Dalai Lama's Secret Buryat Escort in Khalkha Mongolia (1905–1906)**

Irina Garri

The paper discusses the issue of a secret military escort for the Thirteenth Dalai Lama during his sojourn in Khalkha Mongolia in 1905–1906. It is based on Russian official documents of the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (Moscow), as well as on the travel diaries of the Russian explorer Petr Kozlov and the scholar/Orientalist Fedor Ippolit Shcherbatskoi. The author analyses the political situation in Urga during the Dalai Lama's stay in the summer of 1905, namely the Russian Tibet Policy, the role of the Buryats, and the idea of a Buryat military escort and its final implementation. She concludes that the secret convoy was actually formed with the approval of the highest Russian authorities. It consisted of Buryat Cossacks under the guise of Buddhist monks who accompanied the Dalai Lama during his travels in Khalkha Mongolia. The author argues that this secret escort was of major significance for the Dalai Lama's security helping him to successfully resist the persistent attempts of the Qing government to remove him from Mongolia away from Russian political influence.

### **The Thirteenth Dalai Lama's Sojourns at Kumbum Monastery between 1906 and 1909: (Further) Lessons on International Politics, Necessary Reforms in Tibet, and the Dalai Lama's Role in Amdo**

Bianca Horlemann

After about two years of exile in Mongolia, the Tibetan hierarch moved on to Amdo and remained at Kumbum (Sku 'bum) Monastery for over a year from November 1906 to December 1907, and again from mid-February to early June 1909. However, this comparatively long period of time has not attracted much academic attention yet. In this paper, I argue that the sojourn in Amdo was of major importance for the Dalai Lama's future policies for Tibet with regard to three main aspects. First, the Dalai Lama was exposed to further important lessons on international relations and power politics by meeting, for the first time, several non-Russian westerners at Kumbum such as the Japanese Buddhist monk Teramoto Enga (1872–1940). Second, Tibetan reform plans for Tibet's military and foreign relations that also included more, if not complete, independence from Qing China, were discussed—albeit controversially—among the Dalai Lama's close advisers. And last not least, I argue that the Tibetan hierarch's experiences with the Gansu

and Amdo elites, foremost the conflict with the head of Kumbum Monastery, Akya Khutughtu, forced the Dalai Lama to rethink the limits of his temporal and even religious power in Amdo.

**Unexpected Actors in the Great Game: The Influence of the Theosophical and the Maha Bodhi Societies on Russian and Buryat Buddhists**

Yumiko Ishihama

In July 1904, when the British army approached Lhasa, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama Tubten Gyatso's (Thub bstan rgya mtsho, 1876–1933) followed the advice of Agvan Dorzhiev (1854–1938), his Buryat aide, to move northward to seek Russian support. When he came near the suburbs of Ikh Khüree (present-day Ulan Bataar), he was received by Khambo Lama Iroltuev (1843–1918), the leader of the Buryat Buddhist community. Then, the Dalai Lama ignored the Qing Dynasty's edicts urging him to return to Tibet and remained in Mongolia, striving to find a way out of his predicament. He was able to take this decision because a large crowd of pilgrims from Mongolia, especially from Buryatia provided him wealth and security.

This article shows that the friendship between Russian Prince Ukhtomskii (1861–1921) and Colonel Henry Steel Olcott (1832–1907), the Buryat Intellectuals' success at the Russian Court, the establishment of diplomatic relations between Russia and Siam, and the distribution of Buddha's relics to Russia in 1900, all contributed together and eventually led Khambo Lama Iroltuev making a pilgrimage to India and meeting with the Dalai Lama.

With the help of European Orientalists like Prince Ukhtomskii, a Russian orientalist who accompanied Prince Crown Nicholas (1868–1918) during his 1890–1891 Eastern journey, Iroltuev made pilgrimage to India and Siam in 1901. Though Ukhtomskii believed that the people from the Transbaikal region would naturally fuse with Russian Empire because Russian Orthodoxy was homogeneous with Buddhism, the Russian Consulate in Colombo viewed Iroltuev's behavior in India with suspicion and prevented him from going to Tibet. But no matter how much Russian authority glorified the Russian Emperor among Buryats, the Dalai Lama was a more attractive icon to Buryats. As proof of this, when the Thirteenth Dalai Lama appeared in Mongolia with Dorzhiev in 1904, Khambo Lama Iroltuev and other Buryats rushed across the border towards the Dalai Lama like a dam that lets go.

### **The Thirteenth Dalai Lama and the Water-Rat Year Chinese War (1912)**

Fabienne Jagou

The occupation of Tibet by the Sichuan troops (1910–1912), the Manchu army mutiny, the expulsion of Chinese troops from Tibet and the establishment of a Chinese republic in 1912 put an end to the priest-patron relationship that existed between the Dalai Lamas and the Manchu emperors and led to the establishment of Tibet's *de facto* independence. This assertion is questioned in order to examine the emergence of a national consciousness among the highest Tibetan authorities prior to—and during—the Chinese Water-Rat War. The Thirteenth Dalai Lama Tubten Gyatso's actions, along with their consequences as recorded in various sources, hold our attention: his exile in Inner Asia and China (1904–1909), his negotiations with the Manchu amban (1910), his departure to British India (1910–1912) and his organization of the Tibetan resistance from India to Tibet (1911–1912). While the Tibetan government was already politically active on the international scene (signing treaties with Nepal in 1856 and Sikkim in 1888 and sending Buryat monk Agvan Dorzhiev (1854–1938) to Europe and Russia as the Dalai Lama's emissary in the 1890s), the Dalai Lama second exile in India (1910–1912) confirmed his personal involvement in the international power-play then developing in Inner Asia and he played a direct role in global interactions although the complexities of British domestic and international politics prevented him from reaching all his goals.

### **Translating Sovereignty: Early Twentieth-Century Tibet Conventions between Britain and China**

Ling-wei Kung

This article examines the diplomatic and legal complexities of sovereignty disputes over Tibet between Qing China and the British Empire in the early twentieth century, with a focus on the Tibet Conventions between 1904 and 1906. It explores how the concepts of sovereignty and suzerainty were translated and negotiated within Chinese, British, and Tibetan legal and political discourses during the decline of the Qing dynasty and the emergence of modern international law. Drawing on archival sources from China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the British Foreign Office, and Tibetan customs records, the study highlights the role of linguistic translation and translingual legal practices in treaty negotiations. The article analyzes diplomatic negotiations led by Chinese envoys Tang Shaoyi and Zhang Yintang, showing how Qing officials reinterpreted "sovereignty" (*zhuquan*) to assert control over Tibet. Meanwhile, the British emphasized "suzerainty" to limit

China's claims and maintain Tibet as a buffer zone between British India and Tsarist Russia. This impasse was eventually resolved by excluding both terms in the 1906 Convention. Additionally, the study investigates the ideological consequences of these disputes, revealing how sovereignty debates influenced China's shift from the tributary system to modern diplomacy. It also examines how sovereignty became a key concept in Chinese public discourse, shaping national understandings of international law. By reevaluating the Qing's approach to Tibet, the article demonstrates that the sovereignty/suzerainty debate reflected broader shifts in legal thought and political identity across Eurasia. Ultimately, it underscores how the Tibet Conventions contributed to the transformation of East and Inner Asia's geopolitical landscape.

**Dancing for Joy on a Clear Day: Anti-imperialist rhetoric and perceptions of Chinese policy in Kham**

Scott Relyea

In April 1905, a Qing imperial official met an unfortunate fate in a narrow valley outside Batang town on the road linking Chengdu with Lhasa. Several days later, Batang's indigenous rulers and others involved in the ambush prepared a petition to the Qing Emperor seeking both to explain their actions and to forestall retribution. Although the petition could not prevent the dispatch of a punitive military expedition from Sichuan, one character appearing in the text only six times proved more influential on both historical understanding of the Assistant Amban's slaughter and opposition in subsequent decades to intrusive Chinese policies across Tibetan regions. The authors of the petition implicitly blamed policies implemented by the Assistant Amban, policies which the Bapas perceived as contrary to imperial will. Yet a brief characterization of the demeanor of the Assistant Amban's bodyguard as *yang* 洋 (foreign) came to be emphasized by Sichuan officials. A narrative thus emerged in subsequent decades that simultaneously drained agency from the indigenous residents of Batang, characterizing their opposition as inspired either by external forces—the Dalai Lama and the great monasteries of Lhasa—or by foreign imperialists—typically the British. This article explores the process by which brief characterization of the Assistant Amban and his bodyguard as “foreign” displaced the real catalyst articulated by the petitioners and established a template for interpreting all future opposition to Chinese policies in Kham and Tibet as instigated solely by external or foreign forces rather than the result of indigenous unhappiness with those policies.

